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In the USSR since the early 1930s. issues of preparation for a possible war were constantly in the field of view of the country's political and military leadership. Their decision was reflected in the military doctrine of the Soviet state. Along with this, there was a search for the most effective methods of conducting armed struggle.
The scientific foundation of the military doctrine was the Marxist-Leninist understanding of the development of social processes, including war and the army. In accordance with this, from the very beginning it was developed based on the state’s commitment to peace, and therefore, in military-political terms, it was defensive in nature. The fundamental assertion was that wars are now waged by peoples and that it is necessary to mobilize all the forces and resources of the state. Great importance was attached to moral and economic factors. Taking all this into account, enormous efforts were made to industrialize the country, increase its economic independence and defense power.
The question of which enemy would have to be fought first began to emerge clearly with the Nazis coming to power in Germany, the emergence of a bloc of fascist states and the intensification of anti-Soviet policies on the part of Japan. It was from this time that the position remained unchanged in all operational plans of the General Staff that the Soviet Union must be prepared for war against Germany in the West and Japan in the East.
In the event of aggression, it was planned to first repel the enemy's blow, then deliver a powerful retaliatory strike with the transfer of military operations beyond the borders of one's country with the goal of crushing defeat. The Field Manual of 1939 emphasized that if war was imposed, the Red Army would become the most attacking army. It was emphasized in every possible way that the Soviet people do not want war, but are ready to respond blow to blow or even a “double blow” to the blow of the aggressor.
Thus, Soviet military doctrine was based on the possibility of a two-front war against a coalition of several states. Understanding the inevitability of a military clash with Germany and Japan, the Soviet leadership, however, did not correctly assess the possible timing of the outbreak of aggression. It was considered unlikely that Germany would decide to fight a war on two fronts simultaneously and would launch a campaign against the USSR only after Great Britain left the war.

The military personnel, weakened as a result of repression, had not fully mastered the achievements of military science that were available at the beginning of the war, and practical skills in their application were also insufficient. It is known that for success, in addition to deep theoretical knowledge, the skills of operational and tactical thinking, a creative approach to business, and a quick objective assessment of the situation are important. To this we must add courage and determination, initiative and independence, firmness and perseverance. All these qualities are by no means innate, but are developed in the process of combat and operational training, throughout military service, even in peacetime. But this is exactly what they didn’t really do before the war. There was, perhaps, no military leader or commander who did not theoretically understand and did not know from past experience about the need to concentrate the main efforts on the decisive direction, create strike groups, thorough reconnaissance and reliable fire defeat of the enemy. And yet, considerable time passed, considerable effort and sacrifice were required before they were able to master the art of solving these and other equally important problems.

The interwar period can be characterized as:

• The temporary period of formation of a huge number of new states;
• The period of the global economic crisis of 1929 – 1933;
• The time of gradual and stage-by-stage recognition of the socialist state in the international political arena;
• Increased aggression on the part of Germany towards the states that won World War 1;
• Carrying out a policy of exporting revolution on the part of the USSR;
• The policy of rapprochement between the totalitarian regimes of the USSR and Germany, the apogee of which was the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

Let's begin by considering the general trends in Soviet foreign policy of this period.

Traits

The foreign policy aspirations of the USSR during these years can be characterized as follows:

• Breaking the blockade;
• Exporting revolution by creating communist parties and organizations around the world;
• Establishing economic cooperation with European countries.

Goals

The main goals of the USSR in the period after the creation of the state in the external arena:

• Confession;
• Forming as many allies as possible;
• Development of a network of communist organizations by influencing the masses through the Comintern;
• Expanding the territory of the state by restoring the borders of the Russian Empire;
• Development of economic and trade relations with other countries to implement the tasks of industrialization of the Soviet state.

Tasks

The Foreign Policy Department of the USSR, under the leadership of Chicherin, Litvinov and other diplomats, performed the following tasks:

• International recognition of a socialist state;
• Formation of developed contractual relations with most major countries of the world;
• Involvement and participation of the USSR in international conferences;
• Entry into the League of Nations as the completion of the recognition procedure;
• Providing all-powerful assistance to friendly states, including military assistance.

Basic principles of foreign policy

The theory of the Union's foreign policy was built on the following principles:

Proletarian internationalism- unity of interests of the working population in the struggle for their rights and for the overthrow of the capitalist masters, that is, the exploiting class;

Peaceful coexistence with the capitalist system. This principle appeared when it became clear that an instant revolution was impossible. The Union decided to show the desire for peaceful coexistence of two opposing systems.

If we talk about the policy of Western countries towards the USSR, we can highlight the following points:

Non-recognition of the Union by the leading world powers from the European continent at the beginning of the existence of the USSR (until approximately 1925);

Combating the spread of communist ideas;

The gradual establishment of diplomatic relations with the Union (for example, one can recall);

US participation with its own interests. The States were not interested in a very strong Western Europe. It was important for them to create a certain balance of power on the continent in order to keep the situation under control as much as possible. For example, according to the Dawes Plan, assistance was provided to Germany to revive its industry. Due to economic growth, Germany paid reparations to England and France. At the same time, the Germans were obliged to repay their debt to America by increasing trade turnover with the Union;

Creating a system of checks and balances. Developed Germany became a counterweight to England and France. The revived military potential of the Germans (according to the Americans' plans) will restrain the USSR's efforts to export the revolution.

No one in the West was interested in the development of the USSR, but at the same time, diplomats understood the inevitability of recognition and the gradual development of relations on the principle of peaceful coexistence.

Three stages of foreign policy of this period

1922 – 1933

During these years, the main emphasis of the USSR's policy was aimed at recognizing the state as a subject of international relations. Trade agreements were concluded and representative offices were opened in different countries. Soviet diplomats took part in international conferences, among which are:

• The Hague;
• Moscow;
• Preparatory conference for the creation of the League of Nations;
• Cannes.

An important point in the Union's foreign policy during this period was the signing of a system of non-aggression treaties with other states. In particular, we are talking about Turkey, Iran, Lithuania and other countries.

Of course, the most important area of ​​activity of allied diplomacy is considered to be full-fledged opposition to the plans of the United States and other major political players in the capitalist world in creating a military anti-Soviet bloc.

1933 – 1939

After Hitler came to power in Germany and the establishment of the fascist dictatorship in Italy and Japan, a new task appeared before the world - to unite to preserve peace for as long as possible. In 1934, the USSR was invited to the League of Nations. The Union established diplomatic relations with different countries, signed mutual assistance agreements, tried to create an expanded anti-Hitler coalition, and participated in the signing of the London Convention of 1933.

1939 – 1940

A short and very tragic period. Realizing that Germany is sweeping away everything and everyone in Europe, and the security system of the League of Nations is not working, the vector of foreign policy is changing. Signed on August 23, 1939. The main part of the document spoke about the mutual non-aggression of the two countries against each other, and in the secret part, Europe was divided into spheres of influence almost in half.

During this period, World War II began. In addition, as a result of the USSR’s attack on Poland, territories with a Ukrainian population were annexed to the USSR.

The first agreements with European countries in 1920 - early 1921.

The diplomacy of Soviet Russia during this period concluded the following agreements:

• 02.1920 – agreement with Estonia;
• 11.1920 – agreement with Latvia (recognition of the state’s independence);
• 03.1921 – Moscow Treaty with Turkey on brotherhood and friendship, which resolved territorial issues regarding the lands of Armenia.

Diplomatic recognition of the USSR

The main wave of recognition of the USSR by other countries was in the period from 1923 to 1925. During this period, according to chronological data, diplomatic relations with the Union were established in 20 states. If we talk about major world players, the Union was recognized:

• USA - November 16, 1933;
• Yugoslavia - 06/24/1940;
• Great Britain - 02/02/1924.

The inconsistency of USSR foreign policy

The main contradiction in the policy of the USSR in the 1920s was that the Comintern, fully supported by the Union, promoted the idea of ​​​​the peaceful existence of a socialist state in a capitalist environment, and the state itself officially established peaceful diplomatic relations with a number of countries in the world.

Complications of relations with England and France

The aggravation of relations with England began after the government of Stanley Baldwin came to power in 1924. He had an extremely bad attitude towards the USSR, so he did his best to slow down the ratification of all treaties with the Union. Relations became even worse in 1928 after the refusal of striking miners from England to accept material assistance from Soviet trade unions. Baldwin accused the Union of interfering in the internal affairs of his country.

Relations with France during this period were also not friendly. In early 1930, the country joined the US-initiated trade blockade of the Soviets.

International conferences with the participation of Russia in 1922 – 1933.

International treaties with the participation of Russia 1922 - 1933.

In 1922, the Rappalo Peace Treaty was signed between the USSR and Germany, the main terms of which are as follows:

• Restoration of diplomatic relations;
• Waiver of claims for damages;
• Recognition of the economic principle of most favored nation;
• Intensifying the development of trade and economic relations.

Among the most important agreements with the participation of the USSR in that period, it is important to highlight the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928, the main idea of ​​which was the complete renunciation of military action as a negative way of resolving disputes and conflicts.

International conflicts 1923, 1927, 1929

International communist movement in the 1920s

The USSR, in its international activities, not only negotiated with states, but also developed the communist movement around the world. At the Third Congress of the Communist International in 1921, the following decisions were made:

• Develop a network of communist parties;
• Create youth and other social organizations of a communist nature, including among the working masses of capitalist countries.

In the early 20s, at the behest of the USSR, organizations such as Profintern and MOPR were created.

Communist organizations also contributed to the international recognition of the Union.

New goals and objectives of foreign policy in the 1930s

The foreign policy of the Union in the 1930s was subject to the following goals:

Refusal to participate in military conflicts. At the Geneva Conference of 1932–1934, the Soviet delegation put forward a project for the complete disarmament of the armies of European states. The proposal itself was not accepted, but the United States and partners put forward the “Macdonald Plan,” which provided for the establishment of limits on the number of ground and air forces;

Creation of a system of collective security in Europe against the potentially serious threat of German aggression. The USSR proposed concluding a comprehensive Eastern Pact, but this did not work out. In 1935, mutual assistance agreements were signed with France and Czechoslovakia.

Foreign policy of the USSR in the 1930s

As part of pan-European policy, the main task of the Union before 1939 was to maximally counteract potential aggression from Hitler.

The attitude of the USSR to events in the Far East

Beginning in 1931, Japan began active military operations against China, gradually taking away parts of its territory in Manchuria. The Chinese leadership, led by Chiang Kai-shek, offered virtually no resistance, as they were in collusion with the Japanese. In September 1931, China turned to the League of Nations with a request for help in resolving the issue of aggression. A few months later, LN sent a commission, the report of which stated that there was a threat to Japan from the Chinese border. The LN approved and agreed on the establishment of special Japanese interests in this territory.

The provocation of a military conflict between Japan and the USSR took place in December 1932, when the Japanese drove a group of Chinese soldiers onto Soviet territory. The Soviets hosted the soldiers and eventually signed a non-aggression pact with China. In response to Japanese protests, the NKID proposed signing a similar agreement with Japan.

USSR and the war with Spain

The years 1936–1939 were marked by the Spanish Civil War. The USSR supported the republican government in force at that time. This support materialized in the provision of significant military assistance (648 aircraft, 347 light tanks, 60 armored vehicles, 1,186 artillery pieces) and the participation of military consultants.

USSR entry into the League of Nations

The fight against Japanese aggression

Another deterioration in Soviet-Japanese relations began in 1938. Main manifestations:

• battle in the area of ​​Lake Khasan (1938);
• conflict at Khalkhin Gol (1939);
• creation of the Far Eastern Front (1940).

With the beginning of the 1940s, the USSR and Japan agreed to sign a neutrality treaty.

Rapprochement between the USSR and Germany

In 1939, several agreements were signed between the countries:

• August 19 – trade (supplies of machines and equipment in exchange for supplies of products);
• August 23 – non-aggression pact with a secret document on the division of zones of influence;
• September 28 – treaty of friendship and border along the Curzon line (legalization of the partition of Poland).

Munich Agreement 1938

An agreement was signed between representatives of Britain, Italy, France and Germany on the division of Czechoslovakia and the inclusion of the Sudetenland into Germany. The USSR did not take part in the conspiracy.

Expansion of the territory of the USSR in 1939 – 1940

During these years, the following were annexed to the territory of the USSR:

• Western Ukraine,
• Western Belarus,
• part of the Finnish lands after the war with Finland,
• Baltics.

The war with Finland began on November 30, 1939 due to alleged artillery shelling from Finland. It ended on March 14, 1940 with the signing of a peace treaty fixing the transfer of 11% of the country’s territories under the leadership of the USSR,

Beginning of World War II

In fact, the start of the war was laid by the secret part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939. The Germans began military operations against Poland on September 1, 1939, and the Soviet army started with the development of “their” part of Poland 2 weeks later.

The results of the foreign policy of the USSR in the 20s - 30s

The main results of the first two decades of the existence of the USSR in foreign policy are:

• recognition of the state by leading world powers;
• active participation in international relations;
• development of a network of communist organizations around the world;
• an unsuccessful attempt to form a European system of collective security.

Answers on questions

How were international relations different at the beginning of the 20th century and in the 20s and 30s?— The main difference is the creation of a new type of state in the person of the USSR and the struggle of the countries of the capitalist world against it.

What new factors began to operate in world politics after the First World War?— We can highlight such moments as the fight against fascism and communism, as well as the global economic crisis of 1929 - 1933

Why in the 1930s? there was no strong coalition that could resist aggression from Germany, Italy and Japan?

— The Europeans counted on Germany to fulfill the agreements on maintaining neutrality and banning the development of the military-industrial complex. In addition, the interests of capitalist countries in the 30s were more aimed at fighting against the USSR and at some point did not understand the seriousness of the fascist threat.

• What changes occurred among the leading countries of the Western world after the First World War compared to the beginning of the 20th century? What caused them?— The main change is his promotion to the ranks of US leaders. This is due to the fact that the United States did not suffer much during the First World War and was able to increase its economic potential during this time.

  • How did the growing military threat manifest itself in the 1930s?
  • — Several factors can be identified:
  • creation of the Versailles system;
  • factor of revenge on the part of Germany;
  • the rise to power of fascist forces;

growth of aggressive sentiments in Germany, Japan, Italy;
American official doctrine has always provided and still provides for the option of launching a massive pre-emptive strike in the event that the American leadership comes to the conclusion, albeit erroneously, that the other side is preparing to launch a nuclear strike on the United States. Moreover, only the “conclusion” is enough, and not the aggression itself

In August 1948, the US National Security Council approved Directive No. 20/1, “US Objectives Regarding Russia.” It says:

“Our main goals regarding Russia:

a) reduce the power and influence of Moscow to the extent that it will no longer pose a threat to the peace and stability of international relations;

b) radically change the theory and practice of international relations, which is adhered to by the government in power in Russia.”

“It is primarily a matter of the Soviet Union being weak politically, militarily and psychologically compared to external forces beyond its control.”

These are the political goals of US military doctrine, as they were formulated by Washington leaders in secret directives of the late 40s. Behind these goals were specific plans for waging war against the USSR, developed down to the details, down to the number of atomic bombs that were supposed to destroy Moscow, Leningrad and other Soviet cities.

So, already in 1945, the Pentagon planned the atomic bombing of 20 Soviet cities. In 1948, it was planned to drop 200 atomic bombs on 70 Soviet cities (the Charioter plan); in 1949 - 300 bombs for 100 cities (Dropshot plan); in 1950 - 320 atomic bombs for 120 Soviet cities (Troyan plan)

But that is not all.

On July 25, 1980, US President Jimmy Carter signed the famous Directive No. 59 (PD-59), entitled "Principles of the Use of Nuclear Weapons".

Jimmy Carter signed a document regulating the rules of nuclear aggression against the USSR

Advisor to the President, General Odom became the author of this doctrine

The document, dedicated to a possible nuclear war with the USSR, was classified for a long time, although some of its provisions were leaked to the media. Now its full text has become available to the general public.
The directive stated

• use of high technology to detect Soviet nuclear facilities, including in Eastern Europe and North Korea
• It was planned to hit targets in a targeted manner and, having received data on the damage caused as soon as possible, to deliver a second strike if necessary.
• the use of nuclear weapons against regular units of the Soviet army will not lead to the apocalypse
• the war will be protracted - according to their estimates, it could take “days and weeks” to discover all targets worthy of targeted destruction with nuclear missiles.

To this day, this military doctrine is the main one in the United States.

Military doctrine of the USSR

In the USSR everything was different. For many years, Joseph Stalin's military doctrine was fundamental.

The military doctrine, taking into account the presence of nuclear weapons in the United States, was drawn up by the Soviet military command in the late 1940s. It included the following provisions

• The USSR categorically refused aggression against any country
• In the event of aggression, the USSR entered into a full-scale war with the aggressor and repelled the attack by all possible means
• In the event of aggression, the USSR took all possible measures to strike retaliation against the aggressor outside the USSR

The last point was the main difficulty - the USSR, even possessing atomic weapons, nevertheless could not strike at US territory. The Soviet leadership had to improvise.

In the end, we came up with this arrangement.

The United States would launch a nuclear attack from the air, countered by Soviet air defense and attacks on American air bases.

Soviet ground forces would launch a counteroffensive in Europe and possibly also in the Middle East to prevent the United States from using these regions as springboards to attack the Soviet Union.

The atomic bomb was seen as a strategic weapon that the United States would use against targets behind the lines rather than against troops on the battlefield, where it would be comparatively ineffective.

Stalin's military doctrine provided for immediate retaliation against the aggressor on his territory or the territory of his allies

In the event of aggression, the USSR army would immediately begin to attack and strike at enemy territory.

The correct answer, then, would be air defense, supplemented by attacks on American air bases.

Ground forces must be prepared for a counteroffensive to prevent American troops from landing on the continent. If the United States were pushed out of the continent, it would become much more difficult to conduct a successful strategic bombing campaign.

The confidence that the country would not perish was rooted in part in the belief that an effective military strategy could be developed to counter the atomic bomb. The Soviet Union occupies a vast territory, has rich natural resources and human reserves, and industrial enterprises are scattered throughout the country.

In January 1950, he appointed Malyshev Minister of Shipbuilding, and the following month he created a new Ministry of the Navy.

Stalin decided that the Soviet Union needed to have more than just a coastal defense force. The fleet must threaten NATO transport links and bases, as well as interfere with the supply and transport of troops from the United States to Europe in the event of war.

In 1950, Stalin decided to strengthen the navy.

He initiated a new shipbuilding program that included cruisers, destroyers, escort ships, and naval submarine chasers, as well as submarines themselves.
Stalin's military doctrine became the main one for the USSR for many years. She reliably defended the USSR.

In the 1960s-1980s, the military doctrine included the following provisions

• renunciation of aggression against sovereign countries
• giving our nuclear missile forces the ability to inflict guaranteed retaliatory nuclear missile retaliation against the aggressor in the event of the most unfavorable consequences for us of his nuclear missile attack.

The concept of a guaranteed retaliatory strike was approved by the USSR Defense Council at the end of July 1969, despite the objections of then Defense Minister Grechko, who was a supporter of the concept of a retaliatory strike as more effective.

Marshal Andrei Grechko believed that a nuclear strike on the United States should be launched as soon as it becomes known that US ballistic missiles are heading towards the USSR

But his point of view was not taken into account, it was decided that nuclear weapons could only be used after a strike on the territory of the USSR

Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, who headed the General Staff until the fall of 1984, also believed that the strike should be launched as soon as the tracking systems detected the approach of American missiles

In September 1984, Ogarkov was removed from the post of Chief of the General Staff and Sergei Akhromeev was appointed in his place, who immediately began developing his own doctrine, completely opposite to the views of Grechko and Ogarkov

One of the participants in that meeting of the Defense Council summed up the outcome of the heated discussion that took place there as follows: “From now on, there can be only one basis for launching a nuclear missile strike on the enemy - nuclear explosions of enemy missiles on the territory of the USSR.”

This was the case until “perestroika”.

Change of doctrine
The revision of Soviet military doctrine began under Gorbachev

In connection with the proclamation of “new thinking,” the core of which Gorbachev initially called “the priority of the survival of mankind,” the General Staff could not help but face the task of trying to break this vicious circle.

And the General Staff, on its own initiative at the end of 1985 (I knew about this privately from Marshal Akhromeyev), began working on updating the Soviet military doctrine

Although in fact, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev began working on a new doctrine since 1983, without showing it to the country's leadership.

The Chief of the General Staff of the USSR, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, had been developing a new doctrine since 1984, and by the time Gorbachev came to power, its main provisions were already ready.

He also developed a project for complete nuclear disarmament by the year 2000...

Marshal Akhromeyev recalled it this way:

“The military doctrine of the Soviet Union, which was in force until 1986, was formed during the period of the Cold War and the military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

At that time, military doctrine in the Soviet Union was understood as the officially adopted system of views in the state on military development, on preparing the country and the Armed Forces to repel possible aggression, as well as on methods of conducting armed struggle to defend the Fatherland in the event of aggression. Thus, in its content, the Soviet military doctrine covered the sum of those issues that required development, solution and implementation in the event that war could not be prevented.

Preventing war was the fundamental task of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. All problems related to this task were dealt with by the party and state leadership. The military leaders acted as consultants and advisors.

But already from the late 60s, when the country’s Armed Forces themselves, their quantity and quality, even deployment, increasingly became the subject of international negotiations, military leaders naturally became full participants in both the development of a foreign policy course in the field of military activity and the negotiations on limiting and arms reduction.

Accordingly, a theoretical understanding of global military-political problems, the role and place of military leadership in their solution was required.

It became increasingly obvious that, at its core, the existing military doctrine was outdated and required revision. Issues of preventing war were to become the content of not only foreign policy, but also military doctrine.

Military doctrine must answer, first of all, four main questions, although this is far from exhausting its content.

These are the questions and answers to them that were given before.

1. Who (which states and coalitions) could be a likely adversary of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact? Until 1986, the answer was clear: the main likely enemy of the Soviet Union is the United States, and the Warsaw Pact Organization is NATO.

2. What war (to repel what aggression) should the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces, and, accordingly, the states and armies of the Warsaw Pact Organization be prepared for? This question was also not difficult to answer. The United States and NATO officially declared that, if necessary, they would be the first to use nuclear weapons in a war (although this was conditional on certain circumstances).

They prepared their armed forces for military action using both nuclear and conventional weapons. Consequently, we had no choice but to also prepare the army and navy to conduct combat operations in the same conditions.

3. What armed forces were necessary for the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact states to have?

By the mid-80s, the armed forces of the USSR and the USA, the Warsaw Pact and NATO were approximately equal, comparable, balancing each other, which required a high level of weapons (at the same time, huge material resources were taken away from peaceful construction).

4. How to prepare the armed forces to repel military aggression? This is the key question of those years."

Deputy Foreign Minister Gennady Kornienko wrote this:

“I, who participated in the “diplomatic fine-tuning” of the new military doctrine, will briefly dwell here only on two of its most important elements, which were directly related to “new thinking” in both the positive and negative meaning of these words.

First..

Preventing war was the fundamental task of the foreign policy of the Soviet state. Now the task of preventing war was also becoming an integral part of military doctrine, which entailed a certain change in emphasis in matters of military development.

Second.

In contrast to the previous military doctrine, developed by G.K. Zhukov and his associates, taking into account the lessons of the Great Patriotic War and stipulating that in the event of aggression, the Armed Forces of the USSR and its allies must not only stop the enemy, but immediately go on the offensive, in a new The doctrine - and this was its main novelty - provided that in the event of aggression against the USSR, its armed forces would repel the attack exclusively by defensive operations.

At the same time, political measures must be taken to end the conflict. And only if the war had not been stopped within a few weeks, then large-scale actions would have been launched to defeat the aggressor.

This was truly a radical change in the military-technical part of the Soviet military doctrine, which required a radical change in the army and navy, a rethinking of many strategic and tactical truths, and retraining of command personnel."

One provision of the new doctrine stated that after aggression against the USSR, the Soviet side for several weeks (!) The USSR would not strike back at the territory and bases of the aggressor

Instead of a retaliatory strike, Akhromeyev’s new doctrine proposed looking for.....a political solution

Simply put, the United States could well bomb the USSR and at the same time not receive a retaliatory strike at all

In the end, Marshal Akhromeyev outlined the essence of the doctrine as follows:

“Be that as it may, the General Staff developed the theory of a new military doctrine and military strategy. Generals V.I. Varennikov, V.A. Omelichev, M.A. Gareev, V.V. Korobushin provided me with great assistance in this. Discussed her with

the leadership of the General Staff.
Since the members were familiar with the problem, the discussion was relatively painless.

I then reported its principles to the Minister of Defense and received his approval. After this, shortly after returning from Reykjavik, I gave a presentation on the new Soviet military doctrine to the faculty of the General Staff Academy. In this report, I answered five cardinal questions contained in the doctrine in the spirit of the new foreign policy of the Soviet Union (and not four, as before).

1. About a potential enemy. Yes, we consider the United States and NATO to be our probable adversaries, since they also consider us as such. But we are ready to dismantle the mechanism of military confrontation with the United States and NATO in Europe. We are ready to act together in this direction.

2. About the nature of the war. For now, we are forced to prepare the armed forces for combat operations using nuclear and conventional weapons, since, again, such training is carried out by the United States and its allies. But we stand for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the world. We are ready to take practical measures, together with the leadership of the United States and NATO, to reduce tension and military danger in the world.

3. What kind of military do we need? As the military danger decreases, we are ready for bilateral and multilateral reductions, and, under certain conditions, for unilateral reductions in the army and navy. We are also ready to replace certain military measures with political ones in the course of creating a safe world.

4. And finally (this was something completely new and unexpected), in the event of aggression against us, we refuse to switch to offensive operations within a short time after its start."
.....
Akhromeev concludes:

“At the very end of 1986, the content and essence of the new Soviet military doctrine were reviewed and approved by the USSR Defense Council.

After this, familiarization with the new military doctrine of the senior command began. Soon, at a meeting following the results of 1986, the USSR Minister of Defense made a report on the new doctrine to the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, the command of military districts, fleets and armies. Publications appeared here and abroad.

It took time and great effort for the new military doctrine to be assimilated and accepted by the command staff of the army and navy.
The year 1986 was full of major events, which we have tried to describe. This was the year when the preconditions were created for a sharp turn from the old to the new in the life of the Soviet people. And nothing, except perhaps the Chernobyl accident, foreshadowed those difficult and tragic events that shook the Soviet Union in 1989–1991."

As a result, the new defensive doctrine included the following points

• nuclear disarmament, military reductions, various concessions to the West
• in case of aggression, the USSR refused to retaliate against the aggressor for a “short” period (within a few weeks), carrying out only defensive actions

Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, either through stupidity or malicious intent, provided the United States with a magnificent gift, in the form of a doctrine that completely destroyed the Soviet military bloc and Soviet defense

But reading the marshal’s arguments, one gets the impression that he actually believed that the USSR and the USA would live in peace and eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000....

All this sounds like a utopia; in the United States no one was going to disarm or make any concessions. And in the USSR it was precisely on the basis of this wild utopia that all concessions and disarmament were made.

From the very beginning of the Cold War, the right of the first strike was entirely in the hands of the United States, the USSR took a defensive position, but since 1986, the USSR, according to the new doctrine, could not immediately respond to the first strike.