The Germans failed to cover the “ridiculous” (Hitler’s expression) 100 kilometers to Murmansk in 3 years. In three weeks, Soviet troops not only defeated the enemy group in the Arctic, but also liberated the neighboring country.

Failed banquet

When they talk about the war in the Far North, they usually remember naval battles in the Arctic, about the caravans of ships of our allies in World War II, delivering weapons and food to the USSR.

The land war on the Kola Peninsula is much less known. But it was here that for the first time in the Great Patriotic War the Germans were stopped in the fall of 1941 on the distant approaches to Murmansk, which they were going to take in a matter of days. (Pre-printed invitations to a banquet at the Murmansk Arktika Hotel were even found in the pockets of killed Nazis).

By the way, the Soviet government also admitted that it would not be possible to hold the city. Stalin's secret order is known about the evacuation of enterprises in case it is impossible to hold Murmansk.

The front line, however, stopped on the banks of the Zapadnaya Litsa River, in places that are now called the Valley of Glory, and during the war were called the Valley of Death.

The Nazis were stopped here thanks to a counterattack by the Polar Division, more than half of which consisted of prisoners. The Germans, including the rangers from the vaunted Edelweiss mountain division, were terrified during the bayonet attacks of the soldiers of this military unit. And that is why they called it “wild”. For more than three years of war, the Germans were never able to get one meter closer to Murmansk from the lines where they were stopped by the polar “wild division”. Moreover, on the Soviet-Finnish border in the Arctic there was a section where it was possible to push back the Finnish units advancing on Murmansk and the Kirov Railway to their original positions. And at border checkpoint No. 1 on the Kola Peninsula, the Germans were never able to cross the border. We can say that it was in the Arctic that the Blitzkrieg was first disrupted.

Defiant Admiral

There were several explanations for this. Firstly, the Germans in the Arctic did not have the effect of surprise. The offensive here began a few days after Germany attacked the USSR. During the first days of the war, the Germans even went to fetch water in front of Soviet soldiers, showing off. Before the start of active fighting, Soviet military personnel did not always dare to open fire. Not everyone could still wrap their heads around the fact that war had begun.

The courageous position of Admiral Arseny Golovko, the permanent commander of the Northern Fleet during the war, also played a positive role. It was he who, at his own peril and risk, gave the order to put the fleet on combat readiness back on June 21, 1941. Thanks to this, the enemy's bombing did not cause significant damage to the fleet, and he took an active part in supporting the ground forces with naval artillery fire.

However, at the end of the summer of 1941, the Germans managed to break through our defenses. A critical situation developed at the front, which could lead to the defeat of the 14th Army and the fall of Murmansk.

On September 5, 1941, the formation of the Polar Division of the People's Militia began in Murmansk. Regular workers, port stevedores, fishermen, and ship repairers enrolled in it. Most of them had no military experience, and some held weapons for the first time in their lives. There were party and Komsomol workers in the division. But most of all, political prisoners and criminals were enrolled in the Polar Division.

If 5,715 people were registered as workers liable for military service, then there were 7,650 prisoners.
According to the memoirs of veterans, there were no traitors among the volunteers among the prisoners. They fought the enemy desperately, many died in battle.
It was the Polar Division's strike on the flank of the advancing German troops that stopped their advance on Murmansk.

Second after Stalingrad

Yes, the Nazis failed to take the capital of the Arctic. But goods that the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition sent to the fighting USSR passed through Murmansk. The Germans could not look at this indifferently. Therefore, Hitler ordered the city to be destroyed from the air. Sometimes it was more dangerous in the city than at the front. The people of Murmansk had the hardest time in the summer of 1942. Taking advantage of the fact that during the polar day there was light around the clock, the Germans carried out dozens of air raids on the city day and night. Murmansk, which was then mostly made of wood, burned out by three quarters. In terms of the number of bombs dropped on it, this city is second only to Stalingrad. It is not for nothing that after the war Murmansk was included in the top ten cities to be restored first.

Tanks on deer trails

These days mark the 70th anniversary of the Petsamo-Kirkene operation to liberate the Soviet Arctic and Northern Norway from the Nazi invaders. The Germans dug into the polar granite for 4 years and built powerful defensive structures. It was especially difficult to storm the fortified fascist line in the Musta-Tunturi mountains. The Soviet command took what is called an unconventional step. It was here that tanks were used in combat for the first and so far only time in world practice in the Arctic. Moreover, these were heavy KV2 tanks, already obsolete by 1944. However, as it turned out, it was they, and not the legendary “thirty-fours”, that had the best cross-country ability in the mountains and swampy tundra.

It was especially important for the Germans to hold on in the Pechenga area near the Norwegian border, where there were nickel deposits necessary for the Reich to smelt military steel. However, despite Hitler’s traditional order to hold out until the last, about half of the fifty-thousand-strong group of fascists were forced to “scuttle” from the Arctic.

That is, in just three weeks, Soviet soldiers defeated the enemy group, which had been preparing for defense for four years.

By the way, it is interesting that the balance of forces at the time of the Soviet offensive was approximately the same as during the German offensive on Murmansk in 1941. Just the opposite. For example, the number of “manpower” in 1944 was 56 thousand for the Germans, 113 thousand for ours. That is, two to one. And in June '41 there were also two soldiers for one. But only two German soldiers for one Soviet. But the Germans did not manage to cover the “ridiculous” (Hitler’s expression) 100 kilometers to Murmansk in 3 years. While Soviet troops in three weeks not only defeated the enemy group in the Arctic, but also liberated the neighboring country. The soldiers of the Arctic were saluted four times in Moscow. The medal “For the Defense of the Soviet Arctic” was established, which was awarded to more than 300 thousand people.

In Russia, when talking about the Great Patriotic War, they remember the defeats of 1941-1942, the battle of Moscow, the siege of Leningrad, the battle for Stalingrad, the North Caucasus, the Arc of Fire and a number of other famous operations. But they can say little about the war in the North, on the Kola Peninsula, if they have heard at all about this page of the Great War.

The Kola Peninsula occupied a large place in the aggressive plans of the German military-political command. Firstly, Berlin was interested in the city of Murmansk, an ice-free port and the base of the USSR Northern Fleet. In addition, the Murmansk port was connected to the main part of the country by the Kirov Railway, which made it possible to receive military cargo and quickly deliver it to Central Russia. Therefore, the Germans planned to capture the port and cut the railway as soon as possible. Secondly, Hitler was attracted by the rich natural resources of the Kola Land, and especially by the deposits of nickel, a metal very necessary for the German military-industrial complex and the economies of Germany's allies. Thirdly, these lands were of interest to the Finnish elite; according to their plans, the Kola Peninsula was to become part of “Greater Finland”.

To capture the Kola Peninsula, the Army “Norway” was concentrated in the Arctic theater of operations (it was formed in December 1940) consisting of 3 corps - two German mountain corps and one Finnish corps. It was led by Colonel General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst. The army had 97 thousand people, 1037 guns and mortars, 106 tanks. This army was supported by part of the forces of the 5th Air Fleet and the Navy of the Third Reich.

They were opposed by the Soviet 14th Army, which occupied the defense in the Murmansk and Kandalaksha directions, under the command of Valerian Frolov. At the start of hostilities, the army included: 4th Rifle Corps (10th and 122nd Rifle Divisions), 14th, 52nd Rifle Divisions, 1st Tank Division, 1st Mixed Air Division, 23 th fortified area and a number of other connections. The 23rd fortified area (UR) was located on the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas and occupied a defensive line along the front of 85 kilometers, 5 kilometers deep, having 7 defense units, consisting of 12 built and combat-ready long-term defensive structures, and 30 located on construction stage. The UR was defended by two machine-gun battalions (two more were planned to be deployed), in addition, one of the regiments of the 14th Infantry Division operated in its zone. The army had 52.6 thousand personnel, 1,150 guns and mortars, 392 tanks. From the sea, the 14th Army was covered by ships and aircraft of the Northern Fleet (8 destroyers, 7 patrol ships, 15 submarines, 116 aircraft).

It must be said that in the future the composition of the forces of the two armies constantly changed, since the sides constantly increased them.

Colonel General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst.

Failure of the Arctic Blitzkrieg

The Great War in the Arctic began on the night of June 22, 1941 with massive air raids on cities, towns, industrial facilities, border posts and naval bases.

After the occupation of Norway, the Germans began to develop a plan for waging war in the Arctic. Planning for the operation began on August 13, 1940 and was completed in October of the same year. The Murmansk operation (Blaufuchs plan or Silberfuchs plan, German: Unternehmen Silberfuchs - “Polar Fox”) was an integral part of the Barbarossa plan. It was divided into several stages. During the first - Operation Renntir ("Reindeer") - the German 2nd Mountain Division and the 3rd Mountain Division from the Norway Mountain Corps invaded the Petsamo area (where the nickel mines were located) and captured it.

It should be noted that the Soviet troops were not taken by surprise, as is often shown at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Already on June 14-15, the 122nd Rifle Division from the 14th Army, by order of the commander of the Leningrad Military District M.M. Popov, was advanced to the state border. The division was supposed to cover the Kandalaksha direction. It was of strategic importance - if successful, enemy troops reached the Kandalaksha Bay of the White Sea and cut off the Kola Peninsula from the central regions of the country. On the 19th, the 1st Tank Division began to advance to the border; on the 21st, the 52nd Infantry Division was alerted; it was stationed in Murmansk, Monchegorsk and Kirovsk. On the night of June 22, two regiments and a reconnaissance battalion of the 14th Infantry Division were transferred to the border. In addition, the success of the defense was accompanied by the factor of difficult terrain.

On June 28-29, 1941, active hostilities began in the Murmansk direction (the main attack). This was the second stage - Operation Platinfuchs (German Platinfuchs - “Platinum Fox”), German forces advanced through Titovka, Ura-Guba to Polyarny (the main base of the Northern Fleet) and Murmansk. The Nazis planned to capture the Northern Fleet bases, blockade and capture Murmansk, and then go to the White Sea coast and occupy Arkhangelsk. During the second phase of the operation, they were going to carry out the third - to carry out Operation Arctic Fox (German: Polarfuchs). The 2nd German Mountain Division was advancing towards Polyarnoye, and one Finnish division and one German division were to move from Kemijärvi to the east.

On April 28, the 2nd and 3rd mountain rifle divisions, 40th and 112th separate tank battalions went on the attack in the Murmansk direction. They had a 4-fold advantage in the decisive direction - the 95th Infantry Regiment of the 14th Infantry Division could not withstand the blow and retreated, breaking the ranks of the 325th Infantry Regiment of the same division that came to the rescue. But the Nazis failed to defeat the garrison of the 23rd URA on the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas. The garrison, relying on powerful fortifications and coastal batteries (3 130 mm and 4 100 mm guns), repelled all attacks.

By June 30, the 52nd Rifle Division secured a foothold on the Zapadnaya Litsa River (“Valley of Glory”) and throughout July repulsed all German attempts to force the water barrier. On the right flank, regrouped units of the 14th Infantry Division held the defense. In September, the defense was reinforced by the 186th Infantry Division (Polar Division), after which the front in this sector stabilized until 1944. In 104 days of fighting, the Germans advanced 30-60 km and did not solve the assigned tasks. The landings of the Marine Corps of the Northern Fleet also played a positive role - attacks on the enemy’s flank were carried out on July 7 and 14. And also the “unsinkable battleship of the Arctic” - the Rybachy Peninsula, on the site of the 23rd UR and the 135th Infantry Regiment of the 14th Infantry Division, the Nazis never managed to cross border marker No. 1.

In the Kandalaksha direction the first attack was repelled on June 24. On July 1, 1941, the Germans, with the help of the 36th Army Corps, which included the 169th Infantry Division, the SS Nord mountain brigade, as well as the Finnish 6th Infantry Division and two Finnish Jaeger battalions, launched a general offensive on Kandalaksha. The enemy was opposed by the 122nd Infantry Division, the 1st Tank Division (until mid-July 1941, then it was withdrawn to another section of the front) and the 104th Infantry Division, which was later transferred to the Kairaly area (without the 242nd Infantry Regiment, which was located in the Kesteng direction ). Until the beginning of August there were fierce battles with little advance of enemy units. At the beginning of August 1941, a reinforced Finnish battalion penetrated into the rear of the Soviet forces. The Finns saddled the road in the area of ​​the Nyamozero station, as a result of which the Soviet group had to fight for two weeks in a strange environment. Just one enemy battalion blocked five rifle regiments, three artillery regiments and other formations. This case speaks of the complexity of the theater of operations, the lack of a developed road network, and the difficult terrain among forests and swamps. When the road was unblocked two weeks later, the enemy struck a strong blow from the front and forced the Red Army units to retreat. Soviet troops gained a foothold four kilometers east of Alakurtti, and there the front line stabilized until 1944. The enemy's maximum advance was about 95 kilometers.

In the Kestenga direction, the 242nd Infantry Regiment of the 104th Infantry Division held the defense. Active hostilities began in early July 1941. By July 10, the Germans managed to reach the Sofyanga River, and in November they captured Kestenga and advanced eastward from it by about another 30 km. By November 11, 1941, the front line had stabilized 40 km west of Loukha. By that time, the grouping of Soviet troops in this sector of the front had been reinforced by the 5th Infantry Brigade and the 88th Infantry Division.

German ski division in the Arctic.

Results of the 1941 campaign. By the fall of 1941, it became clear that the plan for a lightning war in the Arctic had been thwarted. In fierce defensive battles, showing courage and perseverance, Soviet border guards, soldiers of the 14th Army, and sailors of the Northern Fleet bled the advancing enemy units and forced the Germans to take a break and go on the defensive. The German command failed to achieve any of its goals in the Arctic. Despite some initial successes, German troops failed to reach the Murmansk railway in any sector, and also to capture the bases of the Northern Fleet, reach Murmansk and capture it. As a result, here was the only section of the Soviet-German front where enemy troops were stopped already several tens of kilometers from the line of the Soviet State border, and in some places the Germans were not even able to cross the border.

Marines of the Northern Fleet on the deck of a boat of the MO-4 project.

The role of the rear in the defense of the Arctic

Residents of the Murmansk region provided enormous assistance to the formations of the Red Army and the USSR Navy. Already on the first day of the Great War, martial law was introduced in the Murmansk region, the military commissariats began mobilizing those liable for military service, and the military registration and enlistment offices received up to 3.5 thousand applications from volunteers. In total, every sixth resident of the region went to the front - more than 50 thousand people.

Party, Soviet and military bodies organized universal military training of the population. In regions and settlements, units of the people's militia, fighter squads, sanitary squads, and local air defense units were formed. Thus, in just the first few weeks of the war, the Murmansk fighter regiment went out on missions 13 times that were associated with the destruction of enemy sabotage and reconnaissance groups. Soldiers of the Kandalaksha fighter battalion directly participated in the fighting in Karelia in the area of ​​the Loukhi station. Fighters from fighter formations in the Kola and Kirov regions served as guards for the Kirov Railway.

In the summer of 1942, on the initiative of the regional party committee in the region, the partisan detachments “Bolshevik of the Arctic” and “Soviet Murman” were formed. Considering the fact that the Murmansk region was practically not occupied, partisan formations were based on their own territory and went on deep raids behind enemy lines. The main target of the partisan detachments was the Rovaniemi-Petsamo highway, which supplied German troops located in the regions of Northern Finland. During raids, Murmansk partisans attacked enemy garrisons, disrupted communication lines, carried out reconnaissance and sabotage activities, and captured prisoners. Several partisan detachments also operated in the Kandalaksha direction.

Approximately 30 thousand people were mobilized for military construction work. These people created several defensive lines on the approaches to Murmansk and Kandalaksha. With the participation of the civilian population, massive construction of trenches, crevices, and bomb shelters was carried out. From the end of June 1941, a mass evacuation of civilians and industrial equipment began from the region. Initially, it was carried out using railway transport, then using ships and vessels - they were transported to Arkhangelsk. They took out children, women, old people, supplies of strategic raw materials, equipment from Severnickel, Tuloma and Niva hydroelectric stations. In total, 8 thousand wagons and more than 100 ships were taken out of the Murmansk region - this evacuation became part of a larger operation that was carried out throughout the western regions of the Soviet Union. Those enterprises that were left in the region were transferred to a military footing and focused on fulfilling military orders.

All fishing trawlers were transferred to the Northern Fleet. Ship repair enterprises carried out work to convert them into warships, and installed weapons on them. Shipyards also repaired warships and submarines. As of June 23, all enterprises in the region switched to round-the-clock (emergency) operation.

Enterprises in Murmansk, Kandalaksha, Kirovsk, and Monchegorsk quickly mastered the production of automatic weapons, grenades, and mortars. The Apatit plant began producing a mixture for incendiary bombs, ship repair shops made boats, drags, and mountain sleds, and a furniture factory produced skis for soldiers. Artels of fishing cooperation produced reindeer sleds, soap, portable stoves (potbelly stoves), various camping utensils, sewed uniforms, and repaired shoes. Reindeer collective farms handed over reindeer and sledges to the army, and supplied them with meat and fish.

The women, teenagers and old people who remained in the region replaced the men who had gone to the front in production. They mastered new professions at various courses, fulfilled the norms of not only healthy men, but also set records. The working day at enterprises increased to 10, 12 hours, and sometimes 14 hours.

Fishermen resumed fishing in the fall of 1941, catching fish necessary for the front and rear in combat conditions (they could be attacked by enemy planes and submarines). Although the region itself experienced a food shortage, several trains with fish were still able to be sent to besieged Leningrad. In order to improve the food supply to the population of the Murmansk region at industrial enterprises, subsidiary farms were created, and people cultivated vegetable gardens. The collection of berries and mushrooms, medicinal herbs, and pine needles was organized. Brigades of hunters were engaged in catching game - elk, wild deer, birds. Fishing for lake and river fish was organized in the inland waters of the Kola Peninsula.

In addition, residents of the region took an active part in raising funds for the Defense Fund: people donated 15 kg of gold and 23.5 kg of silver. In total, during the years of the Great War, more than 65 million rubles were received from residents of the Murmansk region. In 1941, 2.8 million rubles were transferred to create the Komsomolets Zapolyarya squadron, and the railway workers built the Sovetsky Murman squadron at their own expense. More than 60 thousand gifts were collected and sent to the Red Army soldiers at the front. School buildings in populated areas were converted into hospitals.

And all this was done in the most difficult conditions of the front-line zone, populated areas were subjected to constant air strikes. Thus, since the summer of 1942, Murmansk was subjected to severe bombing; on June 18 alone, German planes dropped 12 thousand bombs, and fire destroyed more than 600 wooden buildings in the city. In total, from 1941 to 1944, 792 German Air Force raids were carried out on the main city of the region; the Luftwaffe dropped about 7 thousand high-explosive and 200 thousand incendiary bombs. In Murmansk, more than 1,500 houses (three quarters of the total housing stock), 437 industrial and service buildings were destroyed and burned. German aviation regularly attacked the Kirov Railway. During the military operations in the Arctic, the German Air Force dropped an average of 120 bombs on every kilometer of the railway line. But, despite the constant danger of being bombed or shelled, Murmansk railway workers and port workers did their job, and communication with the mainland was not interrupted; trains were moving along the Kirov Railway. It should be noted that air defense forces shot down 185 enemy aircraft over Murmansk and the Kirov Railway in 1941-1943.

Murmansk after the bombing. Among Soviet cities, Murmansk is second only to Stalingrad in terms of the number and density of bomb attacks on the city. As a result of German bombing, three-quarters of the city was destroyed.

Arctic and allies

A big battle in 1942 took place in the sea zone. The USSR's allies in the Anti-Hitler Coalition began supplying military equipment, equipment, and food. The Soviet Union supplied the Allies with strategic raw materials. In total, during the Great War, 42 allied convoys (722 transports) arrived in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, 36 convoys were sent from the Soviet Union (682 transports reached their destination ports). The first allied convoy arrived at the port of Murmansk on January 11, 1942, and during the Great Patriotic War, up to 300 ships were unloaded and more than 1.2 million tons of foreign cargo were processed.

The German command tried to disrupt cargo deliveries and cut off this strategic communication. To combat the Allied convoys, large forces of the Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine and surface forces, which were located in Norwegian bases, were brought in. The main burden of protecting the convoys was placed on the forces of the British fleet and the Soviet Northern Fleet. Northern Fleet ships made 838 trips to guard convoys alone. In addition, naval aviation conducted reconnaissance from the air and covered the convoys. The Air Force also attacked German bases and airfields and enemy ships on the high seas. Soviet submarine forces went to sea and kept combat watch at German naval bases and along possible transit routes for large surface ships of the Reich naval forces. The combined efforts of the British and Soviet covering forces destroyed 27 enemy submarines, 2 battleships and 3 destroyers. In general, the protection of the convoys was successful: under the cover of sailors and pilots of the Northern Fleet and the British Navy, the sea convoys lost 85 transports, and more than 1,400 reached their goal.

In addition, the Northern Fleet conducted active combat activities off the enemy’s coast, trying to disrupt German maritime transport along the coast of Northern Norway. If in 1941-1942 the submarine fleet was mainly involved in these operations, then from the second half of 1943 naval aviation forces began to play the first fiddle. In total, in 1941-1945, the Northern Fleet, mainly through the efforts of the Northern Fleet Air Force, destroyed more than 200 enemy ships and auxiliary vessels, over 400 transports with a total tonnage of 1 million tons and about 1.3 thousand aircraft.

Project 7 Soviet Northern Fleet destroyer "Grozny" at sea.

Front line in 1942-1944

In the 14th Army's zone of action, the front line was very stable between the fall of 1941 and the fall of 1944. Both sides experienced the same difficulties. Firstly, a fast, maneuverable war was hampered by natural and climatic conditions. There was no continuous front; the battle formations were replaced by rock ridges, swamps, rivers, lakes, and forests that were insurmountable by large formations. Secondly, the defensive formations of the German and Soviet troops were constantly being improved. Thirdly, neither the Soviet command nor the Germans had a decisive superiority in forces.

Basically, the armies opposing each other carried out reconnaissance, sabotage (including with the help of partisans), and improved defense. Of the most significant actions, one can note the counter-offensive of the Red Army at the end of April 1942 in the Kesteng direction. Soviet troops actually thwarted the German offensive; reconnaissance revealed the concentration of enemy forces in this direction. But after a 10-day battle the situation stabilized in its previous positions. At the same time, the Red Army tried to go on the offensive in the Murmansk direction - at the turn of the Zapadnaya Litsa River. Soviet troops were able to push forward several kilometers, but the Germans soon restored the front.

After this, there were no more or less large-scale military operations in the 14th Army zone until October 1944.

Soviet submarines of the C series in the port of Polyarny.

Defeat of the Germans in the Arctic

By the autumn of 1944, Soviet troops firmly held the strategic initiative along the entire length of the Soviet-German front. The time has come to defeat the enemy on the northern sector of the front.

The 14th Army became the main fighting force in the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation (took place from October 7 to November 1, 1944). The army was given the task of destroying the main forces of the 19th German Mountain Corps (Norway Corps), which had fortified themselves in the Petsamo region, and then continue the offensive in the direction of Kirkenes in Northern Norway.

The 14th Army, under the command of Lieutenant General Vladimir Shcherbakov, consisted of: 8 rifle divisions, 5 rifle, 1 tank and 2 engineering brigades, 1 brigade of rocket launchers, 21 artillery and mortar regiments, 2 self-propelled gun regiments. It had 97 thousand soldiers and officers, 2212 guns and mortars, 107 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts. The army was supported from the air by the 7th Air Army - 689 aircraft. And from the sea, the Northern Fleet under the command of Admiral Arseny Golovko. The fleet participated in the operation with detachments of ships, 2 marine brigades and 276 naval aviation aircraft.

The German 19th Mountain Corps had: 3 mountain divisions and 4 brigades (53 thousand soldiers and officers), 753 guns and mortars. It was commanded by General of the Mountain Troops Ferdinand Jodl. The forces of the 5th Air Fleet were covered from the air - up to 160 aircraft. The German Navy operated at sea.

The situation was complicated by the fact that in three years the Germans built the so-called. Lapland defensive rampart. And after Finland left the war (September 19, 1944), military construction work took on a very active character. On the 90 km front there were minefields, wire fences, anti-tank ditches and gaps, reinforced concrete and armored firing points, shelters, trenches, and communication passages were erected. The fortifications intercepted all passes, hollows, roads, and commanding heights. On the sea side, the positions were reinforced by coastal batteries and anti-aircraft positions located in caponiers. And this despite the fact that the terrain was already difficult to pass - rivers, lakes, swamps, rocks.

On October 7, 1944, after artillery preparation, the offensive began. Even before it began, engineering units were sent behind enemy lines in order to destroy enemy fortifications. On the right flank of the strike force, the 131st Rifle Corps was advancing, its goal was Petsamo, it was supported by a distracting task force and two brigades of marines. On the left flank, the 99th Rifle Corps went on the attack; it had the task of advancing in the direction of Luostari. On the left flank, a deep outflanking maneuver was carried out by the 126th Light Rifle Corps (its target was also Luostari).

By 15.00, the 131st Corps broke through the first line of German defense and reached the Titovka River. On October 8, the bridgehead was expanded, and movement began in the direction of Petsamo. The 99th Corps was unable to break through the German defenses on the first day, but did so in a night attack (on the night of October 7–8). In the zone of his offensive, a reserve was brought into battle - the 127th Light Rifle Corps; on October 12 they captured Luostari and began moving towards Petsamo from the south.

The 126th Light Rifle Corps, performing a difficult outflanking maneuver, reached west of Luostari by October 11 and cut the Petsamo-Salmijärvi road. By this, the Soviet command prevented the approach of German reinforcements. The corps received the following task - to seize the Petsamo-Tarnet road from the west with a new roundabout maneuver. The task was completed on October 13.

On October 14, the 131st, 99th and 127th corps approached Petsamo, and the assault began. On October 15, Petsamo fell. After this, the army corps regrouped and on October 18 the second stage of the operation began. Units of the 4 corps already participating in the battle and the new reserve 31st Rifle Corps were thrown into battle. The enemy was mainly pursued during this phase. The 127th Light Rifle Corps and the 31st Rifle Corps were advancing on Nikel, the 99th Rifle Corps and the 126th Light Rifle Corps were advancing on Akhmalakhti, and the 131st Rifle Corps was advancing on Tarnet. Already on October 20, Nikel began to be captured, and on the 22nd it fell. The remaining corps also reached their target lines by October 22.

Amphibious landing, 1944.

On October 18, the 131st Rifle Corps entered Norwegian soil. The liberation of Northern Norway has begun. On October 24-25, the Jarfjord was crossed, the forces of the 14th Army fanned out on Norwegian territory. The 31st Rifle Corps did not cross the bay and began moving deep to the south - by October 27 it reached Nausti, reaching the border of Norway and Finland. The 127th Light Rifle Corps also moved south along the western shore of the fjord. The 126th Light Rifle Corps moved westward, and on October 27 reached Neiden. The 99th and 131st Rifle Corps rushed to Kirkenes and occupied it on October 25. After this, the operation was completed. Amphibious landings and the actions of the Northern Fleet played a major role in the operation. It was a complete victory.

Results of the operation

By expelling German troops from Kirkenes and reaching the Neiden-Nausti line, the Soviet 14th Army and Northern Fleet completed their tasks in the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation. On November 9, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the 14th Army to stop its movement and go on the defensive. During the 19-day battles, army troops advanced west up to 150 km, liberating the Petsamo-Pechenga region and Northern Norway. The loss of these territories greatly limited the actions of the German Navy on Soviet northern communications and deprived the Third Reich of the opportunity to obtain nickel ore (a strategic resource).

German troops suffered significant losses in manpower, weapons and military equipment. Thus, Jodl’s 19th Mountain Corps lost only about 30 thousand people killed. The Northern Fleet destroyed 156 enemy ships and vessels, and Soviet aviation forces eliminated 125 Luftwaffe aircraft. The Soviet army lost more than 15 thousand people killed and wounded, including more than 2 thousand soldiers and officers in Norway.

During the offensive of the Soviet troops in the Far North, the high military art of the Soviet military command was demonstrated. Operational and tactical interaction between the ground forces and the forces of the Northern Fleet was organized at a high level. The Soviet corps carried out the offensive in difficult terrain, often without direct communication with neighboring units. The forces of the 14th Army maneuvered skillfully and flexibly, using specially trained and prepared light rifle corps in battle. The engineering units of the Soviet army, naval units, and marines showed a high level.

During the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation, Soviet troops liberated the occupied areas of the Soviet Arctic and provided enormous assistance in the liberation of Norway.

Norway was finally liberated with the help of the USSR. On May 7-8, 1945, the German military-political leadership agreed to complete surrender and the German group in Norway (it numbered about 351 thousand soldiers and officers) received an order to surrender and laid down their arms.

General Vladimir Ivanovich Shcherbakov.

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"We walked, without knowing defeat, through forests, swamps and snow and, breaking through steel fortifications, defeated the evil enemy!“- this bravura song ends the documentary about the war with the “White Finns”. The film was released on the screens of the Land of the Soviets in the spring of 1940, shortly after peace was concluded with Finland.

The main theater of military operations was the Karelian Isthmus, which was crossed by a strip of fortifications known as the Mannerheim Line. The film of the same name was dedicated to the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line. It, unsurprisingly, said nothing about the enormous losses suffered by the Red Army in frontal attacks.

The battles in the Arctic were much less intense and bloody than the battles on the Karelian Isthmus, north of Lake Ladoga and in Karelia and were not mentioned in newsreels. But it was on the northernmost sector of the front that Soviet troops achieved the greatest successes with the least losses.

In the north, the struggle was for the ice-free port of Petsamo (now Pechenga), nickel deposits and fleet bases. Both the USSR and Finland were interested in them. Germany and its Western allies, Britain and France, showed interest in the ports and mines.

Petsamo Liinahamari, Finnish photograph, 1939

Polar surprise

Combat operations on all sectors of the Soviet-Finnish front began on November 30, 1939. The Soviet 14th Army was advancing in the Far North. It was commanded by division commander Valerian Frolov. The 52nd Division advanced south along the only Petsamo-Rovaniemi road. The 13th and 104th divisions and forces of the Northern Fleet were tasked with protecting the coast.

The Finns, the researchers note, did not imagine that the Soviet Union would throw an entire combined arms army into the tundra, consisting of three divisions, five attached artillery regiments, an anti-aircraft division and two tank battalions.

On December 2, Soviet troops captured the port of Petsamo and cut off Finland from the Barents Sea and occupied the Rybachy and Sredniy peninsulas. The offensive was soon stopped. The battles boiled down to repelling raids by Finnish skiers.

“There was no continuous front line at all north of Lake Ladoga,” says Finnish historian Karl-Frederik Geust. “There was nothing like the “Mannerheim Line” in the north. It was a surprise for the Finnish command that the Red Army was advancing with the same massive forces there, where there are no roads. The Finns thought that it was impossible to conduct offensive battles with large forces in the conditions of the roadless tundra. But the Kremlin thought differently."

The deployment of the Soviet 9th Army in Karelia was also a surprise for the Finns, according to Russian historian Bair Irincheev. “The appearance of the 52nd division, as well as three divisions of the 9th Army, the 122nd, 163rd and 44th, was a very big surprise for the Finns. Finnish pre-war plans did not provide for the possibility of deploying such large formations in the tundra.”

Historian Mikhail Meltyukhov describes the situation in the Arctic in November-December 1939: “The Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas were separated by a border. These peninsulas were the objects of territorial claims. The offensive began, and it turned out that there were simply no Finns there.”

As a result, says Mikhail Meltyukhov, the 52nd Division occupied Petsamo and took possession of the nickel mines. Having lost Petsamo, Finland lost the opportunity to receive assistance from friendly states. In addition, the 14th Army was supposed to prevent a possible landing, as Meltyukhov says, of troops from “third countries.”

Fortitude, local knowledge, dexterity

In the summer of 1939, the Red Army, despite the failures of the first stage of fighting, convincingly defeated the Japanese at Khalkhin Gol. In the second half of September, the Red Army made a successful campaign in Eastern Poland.

These victories played a cruel joke on the Soviet command. The People's Commissariat of Defense, the General Staff and the Kremlin believed that Finland could be dealt with quickly and with minor losses.

Many units and formations that fought in Mongolia and Poland were transferred to the Leningrad Military District. However, the war in the north turned out to be completely different.

The Finnish army, according to historian Karl-Fredrik Geust, had at least three advantages. “Firstly, the Finns defended their country. Secondly, the Finns were to a certain extent prepared for war in Arctic conditions, in particular, they all knew how to ski. And thirdly - this was a secret for a long time - they The Finnish army had very effective radio reconnaissance."

Thanks to a well-established radio interception service, says Geust, the Finns had a complete understanding of the intentions of the Soviet command and could successfully maneuver their small forces, throwing them at the most threatened areas of the front. This partly explains the seemingly paradoxical circumstance that during the war the Finns more than once managed to encircle units and formations of the Red Army.

“The 54th Mountain Rifle Division, the place of pre-war deployment of which was the city of Kandalaksha, was staffed by local residents, the division was good. If the Finns managed to defeat the 163rd and 44th divisions and force them to retreat, then the 54th, although it was hit, encirclement, held out until the end of the war and distracted the entire 9th Infantry Division of the Finnish Army,” says Bair Irincheev.

The 44th Division, defeated near Suomusalmi, as well as the 52nd Division operating in the Petsamo area, which suffered minor losses, were among those Red Army formations that took part in the Polish campaign in September 1939.

The 52nd Division occupied Petsamo on December 2, 1939,” Mikhail Meltyukhov restores the course of events, “and by December 18 it was advancing to Rovaniemi... And the 44th Division found itself in a very unpleasant situation, panic began there, and a significant part of the losses is connected precisely with panic. It is clear that the losses of the 44th were simply incomparable with the losses of the 52nd."

Finnish D.O.T. on Rybachy, July 2009 globant.narod.ru

“The open terrain in the tundra,” notes Bair Irincheev, “did not allow the Finns to strike and retreat with impunity. In addition, Frolov, the commander of the 14th Army, very quickly gave the order to set up patrols, brewhouses, and checkpoints along the road in the tundra to protect communications of the 52nd division and its entire army from raids by Finnish skiers."

“We must not forget,” continues Bair Irincheev, “that the entire 9th Finnish division was deployed against the 44th division. It is often found in literature, especially in the West, that the Finns destroyed the 44th division with almost one battalion. This is not So, after the Finns forced the 163rd division to retreat, the 44th found itself in front of a comparable Finnish group."

Exotic General

The actions of the Finnish troops in the area of ​​Petsamo and Salla were led by the commander of the Lapland Group, General Kurt Wallenius, known for his sympathies towards the Nazis. The Lapland group, together with the North Karelian group, was part of the North Finnish group.

In the Salla area the Finns had four separate battalions, an infantry regiment and an artillery battery. Their forces in the vicinity of Petsamo were even more modest: three separate companies, a separate artillery battery and a reconnaissance group.

“Mannerheim, the commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, sent Wallenius to the Vyborg Bay area at the beginning of March 1940. It was believed that since Wallenius had organized a very strong defense in Lapland, he would also be able to successfully organize the defense of Vyborg. However, nothing came of this, and a day later two after Wallenius arrived near Vyborg, he was removed,” says Karl-Fredrik Geust.

Bair Irincheev says that the reason for the disgrace was very prosaic: “Wallenius, when he was called from Lapland to the Karelian Isthmus, three days later went on a drinking binge and was dismissed by Mannerheim.”

“Since the 52nd Division received the order to stop and actually stood still for most of the war, then, probably, the Finnish commander also distinguished himself somehow. But I can hardly imagine what he would have done if the 52nd Division had received the order move on. He simply did not have the strength to stop her,” says Mikhail Meltyukhov.

The American newspaper Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, in its issue dated December 18, 1939, cites excerpts from an interview with General Wallenius to Swedish journalists. He argued that the war could last at least a year, and characterized the enemy as follows:

“The Soviet artillery is good, the tanks are nothing, and the planes are piloted ineptly,” the general said. “Some captured Soviet pilots were found to have printed multiplication tables with which they were supposed to solve technical problems.”

Swedish ally

Throughout the war, foreign volunteers came to help Finland - Hungarians, Norwegians, Danes, British, Estonians. Few of them managed to visit the front line. The largest contingent was fielded by the Swedes, who really had to smell gunpowder.

A Swedish volunteer corps with a total strength of about eight thousand people operated in northern Finland. The volunteers were commanded by General Ernst Linder. With the permission of the Swedish government, a volunteer squadron was formed, which had 12 light bombers and 12 fighters.

“Walleinus had a Swedish volunteer corps, which arrived at the front in Salla in late February 1940. The Swedish squadron arrived in Lapland in January. It was the only air squadron in Lapland,” says Karl-Fredrik Geust. “The Swedish squadron fought for two months, and Swedish infantry and artillery only for two weeks."

According to the Finnish historian, before the arrival of the Swedish squadron, Finland did not have aviation in Lapland. Soviet bombers operated without fighter escort. According to Karl-Fredrik Geust, Swedish pilots shot down 9 Soviet aircraft. Swedes lost 5 aircraft. Three pilots were killed and two were captured.

“The Swedish infantry went on the defensive and freed the Finnish 40th Infantry Regiment, which was sent in full force to the Karelian Isthmus. The Swedes took over the front from the 40th Infantry Regiment on February 28, 1940,” says Bair Irincheev.

“The Swedes provided real help. Not just stew, as they say. They supplied the Finns with weapons, there were plenty of volunteers serving there. For the Swedes, Finland was always the front line of defense. That is, the further the Soviet border is from Sweden, the better. That’s why the Swedes provided the greatest help,” explains Mikhail Meltyukhov.

The landing is canceled

The port of Petsamo, nickel mines and fleet bases were of interest to almost everyone - the USSR, Germany, the British, the French, the Americans.

The capture of Petsamo for the Soviet command was explained by strategic considerations. Karl-Fredrik Geust recalls that the Western powers - Britain and France - planned to land troops on the coast of the Barents Sea.

Bair Irincheev believes that the threat of a British-French landing was one of the factors that prompted the Soviet command to “finish the matter peacefully,” although the Finnish army was holding out with all its might.

“The Soviet-Finnish war, to put it mildly, was not very interesting to the British and French,” says Mikhail Meltyukhov. It’s one thing to verbally support the Finns and send them something, quite another to get involved in a war because of them. It was more about to quietly seize the iron ore deposits in Sweden, which supplied 75 percent of Germany with ore."

Britain and France, continues Meltyukhov, could try, on the one hand, through Norway and Narvik, and on the other, through Petsamo, to occupy this region and control it. The Western allies, the Russian historian believes, firstly, were not in too much of a hurry to land. They expected that the war would drag on, and contributed to this in every possible way.

However, for the Franco-British landing, a request from the Finnish government was required, as well as the consent of Norway and Sweden. The operation was supposed to begin on March 20. The peace treaty between Finland and the USSR was concluded on March 12.

The British, French and Polish units, which did not have the chance to land at Petsamo, had to fight not with Soviet, but with German troops near Narvik in Norway in April. The Germans did not need permission to carry out Operation Weserubung.

The Soviet Union, which had a partnership with Germany after the conclusion of the non-aggression pact and the friendship and border treaty, provided the German navy with a supply point at Zapadnaya Litsa on the Kola Peninsula.

Documentation:

• Memorandum of the USSR to the Government of Finland, October 14, 1939
• “New provocations of the Finnish military,” Pravda, November 29

Chapter 3. Fighting on the Kola Peninsula and North Karelia in 1941

During the war of 1941-1944, two independent commands operated on the territory of Finland - the German one in northern Finland, subordinate to the German General Staff, and the Finnish one in the rest of the country. Both commands coordinated their actions, but were otherwise completely independent of each other. The demarcation line between them ran from Uleaborg (Oulu) on the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia to Belomorsk (White Sea).

To attack Murmansk, the Germans delivered the 2nd Mountain (Austrian) Division from Narvik to the Kirkness area in August 1940. At the last moment, the 3rd Mountain (Austrian) Division, stationed in the Narvik area, was also involved in the operation. In addition, in the Murmansk area there was the 36th Finnish border company under the command of Captain Tintol.

By June 9, 1941, the SS motorized division “Nord” (created in 1941 on the basis of the SS police brigade in Norway) was delivered to the Rovaniemi area from Norway. The Nord division was supposed to attack the city of Salla.

To the north, the 169th German Infantry Division, which arrived at the ports of the Gulf of Bothnia from Germany, was supposed to attack Salla. From the south, the Finnish 6th Division, subordinate to the German command of the Norway group, was advancing on Salla. Note that the 6th Division was formed from the population of Northern Finland, who knew the area well and was accustomed to the harsh climate. In addition, the 3rd Finnish Infantry Division, stationed in Suomussali, was subordinate to the Germans. Colonel General Dietl commanded all German and Finnish units in the Arctic.

The German-Finnish units were opposed by troops of the Leningrad Military District. On June 24, 1941, the Leningrad Military District was transformed into the Northern Front (commander - Lieutenant General M.M. Popov), and on August 27, 1941, the Northern Front was divided into two fronts: Leningrad (commander - Lieutenant General Popov) and Karelian ( commander - Lieutenant General V.A. Frolov).

At the beginning of the war, the 14th Army was stationed in the Arctic, which included: the 42nd Rifle Corps (104th and 122nd Rifle Divisions), separate 14th and 52nd Rifle Divisions, 23rd (Murmansk) fortified area The 14th Army was assigned: 1st Tank Division, 104th Artillery Regiment of the RGK, 1st Mixed Air Division, 42nd Adjustment Squadron and 31st Separate Engineer Battalion.

In June-August 1941, the 14th Army was commanded by Lieutenant General V.A. Frolov, in August 1941 he became commander of the Karelian Front, and Major General R.I. was appointed in his place. Panina. In March 1942, Panin was replaced by Major General V.I. Shcherbakov, who held this post until the end of the war.

On maps in school textbooks and even in serious publications dedicated to the Great Patriotic War, a continuous front line is drawn from the White Sea to Lake Onega. In fact, there was no continuous front, and fighting took place only in five sectors (directions) - Murmansk, Kandalaksha, Kestenga, Ukhta and Rebolsk. The width of the widest among them (Murmansk) did not exceed 120 km, the rest - 40-50 km. The “gaps” between neighboring areas of hostilities were very large: 240 km between the Murmansk and Kandalaksha directions, 200 km between the Ukhta and Rebolsk directions, etc.

Thus, the troops of the Karelian Front in the north fought battles isolated from each other. Units of the 7th Army fought in the Rebol sector, and units of the 14th Army fought in the rest. We'll look at the fighting in these five areas from north to south.

Let's start with the Murmansk direction. At 10:50 a.m. on June 22, 1941, the German mountain corps, consisting of the 2nd and 3rd mountain divisions, began advancing to the Soviet border across Finland. From the south, the German divisions were guarded by a Finnish border guard detachment of about 1,500 people. On June 22, the Military Council of the 14th Army gave the order to transfer the 325th regiment of the 14th division to the western shore of the Kola Bay. 52nd Division, commanded by Major General N.N. Nikitin, was stationed in Monchegorsk. Its transfer to Murmansk began on the evening of June 24, two days before the start of the war between Finland and the USSR.

The 325th Regiment crossed the bay in relatively calm conditions, but the 75-kilometer crossing to the state border across open tundra, with frequent enemy air raids, took several days. Only by the evening of June 28, the regiment occupied the line of defense: the 52nd Division along the route and especially during the crossing of the Kola Bay was subjected to constant enemy air raids and suffered losses. On June 30, she deployed into battle formations on the Zapadnaya Litsa River.

The German offensive began from the Petsamo area on June 28. The main forces of the mountain corps attacked one of our 95th regiment, which had not yet had time to organize a defense. The regiment began to retreat to the village of Titovka. In a disorderly retreat, he carried along with him the 325th Regiment, which was coming to his aid.

If in the Titovka area the enemy achieved some successes relatively easily, then his attacks on the garrison of the 23rd fortified area on the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas floundered. A month before the start of the war, Colonel M.K. Pashkovsky, who commanded the fortified area, managed to build quite powerful defensive structures on the peninsula and position them so that they dominated the Petsamo-Titovka road. For three days the Germans tried to capture the Sredny Peninsula to no avail. Coastal artillery fire played a major role in repelling their attacks (there were three 130-mm and four 100-mm coastal guns on the Sredny Peninsula).

The 52nd Division held the defense on the Zapadnaya Litsa River. She occupied comfortable positions. When the German rangers began their offensive, Soviet troops met them with hurricane fire. Within one day, several enemy attacks were repulsed. Seeing that they would not be able to cross Western Litsa right away, the Germans stopped their attacks for two days in order to bring up the second echelons. The Soviet command also made the most of these two days of respite: the 95th and 325th regiments that had retreated to this area were put in order. They took up defensive positions on the right flank of the Murmansk direction.

Fierce fighting continued here throughout July. The Germans desperately tried to cross the river. They failed to do this in the main direction. By the end of the month, they had captured only a small bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Western Litsa - on the left flank of the 52nd Division.

On July 31, British aircraft bombed German troops for the first time in Petsamo, that is, on Finnish territory. Deck attack aircraft from the aircraft carrier Furious took part in the raid. In this regard, the Finnish government protested to London and recalled its ambassador from there. The British Embassy, ​​in turn, left Helsinki. However, a state of war between England and Finland has not yet been declared.

The 14th Army did not receive reinforcements from the center, and could only rely on local resources. In this regard, the civil and military authorities of the Murmansk region did everything they could. A new 186th division was formed in Murmansk using the human and material resources of the Murmansk region. At the end of September, she already occupied the defense area assigned to her. At the expense of the Northern Fleet, the marine brigade that fought here was significantly strengthened.

At the end of October, Soviet troops attempted to dislodge the enemy from the bridgehead they had occupied on the eastern bank of the Zapadnaya Litsa River. The newly formed 186th Division was brought into battle. However, the Germans resisted desperately, our troops suffered significant losses and were forced to retreat to their original positions. By November, the front line in the Murmansk direction had stabilized.

Now let's move on to the Kandalaksha direction. During the Winter War, a railway with a length of about 90 km was built from the large city of the Murmansk region Kandalaksha to the state border with Finland. Its construction continued after the war. In the summer of 1940, the road was continued to the new state border. The road was accepted only in September 1940.

By June 22, 1941, the headquarters of the 42nd Rifle Corps was located in Kandalaksha. The corps included the 122nd division, located on the border, and the 104th division, located in the city itself. In addition, the 1st Tank Division, the reserve of the 14th Army, was stationed in the Kandalaksha area. The corps was commanded by Major General R.I. Panin. The 1st Panzer Division even had several new heavy KV tanks.

In the Kandalaksha direction, the enemy concentrated the SS Nord division, the German 169th Infantry Division, the Finnish 6th Infantry Division and two Finnish Jaeger battalions. On July 1, the enemy went on the offensive. The enemy forces were opposed by our 122nd and 104th divisions. The latter was transferred to the Kairaly area in the first days of the war without the 242nd regiment (it was located in the Kesteng direction). The 1st Tank Division remained in Kandalaksha as a reserve for the commander of the 14th Army. Later, in mid-July, two regiments of this division were transferred to the Luga area to defend Leningrad from the south, and one regiment was transferred to Petrozavodsk.

The fighting in the Kandalaksha direction continued throughout July. In early August, the Germans, having failed to achieve success (and they planned to reach the Kirov railway 10 days after the start of the war), decided to transfer the SS Nord division to the Kestengi area. The German command feared that the Soviet command might also withdraw some of its forces from the Alakurti area and transfer them to the Kesteng direction. Therefore, simultaneously with the redeployment of the Nord division, it sent a reinforced Finnish battalion through the forests and swamps to the rear of our troops. His task was to seize the road in the area of ​​Nyam station, disable communications, and not allow a single company to be sent through Kandalaksha to Loukhi station.

This operation was a success for the Finns. They captured the only road along which Soviet troops were supplied and held it firmly. The supply of food and ammunition stopped. For two weeks the units were supplied only from field warehouses. Only radio contact was maintained with Murmansk, where the headquarters of the 14th Army was located, and even then irregularly. The commander occasionally received short reports about the situation in the units cut off from the rear. It turned out to be an anecdotal situation - one Finnish battalion seemed to surround five rifle regiments, three artillery regiments and other units. It took Soviet troops two weeks to clear the road from the Finns and secure their communications.

To relieve pressure on the Finnish battalion operating in the Soviet rear, the enemy launched a strong attack from the front in the Bald Mountain area. As a result of fierce fighting, Soviet units were forced to leave their positions and gain a foothold 4 km east of Alakurti - on the line of the old state border. But further attempts by the enemy to advance were unsuccessful. From September 1941 to September 1944, the front line here remained unchanged.

Only a few days before the war, the 242nd Infantry Regiment and the artillery division of the 104th Division, which was part of the 14th Army, were transferred to the Kestenga area. At the beginning of July, an infantry regiment of the German 169th Infantry Division began an offensive in the direction of Kestenga. The first battle took place on July 8 near the village of Tungozero. Soviet units could not withstand the strong onslaught and retreated. On July 10, the Germans reached the Sofyanga River. There was a lull that lasted until the end of July. The enemy was building a road from the border to the village of Sofyanga, studying our defenses, preparing to break through it and cross the river.

New battles began on August 3 with a strong German artillery attack on our defenses. Already on this day, the enemy managed to cross the river and cut off one of our battalions from the regimental headquarters and other units. The battalion was pressed against Pyaozer, fought surrounded, and then went through forests and swamps to the Kestenga area, where it united with the main forces of the regiment. The fighting at Sofianga lasted three days. The Germans, regardless of losses, crossed the river in several places and delved into the defenses of other Soviet battalions. Our units retreated. On August 8, fighting was already taking place near the regional center of Kestenga, 60 km west of Loukhi station.

During 8 days of continuous fighting, the 242nd Regiment suffered heavy losses. Meanwhile, the enemy, as a captured German soldier showed, was bringing up reserves. The entire SS division “Nord” and a separate tank battalion arrived at the scene of the fighting. The Military Council of the 14th Army tried to help the 242nd Regiment. A company of tanks was transferred here from the Kandalaksha direction. The 1087th Infantry Regiment was hastily formed in Murmansk. From these units the 5th Infantry Brigade was created. It was commanded by Colonel N.A. Chernukha.

But the enemy also quickly accumulated forces. A regiment of the 3rd Finnish division, removed from the Ukhta direction, two Jaeger battalions and two more tank battalions, which were then consolidated into a tank brigade, arrived in the fighting area. On August 12, two Finnish battalions and a battalion of the SS division “Nord”, moving through the forest, reached the 34th kilometer of the Kestenga-Loukhi highway. They were met by the rear units of the Soviet 5th brigade, the Louhi fighter battalion and the maneuver group of the 72nd border detachment. The main forces of the brigade were cut off from their supply bases and fought surrounded. The fighting was fierce. Neither the 7th nor the 14th armies had any reserves that could help the defenders.

On the advice of Voroshilov, member of the Military Council of the Karelian Front G.N. Kupriyanov personally addressed Stalin with a request to send the 88th Infantry Division, stationed in Arkhangelsk, to the Kestenga area. Stalin agreed, and on the night of August 12-13, the 88th Division was alerted and placed on railway trains. In less than two days, 18 echelons of the division reached from Arkhangelsk to the Loukhi station (75 km from Kestenga). The most amazing thing is that the trains passed along the Obozersky-Soroka railway that was under construction. Previously, only trains carrying road construction workers went there. By the evening of August 15, the first units of the 88th Infantry Division entered the battle on the move. They pushed the Germans back 6-8 km.

During the second half of August, throughout September and October, local battles took place in the Kesteng direction. The enemy suffered significant losses, so he could not launch a major offensive without reinforcements. On October 25, the enemy began attacks on individual sectors of the 88th Division's defenses. He conducted reconnaissance in force, groping for its weak points. The offensive began on November 2 after a strong two-hour artillery barrage. For the first time on the Karelian front, the enemy used massive air strikes on the front line. 40 bombers made two sorties.

The attacks by the Germans and Finns continued until November 11, but they failed to take the Louhi station. On November 12 there was a lull. The front line has stabilized 40 km west of Loukhi station. The Finnish regiments returned to their divisions, and the German troops began to build housing and prepare for the winter.

The Finnish 3rd Infantry Division was concentrated in the Ukhta direction. Soviet units intended to defend this direction were initially located in the city of Kem, located 250 km from the border. These were the 81st and 118th regiments and two artillery battalions of the 54th division, whose headquarters were also located in Kemi. A few days before the war, one rifle battalion was transported to the border by vehicles. After the declaration of war, the remaining units walked 186 km to Ukhta with full combat gear. By the beginning of the first Finnish offensive, the main units of the 54th Division had already concentrated on the defensive line along the eastern bank of the Voinitsa River. On June 29, the division headquarters moved from Kem to Ukhta.

On July 3, two regiments of the Finnish 3rd Infantry Division went on the offensive in two directions converging at one point - along the road from the state border to the village of Voinitsa and along the Voknavolok - Pango-Guba road, hoping to encircle and destroy our units located east of the village. For 10 days, the Finns fought in the field with border guards and Soviet advanced battalions. The Finns failed to cross the Voinitsa River on the move.

But on the morning of July 14, after a two-hour artillery preparation, a new offensive began. The enemy attacked our right flank especially persistently. The Finnish 32nd Regiment was advancing here. He managed to cross the Voinitsa River north of the village of the same name and penetrate our defenses. By a decisive counterattack by the battalion of the 54th division, which had previously been in the second echelon, the Finns were thrown back to the western bank of the river. Attacks on the right flank continued on July 15, 16 and 17, but they were all successfully repulsed. Having made sure that our resistance could not be broken in this sector, the enemy endured artillery fire and then went on the offensive on the left flank. On July 17, the Finns on rafts crossed Lake Verkhneye Kuito in its narrowest part, with a sudden blow they drove back the rifle company defending here and reached the area of ​​​​Lake Lashku. They sought to break through to the Voinitsa-Ukhta road from the south, to the rear of the main forces of the 54th division defending on the Voinitsa River.

During eight days of fighting, the Finns broke through the defenses of the Soviet troops and crossed Lake Verkhneye Kuito. The situation of our troops became critical, and the commander of the 7th Army, Lieutenant General F.D. Gorelenko ordered the withdrawal of the 54th division from the Korpiyarvi-Pista line to a more advantageous line, built in the isthmus between Nameless Lake, lakes Big Kis-Kis, Cherkiyarvi and along the Kis-Kis River - 10 km west of Ukhta. More than three thousand local residents, the division's engineer battalion and all engineering service officers worked on the construction of this line. By the end of July, three battalion resistance centers were equipped in the main direction, as well as good fortifications to cover the flanks.

At the same time, the population of the Kem region began construction of a rear defense line along the eastern bank of the small Shomba River, approximately half the distance between Ukhta and Kem. Division commander I.V. Panin persistently asked the Army Military Council to allow him to withdraw his units precisely to this line, that is, to immediately retreat 120 km, leaving Ukhta without a fight. He considered the positions near Lake Kis-Kis not entirely convenient, especially for defense in winter: when the Middle and Lower Kuyto freeze, our flank will be open. In addition, the division commander argued that the enemy had pulled up all his forces and reserves close and would try to pursue our units on the heels, that he could break into our defensive units near Lake Kis-Kis, without giving us time to gain a foothold.

The Military Council did not agree with Panin’s arguments and confirmed its decision to withdraw the division to the line of Lake Kis-Kis, give battle here, exhaust and bleed the enemy on the more distant approaches to the Kirov railway. At the same time, it was ordered to increase the pace of construction of a defensive line in the area of ​​the village of Shomba. On July 30, units of the 54th Division retreated to the line between Lake Kis-Kis and Cherkiyarvi. The 81st and 118th regiments occupied new centers of resistance, and artillery was deployed in new positions. Twice on this day the Finns stormed our fortifications, but to no avail. At the end of the first week of August, attacks resumed and continued throughout August and September, but the Finns failed to break through our defenses here. The line on lakes Kis-Kis and Cherkijärvi turned out to be quite strong. Until the summer of 1944, the Finnish units failed to advance a single step here.

The 14th Infantry Division under the command of Colonel Raappaia was advancing in the Rebol direction in central Karelia. The division was assigned two Jaeger battalions. In total, the Finnish group numbered about 20 thousand soldiers.

In the regional center of Reboly, located 9-10 km from the state border, before the war the 337th regiment of the 54th division, which was part of the 7th Army, was stationed. The regiment was assigned an artillery battalion. The 73rd border detachment was also located there. The total number of Soviet troops was 4 thousand people.

From July 3 to July 24, the Finns attacked Reboly head-on, but were stopped by Soviet troops. Then part of the Finnish troops bypassed Reboly from the southwest on July 15. In the rear of our troops was Lexozero. Therefore, in order to avoid being surrounded, the 337th Regiment began to retreat north and then east through forests and swamps parallel to the Reboly-Kochkoma road. In Reboly there were only the rear units of the regiment and the Rebolsky fighter battalion. Of course, these 150 people could not hold back the onslaught of the main Finnish forces. The road from the town of Reboly to the Kochkoma station was open. By noon on July 26, the Rugozersky fighter battalion arrived to help the units defending Reboly (along with it there were about 620 fighters in Reboly). At the same time, the Belomorsky and Tungudsky fighter battalions arrived at Kochkoma station. However, Reboly and the village of Yomelyanovka were abandoned.

On August 10, the Military Council of the 7th Army ordered the formation of the 27th Infantry Division from units from the Rebol direction. The head of the operational detachment of the army headquarters, Colonel G.K. Kozlov, was appointed its commander. By August 1, the division had only 6 thousand people, one artillery battalion, 42 mortars, 30 heavy machine guns and 93 machine guns.

On August 7, units of the 27th Division fought a stubborn battle with the 14th Finnish Division, which was advancing on the village of Andronova Gora. The enemy command sought to break through to the Kochkoma station and cut the Kirov railway. The Finnish battalion managed to cross the Chirkokem River and penetrate our defenses. With a counterattack from the flanks, units of the 27th Division defeated this battalion. The enemy left 160 corpses, 4 heavy and 3 light machine guns, many rifles, machine guns and cartridges on the battlefield. After unsuccessful attacks from the front, the Finns began to regroup their forces, intending to go to the rear of our troops in the area of ​​​​the village of Novaya Tiksha and cut the Andronova Gora - Rugozero highway. But their plan was promptly guessed and thwarted.

On August 15, the enemy still managed to break through the defenses of the 27th Division. On the night of August 16, Soviet troops secretly retreated to the Pizma River. This small river in itself could not serve as a serious obstacle, but on its eastern bank the local population built a good defensive line. The Finns, who had suffered heavy losses in previous battles, were unable to overcome this milestone straight away. They had to pull up reserves.

On August 19, the enemy again launched strong attacks. Bloody battles on the Pisma River continued. Only on September 6 did the Finns manage to break into our defenses. They threw fresh forces into the breakthrough. The entire next day the fighting did not subside for a single minute. Here, for the first time and, perhaps, the only time during the entire “long” war, our units successfully used flamethrowers. There were about forty of them in the 27th division. The commander concentrated this formidable weapon at that time on the most likely direction of enemy attack. The flamethrower team consisted of the most persistent and courageous soldiers. They allowed the Finns to come within 25-30 meters and only then released a stream of fire, the length of which did not exceed 35 meters. A barrage of fire fell on the enemy. The surviving Finns rushed back in panic.

The next day the enemy resumed attacks. They were especially fierce on September 10 and 11, when a fresh regiment, which had previously been in reserve, and a separate Jaeger battalion entered the battle. The Military Council of the 7th Army ordered the 27th Division to withdraw to a newly prepared defensive line 10 km east of Rugozero. On September 12, the division occupied this line. Here, 70 km west of Kochkoma station, she held the defense until the end of the war.

The Finnish 14th Division tried more than once to break through to Kochkoma, but, having suffered heavy losses, went on the defensive at the end of September. Until the end of the war, the Finns did not advance another step.

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Planned operations of Germany and Finland in the Kola Arctic at the beginning of the war

By the beginning of the attack on the Soviet Union, in accordance with the Barbarossa plan, a group of German and Finnish troops was deployed on the territory of Norway and Northern Finland: from Varanger Fiord to Suomussalmi - a separate German army "Norway" (Colonel General N. Falkenhorst), subordinate directly to the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht; from Kuhmo to Varkaus - the Finnish Karelian and to the south of it - the South-Eastern Army, subordinate to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Field Marshal K. Mannerheim. In total, this group consisted of more than 530 thousand people, 206 tanks, over 4,300 guns and mortars. The German 5th Air Fleet and the Finnish Air Force (547 aircraft in total) were allocated to support it. German naval forces (5 destroyers, 6 submarines and other ships) were concentrated in the ports of Norway, and the Finnish Navy (up to 60 ships) was concentrated in the Gulf of Finland.

Wehrmacht units in the Kandalaksha direction. 1941

Army Norway (33rd, 36th and 70th Army Corps, Mountain Corps Norway, 160 separate coastal batteries) was entrusted with carrying out Operation Blaufuchs (Blue Fox). In accordance with its plan, the Norway mountain corps (2nd and 3rd mountain divisions) was to strike in the Murmansk direction with the goal of capturing the Northern Fleet naval base in Polyarny within two weeks and blocking the Kola Bay, and in subsequently, in cooperation with the 36th Army Corps, capture Murmansk. This corps (169th infantry division, SS mountain division "North", two tank battalions), advancing in the Kandalaksha direction, was supposed to reach the White Sea in the Kandalaksha area, cut the Kirov railway here, and then, moving north along this roads, in cooperation with the Norway mountain corps, destroy Soviet troops on the Kola Peninsula and capture Murmansk. The Finnish 3rd Army Corps (3rd and 6th Infantry Divisions), which was operationally subordinate to the commander of Army Norway, was to strike in the Kestengsky and Ukhtinsky directions, capture Ukhta, Kestenga, the village of Louhi and cut the Kirov railway to the north Kem. The mission of the 5th Air Fleet included supporting ground forces, striking port facilities in Murmansk, blocking exits to the Arctic Ocean and the actions of the Soviet Northern Fleet. The German naval forces were entrusted with ensuring the defense of the coast of Northern Norway and Petsamo.

The Finnish 14th Infantry Division was to attack in the Rebolsky direction. The troops of the Karelian Army were supposed to strike in the Petrozavodsk and Olonets directions, capture the southern regions of Karelia, and reach the river. Svir and connect in this area with the troops of the German Army Group North. The Southeastern Army (2nd and 4th Army Corps, 17th Infantry Division) was tasked with capturing the Karelian Isthmus, joining the forces of Army Group North in the Leningrad area, occupying the peninsula and the Hanko naval base.

Subsequently, the plan for Operation Blaufuchs was to capture Arkhangelsk and, before the onset of cold weather, interrupt the northern sea and land communications connecting the Soviet Union with the outside world, as well as cut off the northern regions of the USSR from its central regions. The transition to the offensive was envisaged at different times and depended on the timing of the arrival of the troops of Army Group North to the river line. Western Dvina.

Covering the Soviet-Finnish state border by Directive No. 3 of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR dated June 22, 1941, was entrusted to the troops of the Northern Front, created on the basis of the administration of the Leningrad Military District under the command of Lieutenant General. The front included the 14th, 7th and 23rd armies, numbering 402 thousand people, 1543 tanks, 7750 guns and mortars, 1678 aircraft. The border detachments of the Murmansk, Karelo-Finnish and Leningrad border districts were transferred to operational subordination to the front commander.

On the northern coast of the Kola Peninsula (up to 300 km) and in the strip from the Barents Sea to the river. Pisto (about 550 km) the 14th Army (42nd Rifle Corps, 14th, 52nd Rifle and 1st Mixed Aviation Divisions, 23rd Murmansk Fortified Area) was deployed with the task of preventing the enemy naval fleet from breaking through into Kola and Motovsky bays, firmly cover Murmansk and the Kirov railway in the Kandalaksha and Loukhsky directions. Operationally, the Northern Fleet (32 surface ships, 15 submarines, 116 aircraft; rear admiral, from September 16, 1941 vice admiral), 72, 82, 100 and 101st border detachments were subordinate to the army commander, lieutenant general. , 35th separate border commandant's office of the Murmansk border district. The troops of the 7th Army (54, 71, 168, 237th Infantry, 55th Mixed Aviation Division, 26th Sortavala Fortified Area) had to, in cooperation with the Ladoga Military Flotilla, defend the state border from the river. Pisto to Ristalahti (480 km), prevent the enemy from reaching Lake Ladoga and ensure the uninterrupted operation of the Kirov Railway. The 1st, 3rd, 73rd and 80th border detachments of the Karelo-Finnish border district were operationally subordinate to the army commander, lieutenant general. Formations of the 23rd Army (19th, 50th Rifle and 10th Mechanized Corps, 27th and 28th fortified areas) covered the border along the Karelian Isthmus from the Gulf of Finland to Lake Ladoga with the task of preventing the enemy from attacking Leningrad with northwest.

By June 27, 1941, the troops of the Northern Front and the forces of the Northern Fleet were put on full combat readiness, and rifle formations and units took up defensive positions near the state border. At dawn on June 29, the Norway mountain corps, having a fourfold superiority in forces and means, after an hour and a half of artillery preparation and a raid of 120 bombers with the forces of two divisions, went on the offensive in the Murmansk direction. It marked the beginning of a strategic defensive operation in the Arctic and Karelia (June 29? October 10, 1941), within the framework of which defensive battles and operations were carried out in the Murmansk, Kandalaksha, Kestenga, Ukhtinsky, Rebolsk, Petrozavodsk, Olonets directions and the Vyborg-Kexholm defensive operation.

Defensive operation in the Murmansk direction.

Defensive battles of the 14th Army in the Murmansk direction. July - September 1941

In the Murmansk direction, troops of the 14th Army, supported by naval artillery fire from the Northern Fleet, put up stubborn resistance to the formations of the Norway mountain corps. Despite his superiority in strength, by the end of June 29 he managed to penetrate the defenses of the army troops by only 3-12 km, reach the isthmus of the Sredny Peninsula and the line of the river. Titovka, capturing a small bridgehead on its eastern bank. By decision of Army Commander Lieutenant General V.A. Frolov from Murmansk to the river area. The 52nd Infantry Division was transferred to Western Litsa. Its 112th Infantry Regiment stopped the enemy at the line of this river on July 2. In order to weaken his onslaught, by order of the army commander, on July 6, the ships of the Northern Fleet landed behind enemy lines in the Nerpichya Bay landing (2nd battalion of the 205th rifle regiment).

After a regrouping of forces, the enemy, resuming the offensive on July 7 with the support of aviation, crossed the river. Zapadnaya Litsa and wedged into the defenses of the 52nd Infantry Division. The next day, a new landing party (a battalion of border guards) was landed in the Bolshaya Zapadnaya Litsa Bay. The actions of the landing forces forced the commander of the mountain corps "Norway" to withdraw part of the forces operating against the 52nd Infantry Division, which, taking advantage of this, launched a counter-offensive, liquidated the bridgeheads captured by the enemy, and by the end of July 8, threw it back to the western bank of the river. Western Faces. By the end of July 11, parts of the corps were forced to go on the defensive in this direction.

The enemy, trying to break through to Murmansk, in mid-July transferred the 2nd battalion of the 136th mountain rifle regiment, the 67th scooter battalion and the 55th anti-tank division from the isthmus of the Sredny peninsula to the area of ​​the village of Bolshaya Zapadnaya Litsa. In turn, the commander of the 14th Army sent the 95th Infantry Regiment of the 14th Infantry Division to this area. On July 14, the ships of the Northern Fleet landed the third landing party (325th Infantry Regiment of the 14th Infantry Division) and a volunteer detachment of sailors on the northwestern coast of the Bolshaya Zapadnaya Litsa Bay and on Cape Pikshuev, and on July 16? another volunteer detachment of sailors of the Northern Fleet. The total number of amphibious assault forces was about 2.2 thousand people. Their attacks from the rear diverted enemy reserves intended to reinforce the troops operating against the 14th Army. By July 20, units of the 52nd and 14th Rifle Divisions, supported by artillery fire and air strikes from the 14th Army and the Northern Fleet, through their active actions forced the enemy to retreat to the line of the village of Bolshaya Zapadnaya Litsa, the waterfall, and then the western bank of the river. Western Faces and go on the defensive. On August 3, the paratroopers, who experienced a lack of food and ammunition and difficulties in evacuating the wounded, were evacuated by ships of the Northern Fleet to the eastern shore of the Bolshaya Zapadnaya Litsa Bay.

The stubborn resistance of the troops of the 14th Army forced the Wehrmacht High Command to make adjustments to its plans. According to Directive No. 34 of July 30, it was planned: in the “Norway” mountain corps zone, to eliminate the threat to its flank from the Motovsky Bay; “to make attempts to cut the Murmansk road in the zone of the 3rd (Finnish) army corps, and first of all in the direction of Loukhi”; suspend the attack on Kandalaksha. In August, the Norway mountain corps was reinforced by the 6th mountain division redeployed from Greece, the 9th SS motorized regiment, the 388th infantry regiment of the 214th infantry division, and the 4th separate battalion of the 199th infantry division redeployed from Norway. , Finnish 14th Infantry Regiment and received reinforcements (6,500 people).

The Supreme Command Headquarters, taking into account the significant length of the defense zone of the Northern Front troops, which were fighting in individual operational directions, in order to improve their management, by its directive of August 23, divided it into two fronts: Karelian (14th, 7th armies) and Leningrad (23rd, 8th and 48th armies; Lieutenant General M.M. Popov). The Karelian Front was headed by Lieutenant General V.A. Frolov, to whom the Northern Fleet was subordinated. On September 3, the Headquarters demanded that the front commander prevent further withdrawal of troops, create heavily fortified defensive lines, organize a powerful fire system, and allocate part of the forces to reserve. To reinforce the front troops, the 313th Infantry Division was transferred.

On September 8, the Norway mountain corps, with the support of the main forces of the 5th Air Fleet (up to 300 aircraft), launched a new offensive in the Murmansk direction. However, the enemy failed to break through to the city of Polyarny due to stubborn resistance from units of the 52nd Infantry Division. At the same time, he managed to push the left flank of the 14th Infantry Division to a depth of 8 km, capture a number of dominant heights and, in the area of ​​42 kilometers, cut the only road to Murmansk? the village of Bolshaya Zapadnaya Litsa, creating a threat of access to the Murmansk region. In this regard, the Supreme High Command Headquarters on September 16 demanded that General Frolov, with the support of naval artillery fire and Northern Fleet aviation strikes, restore the situation in the Murmansk direction and push the enemy back to their original position. On September 10, the reserve of the 14th Army was transferred to the area of ​​​​his breakthrough? Volunteer Polar Division. It, in cooperation with the 14th Infantry Division, stopped the enemy’s advance, and then both divisions launched a counteroffensive and threw back units of the 2nd Mountain Rifle Division to the west bank of the river. Western Faces. This forced the Wehrmacht High Command, by directive No. 36 of September 22, to temporarily suspend the offensive on Murmansk.

Defensive operation in the Kandalaksha direction.

The offensive in the Kandalaksha direction began on July 1 by the German 36th Army Corps and the Finnish 6th Infantry Division, supported by 100 tanks. During fierce battles, they managed to break through to the Barracks area, north of Kuolajärvi and create a threat of exit from the north to the rear of the 122nd Infantry Division of the 42nd Infantry Corps. In order to prevent its encirclement, the corps commander, Major General, with the permission of the commander of the 14th Army, by the end of July 8, took the division to the line of lakes Kuolajärvi and Alayarvi, where the second line of defense was prepared and the 104th Infantry Division was located (without the 242nd Infantry Division shelf). The enemy, developing the offensive, on July 10 entered the area 10 km east of Kailara. The commander of the 42nd Rifle Corps brought his reserve and division reserves into the battle, which on the night of July 11 encircled and completely destroyed large enemy forces that had broken through into this area. This forced him to temporarily suspend the offensive in the Kandalaksha direction.

On August 19, the German 36th Army Corps, significantly replenished with men and military equipment, again launched an offensive against Kandalaksha. He attacked the flanks of the 42nd Rifle Corps, creating a threat of encirclement of its units. The corps commander no longer had reserves to parry enemy attacks. Therefore, the commander of the 14th Army ordered his units to withdraw to a previously prepared defensive line east of Alakurtti. An attempt by the 36th Army Corps, reinforced by the SS Division North, to continue the offensive was unsuccessful. Having suffered losses, the enemy went on the defensive in mid-September without reaching the Kirov Railway.

Defensive battles in the Kesteng direction.

In the Kestenga direction, the enemy launched an offensive in separate units from July 1 (Finnish detachment “Salvinen”, divisional group “J”, 2nd battalion of the 12th infantry regiment of the 6th infantry division and a border scooter company). However, as a result of stubborn resistance from the 242nd Infantry Regiment of the 104th Infantry Division and the 72nd Border Detachment, they were stopped on the river by the end of July 10. Sofyanga, having failed to force it in the twentieth of July. After the main forces of the SS Division North were transferred to the combat area from the Kandalaksha direction, the enemy, with the support of bomber aviation of the 5th Air Fleet, again went on the offensive on July 31. Having superiority in forces, he broke through the defenses of the 212th Infantry Regiment, crossed Sofyanga and captured a small bridgehead on its opposite bank. At the same time, a battalion of the 53rd Infantry Regiment was transported on motor boats through Topozero (8 - 10 km southwest of Kestenga), which, as a result of a counterattack by a specially created detachment (infantry, transport companies, three fighter squads, a platoon of the 80th regiment of railway troops NKVD) was thrown back to Topozer in the forest.

On August 4, by order of the commander of the 14th Army, Soviet units fought back to Kestenga. After three days of stubborn fighting, the 242nd Infantry Regiment left the city on the night of August 8 and retreated to the river line. Taka (5-6 km northeast of Kestenga). By order of the army commander, the Murmansk rifle regiment and a tank company were transferred to this area. From the scattered units operating in the Kestenga direction, the Murmansk Rifle Brigade was formed under the command of a colonel. A significant role in organizing resistance to the enemy in this direction was played by the army's auxiliary command post, headed by the army chief of staff, colonel. At the request of the commander of the 14th Army, the Supreme Command Headquarters sent the 88th Infantry Division from Arkhangelsk to the Kestengi area. On September 3, it went on the offensive and, in cooperation with the Murmansk Rifle Brigade, having advanced 15 km, on September 12 it reached the line of Lake Yanisjärvi, Loukh-Guba, where it took up defensive positions.

Defensive battles in the Ukhta direction.

In the Ukhta direction, the offensive from July 1 was led by the Finnish 3rd Infantry Division of the 3rd Army Corps. However, as a result of the heroic efforts of the forward detachment of the 54th Infantry Division of the 7th Army and the 1st Border Detachment, after 10 days of fighting, it was stopped at the front edge of the main defense line created on the eastern bank of the river. Voinitsa. The commander of the 3rd Army Corps, having regrouped, launched a new offensive on July 14 after artillery and air preparation. The enemy managed to achieve success by striking the flanks of the 54th Infantry Division. This forced the commander of the 7th Army, Lieutenant General F.D. Gorelenko to withdraw parts of the division to a more advantageous line for defense between the Bolshoy Kis-Kis and Chirkiyarvi lakes, 10 km west of Ukhta. At this point, on July 31 and early September, they repelled all enemy attempts to resume the offensive.

Defensive battles in the Rebolsky direction.

In this direction, on the morning of July 4, the Finnish 14th Infantry Division went on the offensive. Despite more than threefold superiority in forces and means, the 337th Infantry Regiment of the 54th Infantry Division and the 73rd Border Detachment, skillfully using engineering and mine-explosive barriers, held back the enemy’s advance for three days. And only after he captured the flanks of the 337th Infantry Regiment did the commander of the 7th Army decide on July 8 to leave Rebola. The regiment's units retreated to the Emelyanovka, Virda sector, which they held for 13 days. To strengthen the regiment, a rifle battalion was sent, formed from the guards of the White Sea-Baltic Canal and the airfield, police officers and the local population. The battalion, having completed a 150-kilometer march, on the morning of July 27 immediately entered battle with the enemy in the area southwest of Lake Mui. To help him, by the morning of July 28, another battalion was created from the retreating rear units and two rifle companies of the 54th Infantry Division. Both battalions were combined into the consolidated 345th Infantry Regiment. To improve the management of units operating in the Rebolsk direction, in accordance with the order of the commander of the Northern Front dated July 29, the Rebolsk operational group was formed under the command of the head of the operational department of the army headquarters, Colonel. It included the combined 345th and 337th rifle regiments, a mountain rifle battalion, an artillery division, mortar, engineer and partisan companies, and the 73rd border detachment. The troops of the Rebolsk group, with the active help of the local population, created a new defensive line in the Andronova Gora area. Relying on it, they put up stubborn resistance to the enemy, who was trying to cut the Kirov Railway in the area of ​​​​the Kochkoma station.

On August 10, the Rebolsky operational group, by order of the commander of the 7th Army, was transformed into the 27th Infantry Division under the command of Colonel G.K. Kozlova. On September 11, the Finnish command, having strengthened the 14th Infantry Division with units from the Ukhta direction, resumed the offensive in the Rebolsk direction. Units of the 27th Rifle Division steadfastly repelled repeated enemy attacks until September 27, and then, on the orders of the commander of the Karelian Front, retreated to the main defensive line east of Rugozero. All subsequent attempts by the 14th Infantry Division to break through the defenses here were unsuccessful.

Defensive operation in the Petrozavodsk and Olonets directions.

In the Petrozavodsk and Olonets directions, the troops of the Finnish Karelian Army, which had a 4-fold superiority in strength, on July 2 struck at the junction of the 7th and 23rd armies in the Ristalahti area, managing to wedge into their defenses. However, a counterattack by the 260th Infantry Regiment (without the battalion) of the 168th Infantry Division, the 187th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion and units of the 142nd Infantry Division on the morning of July 7 restored the situation in this direction. Units of the 71st Infantry Division also offered stubborn resistance to the enemy. The commander of the Karelian Army, having brought the main forces into the battle, resumed the offensive on July 10 after powerful, lengthy artillery and air preparation. Despite the heroism of the Soviet soldiers, Finnish troops managed to reach the river line by July 15. Janis-Joki, where they were stopped by the forces of units of the 168th Infantry Division and the 367th Infantry Regiment of the 71st Infantry Division that retreated here. The commander of the Northern Front, trying to prevent the enemy from breaking through to the Kirov Railway, reinforced the 7th Army with several separate rifle regiments, subunits and a tank regiment. In order to more effectively control the troops, by July 21, Petrozavodsk was created (24th and 9th motorized rifle, 10th reserve rifle and 2nd tank regiments, fighter detachment, 2nd division of the 102nd howitzer artillery regiment; general lieutenant) and Southern (3rd Marine Brigade, 452nd, 719th and 7th separate rifle regiments, battalion of Leningrad volunteers, armored division, artillery and mortar divisions; lieutenant general) operational groups. On July 23, the Petrozavodsk operational group launched a counterattack on Loymola, and the Southern one on Pitkyaranta, stopping the enemy’s advance.

On July 31, the Finnish South-Eastern Army began its offensive on the Karelian Isthmus. The Supreme Command headquarters, trying to disrupt its offensive, in early August ordered the commander of the Northern Front to intensify the actions of the 7th Army troops in the Petrozavodsk and Olonets directions. The army received the 272nd Infantry Division and the 3rd People's Militia Division for reinforcement. Limited forces and means, their scattering on a wide front, as well as weak artillery support did not allow us to fully complete the task. But to repel the counterattacks of the 7th Army, the enemy was forced to use the 4th and 17th infantry divisions, intended for the offensive on the Karelian Isthmus.

The troops of the Karelian Army, having received four infantry divisions and two infantry brigades for reinforcement, went on the offensive again on September 4, with the support of aviation. In the Petrozavodsk direction, units of the 7th and 6th Army Corps broke through the defenses of the troops of the Petrozavodsk operational group and on September 20 divided them into two parts, which retreated to the line of the river. Svir. In the Olonets direction, the 6th Army Corps, having broken through the defenses of the Southern Operational Group, also dismembered its two parts and captured Olonets on September 5. Developing the offensive, on September 7 he reached the northern bank of the river. Svir, in the Lodeynoye Pole, Svirstroy section, cut the Kirov railway and crossed the river, capturing a small bridgehead on its southern bank.

In order to improve command and control of troops, the 7th Army with all its troops, institutions and the Onega military flotilla, by a directive of the Supreme High Command Headquarters on September 24, was separated from the Karelian Front and renamed into the 7th separate army with direct subordination to Headquarters. Instead of Lieutenant General F.D. Gorelenko was appointed army general as commander of the army. On the southern bank of the river. Svir was deployed by the 314th Infantry Division, transferred from the Headquarters reserve, as well as the 67th Infantry Division and the 3rd Marine Brigade.

On September 30, the enemy, having brought two infantry divisions and several tank battalions from his reserve into the battle, managed to break through the defenses of the Petrozavodsk operational group and reach Petrozavodsk. In order to avoid its encirclement, Army General Meretskov on October 2 allowed parts of the group to leave Petrozavodsk and retreat to the northern bank of the river. Shuya. After the capture of Petrozavodsk, Finnish troops continued to develop an offensive in the Medvezhyegorsk direction, for the defense of which on October 11, the Medvezhyegorsk operational group (37, 71 and 313th rifle divisions, 2nd light rifle brigade; major general) was created with direct subordination to the commander of the Karelian Front .

Vyborg-Kexholm defensive operation.

The offensive on the Karelian Isthmus began on July 31 by the Finnish South-Eastern Army. The troops of the 23rd Army (Lieutenant General, from August 6, Lieutenant General M.N. Gerasimov, from September 9, Major General), despite stubborn resistance, were forced to leave Khiitola on August 11, and Sortavala on August 16. On August 25, units of the 2nd Army Corps cut the Vyborg-Leningrad railway, and one of the divisions of the 4th Army Corps, having crossed the Vyborg Bay, occupied Vyborg, abandoned by Soviet troops, on August 29. By September 4, Finnish troops pushed back the formations of the 23rd Army to the state border line of 1939, where they secured a foothold on the line of the Karelian fortified area. This allowed the enemy to release part of the forces and transfer them to the Petrozavodsk direction with the aim of capturing the Kirov railway.

As a result of the active defensive actions of the troops of the Northern (from August 23, 1941 Karelian) Front and the 7th Separate Army, the enemy was unable to fully implement the plan of Operation Blue Fox to capture the Arctic and Karelia and unite Finnish troops with Army Group North in area of ​​Leningrad. Soviet troops pinned down 8 German and 12 Finnish divisions, which prevented the Wehrmacht Supreme Command from using them in other sectors of the Soviet-German front. The troops of the Northern (Karelian) Front acquired significant experience in organizing and conducting defensive battles and operations in difficult conditions of forested-lake terrain on a wide front and in disparate directions, organizing and maintaining interaction with aviation, the forces of the Northern Fleet, the Ladoga and Onega military flotillas. For courage, heroism and military skill, the 52nd Rifle Division was reorganized into the 10th Guards Rifle Division on December 26, 1941. The losses of Soviet troops were: irrecoverable - 67,265, sanitary - 68,448 people, 546 tanks, 540 guns and mortars, 64 aircraft. German troops lost about 20.7 thousand people (of which 4.4 thousand were killed), and Finnish troops lost about 46.4 thousand, including 9.9 thousand people killed.

Subsequently, active hostilities were conducted mainly in three operational directions. On October 17, 1941, troops of the 14th Army, with the support of aviation and artillery of the Northern Fleet, launched a counterattack in the Murmansk direction, forcing units of the German 3rd Mountain Rifle Division to retreat beyond the river. Western Faces. In the Kestenga direction, the Kem task force, created on September 14 under the command of Major General, stopped the advance of the Finnish 3rd Army Corps during November, throwing it back to its original positions. In the Medvezhyegorsk direction, the troops of the Karelian Army managed to break the resistance of units of the 71st and 313th Infantry Divisions, which left Medvezhyegorsk on December 6 and retreated across the ice to the eastern shore of the Povenets Bay. By mid-December 1941, the enemy was completely stopped at the turn of the river. Western Litsa (60 km west of Murmansk), a system of rivers and lakes (90 km west of Kandalaksha), 40 km west of Loukha, 10 km west of Ukhta, Rugozero, Maselgskaya station, Povenets, Lake Onega, river. Svir. At this point, the front line remained stable until June 1944.

Vladimir Daines,
Leading Researcher at the Scientific Research Institute
Institute of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces,
Candidate of Historical Sciences