A brief description of Gorbachev's foreign policy pluses minuses. Foreign policy of the ussr during the years of perestroika

Pros and cons of Gorbachev's rule the choice of religion by a people is always determined by its rulers. the true religion is always the one that the sovereign professes; the true god is that god, whom the sovereign orders to worship; thus, the will of the clergy, which leads the sovereigns, always turns out to be the will of God himself. Mikhail Gorbachev was born in the village. Privolnoye (Stavropol Territory) On March 2, 1931, father, Sergei Gorbachev was, and mother, Maria Gopkalo, was Ukrainian, which is associated with the special tolerance of the future politician in the national question. Mikhail, while still a teenager, worked on the collective farm and in the MTS, to his parents, since the family lived modestly. As a fifteen-year-old boy, Mikhail Sergeevich becomes a combine operator. pros and cons of Gorbachev's rule at the age of 19 Gorbachev joins the ranks of candidates for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, having received patronage from teachers and the headmaster of his school. In 1950, Mikhail Sergeevich entered the Moscow State University without any exams, and three years later he married Titarenko Raisa Mikhailovna, with whom he would live in a happy marriage until his death (in 1952, Mikhail Sergeevich entered the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In 1968, in August, Gorbachev was he was elected first secretary of the CPSU of the Stavropol regional committee, holding this position until April 1970. Since 1970, Gorbachev was appointed a member of the Supreme Council.While in power, Mikhail Sergeevich carried out many different reforms, because of which the CPSU collapsed and, as well as the monopoly of the CPSU was destroyed although often the actions of Gorbachev were criticized by politicians for inconsistency of actions, for an attempt to preserve socialism and the former centrally planned.in 1862 (May 15) a company was created to fight unearned. many people have lost their illegal work earnings.On the other hand, Gorbachev is partially responsible for increasing the the efficiency of life, the ability to work of the population and the reduction of crimes due to alcohol intoxication. in 1985, on May 17, an anti-alcohol company entered into force c. the pros and cons of Gorbachev's rule because of this innovation, alcohol prices increased by 45%, vineyards were cut down, and sugar in stores, used by craftsmen for home brewing, disappeared, which is only available for sale with coupons. As a result of Gorbachev's reforms, in 1989 many goods disappeared from stores, there was latent inflation, the introduction, as already mentioned, of cards for a certain group of goods. hard life of the majority of citizens to the decline in the birth rate, which was observed until 2001. under Mikhail Sergeevich, troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan, which was positively received by many compatriots. but in 1986 the facts of the explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant 26 were partially hidden, this "mystery" left a negative imprint on the biography of the politician. at the end of 1991, Gorbachev resigned, voluntarily relinquishing his powers as head. however, five years later (1996) Mikhail Sergeevich became the chairman of the board of the international green cross. In 2011, on his 80th birthday, Mikhail Sergeevich received the Andrew the First-Called award. do not judge a person by what views he holds, but judge by what he has achieved with them.

Posted by: Guest

After the defeat of the troops in the battle of Friedland in June 1807, Alexander I concluded peace with Napoleon, under which he pledged to join the continental blockade. By agreement with Napoleon, Russia took Finland away from Sweden and made a number of other acquisitions!

Posted by: Guest

Marsovo Field - a square in the center of St. Petersburg, later Tsaritsyn Meadow. military parades were held there.

architects: I.A. fomin, h.p. rudnev

memorial created in 1917-1919

Posted by: Guest

Middle Ages - Knights

in the Middle Ages, it was customary to admire and idealize beautiful women and the exploits of knights. in those days, knight poets from the French city of Provence were popular. then poets were called troubadours. the main theme of the troubadours from Provence was love. they wrote about unrequited love, the loyalty of their knight right up to death, or about the torment of the knight when the beauty left them. but in Germany poets are usually called minnesingers. in translation from the language it means the singer of love. Walter von der Vogelweide was the most famous minnesinger.

but besides love, the theme of heroes and their exploits was popular. poems on this topic were read during feasts in castles. it is worth noting that many of the works were based on real personalities who performed a feat. true speakers over time more and more added new details to the fact. it turned out that most of it was invented. but the main purpose of such verses was to glorify loyalty to the lord, courage, determination, nobility and willingness to give his life for the church. the real hits of the xii and xiii centuries were the Song of the Nibelungs and the Song of Roland. a few words about the last story. Roland was the nephew of Charlemagne. he became famous for not having his own life in order to save the king. he accomplished his feat during a campaign in Spain. about the Nibelungs tells about Siegfried's faithful love for the princess Krimhild. Siegfried was killed by a traitor from his own vassals. krimhilda avenged the vassal for the murder.

novels were also popular. the main difference from poetry and songs was that the novels were mostly fictional. it is not uncommon for a knight to fight a sorcerer or a huge dragon in a novel and be sure to defeat them. the knight was always rewarded for his exploits with beautiful love. Among the popular novels of that time, the legends of King Arthur and the tale of lovers, Tristan and Isolde, with a tragic ending should be distinguished. at the heart of the last novel is the knight's contradiction between duty and love, as well as an oath and feelings for. Since the novels were popular, there were many storytellers. Chrétien de Trois was still considered the most popular.

Mikhail Gorbachev's two grandfathers were teetotalers, his father also had no addiction to alcohol, not exceeding the front-line measure of one hundred grams. Gorbachev himself also had no desire for booze. However, the anti-alcohol campaign, remembered by everyone for its awkwardness and administrative overkill, was not at all his personal initiative.

In an interview with the Komsomolskaya Pravda correspondent who came to the last Soviet general secretary on the eve of the 30th anniversary of the anti-drunkenness campaign, Mikhail Gorbachev spoke about his first alcoholic experience. He, still a teenager - his father and his comrades - on the front line - poured burning alcohol into an aluminum mug to wash the end of the first harvest. The overwhelming impression immediately discouraged interest in alcohol. "You see in front of you a man who never had the urge to drink."

The threat of drunkenness in Gorbachev's house was discussed more than once. Raisa Maksimovna, teaching philosophy at the Agricultural Institute, told her husband that colleagues after work every other day find out whose turn it is to go for wine today. True, they decided to ask her to buy sausages for a snack.
In the evening she said to her husband: "Listen, something abnormal is happening! Something needs to be done."

But even this, despite the fashionable opinion about the great influence of his wife on Gorbachev, did not make him the initiator of the anti-alcohol campaign. Everything was serious, boring and irrevocable.

It’s just that by that time the Central Committee had already been planning anti-alcohol measures for six years, having begun this under Brezhnev. Moreover, according to Gorbachev, he did not do it for good. "Leonid Ilyich was forced to agree with this idea." Brezhnev was essentially against it, and the campaign was delayed.

I remember that Gromyko (the USSR Foreign Minister) said: “We are going from the Zavidovo hunting farm, I say: listen, Leonid (they were on you), something must be done. It's horror! The whole country is drinking. Brezhnev is silent. (Leonid Ilyich himself was driving - he loved cars.) And suddenly the general said: “You know what, Andrei, our Russian people cannot live without vodka,” Mikhail Gorbachev told KP.

But gradually Brezhnev was persuaded, and Andropov, becoming the general secretary, got involved in this "topic", and Chernenko.

When the campaign was prepared, a letter was written to 200 large labor collectives. Anti-alcohol measures were supported by everyone, even the bitter drunkards. Someone even radically proposed a "dry law".

Although there were also sarcastic responses about the fact that you "there, upstairs, drank your share, and with the people - to hell with him ?!"

We, I remember, vigorously discussed this at the Politburo, - recalls Mikhail Gorbachev.

In reality, however, the anti-alcohol campaign met with enormous rejection. Gorbachev became the hero of ditties and anecdotes. Elite Crimean vineyards were cut down, the budget lost 12 billion rubles.

There was no need to close the trade and provoke moonshine. Everything had to be done gradually. Not with an ax on the head, - this is how Gorbachev himself evaluates the campaign today.

He admits it was his mistake, noting that Yegor Ligachev was the main ideologist of its implementation. The then symbol of retrogradeness and some kind of stagnation of mind and position, Yegor Ligachev was then, however, the ideologist of everything.

Solomentsev led the campaign. Mikhail Gorbachev believes that, despite the excesses, she also had positive results: the death rate decreased - during the campaign 1.6 million people died less than in previous years. The number of accidents at work and on the roads has sharply decreased. And more children were born.

The campaign, however, was curtailed, rather, for financial and economic reasons. Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov, the then chairman of the Council of Ministers, according to Mikhail Gorbachev "shed tears": we are losing such money.

The end of the twentieth century, the century of the two bloodiest wars in the history of mankind, the century of the establishment of a new world order, in which you and I exist to this day, cannot be imagined without mentioning such an iconic and at the same time controversial figure of domestic and world politics as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev.

His name is associated with the end of the global confrontation between two fundamentally different ways of development of our civilization. One can even say the opposition of two systems that are different in their ideology and principles of life order: communist and capitalist. The centers of this confrontation were two superpowers - the USA and the USSR, the latter was headed by Mikhail Sergeevich.

Brief biographical information

Here you need to describe his biography at least in the most brilliant way, but only in order to understand the steps and features in his policy, which he pursued while in power. Gorbachev was born on March 2, 1931 in the village. Privolnoye, Stavropol Territory. He grew up in a family of working peasants, from his youth he was busy in the field, working with his father. In 1950 he graduated from high school and entered the law faculty of Moscow State University. There he meets his future wife Raisa. Already in 1952 he joined the party.

After completing his studies, he was assigned to serve in the USSR Prosecutor's Office, but due to the circumstances prevailing at that time, connected with the exposure of the cult of the leader of the peoples, he was recalled from the service entrusted to him. His political activities began with a return to the Stavropol region.

In 1966, after a long and stubborn Komsomol activity, Mikhail Sergeevich was appointed first secretary of the local city committee. It is there that his main drawback is revealed - selfless labor, which prevented him from demanding the execution of his decrees from his subordinates. It is believed that this shortcoming led to the disintegration of the country. By 1978, Gorbachev was appointed secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in which he was until his election as general secretary on March 11, 1985.

The essence of Gorbachev's policy

The years of his rule radically changed both the situation in the Soviet Union itself and the situation in the world as a whole. We will start, perhaps, with a description of the changes that have taken place in the world, since everything here is more or less clear and unambiguous, and only then we will move on to the field of internal political and ideological changes and transformations in our country.

These transformations to this day contain a huge number of questions that have not been assessed or have fundamentally opposite points of view in relation to society.

The advantages of the current policy

Pluses of foreign policy

And so, what about this we can tell about the restructuring in foreign policy, which was led by Gorbachev? Not yet the first person of the state, he made his first visit to Canada in May 1983. It was there that Mikhail Sergeevich gained his first fame in the West, where he was appreciated as a bold and energetic politician. While there, he became very interested in the Western economic model, their moral values, including democracy. In the same year, after being appointed to the post of secretary general, Gorbachev met with the President of the United States, Reagan.

The result of lengthy negotiations is the establishment of a course for improving relations between the two countries, the signing of a number of treaties (including START), which in the future will remove the tension hanging over the world. We also agreed to reduce the number of chemical and nuclear weapons available in the arsenal of the two states, up to and including their complete elimination. The West in its face applauded and welcomed the new Soviet reformer.

Gorbachev's actions to remove the Iron Curtain brought him worldwide recognition, in 1990 he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his significant contribution to the development of friendly dialogue and cooperation between all countries of the world.

The advantages of domestic politics

Well, now let's move, as they say, to our garden. Here before everything was much more complicated and rougher than on the outer contour. Undoubtedly, the advantages of Gorbachev's policy are obvious: society received freedom, moral and political emancipation, the foundations of a democratic structure of society (elections, a multi-party system, etc.), freedom of religion.

The equivalence of the rights of different forms of ownership was established, and the first signs of a market economy appeared. Finally, the arms race was stopped, causing enormous damage to the national economy.

Cons of the policy

Cons of foreign policy

Excessive naivety and unjustifiably placed confidence in yesterday's opponents led to the fact that the so-called mutual concessions in fact turned out to be concessions only from our side, which greatly undermined national security and respect from many peoples of the world. We have lost practically all levers of geopolitical influence and have withdrawn ourselves from the international political arena.

Cons of domestic politics

There were more than enough minuses in his actions in domestic politics. Take, for example, the well-known anti-alcohol company, the so-called "dry law", it ran counter to the trend of freedom, as it had signs of administrative coercion.

A kind of indecision of Mikhail Sergeevich in making decisions slowed down the transformation of the economic model of the state. The settlement of contradictions in politics, interethnic clashes, on the basis of which the state collapsed, was never realized.

Output

The main criticism of Gorbachev, of course, is accusations of unacceptable indecision, which, as a result, led to his forced resignation from the post of head of state, the coming to power of an even more controversial figure in the person of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, as a result of the fatal agreement in Belovezhskaya Pushcha and the collapse of the great country.

In short, a lot has been done in the short years of his reign: for something you can praise, for something to scold, but do not take into account the fact that the world has completely changed and will never be the same - it would be at least wrong. Thanks to such serious world transformations and changes at the global level, he remains one of the largest figures in world politics in the history of our time.

The era of Gorbachev- the last years of the existence of the USSR, when large-scale reforms were carried out in the country in all spheres of life, called "perestroika".

The career breakthrough of the first secretary of the Stavropol Regional Committee of the CPSU began in 1978, when he moved to Moscow and became the youngest (47 years old) secretary of the Central Committee. In 1979, he was already a candidate, and in 1980, a member of the Politburo. According to various versions, he was patronized by L. Brezhnev, Yu. Andropov, M. Suslov or A. Gromyko, who proposed to elect M. Gorbachev as general secretary after the death of K. Chernenko.

At first, the young secretary general, surrounded by the "Brezhnev guard", strengthened his apparatus positions and did not dare to make radical changes. In 1985, he appointed A. Yakovlev as the head of the propaganda department of the CPSU Central Committee, introduced E. Ligachev to the Politburo and, on his recommendation, transferred him to Moscow. They, as well as N. Ryzhkov and A. Lukyanov, have become key figures in the upcoming transformations.

Anti-alcohol campaign

The initiative came from E. Ligachev and M. Solomentsev. Alcohol prices rose 45%. Its production was sharply reduced, which led to the massive felling of vineyards. Sugar (the main raw material for moonshine) disappeared from stores, and cards had to be introduced for it. All this caused discontent among the population, and the state budget missed about 62 billion "drunken" rubles.

The positive effect of the imposed restrictions was felt later.- when there were statistics on a sharp decline in crime and mortality. The birth rate growth was so significant that they started talking about the "Gorbachev baby boom". The reproductive age of the children born then fell on the 2000s. It was they who ensured the steady growth in the birth rate in Russia in recent years.

The Chernobyl accident

A large-scale man-made disaster not only caused enormous material damage and led to numerous human casualties. She discovered the imperfection of the system of public administration and led to significant changes in public consciousness. Indignation was caused by the concealment of information about the threat of radiation from citizens. And the dedication of the liquidators has become a significant factor in the growth of citizens' activity.

Falling oil prices

The growth in oil production in the USSR and the USA led to overstocking of the market and a significant decrease in prices. The fatal blow in 1985 was struck by Saudi Arabia, which lifted restrictions on production. As a result, oil prices fell from $ 35 per barrel to $ 10 and below. For the economy of the USSR, this had disastrous consequences due to a sharp decline in foreign exchange earnings..

"Perestroika"

At the XXVII Congress of the CPSU in 1986, on the initiative of M. Gorbachev, the party program replaced "building communism" with "improving socialism." The goal was to double the economic potential of the USSR by 2000 and provide all citizens with housing.

The collapse of the USSR, which M. Gorbachev tried to avoid, became a fait accompli. On December 25, he resigned as president of the USSR, and on December 26, 1991, the Council of Republics of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (a transitional authority) adopted a declaration “on the termination of the existence of the USSR in connection with the formation of the CIS”.

Outcome

The transformations in the USSR, called "perestroika", were dictated by the difficult economic situation in which the country found itself in the mid-1980s. The policy of "tightening the screws" at this moment would only exacerbate the situation.

M. Gorbachev failed due to a combination of external and internal factors that he could not influence. Among them: the disunity of the political elites of the USSR, the personal ambitions of some members of its team, interethnic conflicts in the Union republics, the Chernobyl accident, the unconstructive position of the US leadership, and many others.

Historical meaning

The era of Gorbachev became a kind of gateway between the USSR and the new post-Soviet states. During this time, people freed themselves from ideological pressure, joined the market relations and civil liberties. The anti-alcohol campaign and the "new thinking" that brought an end to the Cold War had significant positive consequences.

Thanks to the efforts of M. Gorbachev, the collapse of the USSR followed a relatively mild scenario, in contrast to another union state - the SFRY, whose leadership acted tough.

Video: Gorbachev: "The collapse of the USSR is my drama" (BBC interview)

References:

Appeal to the Soviet people of the State Emergency Committee [Electronic resource] / Pravda. - 1991 - http://www.agitclub.ru/gorby/putch/gkcpdocument.htm
Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States [Electronic resource] / Moscow news. - 1991 - http://www.agitclub.ru/gorby/putch/dogovor.htm
Agreement on the establishment of the CIS [Electronic resource] / Rossiyskaya Gazeta. - 1991 - https://rg.ru/1991/12/19/sng-site-dok.html

Send your good work in the knowledge base is simple. Use the form below

Students, graduate students, young scientists who use the knowledge base in their studies and work will be very grateful to you.

Gorbachev himself presents this problem in a different way, claiming that this issue was the subject of wide discussion in party circles: “Back in the years of perestroika, we wanted to socially democratize the CPSU (italics ours - VP). A corresponding program was prepared for the scheduled XXIX Congress. But the putsch and the policy of Boris Yeltsin, which actually banned the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, made it impossible to carry out it "(See: Unfinished history. Conversations between Mikhail Gorbachev and political scientist Boris Slavin. Moscow, 2001, p. 106).

According to D. Volkogonov, when Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet Union, like an ancient knight at a crossroads, stood at a “historical crossroads” from which three possible paths diverged: radical reforms, liberal development, and conservative restoration. Gorbachev took the middle path, trying, according to Volkogonov, to create a model that would include "the best socialist and capitalist elements." Gorbachev had to act according to the situation, there was no one to learn from, and hence the "indecision and half-heartedness" of many steps taken. Volkogonov emphasizes that perestroika caused "very profound changes in public attitudes", myths about the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, about the "advantages of the socialist system", "democracy" of the Soviet system and many others gradually disintegrated. According to Volkogonov, the results of perestroika were also influenced by the personal factor, which he explains for the so-called Gorbachev paradox. In his opinion, the general secretary "is a man of great intelligence, but weak character." Therefore, having begun perestroika under the slogan of renewing socialism, Gorbachev "against his will and desire" came to its elimination six years later. (See: Volkogonov D. Seven leaders: Gallery of the leaders of the USSR. M., 1995, Book. 2, pp. 310-312; 320-323; 330-331).

Not all historians agree with the above characteristic, attempts to find an explanation for the “political indistinctness” of the first stage of perestroika in the softness of the secretary general's nature. So, A.S. Grachev refers to the following opinion of E. Ligachev: “We often hear that Gorbachev is a weak-willed person. This is not true. This is an apparent impression. " He also quotes Gorbachev's remark to his assistant: "I will go as far as necessary, and no one will stop me." According to Grachev himself, Gorbachev's apparent indecision was due to the fact that in his policy he was under pressure from two forces - conservative (in the person of the ruling nomenklatura, who survived many reformers and reforms and did not want to go beyond "refreshing" the socialist facade) and radical, pushing the leader to populist improvisations and for the sake of this he uses the administrative resource to the utmost. Gorbachev tried not to follow the lead of either force, and therefore "earned a reputation as a vacillating and indecisive politician" (See: Grachev A. S. Gorbachev. M., 2001, pp. 151-152).

Vorotnikov described this feature of the politician Gorbachev quite figuratively in his memoirs: “Serious disputes often arose at Politburo meetings. Having listened to everyone, Gorbachev made general phrases, appeals to think again (our italics - V.P.), work on comments, as if bringing different positions closer together, curtailed the discussion "(See: V.I. member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. M., 1995, p. 165).

The problem in the title appears to be one of the most controversial in the literature on perestroika. Naturally, success is understood as the completion of perestroika in the interests of the entire society, and not only of the Soviet elite alone. Most scholars believe that the fate of political projects (including perestroika) is ultimately determined by the "structure of society", i.e. representatives of various "interest groups" exercising power.

According to academician T.I. Zaslavskaya, in the Soviet Union there were two forces "most interested" in perestroika and "ready to fight for it." The first was represented by the reformist wing of the nomenklatura - the “younger, educated, Westernized”, which was dissatisfied not only with its position in the system of power “on the sidelines”, but also with the general state of affairs in the country. The second force was the intelligentsia, "deeply interested" in democratic rights and freedoms. According to another scientist M. Castells, the fate of perestroika in the USSR was determined by representatives of the following "interest groups": communist ideologists, the ruling elite of the state, Soviet and party apparatus, heads of large state enterprises and a network "formed by the nomenklatura and the bosses of the shadow economy." Fighting representatives of these groups in the course of his reforms, which contradicted the “vested interests” of the state bureaucracy and the party nomenklatura, Gorbachev “inadvertently initiated the process of the collapse of the USSR” (See: 10 years without the USSR: Perestroika - our past or the future? ... Conference proceedings. M., 2002, pp. 18-19; Castells M. Information age: economy, society, culture. Transl. From English. M., 2000, pp. 438, 477-479).

In connection with the above, it is of considerable interest to assess the content of the political reform, in the course of which the interests of various social forces collided, primarily within the Soviet nomenklatura - the ruling class of the USSR.

In modern scientific literature, with all the diversity of approaches, one of the most common definitions of the concept of "elite" is the following: "a minority that has a monopoly on power, on making decisions regarding the content and distribution of basic values in society" (See: Kodin M.I. -political associations and the formation of the political elite in Russia (1990-1997). M., 1998, pp. 67-68).

According to the calculations of the historian A.D. Chernev, the total number of nomenklatura workers who took place in the late 80s of the XX century. approval in the Politburo, Secretariat or departments of the CPSU Central Committee, amounted to about 15 thousand people. The same nomenclature principle for the selection and placement of leading personnel as in the Central Committee of the CPSU was implemented in all other party organizations of the country up to the primary ones, which allowed the CPSU to direct the economic, political and cultural life of the country, to control all spheres of Soviet society. According to a number of scholars, the definition of the Soviet elite as a "nomenclature" indicates its fundamental feature - inseparability into separate functional groups. At the same time, the Soviet elite was “hierarchical” and “stable” due to strong vertical ties between its various levels. The indisputable priority was given to the party elite, followed by the state and economic elite. Scientists note that in the course of perestroika, the elite has changed "structurally and essentially." Instead of a monolithic nomenclature pyramid, numerous elite groups have appeared, which are among themselves "in a relationship of competition." The new elite has lost most of the levers of power inherent in the old ruling class. As a result of the reforms, the role of economic factors in the management of society has grown, and it became necessary to search for allies, temporary alliances "for the sake of achieving specific goals." These elite groups have become more dynamic, their number has grown sharply, and “horizontal and informal ties” have intensified between them. According to sociologist O. Kryshtanovskaya, about a third of the elite in the early 90s was in the nomenclature of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1988, and the remaining two-thirds came to the ruling stratum from “pre-nomenclature” positions, which gave scientists reason to talk about a change of elites at the turn of 80 -90s as a "revolution of deputies" (See: Chernev A.D. The ruling party in the system of Soviet state administration / Problems of Russian history. Issue 8. M., 2004, pp. 168-169, 185; Kodin MI Social and political associations and the formation of the political elite in Russia (1990-1997). M., 1998, pp. 74-76; Kryshtanovskaya O. Transformation of the old nomenklatura into the new Russian elite / Social sciences and modernity. 1995, no. 1, p. 62).

For a better understanding of this process, let us turn to historical facts. By the fall of 1987, in the opinion of Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, there was a need to change the current system of economic management, to leave only political functions to the party, and to transfer state power to the Soviets. The main question was how to solve these problems: should it be done by evolutionary, gradual transformations, trying to maintain stability, or by revolutionary breakdown? According to Gorbachev, those members of the Politburo who held government posts advocated the decisive release of the Central Committee apparatus from "unusual functions" (guardianship of defense, foreign policy), while the secretaries of the Central Committee tried to preserve their "allotments." In this situation, Gorbachev decided to actively pursue a political reform, the meaning of which he saw in the “transfer of power” from the hands of the communist party that monopolized it to the Soviets through “free elections of people's deputies” (See: M. Gorbachev, Life and Reforms. M., 1995 , Book. 1, pp. 407, 423). The difficulty of carrying out the reform, Gorbachev noted in this regard, was in keeping the “main levers of power” in the hands of the party-state bureaucracy, so it was necessary to organize “powerful pressure” on this bureaucracy from the radical part of society, as well as by “cutting off” the conservatives from party and state environment.

In June 1988, the 19th All-Union Party Conference took place, which approved the reform of the central authorities. It was decided to recreate the Congress of People's Deputies as the highest body of representative power. The apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU was sharply criticized at the conference.

At the initial stage of perestroika, most of the party cadres were convinced that, despite the shortcomings, “we do not have, and in the foreseeable future, no other political force, except the Communist Party, is capable of carrying out the planned reforms and ensuring stability for the country”. Over time, more and more people came to the idea that the party was becoming "unnecessary for society", that party institutions were "entwining" legal administrative structures - Soviets, ministries, trade unions, that cabbage or carrots were growing successfully "without the political leadership of the CPSU." Often, the most radical-minded people asked themselves the question: since the party "has always been wise has led along the only correct, Leninist path and has brought it into stagnation, does not all this give the party the right to express what they think of it?" (See: Party and Perestroika: Discussion sheets "Pravda". M., 1990, pp. 12, 53, 85, 207-208).

In practice, the political reform meant a reduction in the party apparatus by 700-800 thousand people. Historians note that with his reform Gorbachev not only reduced the size of the apparatus, in fact he "destroyed the stability of the ruling class of the USSR." His attempt to "denationalize" the party, relieve it of supervision over the activities of state bodies meant the risk that neither the party nor the state "would survive this operation."

The previously unified party apparatus began to stratify, realizing that perestroika posed a threat, first of all, to its well-being. Most of the rank-and-file members stopped paying party dues and left the party en masse: if in 1988 18 thousand people surrendered their membership cards, then in 1989 - 137 thousand. More than half of those who left the party were workers.

However, unlike the previous practice of the Soviet era, parting with the party under Gorbachev did not mean the end of a career for yesterday's nomenklatura. Perestroika opened up previously unprecedented opportunities: in 1990, about 1 million people took part in cooperative activities alone, there was a stir in the joint stock market, and commercial banks began to be created, accumulating significant funds by laundering money received from the state budget. And the former Soviet nomenklatura did not stand aside from the gaining strength of market processes, but actively participated in them, fully using their administrative resources. A significant part of the hierarchs of the past have moved into the private sector.

Historians note that part of the former nomenklatura moved to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and began to form into an "aggressive anti-perestroika force", the other into the camp of democrats, and the regional elites, freed from fear of the center, "turned towards the now safe nationalist and separatist movements" (See. : Grachev A.S. Gorbachev. M., 2001, pp. 237, 241-243).

The cleavage within the ruling class of the Soviet Union manifested itself most visibly during the August 1991 coup, which was the last act of the tragedy of the collapse of the USSR.

Author's opinion

We fully share the opinion of those historians who believe that in the course of perestroika, the ruling class of the Soviet Union as a whole was not capable of anything other than defending its own privileges. The quality of the Soviet elite turned out to be very low - even among the closest circle of Gorbachev, gradually, as the difficulties grew, personal ambitions and political claims prevailed over national interests - therefore, the task of restructuring society in the interests of this society turned out to be beyond the capabilities of the Soviet nomenclature, which for the most part remained the same who could only order and obey orders. Not only was society not ready for perestroika, most of which displayed the traits of social dependence familiar from previous years and still waited for instructions from above on the question of "how to live further", but also the ruling bureaucracy, since the loss of power of the CPSU in fact meant the loss of the only the strength she possessed, directive control.

What "ruined" perestroika: politics or economics?

There are at least two aspects of this topic, which still cause numerous controversies and discussions. And not only in the scientific community.

The first aspect is expressed in the works of economists who are convinced that in the Gorbachev era, "economic reforms were impossible" without political changes. A striking example is the work of an economist, professor at Moscow State University, and then People's Deputy of the USSR and Mayor of Moscow G.Kh. Popov. This figure is largely symbolic: the evolution of his views and political activities reflected the moods and views of a significant layer of the capital's intelligentsia, which became one of the leading forces of perestroika. In the first years of perestroika, G. Popov saw the main task of economic science in "clarifying the model of socialism." The slogans of his pre-election platform as an elect for the post of People's Deputy of the USSR included a bizarre mixture of the new and the old: "socialist property - owners", "land for those who cultivate it", "income - according to labor", "republics and regions - economic independence" , “Prices are regulated by the market”, but, at the same time, he demanded “stability” of state retail prices and the preservation of state orders for basic necessities. In this matter, he was even ready to go to the "introduction of cards." However, in December 1989, he considered the issue of property as the central issue requiring submission to the Supreme Soviet - “we must recognize the pluralism of all types of property”. In words, he had not yet broken with socialism, although he admitted that the administrative economy "has not solved and cannot solve," using Lenin's expression, the fundamental task of socialism - "to create a higher labor productivity in comparison with the previous system." At the same time, G. Popov is convinced that it is “impossible” to carry out real economic transformations in the current political system, i.e. in his scale of priorities, the political aspect of the reform came out on top in comparison with the economic one. This transformation of an economist into a politician took place when it became clear to the majority of the population of the Soviet Union that among the entire package of reforms, it was the economic achievements of perestroika that turned out to be minimal - the people began to live worse than in previous years. It was necessary not only to give an explanation for this fact, but also to find the culprit. The roots of the economic failures of perestroika began to be seen in the imperfection of the Soviet political system. The involvement of many active participants in perestroika in the political confrontation between Gorbachev and Yeltsin also had an effect. Largely for these reasons, in December 1990 Popov considered the main thing in the democratic program "overcoming the omnipotence of the Soviets, de-Sovietization." In his opinion, when different types of property, the market, new classes of society, their parties appear, then "conditions will be created for a normal democratic mechanism." This democratic platform was the voice of the policy of Gorbachev's main competitor, B.N. Yeltsin (See: Popov G.Kh. Selected Works. T. 8. Gorbachev's Perestroika. M., 1996, pp. 153, 179, 438-439, 441-443, 454, 484, 508-509, 540, 642 -643).

Another point of view on the problems of economic reforming of the Soviet system is presented mainly by the works of politicians, many of whom are convinced that “if we could induce M. Gorbachev to make everything else subordinate to economic tasks, the fate of the Soviet Union would undoubtedly be to another. " Thus, the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Falin, being one of the conductors of the Gorbachev policy, in the memorandum addressed to the main reformer of the country tried to prove that the time of state socialism is irrevocably gone and it is "dead", that the previous forms of "production, distribution and exchange" should be abandoned , which give rise to the main antagonism in Soviet society - "the alienation of man from property and power." One of the main measures proposed was the "immediate" introduction of freedom of trade and "real equality of all types of property." Without this, the author warned, perestroika "is doomed to the terror of idiots and clever villains." (See: V. Falin Conflicts in the Kremlin: Twilight of the Gods in Russian. M., 1999, pp. 69, 243-245, 269).

Thus, despite the painful search for a way out of the crisis, the theoretical thought of the reformers revolved mainly in the circle of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism - not owning other ideological guidelines, the leaders of perestroika tried to adapt "socialism in the Leninist edition" for their own purposes.

The refrain that the country's economic problems were brought by Gorbachev “for the sake of his personal political interests” was also repeated many times in the memoirs of V. Pavlov, N. Ryzhkov, V. Vorotnikov and many other associates of Gorbachev. So, Vorotnikov argued that only in December 1989 the government developed and presented "a comprehensive, balanced program of economic reform of the country's economy", and before that there was only talk about "private economic problems" (See: V.I. And it was like this ... From the diary of a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU. M., 1995, p. 322).

By this time, in the West, socialist thought had developed a critical approach to assessing the Soviet experience. So, in 1982, at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party, the thesis was formulated that "the phase of development of socialism, which began with the October Revolution, has exhausted its motivating force, the ability of these countries for political, economic, cultural renewal has entered a state of crisis." It was emphasized that we are not talking about a simple lag, but about a crisis, about the historical hopelessness of "state socialism" (See: World History of Economic Thought. Vol. 5, Moscow, 1994, pp. 283 - 286). These ideas became popular during the years of perestroika and in the Soviet Union.

Both foreign and Russian scientists are characterized by several points of view on the problem raised.

First, an approach is highlighted according to which the idea of “improved” or market socialism “is completely contrived and unrealistic”. The only effective economy is the capitalist market economy, and the modernization of Soviet-type socialism is “doomed to failure”. In the most complete form, this point of view was expressed back in 1922 by the famous economist B. Brutskus, who argued in his works that socialism as a positive system is “impossible”, and the economic problem of socialism is “insoluble”, since this system “does not have a mechanism to bring production in line with social needs ”. All the most important elements of economic freedom (economic initiative, freedom to organize consumption and freedom of labor) in a socialist society take place only in the form of "state coercion." On the direct order of Lenin, Brutskus was expelled from Soviet Russia as an ideological opponent of Bolshevism (See: B.D. Brutskus. Socialist economy. Theoretical thoughts about the Russian experience. M., 1999, pp. 48-49, 58, 68-69, 72). Brutskus's point of view is today shared by many modern domestic economists, but not all.

The second direction is those who argued that reforming the Soviet economy is possible, but extremely difficult and contradictory, that the reform process will inevitably entail "difficulties and temporary deterioration" and the political elite. Thus, Ryazanov believed that all post-war economic reforms in our country should be characterized as a period of breaking down the administrative-command system and a real revival of commodity-market relations. In his opinion, by 1985 the Soviet economy was "actually a mixed, multi-sectoral economy with limited market mechanisms," which manifested themselves primarily in the market for goods and services. He believed that in the 70s the Soviet Union missed a historic chance in the implementation of the overdue technical modernization of the national economy, which consisted in the rational use of the huge export earnings received by the USSR from the export of energy resources (oil, gas, electricity). Ryazanov believed that one of the main reasons for the failures of perestroika in the field of economics was that the implementation of economic reforms led to the "revival" in Russia of the strategy of catch-up development, the imitation and use of economic forms of the leading countries in our country. Thus, in his opinion, the “historically leaving” type of early industrial capitalism was reproduced. A promising goal, in his opinion, should be associated with an orientation towards the manufacturing industry and "especially" high technology products (See: Ryazanov V.T. Economic development of Russia. Reforms and the Russian economy in the XIX - XX centuries. M., 1998, Pp. 390, 392-393, 432-434, 449).

As a rule, scientists emphasized, supporters of this approach focused on the mistakes of Gorbachev and his colleagues, which allowed them to justify the correctness of their own theoretical constructions.

The adherents of the third trend viewed the crisis of the Soviet economy as the result of a “failed attempt” to adapt the socialist system to the needs of the post-industrial era - the state authorities tried to use the previous mobilization model “to break through the framework of industrialism”, but the Soviet economy “could not” adapt to the challenges of the time (See. : Economy in Transition: Essays on the Economic Policy of Post-Communist Russia. 1991-1997. Edited by E. Gaidar. M., 1998, pp. 55-57.).

A group of economists led by E.T. Gaidara drew attention to the fact that the choice of a model for reforming the Soviet economy in the 1980s was explained by two main points. First, there was an ideological alternative between a mobilization (war communism or accelerated industrialization) organization of economic life and a liberal one (with elements of decentralization and the market). According to Gaidar, the economic successes achieved in these years in the USA, Great Britain and Chile were viewed by public opinion in the USSR as the results of the implementation of the "liberal course". Thus, the penetration of liberal ideology into the Soviet scientific intelligentsia created a real basis for reform. Secondly, the choice of a specific program was associated with political circumstances, the practical experience that had been accumulated by the communist countries by that time. The Soviet leadership, headed by Andropov, tended more in favor of the Czech-Hungarian model, rather than the Chinese one. By the time of Gorbachev's rule in the USSR, there was already a reform program, Gaidar believes, although “not in the form of an integral document,” but in the form of numerous notes to decision-making bodies. One of the most famous is the closed report of Academician T. Zaslavskaya in 1983, which received scandalous notoriety thanks to its publication in the West (See: Economy of the Transition Period. Essays on the Economic Policy of Post-Communist Russia. 1991-1997. M., 1998, pp. 58- 65).

Scientists note that Gorbachev adopted the ideas that formed the basis of the program of "improving the economic mechanism", the hallmarks of which were: the revitalization of enterprises and workers; the presence of the State Planning Commission and other decision-making bodies to ensure the "balance" of the Soviet economy; the ban on the problem of "property reform", which was completely passed over in silence. The unresolved ownership problem left the hopes for program developers that the "wise center" would intervene and correct market processes "when they fail."

Thus, the program tried to combine the advantages of two systems - planned socialist and market capitalist, which, according to economists, initially made this program "inconsistent and internally contradictory." Many elements of this program were known to Gorbachev when he was at the head of the Stavropol Territory. It was then that the experience of introducing a brigade contract and "full cost accounting" in primary labor collectives led to a sharp increase in labor productivity and earnings. Despite this, according to N. Petrakov, Gorbachev's assistant in economics, the secretary general's own baggage of economic knowledge contained only an "empty suitcase" that still had to be filled. Gorbachev did not hide from his colleagues in the Politburo what they knew without him: “the country is in queues; we live in constant deficit - from energy sources to women's tights; only the military sector is fattening; technological dependence on the West is accumulating ”.

Economists believe that when Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet elite did not have an awareness of the fact that not only the economy, but the entire Soviet system was in crisis. Therefore, Gorbachev's first steps towards acceleration in the field of the national economy were conditioned by the usual logic of the "mobilization approach" - the machine-building complex had to be intensively developed. By October 1985 in the USSR, on the basis of the acceleration concept, drafts of a new edition of the party program and the main directions for the twelfth five-year plan and for the period up to 2000, approved at the 27th party congress, were prepared. In essence, the new course replaced the directive contained in the previous Khrushchev version of the program about building the "foundations of communism" in 20 years. At the same time, the mention of the "communist perspective" as the highest phase has been preserved. At the congress it was also proposed “to overcome prejudices regarding commodity-money relations”, the principle of cost accounting was declared, according to which enterprises and associations “are fully responsible for the break-even of their work,” and the state “is not responsible for their obligations” (See: Materials of the XXVII Congress of the CPSU M., 1986, pp. 5, 139-140, 39-41, 147, 331).

The well-known economist L. Piyasheva believed that the idea of economic independence of state enterprises was to transfer them to a self-sustaining and self-financing mode, but “without excommunication” from the budget and introducing an inexorably operating mechanism of bankruptcies for all “non-self-supporting” enterprises. For this reason, the implementation of the idea did not provide either economic growth or additional income for the budget. The only winners were the directors of the enterprises, who used the resulting freedom to "satisfy their personal needs." The concept provided for the division of products produced at state-owned enterprises into "planned" (socialist) and "over-planned" (commercial). As soon as the state-owned enterprises had the opportunity to sell part of their "above-plan" products through the cooperatives they opened, the outflow of resources from the main industries to the "subsidiaries" immediately began, and through them - into the sphere of personal consumption of those who "sat" on resources, property and money. “It was inevitable,” notes Piyasheva, since the funds received from the commercial sale of "above-planned" products could not be legalized and they had to go "into the shadows". In her opinion, Gorbachev's attempt to carry out an economic reform was untenable, since in Russia there was “no right” for everyone to be a private owner and freely engage in entrepreneurial activity. In addition, Piyasheva notes, Gorbachev did not go for more radical transformations "out of fear of mass unemployment" that could begin as a result of privatization (See: Russia: 21st century ... Where are you? M., 2002, pp. 78-81) ...

On the pros and cons of Gorbachev's foreign policy

As D. Volkogonov aptly noted, for the West, Gorbachev's popularity was primarily due to the fact that he became “a symbol of the departure from the political scene of the Bolshevik monster” (See: D. Volkogonov. Seven Leaders. Gallery of USSR Leaders. Book 2, M ., 1995, p. 362).

In December 1990, Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, but the internal situation did not allow the president to travel to receive the prize awarded to him. A large part of the population wondered: why was Gorbachev given the prize? The country is in collapse - and he has a prize! It was by the end of 1990 that the gap between the president's foreign policy triumph and the consequences of his policies at home became obvious to many. The situation remained tense in Tbilisi, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku, Chechnya, and the Baltic states. At the IV Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the country E. Shevardnadze, who had resigned, issued a warning about the impending coup. Prime Minister N.I. Ryzhkov. At the congress, it was also proposed to include in the agenda the issue of distrust to the President of the USSR, which indicated serious dissatisfaction with Gorbachev's policies in internal and external affairs. Observers noted the president's break with the progressive part of his entourage. In December, a decision was made by the Moscow City Council on the rationed distribution of food products. A budgetary crisis arose, and the USSR entered the new 1991 without a plan and budget. These are just a few touches that characterize the situation in the outgoing 1990.

According to his assistant Chernyaev, these days the general secretary received “bundles of telegrams” from the population, in which Gorbachev was congratulated on the “imperialist prize” for “destroying” the Soviet Union, “betraying” Eastern Europe, “giving” resources to the Americans , and the media - to the "Zionists" (See: AS Chernyaev Six years with Gorbachev: According to diary entries. M., 1993, p. 384).

Against this background, Gorbachev's foreign policy began to lose support within the country. Describing the situation of those days, Shevardnadze noticed that the “shadow” authorities were recapturing their surrendered positions, emerging from the shadows and beginning to act openly. " If democratic forces were united, he notes, this offensive could be "stopped." However, the lack of "united action" among like-minded people forced him to resign. Political opponents of the retired foreign minister explained his voluntary departure by “the desire to evade responsibility for the mistakes allegedly committed in foreign policy” (See: E. Sheverdnadze. My Choice. In Defense of Democracy and Freedom. M., 1991, pp. 20-21 ).

What was the foreign policy like during the Gorbachev era according to the testimony of those who created it? What is its assessment by historians?

The biographer of the first president of the USSR Grachev notes that in the spring of 1985 Gorbachev had a list of top-priority foreign policy tasks to be solved. Among the priorities of the secretary general's working notebooks were: “end the arms race”, “leave Afghanistan”, “improve relations with the United States and China” (See: Grachev A.S. Gorbachev. M., 2001, p. 179). The biographer points out that Gorbachev had to reckon with the prevailing foreign policy stereotypes between the two superpowers - to look at each other "through the embrasure." Having encroached on this strategic "balance of fear" Gorbachev, his biographer emphasizes, knocked one of the most important supports out from under his own chair. If earlier the Soviet people put up with their wretched life and voluntarily gave up the last for defense, then the transformation of yesterday's enemy into a partner also changed their consciousness - they turned their dissatisfaction with their lives to those who ruled them.

Gorbachev's opponents blamed him for the fact that, while carrying out perestroika, he and his associates “did not care about the ideological, socio-economic, political and historical systemic foundations” of the Soviet system, that the doom of perestroika lay in its “top” character, as a result of which “ power gradually became a foreign body within the system, primarily in relation to its foundations ", that behind the facade of perestroika" there was an energetic process of change of landmarks ", in which Yakovlev and Shevardnadze played the first violin. Among the main slogans of perestroika and, in the opinion of these opponents, “destructive” for the Soviet system, were the following: universal human values and their priority over class values, which led to a revision of the results of the Second World War, a violation of the agreements of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, borders, caused the liquidation of the Warsaw Pact Organization, CMEA, East Germany and "prepared" the collapse of the USSR; entry into world civilization, which became possible for our country only "after the collapse" of the socialist system; the democratization of society, which led to the “decentralization and disintegration of power” in Russia; rethinking history, which in fact turned into “spitting on the past”, into a reliable mechanism for “destroying the historical memory of the people” (See: Russia - 2000. Modern political history (1985-1999). Vol. 1. Chronicle and analytics. M. , 2000, pp. 572-573, 617-618).

Soviet leaders, primarily Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, were criticized for “losing” Eastern Europe and Germany, for isolating and weakening the country, for canceling out the results of the war and its conquests by unreasonable political actions, for which whole generations paid an exorbitant price the blood of the people for the liberation of Europe from Nazism. " At the ceremony of signing the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe, the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal D. Yazov, said in a narrow circle: “We lost the third world war without firing a single shot” (See: J. Boffa. From the USSR to Russia: The History of an Unfinished Crisis. 1964- 1994. M., 1994, p. 202).

Responding to such accusations, in particular to the fact that Gorbachev “surrendered the socialist countries,” the former president of the USSR wrote that these thoughts were put forward by “adherents of imperial ideology,” for whom the right of the strong to dispose of foreign countries as his property, “to play the fate of peoples ". Referring to the recent history of relations between the USSR and the countries of the "socialist community", Gorbachev pointed out that in these countries we had implanted a modified "Stalinist model of socialism", and all attempts of these countries to break out of the "friendly embrace" of the superpower were "strictly suppressed." As an example, he cited events in the GDR in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968 (See: M. Gorbachev Life and Reforms. Book 2, M., 1995, p. 474-475).

There was no unanimity about Gorbachev's political line among the leaders of the "socialist camp." Kadar and Honecker did not believe in the "irreversibility" of perestroika and took a wait and see attitude, Zhivkov warned, referring to the Khrushchev policy, that perestroika could “destabilize the socialist community,” and the leader of the Romanian communists, Ceausescu, took an openly hostile position.

A.V. Kozyrev, appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia in 1990, when he was an employee of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, saw his main task in the years of perestroika as participating in "dismantling obsolete ideological dogmas." “The crux of the matter,” he writes in his memoirs, “was to promote into official Soviet documents, right up to speeches on foreign policy issues by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee,“ seditious ”formulations that, if not immediately, then in potential would open up opportunities for undermining, and then a complete revision of communist dogma. " He called E.K. as his opponents in the Politburo. Ligachev, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - G.M. Kornienko, and their supporters - G.Kh. Shakhnazarov and A.S. Chernyaeva, with A.N. Yakovleva and E.A. Shevardnadze. In his opinion, Gorbachev, with his statements about new political thinking, "created a kind of cover for such far-reaching interpretations." Kozyrev was skeptical of Gorbachev and his followers, believing that by 1989 they had exhausted themselves, primarily because "they were striving at all costs to remain faithful to the socialist choice, to renew and modernize the Soviet system, while completely failing to understand its doom." Kozyrev saw the origins of the new Russian concept of national security in “the ideas of A.D. Sakharov ", who, in his opinion, combined the thesis of curbing the nuclear arms race with the solution of the problem of" the relationship between man and the state in our country "(See: A. Kozyrev Preobrazhenie. M., 1995, pp. 42-46, 72) ...

Soviet diplomats objected to such a simplified approach in assessing the most complex foreign policy problems facing the Soviet Union at the turn of the 70s and 80s. So, according to the same G.M. Kornienko, it was during these years that there were opportunities to reach a compromise with the West in the field of disarmament. He called A.A. Gromyko is a "staunch supporter" of the disarmament line, the "main generator" of ideas in this area. Another thing, noted Kornienko, that when it came to the development of specific positions, and the military were against this or that decision, then Gromyko "did not go into conflict with them." In general, he believed that Soviet foreign policy was characterized by “underestimation” and sometimes “ignorance” of the possibilities of strengthening the security of the state by “political means”, and not by further increasing the already excessive defense spending (See: S.F. Akhromeev. , Kornienko G.M. Through the eyes of a marshal and a diplomat: A critical look at the foreign policy of the USSR before and after 1985, M., 1992, pp. 40-45).

The 27th Congress of the CPSU officially proclaimed a new foreign policy for the country and defined three main areas of activity: overcoming the confrontation between East and West, resolving regional conflicts, rejecting ideological preferences in relations with other states and recognizing the existing world order. To solve the first problem, the meetings of M.S. Gorbachev with US President R. Reagan in Geneva in 1985, in Reykjavik and Washington in 1986, in Moscow in 1988. The result of the first meetings was the signing of a joint statement stating that "a nuclear war is unacceptable" because " there can be no winners "and that" the parties will not strive for military superiority over each other. " In December 1987, an agreement was reached on the elimination of Soviet and American medium and short-range missiles in Europe; the agreement was supplemented by the establishment of a system of mutual control. In addition, the USSR eliminated some of its medium and short-range missiles located in Siberia and the Far East. The military, primarily Chief of the General Staff S. Akhromeev, fully shared the position of President Gorbachev.

Western historians and politicians emphasize the fact that it was largely thanks to Gorbachev's foreign policy that it was possible to end the Cold War and the arms race.

In February 1988, Gorbachev announced the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, which began on May 15, and in February 1989 the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan. This decision was not easy for Gorbachev. Even under Brezhnev in 1981, the Politburo made a decision to "lead the case to leave," but the whole question was only how, when and on what conditions to leave. According to Soviet data, our country annually spent 1 billion rubles on the Afghan adventure. Gorbachev was worried not only about the decline of the USSR's prestige in the Third World countries, but, as he put it: “We will not pay off to our people: why did so many people get laid?”. Defense Minister Marshal Sokolov confirmed that "it is impossible to win the war by military means." Gorbachev's decision to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan was supported by the Politburo and his closest associates, Ryzhkov and Ligachev. However, even having made the decision to leave, Gorbachev posed, as the development of subsequent events in this region showed, an impossible task - not only to "restore a friendly and neutral country", but to make sure that "the United States with its bases did not settle in Afghanistan."

During this period, the opposition came to power in almost all socialist countries. In March 1991, the Warsaw Pact Organization officially ceased to exist. Thus, for the first time since 1945, the Soviet Union found itself without military allies in Europe.

The most important event of this period was the unification of Germany. In November 1989, the Berlin Wall came down, dividing the German people for more than thirty years. On September 12, 1990 in Moscow, Germany, the German Democratic Republic, France, the USSR, Great Britain and the United States signed the Treaty on the Final Settlement of Germany. Article 1 stated that a united Germany would include the territories of the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany and "all of Berlin." This treaty also confirmed the "final character of the borders" of the united Germany, the fact that she "has no territorial claims to other states" and will not put forward such claims "in the future." The governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic reaffirmed their renunciation of the "production, possession and disposal of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons" and said that a reunified Germany would also adhere to these obligations. The agreement provided for the time frame for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the GDR and Berlin. The right of a united Germany "to participate in unions" was established, the country acquired "full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs" (See: Russia - 2000. Modern political history (1985-1999). T. 1. Chronicle and analytics. M ., 2000, pp. 621-623).

How could this significant event have happened, what is its assessment in modern historical literature?

According to Western researchers, the problem of the post-war reconstruction of Germany was "central" in relations between the victorious powers, and it also became an "obstacle" for the USSR's alliance with the Western powers. When the cohesion of one of the opposing military-political blocs, the Warsaw Pact Organization, “began to collapse,” the factors of the split in Germany began to seem to German society “less significant” than the factors of reunification, and the speed and political strength of the reunification process “overturned all resistance” (See. : Ennio Di Nolfo. History of International Relations (1918-1999). In 2 volumes. Translated from Italian. V.2. M., 2003, p. 726).

Russian historians noted that when the German question turned into a practical solution, neither Gorbachev, nor the country's political elite, nor Soviet society itself "were ready for such a turn of affairs." Initially, Gorbachev limited himself to "general reasoning", but then at a narrow meeting in January 1990, the Soviet leadership put forward the idea of a "six" - the formation of a special negotiating mechanism consisting of four victorious powers (USSR, USA, Great Britain, France) and two German states (East Germany and West Germany) to discuss the international aspects of the unification of Germany. At the same time, according to Russian historians, the Soviet leadership feared that the situation would get out of control and that an armed conflict would emerge in Europe; it also “was unwilling” and “had no opportunity” to use military force to prevent the unification of Germany. An important role was played by the fact that in the conditions of the deteriorating economic situation in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev counted on receiving foreign loans, including from German banks. The historian Narinsky believes that Gorbachev and his associates "overestimated" the willingness of the Western partners to play by the new "rules of the game", and therefore "did not fix an agreement" on the refusal of NATO's further eastward advance. His general assessment of the reformer's activities in foreign policy is as follows - Gorbachev made a "great contribution" to the end of the Cold War, but "failed (or did not have time)" to lay the foundations of a new world order (See: M.M. Narinsky, M.S. Gorbachev and unification of Germany. Based on new materials / New and Contemporary History. 2004, No. 1, pp. 14-30).

According to Falin, neither the Security Council, nor the Presidential Council, nor any other state bodies took part in the final stage of developing decisions on the unification of Germany. "The new military-political map of Europe in 1989-1990," wrote Falin in his memoirs, "was cut by one M. Gorbachev and his comrade (E. Shevardnadze - VP) according to Western standards." He wrote that he tried to warn Gorbachev against the USSR's huge concessions to the West on the German issue, in particular, in his opinion, it was necessary to envisage in the treaty "non-participation of the united Germany in NATO." To this proposal, Gorbachev said: "I'm afraid the train has already left." There were other alternatives for solving the German problem, Falin is convinced, and no worse than those implemented by Gorbachev (See: V. Falin Conflicts in the Kremlin. Twilight of the Gods in Russian. M., 1999, pp. 180-193).

According to the Italian historian J. Boff, German unity in practice meant "the annexation of East Germany by the FRG" (See: J. Boffa. From the USSR to Russia: A History of the Unfinished Crisis. 1964-1994. M., 1996, p. 198) ...

There is an opinion expressed by employees of the Soviet special services that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the GDR were a surprise to everyone, that no one in the world could have foreseen such a development of events. Therefore, the widespread version that “everything went according to Gorbachev’s plan”, that “he is a traitor” seems to be absolutely “absurd”. “It can be seen from all of Gorbachev’s actions,” wrote I. Kuzmin, an officer of the USSR KGB, “that he did not want the collapse of the GDR, he tried to preserve it, but he acted indecisively” (See: M. Karpov The Fall of the Berlin Wall. Even the Chekists did not expect this // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1994. November 5).

Was there a "putsch"?

On August 18, 1991, a group of USSR leaders arrived in Foros to see President M.S. Gorbachev, who was on vacation. The next day, the USSR announced the transfer of power to the State Committee for the State of Emergency, which went down in history under the name of the State Emergency Committee. Troops were transferred to Moscow and other large cities of the Soviet Union. Thus began the three-day putsch, which led to the banning of the CPSU and, ultimately, to the end of the existence of the USSR. This phenomenon gave rise to a huge stream of literature, mainly from the pen of the participants in the events. However, as Gorbachev told reporters right after his return from Foros, "you will never know the whole truth!" The Dictionary of Foreign Words defines a putsch as "an adventurous attempt by a small group of conspirators to carry out a coup d'etat." To what extent did the events that took place more than ten years ago correspond to the given concept? How is this phenomenon perceived by the current population of Russia? What opinions exist among historians on this score?

A poll conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation in the summer of 2003 on the topic "How do you assess the dramatic events of 12 years ago?" showed that the majority of respondents (48%) consider everything that happened then "an episode of the struggle for power in the country's top leadership." Another fund "ROMIR-Monitoring" asked the respondents about their personal attitude to the main participants in the events of those years. Sympathies were distributed as follows: today Yeltsin would be supported by 13% of those polled, the Emergency Committee - 10%, President Gorbachev - 8%. 54% of those surveyed refused to support all the heroes of August-91. For some, the events of August 1991 are a phenomenon of global significance, when the issue of “changing the state system” of the country and “the impossibility of returning to socialism” was finally resolved. For others, it is "a tragedy not only of our people, but of the entire world community," which caused "bloody upheavals throughout the world." For others, it is only “the beginning of the collapse of the USSR” and a missed opportunity “to carry out deep democratic transformations within the framework of the existing Union” (See: Three days of fear // Novye Izvestia. 2003. 19 August).

On August 19, at six o'clock in the morning, the radio began broadcasting an announcement of the introduction of a state of emergency in some regions of the USSR, a decree of Vice-President of the USSR Yanayev on his assumption of the duties of President of the USSR in connection with Gorbachev's illness, a statement by the "Soviet leadership" on the creation of the State the situation in the USSR, the appeal of the State Emergency Committee to the Soviet people. By its resolutions, the State Emergency Committee announced the suspension of the activities of political parties, public organizations and mass movements that "impede the normalization of the situation", the disbandment of power and management structures operating contrary to the USSR Constitution, the prohibition of rallies and demonstrations, and the establishment of control over the media. Troops and military equipment occupied key points on the highways leading to the center of Moscow, surrounded the area adjacent to the Kremlin. At about 12 noon, several dozen tanks approached the White House of the RSFSR government.

These incidents were preceded by the following event: on August 18, Boldin, Baklanov, Shenin, Varennikov and the head of the USSR KGB security service Plekhanov arrived in Foros. According to Boldin, at the end of the conversation, Gorbachev said: "Fool with you, do whatever you want!" - and even gave some advice on how best, from his point of view, to introduce a state of emergency. " The purpose of the creation of the State Emergency Committee, according to Boldin, is “to take over the key points of control, to restore order in the country” (See: V. Boldin. The collapse of the pedestal: strokes to the portrait of M.S. Gorbachev. M., 1995, 15-17; // Kommersant power. 2001. 21 August, pp. 9-10).

Former Prime Minister Pavlov, referring to the testimony of the Moscow visitors present at the Foros meeting, wrote that “no one offered Gorbachev to resign,” he was only asked “either to agree to sign himself, or to instruct G. Yanayev to sign the declaration of a state of emergency and the convocation of a session Of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ". According to the retired prime minister, Gorbachev's real goal and position, which they initially interpreted as agreeing to declare a state of emergency, was “to deal with Yeltsin with our hands, pushing us to bloodshed. Then, as the President of the USSR, deal with the perpetrators of this bloodshed, that is, with us. As a result, the country is in collapse, division and lawlessness, he is on the throne, and everyone who could resist is in the next world or in prison. " Pavlov also refuted the conventional wisdom that Gorbachev was isolated in Foros. As proof, he referred to the conclusion of one of the founders of the system of government communications in Foros, who stated “the allegations of the complete disconnection of Foros’s communication with the outside world is a fiction (italics ours - VP). This cannot be even with a nuclear attack. " For Pavlov, this is a key moment in the whole story, because if "there is no isolation, there is no conspiracy" (See: Pavlov V.S. August from the inside. Gorbachev-putsch. M., 1993, pp. 32-33, 47, 72-73 ).

Visors and awnings. External and internal stairs. Components