Almost immediately after the October Revolution, our country found itself in a hostile political environment. Petrograd was besieged by external enemies. Counter-revolution raged throughout the country and in the capital, conspiracies were formed and rebellions were committed.

Economic difficulties were soon added to the political difficulties: due to the almost complete inactivity of transport caused by sabotage by the Vikzhel railway union, there was an acute shortage of fuel and food in both capitals. The councils on the periphery, where they were created, did not have full power. In most cities and villages of the country, power was in the hands of counter-revolutionaries, the propertied classes, anarchists and even bandits. By this time, the Soviet government had not yet completely taken control of the situation and mainly controlled the area of ​​the European part within Petrograd - Moscow and south to Tsaritsyn. This area at different periods either expanded or contracted depending on the advance of the armies of the parties and interventionists.

In the cities themselves there was an armed struggle between Red Guard detachments and bandits, robbers, saboteurs and conspirators. Newspapers continued to be published - Bolshevik and anti-Soviet, many different rumors circulated, and first of all about the imminent death of the new regime, about the imminent advance of the Germans and Trotsky's arrest of Lenin. Most of these rumors and gossip were spread by intelligence services and diplomats of Western countries through their agents in the person of anarchists, Socialist Revolutionaries and provocateurs.

The very first building of the Cheka: the former house of provincial offices, Gorokhovaya, 2. After the Council of People's Commissars moved from Petrograd to Moscow, the Petrograd Cheka was located here until 1931.

At this time, the activities of Western intelligence services, especially English and German, noticeably intensified. Under these conditions, it was necessary to restore order and take control over the situation in the country, and primarily in Petrograd and Moscow. In this regard, the Soviet government is taking a number of drastic measures and decisions. They were initiated by Lenin himself. On his direct instructions, on December 20, 1917, a special organization was created to combat internal counter-revolution and external enemies, sabotage and profiteering - the All-Russian emergency commission - Cheka .

The tasks of this political organization were formulated as follows: to pursue and eliminate all counter-revolutionary and sabotage attempts and actions throughout Russia, no matter who they came from; bring all saboteurs and counter-revolutionaries to trial by a revolutionary tribunal and develop measures to combat them; conduct a preliminary investigation. As punitive measures, it was proposed to apply to enemies such as: confiscation of property, eviction, deprivation of food cards, publication of lists of counter-revolutionaries, etc.

First Chairman Cheka on Lenin's recommendation, he became a proven revolutionary, a crystal-honest Bolshevik, deeply devoted to the cause of the working class, irreconcilable with the enemies of the revolution, his closest comrade-in-arms Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky. In December 1917, the apparatus Cheka numbered 40 people.

In January 1918, according to those admitted to Cheka According to several statements, an operation was carried out to neutralize the “Organization to fight the Bolsheviks and send troops to Kaledin,” which operated under the guise of a “charitable organization” to provide assistance to officers wounded in the war and their families. It was led by officers of the tsarist army Meshkov, Lanskoy and Orel. Under the guise of former officers, security officers were introduced into the organization. One of them joined the group that was supposed to move to the Don to Kaledin at the end of January, and on January 23, all the officers of this group who came to an instructional meeting in a cafe on Nevsky Prospekt were arrested. During the investigation, it turned out that the organization, together with the Social Revolutionaries, was preparing an armed uprising and an attempt on Lenin’s life.

First death sentence approved by the College Cheka, was carried out on February 26, 1918 against two bandits - the self-proclaimed prince Eboli(Makovsky, Dolmatov) and his girlfriend Britt, who robbed under the guise of employees Cheka. Two days later, on February 28, V. Smirnov and I. Zanoza, who were engaged in robbery at the Metropol Hotel, also under the guise of security officers, were shot.

From February 21, 1918, according to the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR “The Socialist Fatherland is in danger!” Chekists received the right to shoot on the spot enemy agents, speculators, thugs, hooligans, counter-revolutionary agitators and German spies.

Another act of the Soviet government, which was unexpected for diplomats from Western countries, was the decision to move from Petrograd to Moscow. The adoption of such a decision was due to the fact that Petrograd was constantly under the threat of an offensive by German troops and the presence in it of significant forces of counter-revolutionaries, monarchists, White Guard organizations and agents of Western states. The first building Cheka in Moscow there was by no means the yellow building in which the FSB is now located, but house No. Bolshaya Lubyanka in the former building of the Anchor insurance company. By that time central office of the Cheka already had 120 employees.

The first building of the Cheka in Moscow: house number 11 on Bolshaya Lubyanka

In March 1918, 40 provincial and 365 district Extraordinary Commissions were already operating in the country. They were led by experienced revolutionaries who had gone through the school of tsarist prisons and exiles, who knew the methods of secret work, who knew how to distinguish friends from enemies, who were capable of by word and deed to win and maintain the authority of the party among the people.

Already in the initial period of its activity Cheka dealt a number of tangible blows to internal enemies, who felt that this organization employed experienced people who were capable of not only eliminating bandit raids, but also revealing the plans of foreign intelligence services and internal counter-revolution. During this period, dangerous conspiracies were exposed, and in particular to organize an uprising in Petrograd in order to facilitate the Germans’ capture of the Soviet capital (the so-called monarchical Michel's conspiracy), White Guard recruitment centers were liquidated: Union of Real Help , White cross , Black dot , Everything for the Motherland and others. Gangs of bandits, thugs and raiders, led by Lieutenant Alekseev, Prince Vyazemsky, Prince Eboli. The latter performed in his robber raids under the guise of an employee Cheka.

The first six months of the work of the Extraordinary Commission were mainly directed against the terror unleashed by foreign intelligence services with the help of their agents. British intelligence was particularly active in this direction, the prominent representatives of which were Bruce Lockhart, Sydney Reilly, George Hill, Cromie and many others. Their main goal was to eliminate them from the political arena in Russia through terror against prominent Bolshevik leaders, and primarily Lenin, to eliminate the Bolshevik regime in the country and restore the bourgeois system. The most colorful and original figure among them was Sydney Reilly, who at the beginning of 1918 Reilly was sent to Russia as a resident of British intelligence. Reilly's agents penetrated many important organizations and institutions of Soviet power, including Cheka. Myself Reilly had a certificate in the name of an employee of this organization and traveled freely not only around Petrograd and Moscow, but also around other cities of the country. Agents Reilly were in the Kremlin, the Headquarters of the Red Army, as a result of which he had many secret information of its command and the Soviet government. Moreover, Reilly had the opportunity to listen to the phone himself Dzerzhinsky. See more about this.

In May 1919, the security officers were given their current building, but they were able to move only in September. The point is that the former building of the insurance company "Russia", more precisely, two separate buildings, separated Malaya Lubyanka, were not only administrative, but also residential, and the residents did not want to move out for a very long time.

The complex of buildings of the Rossiya insurance company, where the central office of the Cheka moved in September 1919.

On February 6, 1922, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted a resolution on the abolition Cheka and the formation of the State Political Administration (GPU) under NKVD RSFSR. On November 2, 1923, the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR created the United State Political Administration ( OGPU) under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

By the end of the 20s, the department's tasks were Lubyanka are expanding significantly, the staff is also growing, so right behind building of the insurance company "Russia" By Bolshaya Lubyanka building 2, the site is being cleared, on which in 1932-1933, according to the design of architects A. Ya. Langman and I. G. Bezrukov, a new building, made in the constructivist style, was built. With its main façade the new house faces Furkasovsky Lane, and its two side facades with rounded corners looked at Bolshaya and Malaya Lubyanka. The new building merged with the old building insurance company "Russia" . At the same time, the old building was built on two floors, and the internal prison - on four. The architect Langman solved the problem of prisoners' walks in an original way, by arranging six exercise yards with high walls right on the roof of the building. Those arrested were brought here in special elevators or led up flights of stairs.

Extension on the Furkasovsky Lane side, completed in 1932-33

On July 10, 1934, state security bodies entered the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs ( NKVD) USSR, which included OGPU USSR, renamed the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB). Genrikh Yagoda was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. In September 1936, Nikolai Yezhov was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, and in December 1938 he became People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria .

In February 1941 NKVD The USSR was divided into two independent bodies: NKVD USSR and the People's Commissariat of State Security ( NKGB) THE USSR. In July 1941 NKGB And NKVD The USSR was again united into a single People's Commissariat - NKVD THE USSR. In April 1943, the People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR was re-established. March 15, 1946 N KGB was transformed into the Ministry of State Security. And on March 13, 1954, the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR was created ( KGB).

By the beginning of 1954, the number of operational security units of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs was about 80,000 people. While creating KGB this number was planned to be reduced by 20%. In addition, in 1954, the KGB government communications troops entered (in 1956 - 9,000 people), and in 1957 - border troops. However, the number of organs KGB declined in the 50s. Thus, in 1955, the staff was reduced by 7,678 units, in addition, 7,800 officers KGB were transferred to the position of workers and employees. At the end of 1959, the border troops were also reduced by 42,000 people. In the 60s, the number began to grow again (in 1967 - by 2,250 people). At the beginning of 1991 KGB received from the USSR Ministry of Defense two motorized rifle divisions, a bottom airborne division and a motorized rifle brigade with a total strength of 23,767 people. In total, by 1991 the number of organs KGB amounted to about 480,000 people, including. 5,000 - in the central office, 90,000 - in KGB Union republics, 220,000 people. - in the border troops, 50,000 people. - in the government communications troops.

In 1939, a decision was made to further expand the building. The reconstruction project was entrusted to the famous A. Shchusev. The 1939 project envisaged the unification of buildings with a common main facade on Lubyanka Square and turning parts Malaya Lubyanka from Lubyanka Square before Furkasovsky Lane into the courtyard of the building. In January 1940, the sketch of the future building was approved by Beria. But the war prevented the start of a major reconstruction of the building. Work on the finishing and reconstruction of the right part of the building (former building 1) began in 1944 and was completed in 1947. The left part of the building, although it was increased by 2 floors back in the 1930s, largely retained the historical appearance of the beginning of the century, including even some architectural elements. The building remained asymmetrical until 1983. Only then were the works according to Shchusev’s idea completed and the building received its modern symmetrical appearance. Concurrent with this last renovation of the main building in the late 1970s and early 1980s Lubyanka two new buildings appeared KGB: in 1979-1982 for KGB an additional house No. 1-3 was built along the street Dzerzhinsky (Bolshaya Lubyanka). In 1985 - 1987, a Computer Center building was built on Kirova Street (since 1990 - Myasnitskaya), 4/1 KGB

Computer Center Building KGB

House No. 1-3 on Dzerzhinsky Street (Bolshaya Lubyanka)

Reconstruction of the building KGB in 1983

The FSB building on Lubyanka today

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF THE RF

FEDERAL EDUCATION AGENCY

STATE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION

HIGHER PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION

TYUMEN STATE UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF STATE AND LAW

DAY CARE

SPECIALTY "STATE AND MUNICIPAL MANAGEMENT"

DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND MUNICIPAL MANAGEMENT

COURSE WORK

SUBJECT: “HISTORY OF RUSSIA STATE INSTITUTIONS”

TOPIC: “STATE SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS OF RUSSIA (1917-1980s)”

Scientific adviser:

Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor. Nosova N.P.

Completed by: 2nd year student

26416 groups

Belichenko Vera Alekseevna

Tyumen 2006

Introduction….……………………………………………………………………………….3

Chapter 1. Creation and activities of state security bodies………………5

1.1.VChK and the transition to the GPU……………………………………………………………….….5

1.2. Foreign intelligence in the pre-war period (1935-1941)………………….11

1.3. Soviet military intelligence-GRU………………………………………………………...…. 23

1.4. Activities of the USSR state security agencies in the post-war period (1945-1954)……………………………………………………….40

1.5. State Security Committee (1954-1980s)..………………48

Chapter 2. The role of state security agencies in the internal party struggle (1917-1980s)...……………….…………..…56

Conclusion……………………………………………………….………………………….….62

References…………………………………………………………….63

INTRODUCTION

Until recently, the history of the formation and activities of the system of state security bodies was presented in a somewhat simplified, canonized and largely idealized version as a constant process of improving the forms and methods of work, as a chain of victories over enemies. The complex and ambiguous process of formation of security services, mistakes, failures in operational activities, outright crimes, incorrect political guidelines, incorrect understanding of one’s place in the state structure and incorrect political guidelines, everything was considered an absolutely closed zone. This was not spoken about openly, but the people were told about victories over their enemies. But there was no truth.

The most obvious part of the crimes of the NKVD - MGB of the USSR was revealed within a short period of time, in the late 1930s - early 1950s. The leadership of the party and the country, blaming the perpetrators, tried to absolve themselves of all responsibility for large-scale repressions.

The history of the Cheka-KGB organs again attracted attention in the late 1980s. Reviews of cases revealed massive violations of the law. Many authors, not having archival materials, freely handling the facts, often wrote articles subject to tendentious sentiments and used sources providing one-sided data on the problem; as a result, a sense of proportion and objectivity was lost, they became fixated on only the negative aspects. Thus, in covering the problem of the activities of state security agencies, a new extreme appeared, which was expressed in the simple replacement of the “plus” sign with a “minus” sign. This not only did not bring clarity to history, but led to many things becoming even more incomprehensible and contradictory.

The history of Russia, its statehood is the historical experience of the people, their social memory, which circulates in society, including in the form of monographs, brochures and articles. They contain the answer to the question of the reasons for the ripening of crises in society and ways to overcome them.

Thus, mastering the historical experience of public administration in Russia, studying the place and role of individual government institutions and bodies at different stages of development will help to better understand modern management problems and begin the scientific development of modern Russian statehood - this explains the relevance of this topic.

The object of this work is the history of government institutions in Russia. The subject is the Russian state security agencies at a certain stage, namely from 1917-1980.

The main goal of the work is to study the place and role of state security agencies in 1917-1980.

According to a certain goal, specific work tasks are set:

- consider the creation and activities of state security bodies;

- reveal the activities of foreign intelligence in the pre-war period (1935-1941);

Analyze the activities of Soviet military intelligence - the GRU, as well as the work of the USSR state security agencies in the post-war period (1945-1954);

Consider the structure and activities of the State Security Committee (1954-1980);

Study the role of state security agencies in the internal party struggle (1917-1980s).

This course work on the topic of state security agencies (1917-1980s) is based on the textbook by T.P. Korzhikhina. which examines the structured circle of activities of the Cheka, NKVD of the RSFSR, GPU, OGPU, NKVD of the USSR, GUGB, NKGB, as well as author’s publications (Bezverkhniy A., Kokurin A., Petrov N., Kolpakidi A.I., Prokhorov D.P. , Lazarev V., Soldatov A., Khaustov V.N.) with real views, memories of the activities of security agencies in the pre-war, war and post-war periods

Chapter 1. Creation and activities of state security bodies.

1.1. Cheka and the transition to the GPU

December 7(20), 1917 The Council of People's Commissars formed the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution and Sabotage under the Council of People's Commissars, determined its tasks, structure and penalties for those responsible. The Cheka was charged with conducting a preliminary investigation, suppressing the actions of counter-revolutionaries and saboteurs, and developing specific measures to combat the enemy. Investigated cases were transferred to the revolutionary tribunals. It was thought that the commission would be an emergency not for its actions, but for the period of the deteriorating political situation for the regime, but these illusory ideas did not last long. The creation of the Cheka was a natural act of state building and the Commission became the first Soviet specialized state security body.

The first months of activity for the Cheka were quite tense in operational terms. In the first post-October months, the Military Revolutionary Committee, the Soviets, and the Cheka inflicted a number of thorough blows on the bourgeois, landowner, monarchist and other anti-revolutionary forces. One of the reasons was the small number of Cheka staff, even after moving to Moscow. M. Ya Lyapis recalled that at that time the apparatus consisted of only 40 employees, including drivers and couriers. In the provinces, the Cheka divisions did not yet exist at all.

On February 21, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars issued a decree “The Socialist Fatherland is in danger!” The Cheka and its bodies received the right to extrajudicially investigate cases for counter-revolutionary, official and some common crimes, up to and including execution at the scene of the crime.

In February 1918 External forces came to the aid of anti-revolutionary forces within the country. German troops launched an offensive. In Lenin’s appeal “The Socialist Fatherland is in Danger!” a program to combat the invasion was outlined, it seriously expanded the prerogatives of the Cheka; among other points, it is worth noting paragraph 8 of the appeal, according to which the Cheka received the right to shoot on the spot enemy agents, counter-revolutionary agitators, speculators and criminals.

In March 1918, the government moved to Moscow. On March 10, the Council of Commissioners of the Petrograd Labor Commune, formed on the day the government left, organized departments, including a department for combating counter-revolution. On March 13, the Petrograd Council approved M.S. Uritsky chairman of the Petrograd Cheka, a few days later he also became commissar for internal affairs of the PTC. At the end of April 1918, on the basis of the PTC, the Union of Communes of the Northern Region (UCSO) was created, which included the northwestern and northern provinces. The resolution of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) dated September 16, 1918 approved the special status of the Petrograd Cheka. From the beginning of March 1918, an apparatus for the defense of the revolution was created in the provinces and districts of the North-West.

From the day of the formation of the Cheka, all other provincial and district bodies that handled cases of this kind were abolished, and all cases of state crimes committed were transferred exclusively to the establishment of emergency commissions. The conference emphasized that the activities of the security services should be based on strict adherence to the principles of centralism and the subordination of lower units to higher ones, whose orders were mandatory and subject to unconditional execution. Local Chekas were subordinate to the Cheka and were accountable to the local Council and its executive committee. At the conference, the rights and tasks of local and county Chekas, the approximate structure and functions of the main departments were determined.

The structure of the Cheka, approved by the conference and recommended by the local Cheka, was taken as a basis. Three leading departments were formed: to combat counter-revolution, to combat profiteering and the operational part. Moreover, the first consisted of three sections. The first was engaged in work in the troops; the second - observed prominent figures of the tsarist regime, the clergy, various circles and societies that did not have an open political character; a third monitored party organizations.

Subsequently, the structure of departments and departments changed several times, but all the changes did not encroach on the main thing: the competence to control the political and economic situation, the mood of all segments of the population and take prompt measures against the slightest attempts to change the Soviet management system. The process of forming the Cheka began in the provinces and districts.

In September of the same year, the board of the Cheka adopted the “Regulations on provincial and district Chekas,” which determined the functions, organizational structure and staff of local emergency commissions. In October, the “Regulations of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the All-Russian and Local Extraordinary Commissions” legislatively approved their tasks and subordination. According to the recommendations of the Cheka, four leading departments were organized in the provincial Chekas: a department for combating counter-revolution, a department for combating profiteering, serious attention was paid to the department for combating official crimes, and a non-resident department directed the work of the district Chekas. In addition, border departments operated in the Cheka of the NKSO and the Pskov gubchek. The commandant's office, information desk and office functioned as auxiliary units.

In the district Cheka, two departments were organized: to combat counter-revolution and ex officio crimes, and to combat profiteering. There were border departments in the front-line districts. Investigative workers specialized by department. A similar structure of provincial and district security agencies existed until the beginning of 1919.

In the very first year of the existence of the extraordinary commissions, issues of their activities were in the sphere of attention of the committees of the RCP (b) and the executive committees of the Soviets. In the very first year of the existence of the extraordinary commissions, issues of their activities were in the sphere of attention of the committees of the RCP (b) and the executive committees of the Soviets. However, at the same time, a tendency emerges that is rapidly becoming the norm for the activities of state security agencies.

If the First All-Russian Conference of Extraordinary Commissions in 1918 noted that the Cheka “must be in close contact with all party and Soviet bodies,” then the September “Regulations on provincial and district emergency commissions” stated: “In its work, the emergency commission... must rely on local committees of the Communist Party." There is no mention of Councils and executive committees in this document, although the time difference between these two documents is only three months and this is not at all accidental. As the leading role of the Communist Party in the system of dictatorship of the proletariat was strengthened, representatives of other parties were eliminated from the Soviets and executive committees, and they were expelled from the Chekist bodies, the tendency to subordinate the Cheka services not to state power, but to the ruling party, became a clearly expressed political line of this party.

The main methods of party leadership of the bodies of the Cheka, which began to form in the first year of their existence, were periodic discussions at conferences, plenums and bureaus of committees of the RCP (b) of various issues of the work of the Chekist bodies, setting before them tasks of a political nature, hearing reports from leaders, monitoring and verifying the implementation of adopted decisions. From the first months of their existence, local Chekas also reported to the executive committees of the Soviets (in October 1918, a commission of the Velikoluksk organization of the RCP (b), with the participation of a representative of the Pskov gubchek, audited the reporting of the district Cheka).

Control was more than necessary, since some employees of the Cheka services did not understand the role and place of the security apparatus in the system of public administration and were inclined to consider their position and work “special.” Frequent cases of interference in the operational work of the leaders of the RCP(b) committees and executive committees of the Soviets reached such an extent that they determined penalties. But not everywhere the security officers acted as obedient executors of such orders. The Lodeynopolsky regional committee of the RCP(b) “passed a verdict” on a specific case and entrusted its execution to the district Cheka. The security officers reported this fact to the Cheka of the NKSO, which, in turn, informed the Northern Regional Committee of the RCP (b). After which the case was transferred for investigation to the Cheka with an explanation that the party committee only exercises its control over the emergency commission and is not a judicial authority.

By the end of February 1919, the reorganization was largely complete. With special permission from the Cheka, county emergency commissions were maintained for one to two months in counties affected by unrest.

A one-month period was set for investigating cases. The right to pass sentences was transferred to the reorganized revolutionary tribunals, which also received the right to verify the investigative actions of emergency commissions. The Cheka authorities could use extrajudicial measures of restraint only in areas where a state of emergency was declared.

The reorganization of emergency commissions on transport led to the formation of district transport Chekas (RTChKs), instead of the previously existing district transport Chekas. At each station that had a depot, local transport Chekas (UTCHK) were created. The protection of the state border of the RSFSR came under the jurisdiction of the Cheka.

The leadership circles of the RCP(b) made an attempt to repeatedly increase the reserve of secret employees of the Cheka bodies at the expense of all members of the Communist Party. Lenin’s words: “a good communist is at the same time a good security officer,” spoken in April 1920 at the IX Party Congress, led to the appearance of directives obliging communists and party cells to report any suspicious act of our enemies to the state security agencies.

On January 8, 1921, the Cheka issued an order “On the punitive policy of the Cheka bodies”, which rejected as outdated the methods of work that had developed during the civil war, ordered the review of the cases of convicted and under investigation workers and peasants, set the task of creating an effective information service and bringing it to the forefront in operational work. The order of the Cheka was discussed and accepted for execution by the provincial emergency commissions.

The Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and on February 6, 1922, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee issued a resolution “On the abolition of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission and on the rules for conducting searches, seizures and arrests.” The Cheka and its local units were abolished. Their tasks were transferred to the State Political Directorate (GPU) under the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR. The GPU was entrusted with the fight against espionage, banditry, the suppression of armed uprisings, the protection of transport communications and the borders of the republic, and the investigation of all anti-state actions.

In connection with the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR dated November 15, 1923 created the United State Political Administration (OGPU) under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR as a body that united and coordinated the efforts of the republican GPU to combat counter-revolution, espionage and banditry. The rights and responsibilities of the OGPU were legislatively enshrined in the Constitution of the USSR of 1924.

At the same time, in 1922, the session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee established the State Prosecutor's Office and adopted the “Regulations on Prosecutor's Supervision,” which, among other responsibilities, charged the prosecutor's office with monitoring the activities of the GPU.

On October 16, 1922, by a resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the State Political Administration was granted the right to extrajudicial reprisal, up to and including execution, against persons caught red-handed during bandit and armed raids. The same resolution of the Special Commission of the NKVD allowed the deportation and imprisonment of opposition party leaders and recidivist criminals in forced labor camps. In March 1924, a Special Meeting was created at the OGPU Collegium for extrajudicial consideration of cases against persons convicted of counter-revolutionary activities; decisions of the OSO were adopted with the obligatory participation of the prosecutor, who had the right to protest them or suspend their implementation.

When studying the qualitative composition of the employees of the provincial departments of the GPU, the low educational level is striking. Even in the central apparatus of the OGPU in 1924, out of 2,402 employees, only 59 people graduated from higher educational institutions, and 2/3 were completely illiterate.

The lower-level security apparatus was reorganized. The district politburos were liquidated and in their place the institution of district authorized provincial departments of the GPU was introduced. They were appointed in agreement with the provincial party committees, and only two institutions could decide on their recall or replacement. The authorized officers were subordinate to the secret operational department and had a small staff. Noteworthy is the special paragraph of the instructions entitled “Relationships with party committees and executive committees.” At least twice a month, the authorized GPU was obliged to inform the secretary of the regional committee of the RCP(b) and the chairman of the executive committee of the county council about the situation in the county and receive from them the information necessary for operational work. Now the head of the state security unit reported only to the leaders of the party committee and the executive committee of the Council. Deputies and ordinary communists were deprived of the right to know anything and somehow influence the activities of local units of the GPU. All issues were resolved by the party-Chekist-Soviet elite in a narrow circle. Subsequently, the head of the state security agency, if necessary, informed exclusively the first secretary of the relevant committee of the Communist Party. Party leadership was carried out on the basis of developed methods: determination of key areas of activity; selection, placement and training of personnel; control over the implementation of party directives and decisions. At plenums and meetings of the bureau of party committees, reports from the heads of local divisions of the OGPU were periodically heard. Representatives of provincial departments were elected to the leading party and Soviet bodies. As a rule, the heads of provincial departments were elected by members of the bureau of the provincial committees of the RCP (b) and the presidiums of the executive committees of the provincial Soviets. The practice of representation, established in the early 1920s, continued into the early 1990s.

1.2. Foreign intelligence in the pre-war period (1935-1941)

In 1933, a fascist dictatorship was established in Germany. Hitler did not hide his aggressive plans for the Soviet Union and other countries, putting forward the idea of ​​​​redividing the world. Thus, by the end of 1933, a hotbed of military threat had emerged in Europe.

In November 1936, Germany and Japan signed the so-called "Anti-Comintern Pact" directed against the USSR. He initiated a military-political alliance between Germany and Japan. In 1937, Fascist Italy also joined the pact.

The governments of the USA, England and France, despite the obvious military threat from Germany and Japan, pursued a policy of appeasing the aggressors, hoping to set Hitler against the USSR and thereby avoid a clash with Germany. Particularly characteristic in this regard was the policy of England and France, which readily agreed with Germany’s territorial claims in Europe, including the annexation of Danzig, the Anschluss of Austria, and the occupation of Czechoslovakia. The Munich deal in September 1938 showed that Hitler could count on a free hand in Europe if his military efforts were directed to the East.

The aggravation of the international situation required a restructuring of the work of foreign intelligence, which was required to obtain information about the secret military-political plans of Germany and Japan in difficult conditions.

The main tasks and directions of intelligence activities in the pre-war period. In May 1934, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the issue of coordinating the activities of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army, the INO and the Special Department of the OGPU was considered. It was decided to create a permanent commission consisting of the heads of these bodies and entrust it with the development of a general plan for intelligence work abroad. Head of INO A.Kh. Artuzov was appointed part-time deputy. Head of the Red Army Intelligence Directorate.

On July 10, 1934, by resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was formed, within which the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) was created. The foreign department - intelligence - became the 5th department of the GUGB.

The tasks of foreign intelligence of state security agencies were formulated as follows:

· identification of anti-Soviet activities of foreign states and their intelligence services, as well as anti-Soviet emigrant organizations;

· discovery of espionage activities on the territory of the USSR;

· management of overseas residencies;

· control over the entry and exit of foreigners into the USSR.

In 1933, in connection with the threat of fascism in Europe, the Center decided to create, on the basis of illegal stations and groups operating in Germany, Italy, France, Austria and other countries, an illegal intelligence apparatus for special purposes for organizing acts of sabotage against Nazi Germany and its satellites and carrying out special actions against White émigré and Trotskyist organizations. This organization later received the name “Serebryansky’s service apparatus.”

The created illegal groups carried out acts of sabotage on German ships transporting weapons and military equipment for the Franco rebels during the Spanish Civil War. During the Great Patriotic War, they also committed acts of sabotage against Nazi transport ships in the Atlantic, Baltic and North Seas.

The structure of foreign intelligence in the early 30s. The 5th department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD included two departments and two independent departments: the 1st department of the 5th department supervised foreign residencies in the field of political, economic, scientific and technical intelligence. It consisted of nine sectors that directed intelligence work in their assigned countries; The 2nd Department dealt with foreign counterintelligence issues. It consisted of six sectors that were engaged in the fight against sabotage, terrorist and espionage activities of foreign intelligence services and white emigrant organizations on the territory of the USSR.

In 1938, a decision was made to strengthen foreign intelligence. By order of the NKVD, a new staffing table was introduced. Intelligence has been expanded. In particular, it consisted of the following units: intelligence leadership (chief and two deputies); secretariat (30 people). Dealt with issues of secret paperwork. 1st department (Germany, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Hungary); 2nd department (Japan, China); 3rd department (Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria); 4th department (England, France, Switzerland, Spain, Benelux); 5th department (Türkiye, Iran, Afghanistan, Greece); 6th department (Finland, Scandinavian countries, Baltic countries); 7th Division (America, Canada); 8th department (Trotskyists, right); 9th department (emigration); 10th department (scientific and technical intelligence); 11th department (operational equipment); 12th department (visas and registration of foreigners).

In total, 210 people worked in the 5th department of the GUGB NKVD in pre-war times.

Heads of foreign intelligence in the 30s. From 1930 to 1936, foreign intelligence of the state security agencies was headed by Artuzov Artur Khristianovich, who later became the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army.

In 1936 he was replaced by Abram Aronovich Slutsky. No information about him has been preserved in the foreign intelligence archives. What is known is that he worked in the USA and Germany and is personally responsible for repression against foreign intelligence officers. In 1938, in connection with the purges of state security organs organized by Beria, he fell victim to his own intrigues.

In 1938, Zelman Isaevich Passov, who soon suffered the same fate as his predecessors, became the head of the 5th department of the GUGB NKVD (foreign intelligence). No information on him has been preserved in the foreign intelligence archives. In 1938 - 1939, Sergei Mikhailovich Shpigelglaz became the head of the 5th department of the GUGB NKVD. In 1939 he was replaced by Vladimir Georgievich Dekanozov. At the end of 1939, Pavel Mikhailovich Fitin was appointed head of foreign intelligence of the state security agencies, who led its activities until 1946.

Repressions against foreign intelligence in the pre-war period. Stalin's brutal internal party struggle against his political opponents in the 1930s had a negative impact not only on state security agencies as a whole, but also on the activities of foreign intelligence. Enormous damage to the activities of the INO NKVD, especially illegal intelligence, was caused by the activities of N. Yezhov and L. Beria, who headed this department in the pre-war period. The climate of mistrust, suspicion and spy mania that was building up in the state security agencies led to unjustified repression and the physical destruction of a large number of senior intelligence officials.

In the pre-war period, about 450 intelligence officers worked in the INO NKVD, including the foreign apparatus. As a result of the purges carried out first by Yezhov and then by Beria, approximately 275 of them were declared “enemies of the people” and repressed. Only a few of the convicted security officers managed to prove their innocence and return to foreign intelligence.

In 1937-1938 a wave of repression swept not only among the employees of the central apparatus, but also the foreign stations. The chief of intelligence, A.Kh., was arrested and shot. Artuzov and its other leaders. The leaders of “legal” and illegal stations were recalled and repressed, especially if in their past there was any evidence of contacts with Trotskyists, Zinovievites, Bukharinites and other “enemies of the people.” As a result of bloody purges, some residencies abroad lost all their workers and ceased to exist literally on the eve of World War 2 (1939), while others were left with 1-2 people who practically did not work and silently awaited their fate.

Much organizational work to create an intelligence apparatus abroad was crossed out, and contact with dozens of valuable agents was lost literally on the eve of Hitler’s attack on our country.

As a result, foreign intelligence, paralyzed by repression, failed, for example, to obtain proactive information about the impending Anschluss of Austria, the Munich Agreement of England, France, Italy and Germany on the division of Czechoslovakia and the annexation of the Sudetenland to the Nazi Reich.

Intelligence activities in new conditions. In the pre-war period, as a result of taking emergency measures to strengthen foreign intelligence, it was possible to create a fairly powerful and reliable intelligence apparatus. There were 45 “legal” and 14 illegal residencies operating abroad. In some countries (Germany, England, France), along with the “legal” residencies, there were from 2 to 4 illegal residencies.

Serious attention was paid to improving intelligence work abroad. If previously residents were given the right to independently make decisions about recruitment, which led to the clogging of the intelligence network with low-value agents, then in the pre-war period, recruitment issues were decided directly by the intelligence leadership.

At the same time, extensive work was launched to acquire foreign agents on the territory of our country. Fellow citizens who had relatives abroad were studied. Due to the difficulty of penetrating into objects of interest to foreign intelligence, in the pre-war period, for the first time, it was decided to acquire promising agents and then introduce them into particularly important objects.

Thus, illegal intelligence officer A. Deutsch, who was a student at Cambridge University in the 30s, attracted members of the famous “Big Five” to cooperation with foreign intelligence, from whom the most important political and military information on Germany, Great Britain and others came during the war. countries. Foreign intelligence resident Gorsky worked most actively with the Cambridge Five during the war.

Given the acute shortage of intelligence personnel, in 1938 it was decided to create a School of Special Purposes (SHON), which trained several dozen intelligence officers until 1941.

Work in the countries of the Anti-Comintern Pact. In the pre-war period, it became clear that the greatest threat to our country came from the Axis countries of Rome-Berlin-Tokyo, which did not hide their aggressive intentions towards the USSR.

In 1933-1937, the “legal” residency in Berlin, headed by B.M. Gordon, obtained valuable information on all main areas of intelligence activity. A skillful combination of the work of “legal” and illegal residencies produced positive results. The residencies acquired valuable agents in the National Socialist Party, in the Foreign Ministry, among the leadership of anti-Soviet emigrant organizations, and intelligence officers. She managed to avoid failures in her work.

However, in 1938, due to the recall of almost all intelligence officers from the country and the appointment of Amayak Kobulov, close to Beria, as a resident (his brother Bogdan was the deputy people's commissar of state security), intelligence activities in this country began to weaken.

Young illegal intelligence officer A.M. Korotkov, who returned to Moscow in 1938 after successfully completing intelligence work in France, was dismissed from intelligence by order of Beria without explanation. A.M. Korotkov turned to Beria with a personal report with a request to reinstate him and his wife, who also worked in illegal intelligence, in the service. This request was supported by the department's leadership. He was soon reinstated, and in 1940 he was sent to a “legal” residency in Berlin as a deputy resident.

Germany. "Red Chapel". In 1935, B. Gordon arrived in Berlin as a resident of foreign intelligence of the state security agencies. Through embassy employee Hirschfeld, he met A. Harnack (“The Corsican”), to whom Hitler’s aggressive plans were clear. “The Corsican” considered it his duty to inform B. Gordon about Germany’s preparations for a new world war.

However, in 1938, B. Gordon’s cooperation with “Corsican” ceased: Gordon was recalled to Moscow and shot for his connection with A. Artuzov, who was declared an “enemy of the people.” For some time, other operatives maintained contact with Corsican.

Considering that, as a result of repression, the activities of the residency must be started from scratch, A.M. Korotkov is doing a lot of work to restore former preserved and lost connections. From “Corsican” and “Starshina”, with whom he restored operational contact, A.M. Korotkov receives valuable information about the growing preparations of Nazi Germany for war against the USSR. Without fear of possible negative consequences, A.M. Korotkov addressed a personal letter to Beria at the beginning of 1941, in which he drew attention to the inevitability of war and asked the Center to help in analyzing incoming information. He received no answer.

Created on the initiative of Arvid Harnak, the illegal anti-fascist organization, which later received the name “Red Chapel,” by the beginning of 1942 numbered more than 200 people, actively resisting the Nazi regime. Soviet foreign intelligence used it to obtain valuable information about the plans and intentions of the Hitler regime regarding our country. From September 1940 to June 1941 alone, about 30 valuable information on this topic was received from A. Harnack and H. Schulze-Boysen (“Starshina”).

Thus, on September 26, 1940, the following message was sent to the Center: “At the beginning of next year, Germany will begin a war against the USSR. The preliminary step... will be the military occupation of Romania, scheduled for the near future.”

On April 12, 1941, the Center was informed that “Starshina” and “Corsican” continue to assure with full responsibility, “... that in all German official instances the issue of military action against the USSR is considered resolved.”

Finally, on June 16, 1941, Moscow received a report: “All German military measures to prepare an armed uprising against the USSR are completely completed and a strike can be expected at any time.”

Stalin, to whom this report was received, ordered that the station in Berlin be asked about the reliability of the sources of information. However, there was no response to the telegram from the Center, because the war began.

Italy. Before Italy joined the “Anti-Comintern Pact,” the Center, taking into account the seemingly normal relations between the USSR and this country along interstate lines, recommended active recruitment work against foreigners. During these years, foreign intelligence mainly developed foreign diplomatic missions and obtained information through scientific and technical intelligence.

As a result, valuable sources of information were acquired from the English Consulate in Milan and the British Embassy in Rome.

However, with Italy's accession to the pact directed against the USSR, closer cooperation between Rome and Berlin and Tokyo, Italian-Soviet relations deteriorated significantly. A decision was made to intensify intelligence work in this country.

Despite the small number of the residency, headed by experienced intelligence officer P.M. Zhuravlev, by 1939 managed to create a wide agent network. Important information came from one station source who was a close friend of Mussolini. On instructions from the station, he recruited two typists from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from whom they received important information about Rome’s foreign policy plans.

From another agent who worked at the Roman post office, the station received diplomatic correspondence from the Japanese embassy and the military attache.

Residency officer N.M. worked actively in Italy. Gorshkov, who arrived here in 1939. He personally recruited a number of sources of valuable political information to cooperate with foreign intelligence. In 1938 P.M. Zhuravlev was replaced by a new resident D.G. Fedichkin.

Considering the sharp deterioration of the internal political situation in the country and the difficulties in the activities of the station, he approached the Center with a proposal to place the main emphasis in work on illegal intelligence. It was proposed to create illegal stations in Rome and Milan with the organization of communication channels to Turkey. However, in 1939 D.G. Fedichkin was recalled to Moscow and until 1940 the residency did not work, and the agents were mothballed.

In 1940, three detectives were sent to the station. Half of the agents were excluded from the agent network due to the loss of intelligence capabilities. Information began to flow from the remaining sources about the political situation in the country and foreign policy, on issues of science and technology. With the outbreak of the war, intelligence work in Italy was stopped.

Japan. In the Far East, Japan was the main enemy of the Soviet Union, constantly threatening military attack. However, due to the difficult situation in this country, it was not possible to organize intelligence work directly in Japan. Exploration of Japan was carried out in other countries, in particular, from the territory of Manchuria, China, Holland, Germany, Bulgaria, Austria and other countries.

In 1940, the composition of the residency was renewed in Tokyo. It was replenished by young workers who went abroad for the first time to a country with a difficult situation and did not speak Japanese. She managed to expose the setup of the Japanese intelligence services by the agent "Handsome", who was transmitting disinformation. There were no other achievements in the work of the station. The most important information on this country was obtained by intelligence in third countries, on the territory of the USSR and by deciphering secret Japanese correspondence.

Thus, resident of foreign intelligence in Iran A.M. At the end of 1937, Otroshchenko brought into cooperation a local employee of the Japanese embassy in Tehran, who received and sent diplomatic mail. As a result, the Center was aware of the subversive activities of the Japanese intelligence services in Iran against our country.

France. In the 1930s, an extensive and capable intelligence apparatus was created in France, which made it possible to successfully solve the tasks assigned to the station. Along with obtaining political, scientific and technical information, the station paid great attention to the development of anti-Soviet emigration. Thus, P.Ya., who worked in residency from 1931 to 1933. Zubov introduced a source of information into the circle of the leader of the Georgian Mensheviks N. Zhordania, from whom he received information about the prepared terrorist attacks on Georgian territory.

The “legal” and illegal residencies in this country worked especially actively during the civil war in Spain, including recruiting volunteers from the international brigades and using them for intelligence purposes. The Paris residency, together with the Madrid one, created a school to train intelligence groups to commit sabotage behind Franco lines.

In 1937-1939 The Paris station received a significant number of documents from the British Embassy. Active development of Trotskyist organizations was carried out, as well as the leadership centers of the EMRO, NTS, and OUN. With the German attack on France in 1940, intelligence work on its territory was stopped.

England. In the pre-war period, foreign intelligence successfully combined work against England from “legal” and illegal positions. Most agents had good intelligence capabilities. Information was regularly received about the situation in the country and the foreign policy plans of the British government, including in relation to the USSR. Through external counterintelligence, information was obtained about the activities of the British intelligence services in relation to the USSR and Soviet citizens.

The most valuable information came from the Big Five during this period. In 1935, A. Deitch recruited Kim Philby, the son of an English intelligence officer. Through him, the son of former minister Donald Maclean and the son of SIS officer Guy Burgess, as well as other members of the “five,” were studied and recruited.

Beria's repressions against foreign intelligence officers led to the fact that in 1940 there was only one operative left in London, who was soon recalled to his homeland. Only at the end of 1940 were 4 employees of the “legal” station sent here, who restored contact with the agents recruited by A. Deitch and established regular receipt of valuable intelligence information.

USA. In 1933, an illegal station, created in 1930 and headed by illegal intelligence officer Davis, operated in New York. She regularly received documentary information from the US State Department and information about the activities of German diplomatic missions.

In 1933, in connection with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, a “legal” residency was created. She worked most actively in the area of ​​scientific and technical intelligence. Only in 1939-1940. About 30 thousand sheets of technical documentation and over 150 samples of technical innovations were received from her.

The residency was also focused on working against Japan. However, she failed to achieve noticeable results in this direction. Active intelligence work in this country in 1937 - 1940 was carried out by intelligence officer K.M. Kukin.

Information work of intelligence on the eve of the war. In 1933-1941 foreign intelligence abroad received a large amount of important, including documentary, intelligence information in all areas of intelligence activity. She had information about the true plans of England and France regarding the USSR, the intentions of the governments of these countries to direct Hitler’s aggression to the East and push the Soviet Union against Germany to weaken them mutually.

An important place in foreign intelligence activities was occupied by obtaining scientific, technical and economic information, which played a large role in strengthening the economy of the USSR and its military industry.

Foreign intelligence worked successfully to thwart the plans of the White Guard emigration towards the USSR.

The most important task of foreign intelligence in the pre-war period was to identify plans for a military attack by Germany, Japan, England and France on our country, which it successfully dealt with. At the same time, foreign intelligence information was ignored by the Soviet leadership.

From January 1941 until the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR, foreign intelligence sent at least a hundred intelligence messages to the country's political leadership, which stated that Germany would start a war in the first half of 1941.

Stalin, who concentrated all power in the country in his hands, received information directly from intelligence sources. Until 1943, foreign intelligence did not have a separate information and analytical service capable of analyzing the information received and weeding out unverified and false information. As a result, Stalin received contradictory information, sometimes mutually exclusive, which did not allow him to draw the right conclusions. Stalin's reluctance to listen to foreign intelligence information and his confidence that the war would begin no earlier than 1942 ultimately led to tragic results for our country and people.

At the end of the 30s, clouds were gathering in Europe and the Far East in connection with the preparation of Germany and Japan for a new redistribution of the world. World War II became a reality in 1939. Under these conditions, the foreign intelligence of the state security agencies faced difficult tasks in identifying the true plans and intentions of Germany and Japan in relation to our country.

The flow of alarming messages from various countries was increasing. The war was on our doorstep. Under these conditions, intelligence officers in Europe, the USA, the Far and Middle East worked tirelessly, supplying the country's political leadership with the necessary information.

In general, the external intelligence of the state security agencies fulfilled its duty to the people. If at the beginning of 1941 there were still some doubts regarding Hitler’s plans, then by the spring the leadership of the 1st Directorate of the NKVD had a firm conviction that war was inevitable this year.

An important role in obtaining military-political information about the plans and intentions of Germany and Japan regarding the USSR belongs to foreign intelligence, P.M. Fitin, who supervised its work in the pre-war and war years. Despite Beria’s desire to please Stalin, who believed that war could be avoided in 1941, State Security Commissioner 3rd Rank Fitin reported alarming information to the Kremlin recluse, which required urgent measures to strengthen the country’s defense capability.

Only a scrupulously honest person could take such a position. P.M. Fitin was threatened with reprisals from the all-powerful Beria, and only the war that soon broke out saved him from execution.

Soon the fiery wave of war scorched our borders, and the history of the USSR began to be divided into pre-war and post-war.

1.3. Soviet military intelligence-GRU.

With the outbreak of the war, the Intelligence Directorate began vigorous work to establish intelligence work in new conditions. Here is what V.A. Nikolsky, at that time an employee of the 2nd department of the 7th department of the Intelligence Directorate, who was involved in coordinating the activities of the intelligence departments of the western border military districts, tells about this: “The Intelligence Directorate began feverish activity in selecting and training intelligence officers for work in the rear enemy. Careless peacetime lapses were made up for through night vigils and continuous searches for persons with connections in German-occupied areas. Schools were created to train group commanders, radio operators, and intelligence officers. Moreover, the teachers were distinguished from the students only by their official position, since they all had neither theoretical nor practical training.

The transfer of individual scouts and entire partisan detachments and groups in the first months of the war was carried out mainly on foot into the gaps between the advancing German units and units. Many organizers of underground groups and partisan detachments with communications equipment and supplies of ammunition, weapons and food were left in the directions along which German troops were moving. They were selected literally on the eve of the enemy’s capture of a settlement from among the local residents, who, under a hastily compiled legend-biography in the form of distant relatives, were assigned a radio operator, and most often a radio operator, equipped with a passport and a military ID with an exemption from military service, were assigned communications, and assigned reconnaissance tasks or sabotage and left until the Germans arrived. After a few days, and sometimes even hours, such reconnaissance and sabotage groups and individuals found themselves behind enemy lines and began to work. Some of the scouts, mostly with family connections deep in the rear, were sent by plane and dropped out at the desired point with parachutes. Similar work on the selection, training and deployment of scouts behind enemy lines was carried out by the intelligence and sabotage sections of the intelligence departments of the front headquarters. Intelligence agencies of front-line and army units began to deploy throughout wartime states already during the fighting, when our troops were fighting heavy defensive battles.

In total, as a result of the combined efforts of the Center and the intelligence departments of the fronts, in the first six months of the war, about 10 thousand people were sent behind enemy lines, including a significant number of intelligence officers with radio transmitters.

Speaking about the actions of military intelligence during the Great Patriotic War, one cannot fail to mention the partisan detachments created by military intelligence agencies from the first days of hostilities. In the directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated June 29, 1941, which determined the main directions of the work of military intelligence, the fifth paragraph stated: “In territories occupied by the enemy, create partisan detachments and sabotage groups to fight units of the enemy army, to incite guerrilla warfare everywhere, for blowing up bridges, roads, damaging telephone and telegraph communications, setting fire to warehouses, etc.” .

Very often, partisan detachments were created on the basis of reconnaissance and sabotage groups thrown behind enemy lines, whose tasks were to collect intelligence information about enemy troops, commit sabotage on military installations and communications, etc. Carrying out this task, reconnaissance groups were included in the partisan movement and soon grew into large detachments and even formations. As examples, we can name such large special groups, detachments and formations as, for example, A.P. Brinsky, D.I. Keimakh, G.M. Linkov, I.N. Banov (Cherny) and others.

Despite the heroic resistance of the Red Army units in the first months of the war, the Nazi troops rapidly moved forward. Possessing strategic initiative, by the end of October 1941 they reached the approaches to Moscow. During this tense period, military intelligence made every effort to reveal the plans and intentions of the German command, to establish the main groupings of German troops, the direction of the main attacks, the arrival of reserves, and possible timing of the offensive. To do this, both individual scouts and reconnaissance and sabotage groups and detachments were sent behind enemy lines.

So, in August - October, a group of employees of the 7th Department of the Intelligence Directorate, sent to the zone of responsibility of the Western and Bryansk fronts, created reconnaissance groups in Gomel, Bryansk, Kursk, Mtsensk and other cities. They were given the task of detecting the transfer of enemy troops through these points. Moreover, the commanders of reconnaissance groups (residencies) were selected in most cases from local residents - most often elderly people who were not subject to conscription into the army, but had experience in army service. They were assisted by trained radio operators, who, in addition, had to not only ensure communication with the Center, but also perform the duties of deputy commander of the group (residence) for human intelligence. All reconnaissance officers remaining behind enemy lines were given the appropriate biographical legends and the necessary documents: passports, military tickets with a mark of removal from military registration, certificates of release from prison, etc. Radio operators received “Sever” radios and two sets of batteries for them . In addition, the groups were provided with money, dry rations for two months, weapons, ammunition and explosives.

As already mentioned, reconnaissance and sabotage detachments were also sent behind enemy lines. One of these detachments under the command of I.F. Shirinkin in September-November 1941 walked over 700 km through the territory of the Smolensk, Vitebsk, Pskov and Novgorod regions, conducting reconnaissance and committing acts of sabotage on enemy targets and communications. For the successful completion of assigned tasks, the detachment commander I.F. Shirinkin and Commissioner Yu.A. Dmitriev were awarded the Order of Lenin.

The head of the intelligence department of the Western Front headquarters, T.F. Korneev, recalling those days, wrote: “On September 23, 1941, front intelligence established that the enemy was preparing for an attack and created for this a large group of troops in front of the Western and Reserve Fronts. In total, about 80 divisions were concentrated in two areas, including up to 20 tank and motorized divisions. Radio reconnaissance made a significant contribution to solving the problem of uncovering offensive groups.”

Speaking about the work of military intelligence during the Battle of Moscow, it should be noted that its efforts made it possible to establish the exact timing of the Germans’ Operation Typhoon, which began on September 30, 1941, and the enemy’s transfer from the deep rear near Moscow to the Western Front by November 11 nine new divisions. And on the basis of data received from intelligence and other sources, the enemy’s plan to encircle Tula was revealed, which contributed to the disruption of his attack on Moscow from the south. Well-organized reconnaissance helped the Soviet command to find out the enemy’s plans, organize a reliable defense of Moscow, and then on December 5-6, 1941, with the forces of the Western, Kalinin and part of the forces of the Southwestern fronts, launch a counteroffensive, as a result of which the German troops suffered heavy losses and were driven back 100-250 km from the capital. During the period of preparation for the counter-offensive of Soviet troops near Moscow, military intelligence continued to conduct active work behind enemy lines, making extensive use of reconnaissance and sabotage groups. In their preparation on the Western Front, a huge role was played by the special unit “military unit 9903” (later the 3rd (sabotage) branch of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Front), commanded by Y.K. Berzin’s comrade-in-arms, a participant in the war in Spain, Major A.K. Sprogis . It was from this unit that the later famous intelligence officers and saboteurs Z. Kosmodemyanskaya, N. Galochkin, N. Gorbach, P. Kiryanov, K. Pakhomov and many others were sent behind enemy lines. In total, the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Front sent behind enemy lines: from June to August 1941 - 184 sabotage groups; from September 15 to December 31, 1941 - 71 sabotage groups and detachments with a total number of 1,194 people.

In acquiring the necessary combat experience, military reconnaissance officers paid a huge price for it. Many of them, captured by German counterintelligence, died, such as Z. Kosmodemyanskaya, who was later awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. But there were also occasional losses, and this made them even more bitter. Thus, on December 25, 1941, in a village house in a village near the city of Plavsk, Tula Region, as a result of a direct hit from a German aerial bomb, almost the entire variable operational staff of the 3rd section of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 10th Army of the Western Front was killed.

In November 1941, instead of F.I. Golikov, who returned to the troops and was appointed commander of the 10th Shock Army, Major General A.P. Panfilov became the head of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff.

In January 1942, after the end of the Battle of Moscow, the State Defense Committee reviewed the activities of military intelligence based on the results of the first months of the war. During the review, the following shortcomings in the activities of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army were noted:

The Intelligence Agency's organizational structure was not adequate for wartime operating conditions;

There was no proper leadership of the Intelligence Directorate on the part of the General Staff of the Red Army;

The material base of military intelligence was insufficient, in particular, there were no aircraft to transport reconnaissance officers behind enemy lines;

The Intelligence Directorate lacked the extremely necessary military and sabotage intelligence departments.

As a result, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense dated February 16, 1942, the Intelligence Directorate was reorganized into the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) with corresponding structural and personnel changes. However, the reorganization did not end there, and on November 22, 1942, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense, military intelligence was withdrawn from the GRU, and front intelligence departments were prohibited from conducting human intelligence. At the same time, the GRU moved from subordination to the General Staff of the Red Army to subordination to the People's Commissar of Defense, and its task was to conduct all human intelligence abroad and in the territory of the USSR occupied by the Germans. The same order created the Intelligence Directorate (RU) within the General Staff, which was entrusted with the leadership of military intelligence. Lieutenant General I.I. Ilyichev was appointed head of the GRU, and Lieutenant General F.F. Kuznetsov was appointed head of the General Staff RU.

However, this decision, as a result of which front-line intelligence departments were deprived of the right to conduct human intelligence, turned out to be erroneous and was negatively received by almost all operational intelligence workers. The already mentioned V.A. Nikolsky, who throughout the war was engaged in human intelligence both in front-line intelligence departments and in the Center, characterizes this innovation as follows: “The new system did not have a clear position, the functions of the bases as centers for intelligence training of intelligence officers were not sufficiently thought out, material facilities and equipment, including aviation, as well as radio equipment, left much to be desired. The central intelligence school created in Fili, designed for mass training of agents and radio operators in the shortest possible time, hastily launched its work, but could not satisfy the needs for personnel previously trained by a dozen front-line schools... The radical breakdown of the entire intelligence system at the very height of the war caused a general surprise not only among the officers of this service, but also among all commanders who, to one degree or another, came into contact with the headquarters service at the army-front level. The order to liquidate front-line intelligence structures was given at the most crucial moment of the beginning of our general offensive at Stalingrad, the preparation of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts to break the blockade, the offensive of the Northern Group of the Transcaucasian, North Caucasian, Southwestern and Kalinin fronts. The disorganization of intelligence during this period had a very negative impact on the combat activity of the troops and was an objective reason for large losses, since the front headquarters during this period did not receive the necessary information about the enemy. In the process of implementing this ill-conceived decision, imposed on the army at the most crucial moment of the war, intelligence lost hundreds of trained low-level intelligence workers, a significant part of the agents behind enemy lines and in training at front-line intelligence schools, experienced route pilots and signalmen sent in accordance with the order for replenishment troops. Taking into account the organizational period in the intelligence department from December 20, 1942, front commanders were practically left without operational information about the situation behind enemy lines. Information received by the GRU from former front-line agents, after being processed in the information department, was often sent to the fronts with such a delay that they lost their relevance. There was also a loss of efficiency in managing agents and assigning tasks to them. Operational officers at the Center were not aware of changes in the intelligence situation that had previously been reported to them directly.”

In connection with the current situation, in the spring of 1943, the front commanders made an urgent request to the Supreme Command Headquarters to cancel the above order. The request was considered, and by order of the People's Commissar of Defense dated April 18, 1943, the leadership of military and intelligence intelligence of the fronts was entrusted to the Intelligence Directorate (RU) of the General Staff, to which the control responsible for conducting intelligence work and sabotage activities in the occupied territory of the USSR was transferred from the GRU. The GRU was entrusted with conducting foreign intelligence. This situation lasted until the end of the war.

The Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff was located in Moscow in house No. 17 on Karl Marx Street and organizationally consisted of the following departments:

The 1st department (headed by Colonel S.I. Zaitsev) was engaged in military reconnaissance and had functions mainly of an inspection nature;

The 2nd department (headed by Major General N.V. Sherstnev) was engaged in human intelligence. The department had four directions: northwestern intelligence (Smirnov), western intelligence (Nikolsky), southwestern intelligence (Sokolov) and sabotage. The deputy head of the department, Colonel Pitalev, oversaw the intelligence areas, and another deputy, Colonel Kosivanov, oversaw the sabotage area;

The 3rd department (headed by Colonel Romanov) was processing incoming information.

In addition to these three main departments, there were others in the Intelligence Directorate: the political department (Malkov); Department of Radio and Electronic Intelligence; the investigative department, which, together with the 1st and 2nd departments, worked with prisoners of war; department of special radio communications (Pekurin); a special communications department to train agents and intelligence officers in codes and maintain communication with them; special purpose air squadron for night operations (Tsutsaev).

At the same time, at the front headquarters, instead of intelligence departments, intelligence departments were created, consisting of five departments: the 1st department supervised the work of lower intelligence units; The 2nd department was engaged in human intelligence; The 3rd department was responsible for sabotage work; The 4th Department processed incoming intelligence information; The 5th department was engaged in radio reconnaissance.

As for the intelligence departments of army headquarters, they consisted of two departments: military intelligence and information. Speaking about their functions, it is worth turning to the memoirs of M.A. Voloshin, who was appointed chief of intelligence of the 39th Army in the summer of 1942: “The military intelligence department was headed by Captain Alexey Nikolaevich Antonov, an experienced staff worker. His assistant was Major Nikita Andreevich Panteleev. They were entrusted with preparing a general reconnaissance plan, reconnaissance instructions to the relevant headquarters, monitoring the accurate implementation of given orders, and providing assistance to reconnaissance units of units and formations. The information department was also small. The chief is senior lieutenant Ivan Maksimovich Diykov, his assistant is lieutenant Mikhail Denisovich Kishek. In addition to them, the department’s staff included translators Lieutenant Nikolai Mikhailovich Yudashkin and draftsman Sergeant Anatoly Kuznetsov. The latter, naturally, often worked in the interests of the entire department. Intelligence data from army formations and units flowed into the information department. Intelligence reports from neighbors, additional information about the enemy from the front headquarters, and sometimes from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army were also received here as a mutual exchange. All these documents had to be carefully analyzed and final conclusions drawn from them, on the basis of which the command’s plans were based.”

A few more words must be said about the procedure for reporting intelligence information to the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, which was established in the first days of the war and did not change until its end. By order of the Chief of the General Staff, the Intelligence Directorate reported intelligence reports and intelligence reports twice a day (morning and evening), and intelligence reports three times a month. The Intelligence Directorate presented a report on the situation on the fronts every day for the past 24 hours, and once a week a map of German troop groupings was given as an appendix (on the 7th, 15th, 22nd and 30th of each month). At the same time, the combat crew of the enemy forces was also reported: groupings of troops along fronts and directions up to the division, individual brigades and battalions inclusive. Particularly important information was transmitted as it became available in the form of special messages. The reports were sent to all members of the State Defense Committee, the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff. In addition, the Chief of the General Staff received information in the form of special reports, certificates, encrypted telegrams and personal reports from the Chief of the GRU. This information covered a wide range of issues of a military-technical, military-economic and military-political nature. As a result of this organization of work, military intelligence constantly provided the country's top military and political leadership with the information they needed.

After the defeat of the German army near Moscow, Soviet military intelligence was tasked with closely monitoring Germany’s preparations for the summer campaign of 1942. This was done by both the GRU and the General Staff RU. And already in March 1942, having analyzed the information received, the Intelligence Directorate reported to the General Staff: “During the period from January 1 to March 10, 1942, up to 35 divisions were deployed, and the active army is continuously being replenished. Intensive work is underway to restore the railway network in the occupied territory of the USSR, there is an intensified delivery of combat and transport vehicles... For the spring offensive, Germany together with its allies will field up to 65 new divisions... The most likely date for the spring offensive is mid-April or early May 1942 ."

Thus, the plan of the Hitlerite command for the summer campaign of 1942 was revealed; according to it, the enemy intended to deliver the main blow in the direction of the Caucasus and Stalingrad, in order to capture Stalingrad to turn the main attack group to the north, cut off Moscow from the rear and begin an attack on it from east and west.

From November 22, 1942, according to the order of the People's Commissar of Defense, front-line intelligence departments were prohibited from conducting human intelligence. This happened at a decisive moment in the preparation of Red Army units for a counteroffensive and immediately deprived the command of the Stalingrad and Don Fronts of operational information about the enemy. Therefore, it often happened that reports about the situation behind enemy lines came to the troops when they had already occupied the territory mentioned in the messages sent. In addition, during the hasty reorganization of human intelligence, hundreds of reconnaissance groups and stations were left without proper leadership, and some of them were completely out of action.

But, despite all the difficulties, military reconnaissance, even before the start of the German offensive on Stalingrad in July 1942, revealed the grouping of the enemy’s first line troops down to the battalion level, their defense system, and established the composition and battle order of many formations in front of the front of our troops. Thus, information was obtained about the combat and numerical strength, weapons, deployment of the main units of the 4th and 6th German tank armies, the 3rd Romanian and 8th Italian armies, and the size of the enemy’s 4th air fleet. Radio reconnaissance played a major role in providing the Stalingrad operation with intelligence data. At the beginning of July 1942, she determined the location of the headquarters of Army Group B and conducted continuous surveillance of them. It also uncovered the transfer of the 24th Tank Division to the breakthrough area (44 km southeast of Kletskaya), the transfer of an assault squadron and two groups of the Edelweiss bomber squadron from the North Caucasus, and revealed the composition of the encircled enemy group. Aerial reconnaissance was also very active, which promptly revealed the transfer of two tank divisions from the North Caucasus to the Kotelnikovo area.

All this taken together helped the Soviet command make the right decisions, organize a counteroffensive in November 1942, which ended in the encirclement and defeat of the 6th German Army under the command of Field Marshal W. von Paulus, and win the Battle of Stalingrad, thereby marking the beginning of a radical change in during the war.

At the end of 1942 - beginning of 1943, the partisan movement intensified, and partisan detachments and formations began to play an increasingly important role in the military intelligence system. At the beginning of 1943, operational centers began to be formed on their basis to organize intelligence work. The main task of such centers was to create intelligence networks in enemy-occupied territory and carry out acts of sabotage. Each center had a radio center for communication with front headquarters. In order for the radio centers to function normally, only at the end of 1942 - beginning of 1943, 650 radio operators were sent behind enemy lines.

N.P. Fedorov is one of the famous partisan intelligence officers; in January 1943, the Omega operations center began working with his detachment. He controlled the areas of Pripyat, Kyiv, Piryatin, Bakhmach and promptly sent information to Moscow about the groupings of German troops in these areas. In the summer of 1943, an operational intelligence center of the Intelligence Directorate was created, headed by A.P. Brinsky, operating in the area of ​​​​the cities of Kovel and Kamenets-Podolsk. An extensive intelligence network was formed here, which regularly sent valuable information to the Center about the groupings of German troops and their transfers. The information of A.P. Brinsky was important, for example, for the planning and conduct of the Belarusian operation. Here are just some of the messages he sent to the Center:

“11/15/43. From Korosten to Shepetovka, the Nazis are transferring one infantry regiment from the 339th Infantry Division... Brook.”

“7.12.43. During December 5-7 this year. The 24th Division was transferred by rail from Rovno to Kovel. During this time, 189 tanks, more than 180 guns, 426 trucks and cars, and about 70 motorcycles were transported. 182 carriages with personnel were noted... Brook.”

Speaking about the most high-profile acts of sabotage carried out by military reconnaissance partisans, we must first of all mention the liquidation of the Gauleiter of Belarus V. Kube in Minsk in 1943. The conduct of this operation was entrusted to N.P. Fedorov’s intelligence officers, who operated in the Minsk region on the basis of the “Dima” special detachment under the command of D.I. Keimakh. The direct perpetrators of the action were E.G. Mazanik, who worked as a servant in the house of V. Kube, and M.B. Osipova, who gave her a mine with a chemical fuse. The mine was placed under the mattress of the Gauleiter's bed, and at 2:20 a.m. on September 22, 1943, V. Kube was killed. For this feat E.G. Mazanik and M.B. Osipova was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and N.P. Fedorov was awarded the Order of Lenin.

After this operation, N.P. Fedorov was sent to Rivne with the task of destroying the Gauleiter of Ukraine E. Koch. But he was soon recalled from Ukraine and the operation did not take place. Next, N.P. Fedorov headed a special-purpose detachment in the Kovel region, where, in cooperation with other partisan detachments, he established control over the railways. His people not only sent important information to the Center, but also committed numerous acts of sabotage behind enemy lines. In 1944, N.P. Fedorov’s detachment crossed the Western Bug and reached the Lublin region, where, having established contact with Polish partisans, they began to carry out sabotage on railways and highways. In these battles, on April 17, 1944, N.P. Fedorov died.

The effectiveness of the actions of the partisan detachments is evidenced by the fact that in the summer of 1943 the Germans were going to use chemical weapons against them. This was reported to the Residency Center and reconnaissance and sabotage groups of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Front, which established the fact of the transfer of cars with chemical agents to the areas of Mogilev, Bobruisk and Borisov. So, on June 8, 1943, in one of the cars of the train, which was derailed by partisans at the Yasen station, there were tear gas cylinders under the hay. Around the same time, an engineering and chemical battalion appeared in Bobruisk, and on August 1 and 2, 1943, boxes and cylinders with chemical agent signs were unloaded at the Krasny Bereg station and in Mogilev. At the same time, the intelligence department of the Western Front received the following information: “The translator of the commander of the 634th French punitive regiment, Colonel Perletsey, reported: in the villages ... of the Borisov region, 8 metal cylinders with a capacity of 30-40 liters with liquid chemical agents were delivered. All Frenchmen were given gas masks. Each company has a department of chemists equipped with overalls. Classes are being held. The purpose of importing chemical agents is to use them against partisans. Miner".

The intention of the German command to use chemical weapons against the partisans was confirmed by the following find: in 1979-1980. near Baranavichy, a German warehouse with shells presumably filled with lewisite and mustard gas was discovered. True, what prevented the Germans from using it is not known.

After the defeat at Stalingrad, the German command began to intensively prepare for the summer campaign of 1943, hoping to take revenge for the failures that had befallen it. In this regard, by the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters of April 3, 1943, military intelligence was tasked with “constantly monitoring all changes in the enemy grouping and promptly determining the directions in which he is concentrating troops and, especially, tank units.” Along with strategic human intelligence, front-line intelligence also successfully solved this problem. It used all means of intelligence, military, air and radio reconnaissance.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, front-line intelligence agencies controlled almost all movements of enemy troops, and a large number of reconnaissance and sabotage groups operated in their rear. Thus, the reconnaissance departments of Bryansk (A.A. Khlebnikov) and Central (P.N. Chekmazov) each had 20 groups behind enemy lines, and the reconnaissance department of the Voronezh Front (I.V. Vinogradov) had 30 groups. And in combined arms formations and units of the Central and Voronezh fronts from April to July 1943, more than 2,700 reconnaissance observation points were organized, reconnaissance in force was carried out more than 100 times, more than 2,600 night searches for prisoners were carried out and about 1,500 ambushes were set up, several hundred prisoners were captured.

Purposeful reconnaissance activity on the eve of the Battle of Kursk allowed the Soviet command to unravel the enemy’s plan, as well as find out the timing of the start of Operation Citadel. Despite the fact that they were postponed from May 3 to May 15, and then even further, it was military reconnaissance that precisely established that the offensive would begin at 3 hours 50 minutes on July 5, 1943. It was this circumstance that allowed the Soviet command to decide to conduct artillery counter-training on to an enemy preparing to attack.

The efficiency and effectiveness of reconnaissance during the Battle of Kursk is evidenced by this fact. During the first six days of the offensive in the Voronezh Front, the enemy command attempted to break through with tank divisions in the direction of Tomarovka, Oboyan, Kursk, but to no avail. Then, on July 11, the Germans began regrouping forces in the direction of Prokhorovka. But literally a few hours later, information about this was on the table of the Soviet command. As a result, the tank battle near Prokhorovka that unfolded on July 12 ended in victory for the Soviet troops.

As a result of the victories won in 1943 in the winter campaign of 1944, units of the Red Army reached the border of the USSR and transferred military operations to the territory of the German-occupied Eastern European states and East Prussia. This circumstance required the front intelligence departments to organize intelligence work in a new way, especially intelligence work behind enemy lines. The fact is that on the territory of Poland or Czechoslovakia the local population was quite loyal to the representatives of the Red Army, but in Germany everyone was an enemy, not out of fear, but out of conscience, helping the authorities fight Russian spies.

On July 24, 1944, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR issues a directive obliging the chiefs of staff and intelligence departments of the fronts to create active intelligence networks in Germany, Hungary, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries by introducing agents to important objects to a depth of 500 km from the front line , as well as various nationalist and other organizations and formations. And in the order on human intelligence No. 001 of the People's Commissar of Defense for 1945, it was required, as we approached German territory, to strengthen reconnaissance and sabotage activities and to increase the number of reconnaissance groups deployed behind enemy lines.

At the beginning of August 1944, to organize reconnaissance and sabotage groups intended for deployment to the territory of East Prussia, an operational group of officers from the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, headed by V.A. Nikolsky, was sent to Brest. The group included Lieutenant Colonel V.I. Kirilenko, Lieutenant Colonel I.M. Semenov, Lieutenant Colonel S.I. Shepelev, Major V.P. Alekseev, Major P.N. Savelyev, Senior Lieutenant V.B. Velichko and others. This and other operational groups of the Intelligence Directorate, together with the intelligence departments of the fronts, sent reconnaissance groups into German territory with the task of identifying the composition and numbering of enemy units and formations, the transfer of troops, the location of airfields, etc. Thus, during the operation in East Prussia, 36 reconnaissance groups were sent behind enemy lines, and more than 18 reconnaissance groups operated in the zone of responsibility of the 1st Ukrainian Front. And the mentioned operational group of V.A. Nikolsky sent more than 120 intelligence officers and agents behind enemy lines.

However, the massive deployment of large reconnaissance groups, which fully justified itself on the territory of the USSR temporarily occupied by the Germans, turned out to be ineffective in the changed conditions. The main reason for this was the desire to achieve the desired results as quickly as possible using proven methods. But this did not take into account the completely different intelligence situation that had developed on German territory, which led to unjustifiably large losses.

Memories of the actions of reconnaissance groups on German territory V.A. Nikolsky: “The final results of the main direction of our activities did not live up to the hopes of the command. Even before the end of the war, we learned that almost all of our reconnaissance and sabotage groups were destroyed by the enemy shortly after landing. Our worst fears, expressed at one time to the management, have come true. Sending a relatively large number of groups of Soviet people who did not know the language was actually a gamble. Our special forces were too small to protect themselves and conduct reconnaissance, and too large to camouflage and hide in the artificially planted neat forests of Western Poland and East Prussia. Wide clearings, an extensive system of forest patrols, perfect means of communication with telephones not only in apartments, but also on roads covering the entire country with a dense network, made it possible, at the slightest signal from any German about the appearance of Soviet paratroopers, to send motorized punitive detachments of police and SS men with dogs to any point where our people could be hiding. All Germans capable of carrying weapons took part in such raids. The so-called “hazenyagd” - “hare hunt” was carried out, where our scouts who discovered themselves acted as hares... Of the 120 experienced scouts and agents sent by us from Brest and Kobrin, only a dozen people survived, barely surviving before the arrival of Soviet troops in the area of ​​their release."

Taking into account the current situation, the Intelligence Directorate at the final stage of the war relied on sending small groups and individual intelligence officers, mostly Germans by nationality, behind enemy lines. Thus, the intelligence department of the 3rd Belorussian Front in December 1944 in Kaunas began to train German agents. Future agents were recruited from among German defectors, prisoners of war or repressed by the Nazis. Such agents were dropped behind enemy lines in German military uniform; they were equipped with the appropriate legend and documents (soldier's books, travel orders, vacation tickets, travel tickets, etc.). The scale and results of the work of such reconnaissance groups can be judged by the following report to the Intelligence Directorate: “To the Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army. Colonel General Kuznetsov. From August 1944 to March 1945, 18 reconnaissance groups were trained from among prisoners - 14 radioactive, 4 groups of marshals. No contact was established with three groups: one group died, the second was betrayed by the radio operator, the third, obviously, died because thrown directly into the area of ​​active hostilities. Of the remaining 11 groups, 2 got in touch, but did not work. 9 worked from 8 days to 3 months...4 groups of marshal agents did not return on time, their fate is unknown. Head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front, Major General Aleshin.”

As can be seen from this document, the results of the work of such reconnaissance groups were clearly unsatisfactory. But there was no choice, and the deployment of reconnaissance groups made up of Germans continued until the Victory.

Front-line military reconnaissance operated more successfully. Thus, during the preparation of the Berlin operation, 1,800 reconnaissance searches were carried out, about 1,400 prisoners and 2,000 various staff documents were captured. Aerial reconnaissance conducted 2,580 reconnaissance missions and photographed the entire system of enemy defenses to a depth of 70-80 km, including Berlin, several times. And radio reconnaissance established the location of the troops of the 3rd Tank Army, the 9th Army, the headquarters of all corps and 15 of the 25 enemy divisions.

In 1945, the Great Patriotic War ended with the victory of the Soviet people over the Nazi troops. The contribution of military intelligence to the victory was enormous. This was noted in their memoirs by such prominent Soviet military leaders as G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky, K.K. Rokossovsky, I.S. Konev, I.Kh. Bagramyan, S.M. Shtemenko, N.I. . Krylov and many others. During the war, an effective system for organizing reconnaissance and its application was developed, combat traditions were formed, highly qualified personnel were formed, and a wealth of experience in conducting reconnaissance operations was accumulated. All this was used in subsequent years, when the world was divided by the Iron Curtain and the world's leading powers were drawn into the so-called Cold War.

1.4. Activities of the USSR state security agencies in the post-war period (1945-1954).

The first post-war decade was a very tense and interesting period in the life of our country and its state security agencies. During these years, the restoration of villages, cities and entire regions destroyed during the war was actively underway, factories and factories were rising from the ruins, and new industries were created. The activities of domestic security agencies unfolded in 1945-1954 in a difficult political and operational situation. The main external factors that had a huge impact on the direction and content of their work include, first of all, the beginning of the Cold War between the USSR and leading Western countries.

Under the conditions of the one-party political system that existed in the country, the actual leadership in the field of ensuring state security, military development, etc. concentrated in the post-war period in the hands of a narrow circle of people who were members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. The bodies of "Smersh" - the NKGB-MGB-MVD of the USSR were under constant control personally by I.V. Stalin, as well as a curator appointed from among the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. In the post-war period, they were alternately A.A. Kuznetsov, G.M. Malenkov and N.A. Bulganin.

All important decisions in the field of legal regulation of the activities of state security agencies were made according to the same scheme that had been established over the years. The initiators - they, as a rule, were members of the Politburo and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), the Central Committee and regional party committees of the union and autonomous republics, territories and regions, the central apparatus of "Smersh" - the NKGB - the MGB - the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR came out with their proposals to the Secretariat of the Central Committee All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), which considered and approved them as the first instance. On minor issues - appointments of heads of local state security agencies, minor staff changes, etc. The decision of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was sufficient and it, formalized in writing, was sent for execution to the executive body - the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which adopted the corresponding resolution. On the most serious issues, documents previously considered by the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) were received for final approval by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and only then, drawn up in the form of an extract from the minutes of the meeting, were sent to the executive authorities. This is precisely the path followed by decisions concerning tasks, the structure of intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, the use of special forces and means, the appointment of heads of the central apparatus of state security agencies, carrying out mass evictions of certain categories of the population, etc.

Throughout the entire first post-war decade, the process of organizational building and improving the structure of Soviet state security bodies was quite active, which can be conditionally divided into three main stages. The first of these stages, in fact, is a period of reunification of state security bodies within a single department and expansion of their competence. Its chronological framework covers the years 1945-1951.

It is known that by the end of the Second World War, for a number of reasons, state security agencies, and, above all, counterintelligence units, found themselves dispersed across four different departments. Foreign policy intelligence, transport and territorial counterintelligence bodies were part of the independent People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR. Military counterintelligence was represented at this point in time by the Main Counterintelligence Directorate "Smersh" of the NPO of the USSR, the Counterintelligence Directorate "Smersh" of the NKVMF of the USSR and the "Smersh" bodies of the NKVD of the USSR, which operationally served the border, internal and railway troops of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. This situation was explained by the fact that during the war, being part of the military departments allowed military counterintelligence, relying on the help of the command, to more effectively solve its problems at the front and in the front-line zone. However, the continued fragmentation of the counterintelligence service in peacetime could become a serious obstacle to organizing an effective fight against the intelligence and subversive activities of the intelligence services of foreign states.

The issue of unifying state security agencies was raised at the level of the country's party and state leadership in the spring of 1946. By this time, as part of the transformation of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR into the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the NKGB of the USSR was renamed the Ministry of State Security of the USSR.

On behalf of I.V. Stalin, USSR Minister of State Security V.N. Merkulov, his deputy S.I. Ogoltsov and the head of the GUKR "Smersh" NPO of the USSR V.S. Abakumov prepared a note with a project for the reorganization of the USSR Ministry of State Security and presented it on May 3, 1946 to the head of government. The project provided for a number of serious structural changes in the USSR MGB, the main one of which was the inclusion of Smersh in the Ministry of Military Counterintelligence. On May 4, 1946, the presented project was reviewed and approved at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

In its updated form, the Ministry of State Security began to include: the First Main Directorate for intelligence and counterintelligence work abroad, the Second Main Directorate for counterintelligence and intelligence work within the USSR (among the civilian population and foreigners), the Third Main Directorate for counterintelligence work in parts of the armed forces. USSR, Fourth Directorate - investigative, Fifth Directorate - operational (external surveillance, preliminary development), Sixth Directorate - encryption and decryption, Security Directorates No. 1 and 2 (government security), Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases.

In addition, the structure of the central apparatus of the USSR MGB included a number of independent operational departments: department “A” (operational records, statistics, archives), department “B” (censorship and censorship of correspondence), and some others.

The decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on August 20, 1946 on the acceptance and delivery of cases to the USSR MGB outlined further measures to improve the organizational structure of state security bodies. In order to ensure the fight against foreign intelligence agents and the “anti-Soviet underground” in railway transport, sea and river fleets, a special department and its local bodies were created in the USSR MGB. The central apparatus of the MGB was additionally replenished with an operational equipment department, as well as prison and financial departments. Under the Minister of State Security of the USSR, its own departmental Special Meeting was formed.

At the beginning of 1947, new serious structural and personnel changes were made in the MGB system, this time related to the need to intensify the fight against the nationalist separatist underground in the western regions of the country. In accordance with the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated January 20, 1947, the personnel of the departments for combating banditry were transferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian SSR, the departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus to the relevant ministries and departments of the Ministry of State Security of the republics and regions. The same decision formalized the transition from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of State Security of Internal Troops. On the basis of the anti-banditry departments transferred to the MGB, in March - April of the same year, the 2-N departments of the MGB-UMGB of Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic republics were formed to combat the nationalist underground.

The year 1947 went down in the history of domestic state security agencies as the year of serious reform of the entire system of Soviet foreign intelligence. In accordance with the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated May 30, 1947, the Information Committee (CI) was created under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which was headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov. The created independent foreign intelligence agency, however, turned out to be insufficiently efficient, according to a number of researchers. The severance of traditional ties between military and foreign intelligence services and their former colleagues from the Ministry of the Armed Forces (MAF) and the USSR Ministry of State Security had a negative impact on the results of operational activities. Because of this, already in January 1949, military intelligence was removed from the Information Committee and transferred to the MVS. The status of the remaining intelligence units was lowered and the Information Committee became subordinate to the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

A very extraordinary conclusion to the process of redistribution of forces and competencies between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security that took place in the period 1947-1949 was the decision taken in October 1949 by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the government to transfer the police and border troops to the Ministry of State Security. It should be noted that in this way the situation of the early 1930s was actually reproduced, when the internal affairs bodies and border guards were part of the OGPU of the USSR.
The entry of border troops into the USSR Ministry of State Security made it possible to improve the coordination of local state security agencies and border guards on issues of increasing the efficiency of protecting the state border and searching for violators.

The last major organizational event of the first stage was the creation in the USSR Ministry of State Security, in accordance with the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on September 9, 1950, of special Bureaus No. 1 and Bureau No. 2. The task of the first of them was to carry out acts of sabotage abroad, and the second - to carry out special assignments within the USSR.

The next second stage of organizational construction of the state security bodies of the USSR, the time frame of which covered the period from mid-1951 to February 1953, proceeded at a much more relaxed pace. The onset of a new period in the development of state security bodies is directly related to the arrest of V.S. Abakumov and the appearance on July 11, 1951 of the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) “On the unfavorable situation in the Ministry of State Security of the USSR.”

Among the very important structural transformations of the state security bodies of the second stage should be, first of all, the return of foreign policy intelligence to the USSR MGB. The decision on this was made at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on November 1, 1951. Organizationally, foreign intelligence became part of the newly created First Main Directorate of the USSR MGB. Around the same time, in March 1952, in the central apparatus of the MGB, on the basis of the Main Directorate of Internal Troops and the Directorate of Government "HF" Communications Troops of the MGB, the Main Directorate of the Internal Security of the MGB of the USSR was formed.

The last major reorganization of the Stalinist period in the history of domestic state security agencies was the decision of the authority on December 30, 1952 to create the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the USSR MGB on the basis of the merger of the already existing First and Second Main Directorates, Bureau No. 1 and some other departments. It was envisaged that the GRU of the USSR MGB would consist of two main directorates: the Directorate for Foreign Intelligence and the Directorate for Counterintelligence within the country. However, this decision was never implemented due to the death of I.V. Stalin and the new reorganization of law enforcement agencies.

The death of the country's unchallenged leader for thirty years in the spring of 1953 marked the beginning of a new third stage of reform of the state security agencies. Already on March 5, 1953, the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in their joint resolution, recognized the need to implement certain measures to improve the party and economic leadership of the country. According to this decree, most of the ministries were merged into larger departments. As part of this company, the USSR Ministry of State Security and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs became part of the new Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, the head of which was appointed L.P. Beria.

The internal structure of the created new department as a whole has not undergone significant changes. Certain changes occurred mainly only in the central apparatus of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and territorial bodies. Thus, foreign intelligence, contrary to tradition, received the name of the Second Main Directorate, and the counterintelligence service became the First Main Directorate. The former Fifth Directorate of the USSR MGB was, in turn, divided into two directorates: the Fourth (secret-political) and the Fifth (economic). The Main Security Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security in Transport became the Sixth (Transport) Directorate. The Main Security Directorate turned into the Ninth Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Third Main Directorate (military counterintelligence) retained its name, but lost the status of the main directorate. Since the summer of 1953, its local bodies began to be called special departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The auxiliary departments of the former Ministry of State Security ("A", "B", etc.) began to be called special departments and received numerical names from one to ten. Only departments “M” (mobilization) and “P” (special settlers) retained their designation.

Summing up the consideration of the issue of organizational building, it should be noted that due to historical traditions and the realities of the international, domestic political and operational situation in the development of Soviet state security agencies in the post-war period, the tendency to unite them within a single department prevailed. In this regard, the bodies of the USSR MGB represented a “universal” intelligence service, or rather a combination of several intelligence services: foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, political investigation, government security, border protection and government communications. Another characteristic trend for this period was the redistribution of forces, means and competence between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security of the USSR.

By the end of the Second World War, the heads of the Soviet state security agencies were mainly those people who made their careers after the massive operations of 1937-38 and were promoted to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L.P. Beria.

Having headed the USSR MGB in May 1946, V.S. Abakumov began to rely on his former subordinates from military counterintelligence. As a result of this, many former leaders of the GUKR "Smersh" NGO and counterintelligence departments of the fronts found themselves at the head of the leading departments and departments of the central apparatus of the ministry in the period 1946-1951.

After the slanderous statement of senior investigator M. Ryumin about the concealment by the Minister of State Security from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of data on important criminal cases, V.S. Abakumov was removed from work in July 1951 and arrested. S.D. was appointed the new Minister of State Security in August 1951. Ignatiev, who relied on attracting former party and Soviet workers to the MGB and appointing them to leadership positions.

Finding himself at the head of the state security department, S.D. Ignatiev, having little understanding of the tactics of conducting current operations and developments, was nevertheless able to reveal a number of really serious problems in the activities of the USSR MGB and tried, as far as it was in his power, to achieve compliance with the law in operational and investigative work.

L.P., who headed the united Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR after Stalin’s death. Beria tried to get rid of S.D.’s nominees. Ignatiev, but was arrested on June 26, 1953 and later shot along with several of his closest employees. After his arrest by the internal affairs and state security agencies, until the creation of the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR on March 13, 1954, S.N. Kruglov.

Such regular reshuffles of the heads of the “upper echelon” of the NKGB-MGB-MVD bodies were a serious obstacle to increasing the efficiency of the work of state security agencies. They generated an atmosphere of uncertainty and deprived managers of the incentive to seriously engage in improving work in their subordinate bodies. There was no sense of continuity in the work of a number of divisions of the center and periphery.

The “mass operations” and “purges” carried out by state security agencies in 1949-1950 determined the fact that it was during this time that the peak of arrests of citizens for “anti-Soviet propaganda” occurred in the first post-war decade. If in 1948 9,499 people were arrested for this type of crime, then in 1949 this figure was 15,471 people, and in 1950 - 12,427 people. In subsequent years, the number of those arrested for “anti-Soviet propaganda” decreased significantly.

The analysis of the main areas of activity of the bodies of the NKGB-MGB-MVD of the USSR allows us to conclude that with the end of the Second World War, the state security bodies of the USSR received only a short “respite”. In 1946-1947, a new serious complication of the political and operational situation began. Taking this into account, as well as fulfilling the instructions of the party and state leadership, the bodies of the NKGB-MGB-MVD of the USSR created and maintained a strict counterintelligence regime in the country in the first post-war decade, and were engaged in the suppression of any forms of dissent.

In general, despite certain costs, it should be recognized that in the context of the flaring up Cold War, the state security agencies of the USSR rose to the occasion. By suppressing the reconnaissance and subversive activities of foreign intelligence services and illegal armed groups, they made a significant contribution to ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country and preserving the international positions won by the USSR during the Second World War.

1.5. State Security Committee

The State Security Committee is one of the most powerful organizations in the world for ensuring state security. The KGB was created in March 1954 on the basis of the existing Ministry of State Security.

By order of the KGB chairman dated March 18, 1954, the structure of the new department was determined, in which, in addition to auxiliary and support units, the following were formed: First Main Directorate - foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, “active measures”, analysis of information coming from residencies; Second Main Directorate - internal counterintelligence, fight against espionage and subversion, industrial security; Third Main Directorate - counterintelligence in the Soviet armed forces (military counterintelligence), OO (special departments); The fourth department - political investigation, carried out work on the search for political criminals and traitors to the motherland, subsequently dealt with the protection and internal security of embassies and consulates, and carried out counterintelligence in transport; Fifth Directorate - fight against anti-Soviet activities (work in all ideological organizations, with dissidents); Sixth Directorate - counterintelligence on all types of transport (engaged in anti-sabotage activities, prevention of dangerous situations, etc., subsequently engaged in the protection of state secrets in the economy); Seventh Directorate - external surveillance service (operational search); The Eighth Main Directorate - encryption and decryption, worked for its intended purpose; Ninth Directorate - ensuring the protection of the country's leadership and secret facilities, Kremlin Regiment; The tenth department is accounting and archiving; Main Directorate of Border Troops; Office of Government Communications; Inspection Department - carried out inspections of the activities of KGB units in the center and locally; Investigative unit for particularly important cases (with management rights); Management of economic services. In addition to the listed headquarters and departments, the committee had ten independent departments, then two more were added. The KGB ceased to exist on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union (December 1991).

In June 1954, an All-Union meeting of senior KGB officials was held, at which the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N.S. delivered a keynote speech. Khrushchev.

On April 2, 1957, the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR transferred border troops from the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and created the Main Directorate of Border Troops (GUPV) to manage them.

In paragraph 1 of the Regulations on the KGB and its local bodies, approved by a resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on January 9, 1959, it was emphasized that state security bodies “... are political bodies that carry out activities of the Communist Party and the government to protect the socialist state from attacks by on the part of external and internal enemies, as well as to protect the state border of the USSR. They are called upon to vigilantly monitor the secret machinations of the enemies of the Soviet country, expose their plans, and suppress the criminal activities of imperialist intelligence services against the Soviet state...
The State Security Committee works under the direct leadership and control of the Central Committee of the CPSU."

In paragraph 11 of the section “Personnel of State Security Bodies and Troops” of the regulation, it was noted: “Employees of state security bodies must be educated in the spirit of a merciless fight against the enemies of our Motherland, the ability to prevent crimes, perform their official duty, sparing their strength, while showing determination and initiative. There should be no place for careerists, sycophants and reinsurers in state security agencies."

Paragraph 12 emphasized: “State security agencies are obliged, directly and through relevant organizations, to take preventive measures against those Soviet citizens who commit politically incorrect actions due to their insufficient political maturity.

Supervision of investigations in state security agencies is carried out by the Prosecutor General of the USSR and the prosecutors subordinate to him in accordance with the Regulations on Prosecutor's Supervision in the USSR."
The leaders and party organizations of the KGB bodies and troops pledged to educate their employees “... in the spirit of party integrity, selfless devotion to the Communist Party and the socialist Motherland, in the spirit of vigilance, an honest attitude to business and the strictest adherence to socialist legality.

Since 1954, training of employees was carried out at the Higher School of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which became a higher educational institution with a three-year period of study.

Since 1954, the number of KGB personnel was reduced by more than 50%, and in 1955, the number of personnel was further reduced by 7,678 units and 7,800 officers were transferred to the position of workers and employees. In April 1959, A.N., who became chairman of the KGB. Shelepin proposed reducing the staff of operational workers in the center and locally by another 3,200 units, and the staff of workers and employees by 8,500 people.

With the introduction of the new Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes of the RSFSR and the Union republics, the jurisdiction, that is, the competence of the KGB bodies under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, included work on 15 elements of especially dangerous and other state crimes, including treason, espionage, disclosure state secrets and loss of documents containing state secrets, terrorist acts, sabotage, sabotage, illegal crossing of the state border, smuggling, illegal currency transactions, anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, organizational anti-Soviet activities.

On May 18, 1967, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and head of the Central Committee department for relations with communist and workers' parties of socialist countries, Yu.V., was appointed to the post of Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Andropov.

In 1967, the KGB brought 738 people to criminal responsibility, of which 263 people were for especially dangerous and 475 for other state crimes. Among those prosecuted were 3 people who committed sabotage, 121 people were traitors and punishers during the Nazi occupation, 34 people were accused of treason and attempted treason, 96 people were accused of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, 221 people were accused of illegal crossing. border, 100 people - in theft of state and public property on a large scale and bribery, 148 people - in smuggling and violating the rules on currency transactions, one foreigner and one Soviet citizen were arrested for espionage...
The investigative apparatus of the KGB reviewed 6,732 archival criminal cases involving 12,376 people based on citizens’ applications, and in 3,783 cases conclusions were made on their termination. In 1967, checkpoints of border troops and investigative apparatus of the KGB confiscated from smugglers and currency traders about 30 kg of gold in bars and coins, products made of precious metals and stones, foreign currency and various goods totaling 2 million 645 thousand rubles.

On November 26, 1969, the “KGB Bureau of Communications with Publishing Houses and Other Media” was formed, more often called the “KGB Press Bureau”, in May 1990 it was transformed into the Center for Public Relations with a significant expansion of its functions and a radical change in methods and forms work.

On March 13, 1969, the 15th Directorate was created, the main task of which was “to ensure constant readiness for the immediate reception of those sheltered (by the Soviet leadership - O.Kh.) in protected points (objects) and the creation in them of the conditions necessary for normal work during a special period."

In September 1981, Directorate "T" of the 2nd Main Directorate, which carried out counterintelligence work to ensure the security of the country's transport industries, was transformed into the independent 4th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR.

In May 1982, Yu.V. Andropov was elected Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and V.V. Fedorchuk became the new chairman of the KGB.

On October 15 of the same year, the 6th Department was formed to protect the economy. Previously, since 1967, this task was solved by the 9th, 19th and 11th departments of the Voronezh State University, and since September 1980 - by Directorate “P” as part of the Second Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR.

By a resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of August 11, 1989, the 5th Directorate was transformed into the Directorate for the Protection of the Soviet Constitutional System (Directorate “3”) of the KGB of the USSR.

In December 1990, the last major reorganization in the KGB took place - the Directorate for Combating Organized Crime - the "OP" Directorate - was formed.

In 1965-1966 State security agencies in a number of republics uncovered about 50 nationalist groups, which included over 500 people. In Moscow, Leningrad and some other places, anti-Soviet groups were exposed, whose participants declared ideas of political restoration in so-called program documents...

Based on the resolution of the Council of Ministers (No. 676-222 of July 17, 1967), Order No. 0096 of July 25 of the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR was issued, announcing the structure and staff of the formed administration.

Initially, 6 departments were formed in the 5th Directorate and their functions were as follows:

1st Department - counterintelligence work on cultural exchange channels, development of foreigners, work through creative unions, research institutes, cultural institutions and medical institutions;

2nd department - planning and implementation of counterintelligence activities together with the PSU against the centers of ideological sabotage of imperialist states, suppression of the activities of the NTS, nationalist and chauvinist elements;

3rd department - counterintelligence work on the student exchange channel, suppression of hostile activities of students and teaching staff;

4th department - counterintelligence work among religious, Zionist and sectarian elements and against foreign religious centers;

5th department - practical assistance to local KGB bodies to prevent mass antisocial manifestations; search for the authors of anti-Soviet anonymous documents and leaflets; verification of terror signals;

6th Department - generalization and analysis of data on enemy activities to carry out ideological sabotage, development of measures for long-term planning and information work.

In August 1969, the 7th Department was formed, to which the functions of identifying the authors of anonymous anti-Soviet documents containing terrorist threats, as well as the prompt development and prevention of hostile activities of persons harboring terrorist intentions were transferred from the 5th Department.

In June 1973, the 8th department was formed to combat the subversive activities of foreign Zionist centers, and the following year - the 9th (development of anti-Soviet groups with connections to foreign centers of ideological sabotage) and 10th departments. The latter, together with the PSU, dealt with issues of penetration, identifying the plans of foreign intelligence services and ideological centers and paralyzing their activities.

In February 1982, the 13th department was formed to identify and suppress “negative processes that tend to develop into politically harmful manifestations,” including the study of unhealthy youth groups - mystical, occult, pro-fascist, rockers, punks, football “fans.” " and the like. The 14th department was involved in preventing acts of ideological sabotage aimed at journalists, SMP employees, and socio-political organizations.

An idea of ​​the tasks of the 5th Directorate is given by the speech of Yu. A. Andropov at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on April 27, 1973. It was noted, in particular, that the changes taking place in the world, “the general strengthening of the positions of socialism forced the imperialists to abandon attempts to break socialism by "frontal attack". These changes certainly meet our interests. At the same time, one cannot help but see that the enemy has not abandoned his goals. Now, especially in the conditions of detente, he is looking and will look for other means of struggle against the socialist countries, trying to provoke they contain “erosion”, negative processes that would soften and, ultimately, weaken socialist society.

Yu.V. Andropov quoted the words of an American intelligence officer, one of the leaders of the Radio Liberty Committee (1); “We are not able to capture the Kremlin, but we can educate people who can do this, and prepare the conditions under which this will become possible.” In general, he says: “Why are we studying the Soviet Union and the situation in this country?.. It is impossible to free ourselves from communism through science alone; action is needed. This means that there must be forces behind us that are able to act."

According to the CIA, the purposeful activities of agents of influence will contribute to the creation of certain difficulties of an internal political nature in the Soviet Union, will delay the development of our economy, and will conduct scientific research in the Soviet Union in dead-end directions. When developing these plans, American intelligence proceeds from the fact that increasing contacts between the Soviet Union and the West create favorable preconditions for their implementation in modern conditions.

According to statements by American intelligence officers called upon to directly work with such agents from among Soviet citizens, the program currently being implemented by American intelligence services will contribute to qualitative changes in various spheres of life of our society and, above all, in the economy, which will ultimately lead to the adoption by the Soviet Union many Western ideals.

Chapter 2. The role of state security agencies in the internal party struggle

The end of the Civil War brought to the fore the practical tasks of building a new society. The ruling party did not have strictly formulated principles or ready-made recipes for such construction. The internal party struggle on these issues became permanent already in 1921. The factions and groupings that emerged in the party represented a kind of surrogate for a multi-party system. They acquired their own leaders, whose political ambitions played a significant role in the intensity of passions. Gradually, the internal party struggle turned into a struggle for power in the party and the state, and in the second half of the 1920s - early 1930s it began to threaten the interests of state security.

The split in the ruling party initially affected its top and partly middle-level party officials, but it was also felt in the state security agencies. Already the discussion in 1923 showed that there was no unity among the OGPU employees. According to data as of December 1923, out of 546 people registered in the OGPU party cell, 367 communists supported the Central Committee line, 129 were hesitant, 40 were in favor of the opposition. The chairman of the OGPU F.E. himself showed hesitation. Dzerzhinsky, who, with a pencil in his hands, personally monitored the political positions of each employee of the central apparatus of the OGPU.

F.E. Dzerzhinsky opposed the transformation of state security agencies into a weapon of internal party struggle. However, after his death, the situation began to change. In 1926-1927, there was already an open struggle for power and the united left opposition used all means to seize power. By this time, the personnel composition of the leadership of the central apparatus and authorized representative offices of the OGPU in the field had changed. Opposition supporters were transferred to economic work in other departments, or found themselves out of work altogether. On the one hand, the OGPU continued to remain part of the state apparatus, providing solutions to security problems, on the other hand, it was an “armed detachment of the Communist Party,” which Stalin viewed as a kind of “order of the sword bearers within the Soviet state.” This duality began to largely affect the forms and methods of fighting the opposition.

The leaders of the OGPU V.R. Menzhinsky, G.G. Yagoda, M.A. Trilisser did not enjoy the same authority in party circles as F.E. Dzerzhinsky, but played an important role in ensuring Soviet statehood. They were invited to almost all meetings of the Politburo, took part in the work of plenums and congresses, and were members of the highest legislative bodies of power.

In 1927, the internal party struggle reached its climax. The time for public debate is over. At a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, old party member A.A. Solts said that “the OGPU may have to arrest the oppositionists led by Trotsky.” L.D. Trotsky and his followers immediately started talking about a “new Thermidor.” Prominent Trotskyist N.I. Muralov, in a private conversation, threw out the phrase that “with such an intensity of the struggle, it can lead to a shootout,” and his interlocutor told the OGPU and the Central Control Commission that the opposition was turning to terror.

On the night of September 12-13, 1927, the OGPU authorities in Moscow arrested members of the illegal organization Shcherbakov and Tverskaya. During the search, copying equipment and printed publications containing the platform of the united left opposition were confiscated from them. During interrogation, Tverskoy testified about the existence among the opposition of a group of military conspirators (Mrachkovsky, Gerdovsky, Okhotnikov) allegedly engaged in preparing a coup d'etat. On September 13, the leadership of the OPTU informed the Central Control Commission about the preparation of a military coup in the USSR in the near future. These materials were added by the Central Control Commission to the case of the illegal printing house. The Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) gave permission to conduct searches of communists connected with this case through the OGPU. On September 22, a special letter was sent to all party organizations about the connections of the oppositionists, who printed the pre-congress platform in an underground printing house, with counter-revolutionary conspirators. In response to these actions, opposition leaders Zinoviev, Smilga and Peterson addressed the Central Committee with an official request regarding the identity of the White Guard officer involved in the case. On September 28, they were accepted by the leadership of the OGPU. G.G., who was present during the conversation. Yagoda said that the “Wrangel officer” is their employee and “has helped the OGPU uncover White Guard conspiracies more than once.” However, he refused to give his last name for confidential reasons. The Presidium of the Central Control Commission reprimanded M.I. Gai, an employee of the central apparatus of the OGPU, for giving false testimony about the Trotskyists’ underground printing house.

The directive of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) “On measures to combat the opposition” indicated that this conspiratorial organization “is rooted in the depths of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Komsomol and is still using their apparatus, trying to destroy them from the inside.” Along with ideological and organizational measures, the document defined the following tasks of the state security agencies: “The GPU is obliged to bring to the attention of local party organizations all participants in the underground organizations of the Trotskyist and Sapronov opposition. Arrests and exiles must be reduced to a minimum.”

By a resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of August 6, 1931, S.A. was removed from their posts. Messing, A. I. Belsky, Y. K. Olsky, E. G. Evdokimov. In March-April 1933, at the request of the Politburo of the Central Committee, the OGPU collegium was forced to expel 23 members from the republican, regional and regional collegiums and dismiss 58 senior officials of the regional and regional departments of the OGPU on charges of a conciliatory attitude towards oppositionists.

At the same time, the intelligence investigation of “Opponents” of individuals belonging to the so-called right-wing deviation began. Particular attention was paid to N.I.’s environment. Bukharin, A.I. Rykova, M.P. Tomsky, former leaders of the Moscow party organization. The heads of the regional secret political departments of the OGPU received the corresponding instructions.

Active intelligence investigation of L.D. continued. Trotsky and his entourage by INOOGPU operatives. On March 19, 1932, the deputy chairman of the OGPU, I.A. Akulov, sent to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee a proposal to deprive 36 emigrants of USSR citizenship, attaching for each a short certificate of “counter-revolutionary” activities abroad, compiled according to intelligence and operational data by the head of the INO OGPU S.A. Messing. For example, in the certificate about “Son” it was reported: “Sedov Lev Lvovich, Trotsky’s son, in August 1928 went to accompany his father to the place of exile, and then abroad and stayed there with him. Actively conducts illegal counter-revolutionary work against the USSR. On Trotsky's instructions, he moved to Berlin, where he organized an illegal safehouse for Trotskyists. He established contact with the Mensheviks, whom he supplied with information about the USSR.”

Opposition leaders who remained in the USSR were also the objects of special intelligence and operational developments. Thus, Operation “In-Laws” was aimed at covering L.D. Kamenev and G.E. Zinoviev. All ordinary oppositionists, after being expelled from the party, were actively developed by the regional state security agencies. During the party purge of 1929-1930, all materials on those expelled were transferred to the OGPU, and during the purge of 1933-1935, state security officials were already part of the central and local commissions for the cleansing and exchange of party documents. In turn, they transferred compromising materials on party members to party bodies. Since 1932, state security agencies have created special forms for all those expelled from the party, and belonging to the opposition was considered a crime against Soviet statehood. The definitions “counter-revolutionary Trotskyist activity” and “anti-Soviet Trotskyist activity” appear.

The oppositionists were actively engaged in by operational officers of the 1st branch of the Secret Political Department under the leadership of A.F. Rutkovsky, supervised by G.A. Molchanov and Ya.S. Agranov. Instructions regarding the development of opposition figures were given to them by employees of the Secretariat of the Secretary General, first L.3. Mehlis, and then A.N. Poskrebyshev. During the preparation of the XVII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, GUGB employees were included in the organizational and credentials commissions, and during the congress - its working bodies; they were members of each of the thirteen subcommittees for counting votes for the elections of the party's governing bodies. Strict control was established over the former leaders of the left and right opposition. G.E. Zinovieva, L.B. Kameneva, A.I. Rykova, N.I. Bukharin, M.P. Tomsky was accompanied everywhere by employees of the SPO, Special Department, and KRO.

Since 1934, issues of the activities of the NKVD were personally supervised by J.V. Stalin. All issues of changing the structure of state security bodies, personnel composition and movements were invariably agreed upon with him, tasks and methods of work were determined. It can be considered that it was from this time that the “armed detachment of the party” turned into the personal guard of the leader.

After the murder of S.M. Kirov's struggle against dissent in the party came down to the physical destruction of former oppositionists. All actions and statements of political opponents were now attributed to the nature of an organized anti-Soviet protest. The beginning was made by a closed letter from the Central Committee “Lessons from the events associated with the villainous murder of comrade. Kirov", prepared by Stalin on January 17, 1935. On his initiative, on January 26, the Politburo adopted a resolution “On the Zinovievites,” which authorized the expulsion of 663 people from Leningrad.

The version of the transition of the opposition to terror was most fully outlined by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and Chairman of the Party Control Commission N. I. Yezhov in the brochure “From factionalism to open counter-revolution.” Its draft was prepared by May 1935 and sent to Stalin. On April 9, 1936, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs G. E. Prokofiev signed a directive to the local bodies of the NKVD, ordering “to immediately begin the liquidation of all cases of Trotskyists and Zinovievites, not limited to the seizure of assets, directing the investigation to the discovery of underground counter-revolutionary formations, all organizational connections of the Trotskyists and Zinovievites and the opening of terrorist groups." By April 1936, 506 people had been arrested. In the same month, People's Commissar for Internal Affairs G.G. Yagoda sent an operational directive to all heads of the NKVD, which stated: “The main task of our bodies today is the immediate identification and complete defeat to the end of all Trotskyist forces, their organizational centers and connections, the identification, exposure and repression of all Trotskyist double-dealers.” In August, an open trial of the first group of former oppositionists took place, and the first blood was shed.

Conclusion

Having analyzed all of the above, we can conclude that it is impossible to simply talk about what terrible things the law enforcement agencies did, that only people thirsting for blood worked in it - this is not the correct point of view, you cannot paint everything in dark colors, although dark colors and prevailed, we must not forget about the actions of Soviet intelligence, about the fierce, heroic resistance of the border troops during the invasion of the fascist invaders. There were many hundreds of employees who openly opposed the Stalinist system of tyranny and paid for it with their lives. And it is not guilt, but the tragedy of honest people who worked in the KGB and collaborated with it, who sincerely believed in the ideals of serving the Motherland, that in fact they served not the Motherland, but the system. People obeyed the general flow of life, accepted reality as it was, lived and honestly, as they understood it for themselves, did their job. These were the harsh rules of the totalitarian regime: either you live “like everyone else,” as the leader, party, “people” indicate, or you are no longer a people, but an “enemy of the people” and must leave the people, into oblivion. And people who lived in such a system adapted to it, developed their own mechanisms of self-defense, including against conscience. Conscience also kills.

Having made the simplest conclusions from all of the above, we can come to one simple scheme: state security bodies, no matter how special and secret they may be, as an integral part of the state apparatus, should first of all serve not individual political interests and ambitions, but stand guard over genuine interests people and Fatherland.

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The original name of the Cheka appeared on December 20, 1917. After the end of the civil war in 1922, the new abbreviation was GPU. Following the formation of the USSR, the OGPU of the USSR arose on its basis.

In 1934, the OGPU was merged with the internal affairs bodies - the police - and a single Union-Republican People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was formed. Genrikh Yagoda became People's Commissar. He was executed in 1938, as was the subsequent People's Commissar of State Security Nikolai Yezhov.

Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs in 1938. In February 1941, the People's Commissariat of State Security - NKGB - was separated from this united structure as an independent one.

In July 1941, he was again returned to the NKVD, and in 1943 he was again separated for many years into an independent structure - the NKGB, renamed in 1946 into the Ministry of State Security. Since 1943, it was headed by Merkulov, who was executed in 1953.

After Stalin's death, Beria once again united the internal affairs bodies and state security bodies into a single ministry - the Ministry of Internal Affairs and headed it himself. On June 26, 1953, Beria was arrested and soon executed. Kruglov became Minister of Internal Affairs.

In March 1954, the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR was created, separated from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Serov was appointed its chairman.

After him, this post was successively occupied by: Shelepin, Semichastny, Andropov, Fedorchuk, Chebrikov, Kryuchkov, Shebarshin, Bakatin, Glushko, Barsukov, Kovalev, Putin, Patrushev, Bortnikov.

Any state can only be called a state when it is able to ensure its security by methods and means available to it.

A universal tool that has been used in all eras, on all continents and in various conditions is the intelligence services. Despite all the differences, intelligence services have common features. Any party, even the ruling one, must be controlled by the intelligence services.

First of all, this is secrecy, the use of unconventional and, often, secret methods of working with agents and special technical means.

The significance and effectiveness of the work of special services naturally varies depending on historical conditions and, accordingly, the tasks assigned to them by the political leadership.

After the crisis of the 1990s, Russian intelligence services regained their former importance. Thanks to the fact that the former head of the FSB from 1998 to 1999, Vladimir Putin, became the country's president, the prestige of the security services structures increased.

The head of the Kremlin has never hidden his sympathy for this organization. He formulated his credo in the following phrase: “Chekists are never former.”

This phrase allows us to draw a conclusion about the continuity of the organization and state that its history will never be revised: the predecessor of the FSB was the loyal Soviet KGB, which, in turn, descended from the Cheka - the Extraordinary All-Russian Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, founded by the Bolsheviks on December 20, 1917, speculation and sabotage.

Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, a monument to its founder Felix Dzerzhinsky adorned the Lubyanka, the square in front of the organization's headquarters near the Kremlin. There has been talk of its restoration several times in recent years.

Putin again raised the prestige of the KGB-FSB, he not only gave many of his former colleagues leading positions in politics and economics, but also returned to the FSB almost all the power of the KGB.

Putin's predecessor and anti-patriot of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, at the behest of America, deliberately destroyed the omnipotence of the KGB, dividing its functions between several organizations, deliberately making them competing.

Today, the FSB is again responsible for state security, counterintelligence and border protection - only foreign intelligence remains independent.

Currently, together with the army, the FSB is the largest recipient of budget funds and is not subject to any serious control.

03/12/1991

USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev signs Law No. 124-N “On the reorganization of state security bodies”: the KGB of the USSR is liquidated as a single state body, and all territorial divisions are transferred to the exclusive jurisdiction of the republican authorities.

18/12/1991

Russian President Boris Yeltsin signs a decree on the creation of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. Later, the Presidential Security Service and FAPSI were separated into separate departments. Many of their responsibilities overlap: competition is expected to be an incentive for quality work.

19/12/1991

from the Ministry of Security, renamed the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK), the Border Service is separated into a separate structure. The Investigation Department is dissolved, and security officers are actually deprived of the opportunity to conduct operational activities. Prisons, including Lefortovo, are transferred to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The lowest point in the fall of the influence of the security officers.

05/01/1994

From the Ministry of Security, renamed the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK), the Border Service is separated into a separate structure. The Investigation Department is dissolved, and security officers are actually deprived of the opportunity to conduct operational activities. Prisons, including Lefortovo, are transferred to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The lowest point in the fall of the influence of the security officers.

12/04/1995

The FSK is renamed the Federal Security Service (FSB), and the Investigation Department is returned to its composition, which dramatically expands the operational capabilities of the security officers. Lefortovo prison returns to the jurisdiction of the FSB.

02/07/1996

The Presidential Security Service is included in the Federal Security Service (FSO). The failure of the first attempt in the modern history of Russia to create a service above services, which was undertaken by Boris Yeltsin’s bodyguard Alexander Korzhakov.

06/07/1998

A constitutional security department is being created within the FSB, the purpose of which its head Gennady Zotov called the fight against “political sedition” within the country. Later it will be merged with the counter-terrorism department.

03/04/1999

The functions of the FSB economic security department have been dramatically expanded: within its framework, a department for counterintelligence support of industrial enterprises (directorate “P”), transport (directorate “T”), the credit and financial system (directorate “K”), a department for combating smuggling and drug trafficking (directorate “N”).

11/03/2003

FAPSI and the Border Service are losing their independence. Border guards are included in the FSB, the powers and material and technical base of FAPSI are divided between the FSB and the FSO. In fact, the Soviet KGB has been recreated. Only foreign intelligence remained independent, as well as a number of highly specialized departments - for the protection of senior officials of the state, control over drug trafficking and the construction of special facilities.

06/03/2006

Vladimir Putin signs the law “On Countering Terrorism”: the FSB officially heads the fight against terrorism, its director coordinates the actions of all departments in this direction as the chairman of the National Anti-Terrorism Committee. Thus, the fight against terrorism is officially recognized as the main priority of the intelligence services.

In 1917, Vladimir Lenin created the Cheka from the remnants of the Tsarist secret police. This new organization, which eventually became the KGB, was charged with a wide range of tasks, including intelligence, counterintelligence, and isolating the Soviet Union from Western goods, news, and ideas. In 1991, the USSR collapsed, which led to the fragmentation of the Committee into many organizations, the largest of which is the FSB.

The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (VChK) was created on December 7, 1917 as an organ of the “dictatorship of the proletariat.” The main task of the commission was to fight counter-revolution and sabotage. The agency also performed the functions of intelligence, counterintelligence and political investigation. Since 1921, the tasks of the Cheka included the elimination of homelessness and neglect among children.

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Vladimir Lenin called the Cheka "a devastating weapon against countless conspiracies, countless attempts on Soviet power by people who were infinitely stronger than us."
The people called the commission “the emergency”, and its employees - “chekists”. The first Soviet state security agency was headed by Felix Dzerzhinsky. The building of the former mayor of Petrograd, located at Gorokhovaya, 2, was allocated for the new structure.

In February 1918, Cheka employees received the right to shoot criminals on the spot without trial or investigation in accordance with the decree “The Fatherland is in Danger!”

Capital punishment was allowed to be applied against “enemy agents, speculators, thugs, hooligans, counter-revolutionary agitators, German spies,” and later “all persons involved in White Guard organizations, conspiracies and rebellions.”

The end of the civil war and the decline of the wave of peasant uprisings made the further existence of the expanded repressive apparatus, whose activities had practically no legal restrictions, meaningless. Therefore, by 1921, the party was faced with the question of reforming the organization.

On February 6, 1922, the Cheka was finally abolished, and its powers were transferred to the State Political Administration, which later received the name United (OGPU). As Lenin emphasized: “... the abolition of the Cheka and the creation of the GPU does not simply mean changing the name of the bodies, but consists of changing the nature of the entire activity of the body during the period of peaceful construction of the state in a new situation...”.

The chairman of the department until July 20, 1926 was Felix Dzerzhinsky; after his death, this post was taken by the former People's Commissar of Finance Vyacheslav Menzhinsky.
The main task of the new body was the same fight against counter-revolution in all its manifestations. Subordinate to the OGPU were special units of troops necessary to suppress public unrest and combat banditry.

In addition, the department was entrusted with the following functions:

Protection of railway and waterways;
- fight against smuggling and border crossing by Soviet citizens);
- implementation of special assignments of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars.

On May 9, 1924, the powers of the OGPU were significantly expanded. The police and criminal investigation authorities began to report to the department. Thus began the process of merging state security agencies with internal affairs agencies.

On July 10, 1934, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR (NKVD) was formed. The People's Commissariat was an all-Union one, and the OGPU was included in it in the form of a structural unit called the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB). The fundamental innovation was that the judicial board of the OGPU was abolished: the new department should not have judicial functions. The new People's Commissariat was headed by Genrikh Yagoda.

The area of ​​responsibility of the NKVD included political investigation and the right to pass sentences out of court, the penal system, foreign intelligence, border troops, and counterintelligence in the army. In 1935, the functions of the NKVD included traffic regulation (GAI), and in 1937 NKVD departments for transport, including sea and river ports, were created.

On March 28, 1937, Yagoda was arrested by the NKVD; during a search of his home, according to the protocol, pornographic photographs, Trotskyist literature and a rubber dildo were found. Due to “anti-state” activities, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks expelled Yagoda from the party. Nikolai Yezhov was appointed the new head of the NKVD.

In 1937, the NKVD “troikas” appeared. A commission of three people handed down thousands of sentences in absentia to “enemies of the people”, based on materials from the authorities, and sometimes simply from lists. A feature of this process was the absence of protocols and the minimum number of documents on the basis of which a decision was made on the guilt of the defendant. The troika's verdict was not subject to appeal.

During the year the “troikas” worked, 767,397 people were convicted, of which 386,798 people were sentenced to death. The victims most often were kulaks - wealthy peasants who did not want to voluntarily give up their property to the collective farm.

On April 10, 1939, Yezhov was arrested in the office of Georgy Malenkov. Subsequently, the former head of the NKVD admitted to homosexual orientation and preparing a coup. Lavrentiy Beria became the third People's Commissar of Internal Affairs.

On February 3, 1941, the NKVD was divided into two people's commissariats - the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB) and the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD).

This was done with the aim of improving the intelligence and operational work of state security agencies and distributing the increased volume of work of the NKVD of the USSR.

The NKGB was assigned the following tasks:

Conducting intelligence work abroad;
- the fight against subversive, espionage, and terrorist activities of foreign intelligence services within the USSR;
- prompt development and elimination of the remnants of anti-Soviet and counter-revolutionary parties -
- formations among various layers of the population of the USSR, in the system of industry, transport, communications, agriculture;
- protection of party and government leaders.

The NKVD was entrusted with the tasks of ensuring state security. Military and prison units, police, and fire protection remained under the jurisdiction of this department.

On July 4, 1941, in connection with the outbreak of war, it was decided to merge the NKGB and NKVD into one department in order to reduce bureaucracy.

The re-creation of the NKGB of the USSR took place in April 1943. The main task of the committee was reconnaissance and sabotage activities behind German lines. As we moved west, the importance of work in the countries of Eastern Europe increased, where the NKGB was engaged in the “liquidation of anti-Soviet elements.”

In 1946, all people's commissariats were renamed into ministries, and accordingly, the NKGB became the USSR Ministry of State Security. At the same time, Viktor Abakumov became Minister of State Security. With his arrival, the transition of the functions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the jurisdiction of the MGB began. In 1947–1952, internal troops, police, border troops and other units were transferred to the department (camp and construction departments, fire protection, escort troops, and courier communications remained within the Ministry of Internal Affairs).

After Stalin's death in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev removed Beria and organized a campaign against the illegal repression of the NKVD. Subsequently, several thousand of those unjustly convicted were rehabilitated.

On March 13, 1954, the State Security Committee (KGB) was created by separating departments, services and departments related to state security issues from the MGB. Compared to its predecessors, the new body had a lower status: it was not a ministry within the government, but a committee under the government. The KGB chairman was a member of the CPSU Central Committee, but he was not a member of the highest authority - the Politburo. This was explained by the fact that the party elite wanted to protect themselves from the emergence of a new Beria - a man capable of removing her from power in order to implement his own political projects.

The area of ​​responsibility of the new body included: foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, operational-search activities, protecting the state border of the USSR, protecting the leaders of the CPSU and the government, organizing and ensuring government communications, as well as the fight against nationalism, dissent, crime and anti-Soviet activities.

Almost immediately after its formation, the KGB carried out a large-scale staff reduction in connection with the beginning of the process of de-Stalinization of society and the state. From 1953 to 1955, state security agencies were reduced by 52%.

In the 1970s, the KGB intensified its fight against dissent and the dissident movement. However, the department's actions have become more subtle and disguised. Such means of psychological pressure as surveillance, public condemnation, undermining a professional career, preventive conversations, forced travel abroad, forced confinement in psychiatric clinics, political trials, slander, lies and compromising evidence, various provocations and intimidation were actively used. At the same time, there were lists of “those not allowed to travel abroad” - those who were denied permission to travel abroad.

A new “invention” of the special services was the so-called “exile beyond the 101st kilometer”: politically unreliable citizens were evicted outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Under the close attention of the KGB during this period were primarily representatives of the creative intelligentsia - figures of literature, art and science - who, due to their social status and international authority, could cause the most widespread damage to the reputation of the Soviet state and the Communist Party.

On December 3, 1991, USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev signed the law “On the reorganization of state security agencies.” Based on the document, the KGB of the USSR was abolished and for the transition period, the Inter-Republican Security Service and the Central Intelligence Service of the USSR (currently the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation) were created on its basis.

After the abolition of the KGB, the process of creating new state security bodies took about three years. During this time, the departments of the disbanded committee moved from one department to another.

On December 21, 1993, Boris Yeltsin signed a decree establishing the Federal Counterintelligence Service of the Russian Federation (FSK). The director of the new body from December 1993 to March 1994 was Nikolai Golushko, and from March 1994 to June 1995 this post was held by Sergei Stepashin.

Currently, the FSB cooperates with 142 intelligence services, law enforcement agencies and border structures of 86 states. Offices of official representatives of the Service bodies operate in 45 countries.

In general, the activities of the FSB bodies are carried out in the following main areas:

Counterintelligence activities;
- fight against terrorism;
- protection of the constitutional order;
- combating particularly dangerous forms of crime;
- intelligence activities;
- border activities;
- ensuring information security; fight against corruption.

The FSB was headed by:
in 1995–1996 M. I. Barsukov;
in 1996–1998 N. D. Kovalev;
in 1998–1999 V.V. Putin;
in 1999–2008 N. P. Patrushev;
since May 2008 - A. V. Bortnikov.

Structure of the FSB of Russia:
- Office of the National Anti-Terrorism Committee;
- Counterintelligence Service;
- Service for the protection of the constitutional order and the fight against terrorism;
- Economic Security Service;
- Service for operational information and international relations;
- Organizational and personnel work service;
- Operations support service;
- Border Service;
- Scientific and technical service;
- Control service;
- Investigation Department;
- Centers, management;
- directorates (departments) of the FSB of Russia for individual regions and constituent entities of the Russian Federation (territorial security agencies);
- border departments (departments, detachments) of the FSB of Russia (border authorities);
- other directorates (departments) of the FSB of Russia that exercise certain powers of this body or ensure the activities of FSB bodies (other security bodies);
- aviation, railway, motor transport units, special training centers, special-purpose units, enterprises, educational institutions, research, expert, forensic, military medical and military construction units, sanatoriums and other institutions and units designed to provide activities of the federal security service.