In the spring of 1943, a relative lull was established on the Soviet-German front. The Germans conducted total mobilization and increased production military equipment Due to the resources of the whole of Europe. Germany was preparing to take revenge for defeat near Stalingrad.

A lot of work was carried out to strengthen the Soviet Army. The design bureaus improved the old and created new types of weapons. Due to the increase in production, it was possible to form a large number of tank and mechanized enclosures. Aviation technique was improved, the number of aviation regiments and compounds increased. But the main thing - after the troops instilled confidence in the victory.

Stalin and the rate initially planned to organize a large-scale offensive in the south-west. However, Marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky managed to predict the place and time of the future of the Wehrmacht.

The Germans, losing the strategic initiative, were not able to conduct large-scale operations throughout the front. For this reason, in 1943, they developed the Operation "Citadel". Having collected together the forces of tank armies, the Germans were going to attack Soviet troops on the protrusion of the front line, which was formed in the Kursk region.

The victory in this operation was planning to change the overall strategic situation in its favor.

Intelligence accurately informed the General Staff about the place of concentration of troops and their quantity.

The Germans concentrated in the area of \u200b\u200bKursk arc 50 divisions, 2 thousand tanks, 900 aircraft.

Zhukov proposed not to prevent an opponent's blow to his offensive, but to organize a reliable defense and meet German tank wedges by artillery, aviation and self-propelled guns, blend them and go to the offensive. From the Soviet side, 3.6 thousand tanks and 2.4 thousand aircraft were concentrated.

Early in the morning of July 5, 1943, the German troops began to attack the positions of our troops. They wrapped on the connections of the Red Army the most powerful tank blow for the entire war.

Methodically hacking the defense, carrying huge losses, they managed to advance for the first days of battles for 10-35 km. IN separate moments It seemed that the Soviet defense was about to be broken. But at the most critical moment, the blow caused fresh parts of the steppe front.

On July 12, 1943, the largest tank battle occurred under a small village of Prokhorovka. At the same time, up to 1.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns come together in the counter-battle. The battle lasted to a deep night and so bleeding German divisions that the next day they had to move back to their original positions.

In the hardest offensive battles, the Germans lost a huge amount of equipment and personnel. From July 12, the character of the battle has changed. The offensive actions were made by Soviet troops, and the German army was forced to go to the defense. To restrain the attacking gust of the Soviet troops, Nazis failed.

On August 5, Eagle and Belgorod were liberated, August 23 - Kharkov. The victory in the Kursk battle finally broke the move, the strategic initiative was doried from the hands of the Nazis.

By the end of September, Soviet troops came to the Dnieper. The Germans created the strengthened area along the river line - the eastern shaft, which was ordered to hold all their might.

However, our advanced parts, despite the lack of plaels, without the support of artillery, have begun forging the Dnieper.

Baking significant losses, the detachments of the miracle of the surviving infantrymen took the bridgeheads and, waiting for reinforcements, began to expand them, attacking the Germans. Forcing Dnieper became an example of a disinterested donation of Soviet soldiers with his lives in the name of the Fatherland and Victory.

All-Russian Society for the Protection of Monuments of History and Culture

Moscow City Branch

Military Historical Club

M. Solomiets, M. Svirin

with the participation of O. Baronova, D. Nedochonova

IN Attention is offered an illustrated edition dedicated to combat actions on a Kursk arc. By drawing up the publication, the authors did not set themselves the goal to give a comprehensive description of the course of the fighting of the summer of 1943. They used as primary sources mostly domestic documents of those years: Magazine magazines, reports on hostilities and losses provided by various military units, and work protocols Commissions engaged in July-August 1943 by studying new samples of German combat technology. The publication considers mainly the actions of anti-tank artillery and armored troops and the actions of aviation and infantry compounds are not considered.

Pthe donkey completion of the winter 1942-43. The onset of the Red Army and the Contrudar of the German Operational Group "Cempf" Eastern Front in the area of \u200b\u200bthe cities of Eagle Kursk-Belgorod adopted fancy outlines. In the Eagle area, the front line Arc was sent to the location of the Soviet troops, and in the area of \u200b\u200bKursk - on the contrary, formed a depression in the western direction. This characteristic configuration of the front suggested the German command of the 1943 Spring-Summer Campaign plan, in which the rate was made to the environment of the Soviet troops near Kursk.

A division of 150-mm self-propelled guns on the chassis of the French tractor "Lorren" before the battles.

Orlovsk direction. June 1943

Plans of the German command

N. Despite the defeat near Stalingrad and in the North Caucasus, the Wehrmacht was still quite capable of emphasizing, to apply fast and powerful strikes, which demonstrated the fights of spring 1943 near Kharkov. However, in the established conditions, the Germans could not already lead a large-scale offensive on a wide front, as in previous summer campaigns. Some representatives of German generals offered to start a positional war, actively developing seized areas. But Hitler did not want to give up the initiative to the Soviet command. He wanted to strike a powerful blow at least one of the front sites, so that the decisive success with minor own losses would dictate his will to dictate their will in further campaigns. To carry out such an offensive, the Kursk protrusion saturated with Soviet troops was suitable. The German Spring-Summer Campaign Plan of 1943 was as follows: to apply powerful blows in the direction of Kursk from the north and south under the basis of the protrusion, surround the main forces of the two Soviet fronts (Central and Voronezh) and destroy them.

The conclusion about the possibility of the destruction of Soviet troops with small eigenvalues \u200b\u200bflowed from the experience of summer operations 1941-42. And a large extent was based on the underestimation of the possibilities of the Red Army. After successful fights near Kharkov, the German top command decided that the crisis on the Eastern Front had already passed and achieving success during the summer offensive under Kurk did not cause doubt. On April 15, 1943, Hitler gave operational order No. 6 on the preparation of a Kursk operation called the "Citadel", and the study of the following large-scale attack on the East and the South-East, which received the code name "Panther Operation".

Before the onset. "Mapander III" and bumps on the source position. July, 1943

"Tigers" of the 505th battalion on the march.

Due to the dedication of neighboring sites of the Eastern Front and the transfer of all operational reserves, three mobile shock groups were formed at the disposal of the Army and South Army Groups. The south of the eagle was located the 9th Army, in the Belgorod district there was the 4th tank army and the "Cempf" operational group. The number of troops engaged in the "Citadel" operation was seven army and five tank corps, which included 34 infantry, 14 tank, 2 motorized divisions, as well as 3 separate battalions of heavy tanks and 8 distortion tool divisions, which was more than 17 percent of infantry , up to 70 percent of tank and up to 30 percent of motorized divisions from the total number of German troops on the Eastern Front.

It was originally planned to begin offensive actions on May 10-15, but later this term was postponed by June, then for July because of the unpretentiousness of the group of Army "South" (some authors believe that this term was transferred due to the unpretentiousness of Panther tanks, However, according to the reports of Manstein, on May 1, 1943, he had in his units a noncomplex of a personnel, reaching 11-18%.

German Tank Pzkpfw IV Ausf G in ambush. Rn Belgorod, June 1943

Ferdinand of the 653rd battalion of fighters of tanks before battles.

Availability of tanks and assault guns in other landlord units

Moreover: Stuging guns Stug 111 and Stug 40 in assault battalions and anti-tank rotations of infantry divisions -
455: Assault 105-mm Gaubitz - 98, storming infantry tools stulg 33 in 23. Tank Division - 12. 150 mm Sau "Hummel" - 55 and more than 160 anti-tank SAU "MARDER". For the rest of the SAU, there is no accurate data.

Plans of the Soviet command

G. The lanctic feature of the Kursk battle, allocating it among other operations of the Second World War, was that for the first time in two years since the attack of fascist Germany in the USSR, the Soviet command correctly determined the direction of the main strategic offensive of the German troops and managed to prepare him in advance.

In the course of the analysis of the situation, which established at the Central and Voronezh fronts in the spring of 1943, based on the information transmitted by British intelligence, as well as the holding of short-term strategic games in the General Staff in April 1943, it was assumed that it was half a Kursk German command to try to take Revenge for the Stalingrad "Boiler".

During the discussion of the Countessing Plans to the German offensive by the staff of the General Staff and the members of the rate, two options for the 1943 summertime campaign were proposed in to apply a powerful proactive blow to the German troops before the onset of the offensive, defeat them in the deployment positions, after which go to a decisive An offensive forces of five fronts in order to quickly access the Dnieper.

The second provided for the meeting of the upcoming German troops in advance prepared deep-headed defense, equipped with a large number of artillery, to exhaust their strength in defensive battles and then go to the onset of three fronts.

The most nuclear supporters of the first campaign option were the commander of the Voronezh Front N. Vatutin and a member of the Military Council of the front N. Khrushchev, who requested the strengthening of his front with one of the general and one tank armies in order to go to the offensive by the end of May. Their plan was supported by the representative of the bet A. Vasilevsky.

A supporter of the second option was the command of the central front, which rightly considered that a proactive blow would be accompanied by large losses of Soviet troops, and the reserves accumulated by German troops will be able to be used to prevent the development of our offensive and apply powerful counterdovern during it.

The problem was allowed when supporters of the second option supported G. Zhukov, who called the first scenario of the "new summer of 1942," when German troops not only reflected the premature Soviet offensive, but were able to surround the main part of the Soviet troops and to reach the operational space for the offensive for Stalingrad . I. Stalin, apparently, convinced of such a visual argument, took the side of the defensive strategy.

203-mm Maubitsa B-4 Artillery Breakthrough Corps in Positions.

The presence of tank and artillery weapons in some armies of the Central and Voronezh fronts

Notes:
* - There is no division on medium and light tanks, but in the 13th Amia there were at least 10 T-60 tanks and approx. 50 T-70 Tanks
** - including 25 Su-152, 32 Su-122, 18 Su-76 and 16 Su-76 on a trophy chassis
*** - including 24 Su-122, 33 Su-76 on the domestic and trophy chassis
**** - including medium tanks M-3 "General Lee"
According to the Voronezh Front, the data is quite contradictory, since the front-line reports filed by the head of the rear and the commander differ significantly. According to the summary of the rear chief, another T-60 and T-70 lungs should be added to the specified quantity), as well as 202 medium tanks (T-34 and M-3).

Preparation for battle

Preliable battles set a number of complex tasks before the command of the Red Army. First, German troops spent in 1942-43. Reorganization and re-equipment by new samples of military equipment that provided them with some qualitative advantage. Secondly, the transfer to the Eastern Front of the Fresh Forces from Germany, France and the total mobilization allowed the German command to concentrate a large number of military compounds on this site. And finally, the lack of successful offensive experience in the Red Army against a strong enemy made a Kursk battle by one of the most significant events of the Second World War.

Despite the numerical advantage of domestic tanks, they were qualitatively inferior to German combat machines. The newly formed tank armies turned out to be bulky and difficult managed compounds. A significant part of the Soviet tanks was light cars, and if we consider even more often the poor quality of the crew preparation, it will become clear how difficult tasks expecting our tank workers when meeting with German.

The best position was in artillery. The basis of the material part of anti-tank regiments of Central and Voronezh fronts was 76 mm Division guns F-22USV, ZIS-22-SIR and ZIS-3. Two artpol had in service the more powerful 76-mm instruments of the ORP. 1936 (F-22), deployed from the Far East, and one regiment - 107-mm gun M-60. The total number of 76-mm guns in anti-tank artpoles almost twice the number of 45-mm guns exceeded.

True, if in the initial period of war, the 76-mm divisional gun could be successfully applied against any German tank at all distant fire distances, now the situation has become more complicated. Expected in the fields of fighting new heavy German tanks "Tiger" and "Panther", modernized average tanks and assault guns were practically invulnerable in the frontal part of the distance over 400 m, and there were no time to develop new artsystem.

Preparation of the firing point by calculating the anti-tank gun of Sergeant Tursunkhodzhiev. On the picture - 76.2 mm, the instrument of F-22 arr. 1936. One of the ITTAP reserve of the chief command. Oryol Direction, July 1943

Order State Committee Defense (Goko) in the spring of 1943 was resumed the production of 57 mm anti-tank (ZIS-2) and tank (ZIS-4M) guns, stopped in the fall of 1941 due to high complexity. However, by the beginning of the battle on the Kursk arc to the front, they did not have time. The first artpolk, armed with 57-mm CIS-2 guns, arrived at the central front only on July 27, 1943, and in Voronezh - even later. In August 1943, the T-34 and kV-1c tanks were also arrived, armed with IR-4M tools, called the Tank Fighter. In May-June 1943, it was planned to resume production of 107-mm guns M-60, but for the needs of anti-tank defense, they were overly heavy and expensive. In the summer of 1943, the CAAC was led by the development of a 100-mm anti-tank C-3 gun, however, before it was adopted by the weapon. An improved in 1942, a 45-mm battalion anti-tank gun was adopted in the winter of 1943 under the index M-42 to armared instead of the 45-mm gun of the arr. 1937, but its use did not give stemward superiority, as it could be considered quite effective only when using a podkalibar projectile against the onboard armor of German tanks from a small distances.

The task of increasing the bribability of the domestic anti-tank artillery by the summer of 1943 was predominantly to modernize the existing armor-piercing ammunition for 76 mm of division and tank guns. So, in March 1943, a 76-mm podkalibernal shell was mastered in mass production, which made it at a distance of 500-1000 m with a thickness of up to 96-84 mm. However, the volume of subcalibal shells in 1943 was extremely insignificant due to the disadvantage of tungsten and molybdenum, whose mining was carried out in the Caucasus. Shells issued commanders of fighter-anti-tank shepherd guns
(ITTAP) to the account, and the loss of at least one projectile was punished sufficiently strictly - until the degradation. In addition to the podcalibers, in 1943, armor-piercing shells of a new type with localizers (BR-350B) were also introduced in 1943, which raised the armor tools at a distance of 500 m to 6-9 mm and with a more durable case.

A heavy tank of KV-1C Guard Lieutenant Kostin of a Heavy-Tank Regiment of the 5th Guards Tank Army before battles. July, 1943

Tested in the fall of 1942, the cumulative 76-mm and 122-mm shells (called "armored-burning") began to enter the troops in April-May 1943. They could pierce the armor to 92 and 130 mm thick, but due to the imperfection of the fuses, they are impossible It was used in long-life divisional and tank weapons (a bowl of all the projectile burst into the trunk of the tools). Therefore, they were included only in the ammunition of regimental, mountain weapons and warmness. For the armament of infantry, the production of manual anti-tank cumulative grenades with a stabilizer was launched, and for anti-tank rifles (PTR) and large-caliber machine guns, DSHK introduced new armor-piercing bullets with a carbide core, which contained tungsten carbide.

Especially for the summer campaign of 1943 in May, a major superplan order for armor-powered (and semi-convened) shells for guns were issued (NKV), which were not previously considered anti-tank: 37 mm anti-aircraft guns, as well as 122-mm 152-mm long-range Gaubi guns and guns. The additional order of the NKV enterprise also received on the Bottles with an incendiary mixture of the COP and the Machine Fugase Fights Fog.

76 mm Division tool arr. 1939/41 ZIS-22 (F-22 SSI), one of the main Soviet anti-tank funds in the summer of 1943

In the artillery workshops of the 13th Army in May 1943, 28 "portable jet guns" were manufactured, which were individual guides from Katyusha installed on a light tripod.

All available light artillery products (caliber from 37 to 76 mm) were focused on fighting tanks. Heavy cannon-welded batteries, heavy mortars and divisions of Katyusha's reactive mortars also learned to reflect the blows of tank beframes. For them, temporary memos and instructions for firing on moving armored targets were specially issued. Anti-aircraft batteries, armed with 85-mm cannons, were transferred to the reserve of fronts to cover particularly important directions from tank attacks. To fire on aircraft batteries allocated for PTO, prohibited.

Rich trophies captured during the Stalingrad battle were also prepared to meet the fire of the former owners. At least four artpol received a trophy match: 75-mm guns of cancer 40 (instead of 76 mm SIR and ZIS-3) and 50-mm cancer 38 (instead of 45-mm cannons). Two anti-tank artpols transmitted to the fronts to strengthen the rates from the reserve were in service with a trophy 88-mm anti-aircraft guns Flak 18 / Flak 36.

But not only the material part occupied the minds of the domestic command. In a significant extent, it also touched on (in the first, and, apparently, the last time) issues of organization and thorough combat training of personnel.

First, the staff of the main unit of anti-tank defense is finally approved - a fighter-protinostric arthpol (ITTAP), which consisted of five four-refinery batteries. A larger unit - a brigade (IPTABR) - had three shelf in its composition and, accordingly, fifteen batteries. Such consolidation of anti-tank units made it possible to counteract large quantities of enemy tanks and at the same time maintain an artillery reserve for operational maneuver with fire. In addition, there were also fighter-anti-tank brigades of the general-purpose type, which had one easily airliner regiment in service and up to two battalions of anti-tank guns in service.

Secondly, all artillery units were selected fighters, achieved success in the fight against new German tanks (not only "Tiger" and "Panther" were new; Many artilleryrs before the summer of 1943 were not met with new modifications of PZKPFW IV and storm stug assault 40), and put on commanders of guns and platforms in newly formed divisions. At the same time, the calculations, victims of defeats in battles with German tanks, on the contrary, were displayed in the rear units. Within two months (May-June) among the artillery units of the fronts, a real hunt for "cannon snipers" was carried out. These gunners were invited to the ITTAP and the IPTABR, which, by order of the bet, in May 1943 increased money content and laces. For additional training, the ITTAP was allocated, in addition to practical, also up to 16 combat armor-piercing shells.

Forces of training units from trophy medium tanks manufactured "Tigers" layouts, welded them on the frontal part of the hull and the tower additional armor. Many gunners, exercising in shooting on moving layouts (layouts towed on long cables for artillery tractors or tanks), achieved the highest mastery, managing from 45-mm, or 76-mm guns on the trunk, the commander's turreka or in the observation device of mechanics The driver of the tank moving in soreness 10-15 km / h (just such real speed Movement tank in battle). Mandatory training of fire for moving targets also calculations of the solutions of greafiers and carries of large caliber (122-152 mm).

Engineering support of defense

TO At the beginning of July 1943, the Kursk ledge defended the following grouping of Soviet troops. The right faculture of the protrusion with a length of 308 km occupied the troops of the central front (commander of the front - K. Rokossovsky). In the first echelon, the front had five combined-arms armies (48, 13, 70, 65 and 60s), the 2nd tank army was located in reserve, as well as the 9th and 19th tank corps. Left FAS, a length of 244 km, occupied the troops of the Voronezh Front (commander of the front - N. Vatutin), having in the first echelon 38, 40, 6th Guards and 7th Guards Army, and in the second echelone - the 69th Army and 35 -y Guards Rifle Case. The front-line reserve was the 1st tank army, as well as the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Cases.

In the rear of the Central and Voronezh fronts, he held the defense of the Steppe Front (commander of the front of I. Koniev) as part of the six general-official, one tank army, as well as four tank and two mechanized buildings. The defense of the Soviet troops in the Kursk ledge was sharply different from that in the battle near Moscow and Stalingrad. It was deliberate, prepared in advance and was carried out in conditions of some superiority in the power of German troops. When organizing defense, the experience gained by Moscow and Stalishrad, especially in terms of engineering and barrier events, was taken into account.

In the army of the first echelon of the fronts, three defensive turns were created: the main army defense band, 6-12 km from her the second defense strip and rear defensive strip, located 20-30 km from the first. In some particularly responsible directions, these bands intensified by intermediate defense borders. In addition, three additional front defensive turns were also organized by the fronts.

Thus, on the estimated directions of the main blows of the enemy, each front had 6 mines of defense with a depth of echelonation to 110 km on the central front and up to 85 km on Voronezh.

The volume of work carried out by engineering services of the fronts was colossal. Only in the location of the central front in April-June, up to 5000 km of trenches and the moves of the message were separated, more than 300 km of wire bardings were installed (of which about 30 km were electrified), more than 400,000 min and fugasov were installed, over 60 km. Superb 80 km of anti-tank pvv.

To enlarge - click on the image

The engineering barrier system in the main defensive strip included anti-tank morals, deadlocks and escarpa, tank traps, surprises, fugas and mine fields. On the Voronezh Front, for the first time, the use of minoOGNEFUGASES (MOF), which presented a box with incendiary bottles, to the center of which was placed with a tolve checker, pomegranate or anti-personnel mine. Multiple of the barriers were created from such Fugasov, which showed themselves very effective both against infantry and against the lungs and medium tanks.

In addition, for the operational setting of mines directly to the upcoming tanks (in those years called "chipped mining"), special mobile barriers (PZO) were organized as part of an engineering assault sapper company, a reinforced platoon of anti-tank rifles and / or machine-gun platoon on freight Machines of increased patency or trophy armored personnel carriers.

The main strip of defense was divided into battalion areas (up to 2.5 km on the front and up to 1 km to depth) and anti-tank reference points, covered by a network of engineering barriers. Two or three battalion district formed a regiment (up to 5 km on the front and up to 4 km to depth). Anti-tank reference points (educated artillery of rifle regiments and divisions) were located preferably in battalion areas of defense. The advantage of the northern plot of defense was that all anti-tank support points located on the site of the rifle regiments, the order of the front commander K. Rokossovsky, were combined into anti-tank areas, the commandants of which were assigned commander of the rifle regiments. This facilitated the interaction of artillery with rifle parts when reflected by the enemy attacks. On the South Face, on the order of the representative of A. Vasilevsky's bet, it was prohibited, and anti-tank reference points often did not have the concepts of the state of affairs in neighboring plots of defense, being, in essence, provided themselves.

By the beginning of the fighting, the troops were occupied by four defensive turns - completely the first (main) strip of defense and most of the second, and in the directions of the probable strike of the enemy also the rear army band and the first front line.

To enlarge - click on the image

All Army of Central and Voronezh fronts were significantly strengthened by Artillery RVGK. The command of the central front had at its disposal in addition to 41 artpol rifle divisions also 77 regiments of the RVGK artillery, not counting the anti-aircraft and field jet artillery, i.e. Total 118 artillery and mortar regiments. The fighter-anti-tank artillery of the RVGK was represented by ten separate ITTAP and three IPTABR (three shelf each). In addition, in the front there were three anti-terrorist brigades of a general-known type and three light artbrigades (three artpol of light type), which were also translated into anti-tank defense. Given the latter, the entire anti-tank artillery of the RVGK front numbered 31 regals.

The Voronezh Front had in its composition, except for 35 artpolkov rifle divisions, also 83 amplification shelf, i.e. Also 118 artillery and mortar regiments, of which in the total complexity there were 46 fighter-anti-tank regiments.

The fighter-anti-tank shelves were equipped with a material part and the personnel almost completely (by the number of instruments - up to 93%, by personnel - up to 92%). There was not enough tools for traction and vehicles (especially in the Voronezh Front). The number of engines on the tool ranged from 1.5 to 2.9 (with a number of numbers - 3.5). The most widely represented cars with a carrying capacity from 1.5 to 5t (gas, ZIS and American trucks), and especially acutely lacking tractors like "STZ-5 (NATI)" (up to half of the required amount) and passenger cars of increased vehicle type "Willis »And GAZ-67 (up to 60% of the quantity).

In the Northern Face, the highest means of artillery gain received troops of the 13th army as located in the most threatened direction. In the South Face, the gains were distributed between the 6th Guards and the 7th Guards Army.

On both fronts, special artillery-anti-tank reserves were created. They included in addition to regular anti-tank guns, battalions and cargoers of armor-consuming, as well as removed from air defense anti-aircraft guns of caliber 76 and 85 mm. In order to somehow compensate for the weakening of the air defense, the bet passed the front commands to the front of the fronts of the 37-mm anti-aircraft guns and 12.7 mm machine guns. Anti-aircraft guns translated into the discharge of anti-tank were installed mostly on previously equipped positions near the tan hazardous directions of the front of the front. To fire from these batteries for aircraft was prohibited, and their ammunition more than 60% consisted of armor-piercing shells.

The calculation of the UIS-22 guns of Sergeant Filippov is preparing to meet German tanks.

The heavy 203-mm Gaubita B-4 artillery breakthrough body in position under the camouflage network. Oryol Direction, July 1943

The disguised Soviet middle tank in the ambush on the approaches to Art. Ponya.

Defensive battles in the Northern Fac

2 July 1943, the command of the Central and Voronezh fronts received a special telegram rate, which said that the beginning of the German offensive should be expected in between 3 and July 6. On the night of July 5, the exploration of the 15th Rifle Division of the 13th Army was faced with a group of German sappers that did pass in mineral fields. In the knocked slaughter, one of them was captured and showed that the German offensive should begin on July 5 at 3 am. The Commander of the Central Front K. Rokossovsky decided to preempt the German offensive, conducting artillery and aviation counterpropitation. In 2 hours 20 minutes, a 30-minute artillery counterpropitation was held in the 3rd and 48th armies band, in which 588 guns and mortars were involved, as well as two shelf of field jet artillery. During the shelling, the German artillery responded very sluggishly, behind the front line there was a large number of mosted explosions. At 4:30 minutes, the counterphanage was repeated.

The aviation blow on both fronts failed due to its unsatisfactory training. By the time of departure of our bombarders, all German aircraft were in the air, and the bombing hit had become mostly on empty or semi-empty airfields.

At 5:30, the German infantry with the support of the tanks attacked the entire defense lane of the 13th Army. Especially strong pressure of the enemy rendered on the right flank of the army - in the Multarhangel Georgian region. Movable barrage fire (PZO) The infantry was stopped, and the tanks and assault guns were hit by mine fields. Attack was repulsed. After 7 hours of 30 minutes, the Germans changed the direction of the main strike and took the offensive on the left flank of the 13th Army.

Up to 10 hours 30 minutes, the German troops could not approach the positions of Soviet infantry close to the positions of Soviet infantry, and only after overcoming minefields they broke into Podolyan. The divisions of our 15th and 81st divisions fell into a partial environment, but successfully reflected the attacks of German motorcycles. According to various reports, for July 5, the Germans lost from 48 to 62 tanks and assault tools on the mineral fields and from the fire of Soviet artillery.

On the night of July 6, the command of the Central Front held a maneuver with artillery reserves and, fulfilling the order of the General Staff, prepared Consturdar on the broken German troops.

The artillery corps of the breakthrough of General N. Ignatova, a mortar team, two regiments of reactive mortars, two regiments of self-propelled artillery, two tank corps (16th and 19th), rifle hull and three rifle divisions were involved in Kontrudar. Infantry and tanks 16th. We hit in the morning of July 6 at the front up to 34 km wide. The enemy artillery was silent, depressed by the fire of the artillery building of the breakthrough, but the tanks of the 107th tank brigade, sweating the German troops in the direction of the boty for 1-2 km, fell under the sudden fire of German tanks buried to the ground. In a short term, the brigade lost 46 tanks, and 4 the remaining moved to their infantry. The commander of the 16th, since, seeing such a position of the mesh, ordered the 164th tank brigade, moving by the ledge after the 107th Brigade, stop the attack and move back to its original position. 19th because, spending too much time to prepare the counterpart, was ready for him only after noon, and therefore did not cross in the offensive. Conrtudar did not reach the main goal - restoring the former line of defense.

"Tigers" of the 505th heavy tank battalion are moving towards the front line. July 1943

Column of French cars of one of the motorized divisions of German troops. Orlovskaya eg., July 1943

Commander Tank PZKPFW IV AUSF F in battle. Orlovsk eg.

The Radio Plant Station of the Center for Army Center supports communication with the headquarters of the 9th Army. July 1943

After the transition of our troops to defense, the Germans resumed the offensive on Olkhovatka. This was thrown from 170 to 230 tanks and sau. Positions of the 17th GW. The hulls here were strengthened by the I-th GW. Artillery division, one ITTAP and a tank regiment, and the Soviet tanks standing in defense were inside the ground.

Fierce fights were conducted here. The Germans quickly regroupled and applied short powerful blows with tank groups, between the attacks of which on the heads of the infantry 17 GW. Page hulls collapsed bombs German dive bombers. By 16 o'clock, the Soviet infantry moved to the initial positions, and the 19th. He received an order to hold a counterpart against a barbed flank of the German group. Starting at 17 o'clock, our tank corps was met with dense fire of German anti-tank and self-propelled guns and suffered great losses. However, the German offensive on Olkhovatka was stopped.

The artilleryrs of the 13th Army are fire on the assault tools of the enemy. July 1943

German tanks of the 2nd Tank Division in the offensive. July 1943

To enlarge - click on the image

Armor-friendly change firing position. July 1943

Tanks T-70 and T-34 of the 2nd Tank Army are put forward for counterattack. July 1943

Tank reserves move to the front. In the picture, American average tanks "General Lee", which came to the USSR on Land Liza. July 1943

German artillery reflects the attack of Soviet tanks. July 1943

Anti-SAU -Maper III "covers the nomination of German tanks.

Losses of the 2nd Tank Army in defensive battles

Note: The general list of losses are not included with the loss of dowred parts and units, including three tank regiments, which were in service with Led-Lizovsky tanks.

Defense BT. Ponya

P The dust of failures on the flanks of the 13th Army, the Germans concentrated their efforts to take the station Ponyry, which occupied a very important strategic position, covering the Eagle Kursk railway.

The station was well prepared for defense. Its washing the managed and unmanaged mine fields, which established a significant number of trophy aviation bombs and large-caliber shells, refurbished in tensioning fugas. The defense was strengthened by a tanks and a large number of anti-tank artillery (the 13th of the Iptabr and the 46th Emer Air-Florine Brigade).

Against pos. "1st Ponyary" on July 6, the Germans threw up to 170 tanks and sau (including up to 40 "tigers" of the 505th heavy tank battalion) and the infantry of the 86th and 292th divisions. Bringing the defense of the 81st pages of divisions, the German troops seized the "1st reindeer" and quickly advanced in the southern direction to the second defense band in the "2 reins" and Art. Ponya. Until the end of the day, they tried to break three times to the station, but were repulsed. Condudar came out by the 16th and 19th tank buildings, Conderdar turned out to be inconsistent and did not reach the goal (to repel the "1st Ponyry"). However, the day for the rearrangement of forces was won.

On July 7, the Germans could no longer appear on a wide front and threw all their strengths against the defense node of Ponyry station. At about 8 am to 40 German heavy tanks (according to the classification existing in the Red Army, German middle tanks PZKPFW IV AUSF H were considered severe) with the support of heavy assault guns, they were supported by the defense strip and opened fire at the positions of Soviet troops. At the same time, the "2nd reindium" was impaired from the air of the German dive bombers. After about half an hour, Tiger tanks began to close with advanced trenches, covering medium tanks and armored personnel carriers with infantry. Heavy assault guns with fire from the location on the discovered firepoints supported the offensive. The tight PZO of large-caliber artillery and "cheeky mining", conducted by units of engineering assault teams with the support of division guns, five times forced the German tanks to move back to its original position.

However, at 10 am, two battalions of German infantry with medium tanks and assault tools managed to break into the northwestern outskirts of the "2 ponyraces". The reserve of the commander of the 307th division entered into battle, consisting of two infantry battalions and a tank brigade, with the support of artillery made it possible to destroy the broken group and restore the situation. After 11 hours, the Germans began to attack the reindeer from the northeast. By 15 o'clock, they mastered the state farm "1st May" and closely approached the station. However, all attempts to break into the territory of the village and the station were unsuccessful. On July 7, the Northern Fac was a critical day when the Germans had large tactical successes.

Heavy assault guns "Ferdinand" before the attack of Art. Ponya. July 1943

On the morning of July 8, the German troops with the support of 25 medium tanks, 15 heavy tanks "Tiger" and up to 20 assault guns "Ferdinand" again attacked the northern outskirts of Art. Ponya. Upon reflection of the attack by fire of the 1180th and 1188th, the ITTAP was beaten 22 tanks, including 5 tanks "Tiger". Two tanks "Tiger" were set on fire bottles of COP, abandoned by the infantry of Kuliyev and Prokhorov from the 1019th joint venture.

After noon, the German troops again tried to break through to bypass Art. Ponya - through the village "1st May." However, here the efforts of the 1180th ITTAP and the 768th paws with the support of infantry and batteries of "portable jet guns" the attack was repulsed. On the battlefield, the Germans left 11 burnt and 5 baked medium tanks, as well as 4 baked assault guns and several armored cars. Moreover, according to the reports of the infantry command and artillery intelligence officers, 3 German combat vehicles accounted for the share of "jet guns". The next two days do not make anything new in the disposition of troops in the area of \u200b\u200bArt. Ponya. On July 9, the Germans crushed the operational shock group of 45 heavy tiger tanks of the 505th heavy tank battalion (according to other data - 40 tiger tanks), the 654th battalion of heavy assault guns "Ferdinand", as well as the 216th division 150 -mm assault tanks and a division of 75-mm and 105-mm assault guns. Command group (according to prisoners' testimony) was carried out by Major Cal (commander of the 505th battalion of heavy tanks). Directly behind the group moved medium tanks and motorcycles on armored personnel carriers. Two hours after the start of the battle, the group broke through the S / x "1st May" to the village. Burner. In these battles, the German troops applied a new tactical construction when the line of the Ferdinand assault guns was moving in the first rows of the shock group (twigs in two echelon), followed by "Tigers", covering assault tools and medium tanks. But at the village Our burner artillery and infantrymen missed German tanks and SAU into a pre-prepared artillery fire bag formed by the 768th, 697th and 546th paws and 1180th ITTAP, supported by fire of long-range artillery and reactive mortars. Called by the floor with a powerful concentrated artillery fire from different directions, beyond the powerful mine field (most of the field was mined by trophy airbabs or fugas, containing 10-50 kg of tool) and exposed to the pixels of the pixel bombers "loops", German tanks stopped. Eighteen combat vehicles were beaten. Some of the tanks left on the battlefield were good, and six of them were evacuironak at night by Soviet repairmen, after which they were transferred to the disposal 19. To replenish the lost match.

The next day, the attack was repeated. But now the German troops failed to break through to Art. Ponya. A large role in the reflection of the occurrence was played by a PZO, delivered by the debris of the artillery of a special purpose (203-mm warmness and 152-mm Gaubi-guns). By noon, the Germans moved away, leaving on the battlefield another seven tanks and two assault guns. On July 12-13, the Germans conducted an operation on evacuation from the battlefield of their baked tanks. Evacuation covered the 654th division of the assault guns "Ferdinand". The operation as a whole was a success, but the number left on the Ferdinand battlefield with damaged mines and the arthogne chassis increased to 17. The counterattack of our infantrymen with the support of the T-34 tank battalion and the T-70 battalion (from the composition of the 3 tax .) He pushed the German troops approached the outskirts. At the same time, the Germans did not have time to evacuate the damaged heavy "Ferdinands", some of which was set fire to their own crews, and some of our infantrymen who used the BC bottle against the crews of the machines that had resistance. Only one "Ferdinand" got a hole in board in the area of \u200b\u200bthe brake drum, although he was fired at the T-34 seven tanks from all directions. In total, after fighting in the area of \u200b\u200bArt. Ponya - C / X "May 1st" left 21 assault gun "Ferdinand" with a damaged chassis, a significant part of which was originated by their crews or advocated infantrymen. Our tankers who supported the contrast of infantry suffered large losses not only from the fire of German assault guns, but also because, approaching the opponent, the Rota T-70 tanks and several T-34 mistakenly hit their own minefield. It was the last day when the German troops came close to the outskirts of Art. Ponya.

German artillery has been shelling the positions of Soviet troops. July-August 1943.

The assault guns "Ferdinand", shot on the outskirts of Art. Ponya. July 1943

Field of the battle after the counterattack of owls. troops in the area of \u200b\u200bArt. Ponya - pos. Burner. On this field, the German assault guns "Ferdinand" and the company of Soviet tanks T-34 / T-70 were exploded from the action of Soviet Fugas. July 9-13, 1943

German Tank PZKPFW IV and SDKFZ 251 armored personnel carrier, baked on the outskirts of Art. Ponya. July 15, 1943

Artillery division of special purpose gene. Ignatiev when reflecting the German offensive at Art. Ponya. July, 1943

Ferdinand, hit by artillery not far from the village. Burner. The gun mask is damaged, the roller of the right side and the drive wheel is broken.

Broken by the direct hit of the heavy shell of the Storm Tank "Brummer". The outskirts of Art. Ponyari July 15, 1943

Tanks of the 3rd regiment of the 2nd Tank Division, baked on the outskirts of Art. Ponya. July 12-15, 1943

Pinged PzBefwg III Ausf H is a commander machine with gun layout and telescopic antenna.

Support tank PZKPFW III AUSF N, armed by a short-barre room 75 mm gun.

Defensive battles of the 70th Army

IN The defense strip of the 70th Army The most fierce battles unfolded in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village. Kutyrki warm. Here, the bulk of the strike of the German tank troops carried the 3rd fighter brigade for himself. The brigade organized in the Kutyrki-warm two anti-tank areas in each of which there were three artillery batteries (76-mm guns and a 45-mm cannon), one mortar battery (120 mm mortar) and a battalion of anti-tank guns. During July 6-7, the brigade successfully restrained the enemy attacks, destroying and having bothering 47 tanks here. Interestingly, the commander of one of the batteries of 45-mm guns, Captain Gorlicin, placed his tools for the reverse row of the ridge of height and hit the emerging German tanks in the opening bottom before the tank could answer the sighting fire. Thus, during the day, his battery destroyed and damaged 17 tanks, without losing a single person from their fire. July 8 at 8:30 am Group of German tanks and assault implements in the amount of up to 70 pcs. With automatic drivers on armored personnel carriers reached the outskirts of the village. Software and with the support of picking bomber conducted an attack in the direction of warm-hammer. Until 11:30 Artilleryrs Brigades, despite the big losses incurred from aviation raids (German aviation dominated the air in the air), held their positions, but by 12:30, when the opponent began the third attack from the Kashara district in the direction The warm, first and seventh brigade batteries were almost completely destroyed, and the German bumps managed to take Kashara, Kutyirki, chavers and self-mass. Only on the northern outskirts, the sixth battery was keen on the northern outskirts, in the region of the height 238.1, the fourth battery and mortar fire was labeled, and on the outskirts of Kutyraki, the remnants of the air-breakers division with the support of two trophy tanks led the shelling of broken German infantrymen. Committed by this anti-tank district, Colonel Herosuev introduced its last reserve into battle - three light batteries of 45-mm cannons and battalion of anti-tank guns. The breakthrough was localized.

Panzergrenaders and anti-tank sau "Mapander III" in battle in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village Kashara.

German six-solid reactive mortars "nebvverfer" in the reflection of the Soviet counterattack.

Calculation of 45-mm guns of Sergeant Kruglov robbed in battles 3 german tank. July 1943

Average MZ tanks on the source position. Orlovsk eg. July-August 1943

On July 11, the Germans tried to re-apply here with large forces of tanks and motorcycles. However, now the advantage in the air was behind the Soviet aviation, and the blows of Soviet dive bombers mixed the combat order of tanks unfolded to attack. In addition, the upcoming troops met not only with a strongly embarled on the eve of the 3rd fighter brigade, but also with the 1st fighter-anti-tank brigade and two anti-aircraft divisions (in service with one of the divisions were the trophy 88-mm anti-aircraft guns Flak eighteen). During the two days of the brigade, 17 tank attacks beat off, having kicked and destroying 6 heavy (including 2 "tiger") and 17 light and medium tanks. In total, on the defense site between us. Points are self-made, Kashara, Kutyirki. Warm, height 238.1, on a field of 2 x 3 km after battles, 74 baked and burnt German tanks, SAU and other armored vehicles were found, including four tiger and two Ferdinand. July 15, with the permission of the commander of the front of K. Rokossovsky, this field was filmed by film players who came from Moscow, and it was his "field under Prokhorov" after the war (there was no "Ferdinand" under Prokhorovka, and could not be Ferdinand, which flashed on the on-screen "Prokhorovsky »Field).

The armored browser of the SDKFZ 252 ammunition should be headed by the assault guns column.

"Tiger", baked by the calculation of Sergeant Lunin. Orlovsk eg. July 1943

Soviet intelligence officers who seized the serviceable PZKPFW III AUSF N and led him to the location of their troops. July 1943.

Defensive battles on southern faca

4 July 1943, at 16 o'clock after aviation and artillery strikes, German troops before the infantry division, with the support of up to 100 tanks, conducted exploration from the Tomarading area to the north. The fight between the combat guard of the Voronezh Front and the intelligence units of the Army Group "South" lasted to a deep night. Under the cover of the battle, German troops occupied the initial position for the offensive. According to the testimony of the German prisoners captured in this battle, as well as the faders, giving up on July 3-4, it became known that the general offensive of the German troops on this section of the front was scheduled for 2 hours 30 minutes on July 5.

To facilitate the position of combat care and losses to the German troops at the initial positions at 22, 30 minutes and 30 minutes on July 4, the artillery of the Voronezh Front held a 5-minute artillery at the identified positions of German artillery. At 3 am on July 5, counterpropitation was carried out in full.

Defensive battles on the southern Face Kursk arc were distinguished by great fierce and big losses on our part. There were several reasons for this. First, the nature of the area more conducive to the use of tanks than in the Northern Facre. Secondly, who was observed for the preparation of defense, the representative of the bet A. Vasilevsky banned the commander of the Voronezh Front N. Vatutin to unite anti-tank reference points to the districts and give them to infantry regiments, considering that the decision would make it difficult to manage. And, thirdly, the domination in the air of German aviation lasted here almost two days longer than on the central front.

The main blow of German troops applied in the defense strip of the 6th Guards Army, along the Belgorod highway, Oboyan, at the same time in two sites. At first plot, up to 400 tanks and SAU focused, and on the second - up to 300.

The first attack at the 6th HB position. The army in the direction of Cherkasy began at 6 o'clock on July 5 from a powerful plaque of picking bombers. Under the cover of the plaque, a motorcycle regiment was sent to the attack with the support of 70 tanks. However, he was stopped on mine floors, being additionally fired by heavy artillery. After a half hours, the attack was repeated. Now the efforts of the upcoming were doubted. In the forefront, German sappers were walking, trying to make passes in minefields. But the fire of infantry and artillery of the 67th rifle division and this attack was reflected. Under the influence of heavy artillery fire, German tanks were forced to break the system before joining fireproof with our troops, and the "cheeky mining" conducted by Soviet savors greatly hampered the maneuver of combat vehicles. A total of 25 medium tanks and assault implements are lost from the mines and fire of heavy artillery.

German tanks with the support of assault implements attack Soviet defense. July 1943 in the air visible a silhouette of a bombarder.

To enlarge - click on the image

The fighter of Tanks "Mapander III" follows the reversed middle tank MZ "Lee".

The column of one of the motorized parts of the German troops follows to the front. Oboyanskoye for example, July 1943

He sowing to take Cherkasy frontal blow, the German troops struck in the direction of Butovo. At the same time, Cherkasy and Butovo collapsed their strike several hundred German aircraft. By noon, on July 5, in this section, the Germans managed to wed up in the defense strip of the 6th GW. Army. To restore breakthrough, the commander of 6 gv. The army I. Chistyakov introduced the wise anti-tank reserve - the 496th ITTAP and the 27th IPTABR. At the same time, the front command was ordered 6th. Entering the Berezovka area to eliminate the outlined dangerous breakthrough of German tanks to eliminate the flank attack.

Despite the emerging breakthrough of German tanks, the artilleryrs by the end of the day on July 5 managed to restore the shaky equilibrium, however, the price of large losses of personnel (up to 70%). The reason for this was in the fact that the infantry units on a number of defense sites were randomly departed, leaving artillery on a straight press without cover. During the day of continuous battles in the Cherkasy-Korovino district, the enemy lost from the fire of 13 tanks from the fire, including 3 severe type "Tiger". Our losses in a number of divisions have numbered up to 50% of the personnel and up to 30% of the material part.

On the night of July 6, it was decided to strengthen the defensive borders of the 6th GW. Army by two tank corps of the 1st Tank Army. By morning, on July 6, the 1st tank army by the 3rd mechanized and 6th tank buildings took defense at a turning line intended to her, covering the Obanoi direction. In addition, the 6th GW. The army was enhanced in addition to the 2nd and 5th GW. TC, which came to cover the flanks.

The main direction of the German troops the next day was Oboyanskoye. On the morning of July 6 from the district of Cherkasy large column of tanks moved along the road. Hidden the tools located on the flank of the 1837th ITTAP opened a sudden fire with a short distance. At the same time, 12 tanks were beaten, among which one "Panther" remained on the battlefield. It is interesting to note that in these battles, Soviet artilleryrs used the tactics of the so-called "fluffing guns", isolated as bait for the tiping of enemy tanks. The "fluffing guns" opened fire on columns with a large distance, forcing the upcoming tanks to deploy on mine fields and to substitute their boards stood in ambush.

As a result of the fighting on July 6, the Germans managed to seize Alekseyevka, Lukhanino, Olkhovka and trirachnoy and go to the second defensive line. However, on the Highway Belgorod - Oboyan their promotion was stopped.

Attacks of German tanks in the direction of Bol. Beacons also ended with nothing. Having met here a dense fire of Soviet artillery, German tanks turned to the northeast, where after a long battle with the parts of the 5th Guards. They managed to capture the loaf. A large role in the refreshment of a German strike was played by an extended from the reserve of the front and twombrava 14th Iptabr, which was confirmed by the confirmation of the trophy team (data).

The artillery of the SS division support the attack of their infantry. Prokhorov for example

Soviet tanks T-70 columns "Revolutionary Mongolia" (112 TBR) are put forward for attack.

PZKPFW IV AUSF H Division Tanks "Grossdoychland" (Great Germany) are fighting.

Raders of the headquarters of Feldmarshal Manstein at work. July 1943

German tanks "Panther" of the 10th Tank Brigade, PZKPFW IV AUSF G division "Grossdoychland" and storm implements Stug 40 in the Oboyan direction. July 9-10, 1943

On July 7, the enemy introduced to 350 tanks into battle and continued the attacks on the Oboyan direction from the Vol. Beacons, Red Dubrava. All parts of the 1st Tank Army and the 6th GW took into battle. Army. To the end of the day, the Germans managed to advance in the Bol area. Lights for 10-12 km. Applying large losses of the 1st Tank Army. The next day, on this plot, the Germans were introduced into the battle of Lo 400 tanks and SAU. However, on the eve at night, the command of the 6th GW. The army transferred to the threatened direction of the 27th Iptabr, whose task was to cover the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. By morning, when the enemy broke through the defense of the infantry and tank parts of the 6th GW. The army and the 1st tank army came out, seemed to openly, two "flirting" guns of the shelf from a distance of 1500-2000 m. The column was rebuilt, putting forward heavy tanks. Above 40 German bombers appeared above the battlefield, after half an hour, the fire of "fluffing guns" was depressed, and when the tanks began to rebuild for further movement, the regiment opened fire from three directions from the maximum distance. Since most instruments of the regiment were on the flank of the columns, their fire was distinguished by great efficiency. Within 8 minutes, 29 enemy tanks and 7 SAU were beaten on the battlefield. The blow was so unexpected that the remaining tanks, without taking the battle, quickly went towards the forest. From among the baked tanks, the repairmen of the 6th Tank Corps of the 1st Tank Army were able to repair and put into operation 9 combat vehicles.

On July 9, the enemy continued the attacks in the Oboyan direction. Attacks of tanks and motorcycles were supported by aviation. The shock groups managed to move here to a distance of 6 km, but then they came across a well-equipped position of anti-aircraft artillery adapted for PTOs and burned tanks into the ground.

In the following days, the enemy ceased to turn our defense directly and began to look for weak sections in it. In such a direction, according to the German command, there was Prokhorovsky, from where it was possible to exit the coupie by bypassing. For this purpose, in the area of \u200b\u200bProkhorovka, the Germans focused a grouping, which entered the 3rd., Speaking up to 300 tanks and sau.

The infantrymen of the Das Reich division help pull out the stuck "tiger".

Tankists 5th gv. Tank Army prepare a tank to battle.

Stug 40 AuSF G assault gun, povered by captain Vinogradov.

IN Wheerer on July 10, the command of the Voronezh Front received an order of the bet on holding a confrudar on a large grouping of the German troops, which accumulated in the neighborhood. Beacons, Ozersky. For confrudar, the front was reinforced by two armies, the 5th Guards, under the command of A. Zhadov, and the 5th Guards Tank, under the command of P. Rothmistrova, transferred from the steppe of the front. However, the preparation of Kontrudar, which began on July 11, was disrupted by the Germans who themselves inflicted our defense on this site two powerful blows. One - in the direction of the roar, and the second - on the Prokhorovka. As a result of sudden strikes, some compounds of the 1st tank and the 6th Guards armies retreated 1-2 km in the direction of the roar. A much more serious position has developed at Prokhorov. Because of the sudden waste of some infantry parts of the 5th Guards Army and the 2nd Tank Corps, the artillery preparation of the counterpart, which began on July 10, was raised. Many batteries remained without a infantry cover and suffered losses both in the positions of deployment and in motion. The front was in a very difficult position. German Motor Appliances entered the village. Prokhorovka and began to force the pile river. Only a quick commissioning in the battle of the 42nd Rifle Division, as well as the transfer of all available artillery to the direct vendor allowed to stop the promotion of German tanks.

The next laziness is the 5th GW. The tank army, reinforced by the attached parts, was ready to start an offensive on the left, Yakovlevo. P. Rothmisters chose the line of the deployment of the army west and south-west of Art. Prokhorovka at the front 15 km. At this time, the German troops, trying to develop their offensive in the northern direction, hit the 69th Army defense strip. But this offensive was looked rather distracting. By 5 o'clock in the morning, part of the 81st and 92th GW. Rifle divisions of the 69th Army were discarded from a defensive border and the Germans managed to master the villages of Rusta, the rigid, faith. There was a threat to the left flank unfolding the 5th GW. The tank army, and, by order of the representative of the bet A. Vasilevsky, the commander of the front N. Vatutin gave an order to send the mobile reserve of the 5th GW. Tank Army in the defense strip of the 69th Army. The reserve group under the command of General Truffanov at 8 o'clock in the morning passed into a counteroffensive to the broken divisions of German troops.

At 8:30, the main forces of the German troops in the composition of the tank divisions "Leibstandart Adolf Hitler", "Das Reich" and "Totenkopf", which consisted in its composition up to 500 tanks and SAU (a century of 42 tank "Tiger"), transferred to the direction Art. Prokhorovka in the strip of highway and railways. This grouping was supported by all available air forces.

Tanks of the 6th Tank Division on the approach to Prokhorovka.

Flameters before attack.

SDKFZ 6/2 anti-aircraft SAU leads fire on Soviet infantry. July 1943

After a 15-minute art preparation, the German group was attacked by the main forces of the 5th GW. Tank army. Despite the suddenness of the strike, the masses of Soviet tanks in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Oktyabrsky state farm were met by focused fire of anti-tank artillery and assault guns. The 18th Tank Corps of General Baharov at high speed broke into the Oktyabrsky state farm, and despite the big losses, captured him. However, at the village Andreevka and Vasilievka, he met the tank group of the enemy, and which was 15 tiger tanks. Trying to break through the bargaining path of German tanks, leading to them the counter fight, parts of the 18th tank corps were able to master Vasilyevka, but as a result of the losses were not able to develop the offensive and were transferred to defense at 18 o'clock.

The 29th Tank Corps was fighting for a height of 252.5, where he was met by the Tanks of the SS Division "Labstandart Adolf Hitler". Throughout the day, the hull led a maneuverable battle, but after 16 hours it was sunken by the Tottenkopf SS division tanks and the darkness was switched to defense.

The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, which occurred in the direction of Kalinin, at 2:30 pm suddenly ran into the Movie Tank Danish Division "Das Reich". Due to the fact that the 29th Tank Corps is promoted in battles T height 252.5, the Germans caused the 2nd GW. The tank corpus is a blow to a bare flank and forced him to waste at its original position.

The assault guns are departed after the fight. The division is unknown.

The Commander Tank PZKPFW III AUSF to the SS division "Das Reich" follows the last-minute average tanks "General Lee". Presumably, Prokhorovskoye for example. July 12-13, 1943

Scouts of the 5th GW. Tank Army on BAS-64 armored cars. Belgorod eg.

2nd Tank Corps provided by the junction between the 2nd HB. The tank corps and the 29th tank corps, was able to slightly press the German units, which were in front of them, but fell under the fire tight from the second line of assault and anti-tank guns, carried the loss and stopped.

By noon, on July 12, the German command became clear that the front offensive was failed. Then it decided, forcing R. PSL, get out of the strength of the fortune of the north of Prokhorovka in the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army, for which the 11th tank division and the remaining divisions of the SS tank division "Totenkopf" (96 tanks, motorcycle regiments, up to 200 motorcyclists with the support of two assault tool divisions ). The grouping broke the battle of the 52nd GW. The rifle division and 13 o'clock overlapped with a height of 226.6.

But on the northern skates of the height, the Germans stumbled upon the resistance of the 95th GW. Rifle Division Colonel Lyakhova. The division was hurriedly enhanced by an artillery anti-tank reserve as part of one ITTAP and two separate divisions of trophy guns. Up to 18 hours, the division was successfully defended from the coming tanks. But at 20:00, after a powerful aviation target, due to the lack of ammunition and large losses of personnel, the division, under the blows of the German motorized rifle parts, departed for the village of Polezhaev. Artillery reserves have already been deployed here, and the German offensive was stopped.

Could not fulfill the tasks and the 5th Guards Army. Faced with massive fire of German artillery and tanks, infantry units advanced a distance of 1-3 km, after which they switched to defense. In the strips of the onset of the 1st Tank Army, the 6th GW. Army, 69th Army and 7th GW. The army of decisive success also did not happen.

Soviet self-propelled Gaubitz Su-122 in the Prokhorov region. July 14, 1943.

Repairmen are evacuated by the t-34 under the enemy fire. Evacuation is carried out strictly on the instruction so that the frontal armor remains facing the enemy.

"Thirtywell" of the plant № 112 "Red Sormovo", somewhere under Obelo. Most likely - 1st Tank Army, July 1943

Thus, the so-called "tank battle near Prokhorov" did not take place on some separate field, as they said before. The operation was carried out at the front with a length of 32-35 km and was whole line Separate battles with the use of tanks by both parties. In total, they participated, according to the assessments of the command of the Voronezh Front, 1500 tanks and SAU on both sides. 5th guv. The tank army, acting in a length of 17-19 km long, together with the prone parties to the beginning of the battle consisted of 680 to 720 tanks and SAU, and the advancing German group is up to 540 tanks and SAU. In addition, from the south in the direction of Art. Prokhorovka led the offensive group "Cempf" as part of the 6th and 19th tank divisions, which had about 180 tanks, which were opposed by 100 Soviet tanks. Only in the battles on July 12, the Germans lost the west and south-west of Prokhorovka, according to the command of the front, about 320 tanks and assault guns (according to other data - from 190 to 218), Kempf Group - 80 tanks, and the 5th GW. The tank army (excluding the losses of the group of the gene. Torucianova) - 328 tanks and SAU (the total losses of the Matchasts of the 5th GW. The tank army with the attached parts reached 60%). Despite the greater concentration of tanks on both sides, the main losses of tank parts were not applied by enemy tanks, but anti-tank and assault artillery of opponents.

Tanks T-34, hit during the Soviet counteroffensive under Prokhorovka.

"Panther", a mlnted ml. Sergeant Egorova at Prokhorov's bridgehead.

Conrtuddar of the Troops of the Voronezh Front did not end with the destruction of the inclusted German grouping and therefore, immediately after completion, was considered failed, but since he allowed to disrupt the German offensive by turning around the city of Oboyan and Kursk, his results were recognized as luck. In addition, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the number of German tanks participating in the battle and their losses given in the command of the command of the Voronezh Front (Commander N. Vatutin, a member of the military sonnet - N. Khrushchev), differ greatly from the reports of the divisions commanders. From this we can conclude that the scale of the "Prokhorov battle" could be very inflated by the front command to justify the large losses of personnel and matching during the failed offensive.

German T-34 Dat Reich Division, baked by the calculation of the guns of Sergeant Kursina. Prokhorov for example July 14-15, 1943

The best armorbooser 6th GW. Army, hacking 7 enemy tanks.

Fighting Eastern Belgorod

N. There were fewer boots against the German army grouping "Cempf" in the defense strip of the 7th Guards Army. This direction was not considered the main thing, and therefore the organization and density of anti-tank guns per 1 km of the front were lower than in Belgorod-Kursk. It was believed that the River Northern Donets and Railway Mound would play their role in the defense of the army border.

On July 5, the Germans launched on the plot of grafovka, Belgorod three infantry and three tank divisions and under the cover of aviation began to boost Sev. Donets. After a noon, their tank units went to the offensive on the site a reasonable, steep log in the eastern and northeast directions. Located in the steep log, the anti-tank reference point by the end of the day was bought off two large tank attacks, having hanged 26 tanks (of which 7 were pre-exploded on mines and fugas). On July 6, the Germans again occurred in the northeast direction. To strengthen the 7th Guards Army, the front command crossed her four rifle divisions. From the army reserve she was transferred to the 31st Iptabr and the 114th Guards ITTAP. For the cover of the junction between the 6th and 7th Guards armies, the 131st and 132nd individual battalions of anti-tank guns were involved.

The most difficult situation was in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Yastrebokovo, where the enemy focused up to 70 tanks and struck along the river river. Reasonable. The 1849th ITTAP approached here, I did not have time to turn around to the German troops approach, and then the folder's commander put forward the second battery for a sudden flank strike on moving tanks. Hiding behind buildings, the battery approached the tank column at a distance of 200-500 m and the sudden flank fire was set fire to six and climb two tanks. Next, within one and a half hours, the battery reflected tank attacks, maneuvering between buildings, and moved only by order of the regiment commander when the regiment prepared for battle. Until the end of the day, the regiment reflected four large tank attacks, hacking 32 tanks and sau. The loss of the regiment was up to 20% of the personnel.

German motorized part in the offensive in the Belgorod area.

To strengthen the defense, the brigade commander put forward 1853th ITTAP, which was located on the second echelon in 1849.

On July 7, the Germans pulled their artillery here, and after a powerful aviation route and art preparation (from 9:00 to 12:00), their tanks went into the attack under the cover of the fire shaft. Now their attack was produced in two directions - along the r. Reasonable (group of more than 100 tanks, sau and other armored combat vehicles) and a frontal blow from a height of 207.9 in the direction of Myasoedovo (up to 100 tanks). The infantry cover left the Hawk, and the artpoles were put in a difficult position, since the leaked enemy infantry began to fill the position of the batteries from the flank and the rear. Since the flanks were bare, the enemy managed to cover two batteries (3rd and 4th), and it had to retrieve back, defending both from tanks and then infantry. Nevertheless, the breakthrough on the left flank was localized in the second echelon of the 1853th ITTAP. Soon, part 94th GW came. Page divisions, and position, shot, was saved. But by the evening, the infantry, who did not have time to consolidate, got the floor. A powerful aviation strike and after treatment with artillery, Yastreboko and Sevryukovo left. In the morning, the largest losses of the 1849th and 1853th ITTAP, which suffered in the morning and the 1853th ITTAPs could not hold back the German tanks and infantry, which dropped after our running infantry, and moved with the fight, thoroughly with themselves all damaged tools.

Anti-tank SAU "MARDER-LLL" follow the streets of Kharkov.

German anti-aircraft people cover the crossing through the Donets. July 1943

From July 8 to July 10, the battles in this area were local in nature, and it seemed that the Germans got out. But on the night of July 11, they inflicted a sudden blow from the Melekhovo district to the north and northwest to break through to Prokhorovka. The infantry divisions of the 9th Guards and the 305th Infantry Division, which did not expect such a powerful blow, moved away in this direction. For the cover of a barbed section of the front on the night of July 11 July 12, the 10th Iptabr was transferred from the rates reserve. In addition, the 1510th ITTAP and a separate PTR battalion were involved in this area. These forces, together with the infantry parts of the 35th GW. p. Cases, did not allow the offensive in the direction of Art. Prokhorovka. On this site, the Germans managed to break through only to the River Sev. Donets.

The last major offensive operation was carried out by the German troops on the southern Face of the Kursk Arc on July 14-15, when they tried to surround and destroy our parties to the Shakhovo and to destroy our parts, defended in the triangle, friendly, lyrics.

"Tiger" on Belgorod Street. July 1943

"Tigers" in battle for the der. Maximovka. Belgorod eg.

Soviet intelligence officers in the ambush at the SAU "MARDER III".

From the morning on July 14, the German troops managed to surround some units of 2 GW. Because and the 69th army, but the troops not only kept most of the positions employed earlier, but even constantly counted (2nd gv. Because). It was not possible to destroy the surrounded group until July 15, and she went to the dawn with minimal losses to the location of his troops.

The defensive battle lasted two weeks (from July 5 to July 18) and reached the task: to stop and bleed the German troops and maintain their own forces to hold an offensive.

According to reports and reports on the action of artillery on the Kursk arc, in the period of defensive battles by all types of land artillery, 1861 enemy combat vehicles were shot down and destroyed (including tanks, SAU, assault tools, heavy cannon bars and cannon-carriers).

Repairmen restore a baked tank. Field repair team of Lieutenant Shchukina. July 1943

Offensive operation in the Oryol direction

ABOUT Announcement of the offensive under Kurk was that it was carried out on a wide front with large forces of three fronts (Central, Voronezh and Steppe), with the participation of the left wing of the Western and Bryansky fronts.

The territorially offensive of the Soviet troops was divided into an Oryol offensive operation (the left wing of the Western, as well as the Central and Bryansk fronts) and the Belgorod-Kharkiv offensive operation (Voronezh and Steppe Fronts). Oryol offensive operation began on July 12, 1943 by the blow of the Western and Bryansky fronts, to which the central joined on July 15. The main defensive band of the Center for Army "Center" on the Oryol ledge had a depth of about 5-7 km. It consisted of reference points related to the network of trenches and moves of the message. Before the front edge, a wire barrier was installed in 1-2 rows of wooden stakes, reinforced in the responsible directions with wire fences on metal racks or Bruno spirals. There were also anti-tank and anti-personnel mine fields. In the main directions, a large number of machine-gun bronorchelopakov installed, from which it was possible to conduct a dense cross. All settlements have adapted for circular defense, anti-tank obstacles arranged along the banks of the rivers. However, many engineering facilities were not completed, since the Germans did not believe in the possibility of wide onset of Soviet troops in this section of the front.

Soviet infantrymen are mastering the English armored personnel carrier "Universal". Orlovsk eg. August 1943

The length of the offensive operation General Staff prepared the following shock groups:
- on the north-western tip of the Orlovsky protrusion, at the site of the merger of the rivers of the Site and Resset (50th Army and the 11th GW. Army);
- in the northern part of the protrusion, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe city of Volkhov (61st Army and the 4th tank army);
- in the eastern part of the protrusion, East Eagle (3rd Army, 63rd Army and 3rd Guards Tank Army);
- in the southern part, in the area of \u200b\u200bArt. Ponya (13th, 48th, 70th Army and 2nd Tank Army).

The German 2nd Tank Army, the 55th, 53rd and 35th army corps opposed the forces of the coming fronts. According to the data of domestic intelligence, they had (including army reserves) to 560 tanks and SAU. In the divisions of the first echelon there were 230-240 tanks and SAU. The grouping acting against the central front was included three tank divisions: the 18th, 9th and 2nd. Located in the offensive band of our 13th army. In the offensive band of the 48th and 70th armies, German tank parts were absent. On the side of the coming was the absolute superiority in the vibrant, artillery, tanks and aviation. At the main directions, the superiority on the infantry was up to 6 times, according to artillery up to 5 ... 6 times, on tanks - up to 2.5 ... 3 times. German tank and anti-tank units were significantly weakened in preceding battles and therefore did not have a large resistance. The rapid transition of Soviet troops from defense to a large-scale offensive did not give the German troops to reorganize and finish repair and restoration work. According to the consensions of the coming parts of the 13th Army, all captured German hiking repair shops were clogged with damaged military equipment.

T-34, equipped with mine-trawl PT-3, move to the front. July-August 1943

The German anti-tank gun of cancer 40 leads fire on attacking Soviet tanks. On the shield of the guns fixed scissors for cutting barbed wire. August 1943

Division of fighters of tanks and assault implements on vacation.

Soviet tank 22nd TBR. enters the burning village. Voronezh Front.

German tank PZKPFW IV AUSF H, baked to the Glagolev tool. Orlovskoye eg., August 1943

On the morning of July 12, at 5:10, immediately after the distance, the Soviet command was made by aviation-artillery training, and at 5:40 he began the assault on the enemy protrusion from the north and northeast. By 10:00, the main defensive strip of the German troops was broken in three places, and part of the 4th tank army went to the breakthrough. However, by 16:00, the German command could regroup the forces and, recalling a number of units from under Art. Ponyary, stop the development of the Soviet offensive. By the evening of the first day of the offensive in the North-West, Soviet troops were able to move 10-12 km, in the north - up to 7.5 km. On the eastern direction, the promotion was insignificant.

The next day, the North-Western group was aimed at the destruction of major supporting points in the villages of Staritsa and Ulyanovo. Using a smoke veil and demonstrating the attack with. Staritsa from the north, the coming parts secretly bypassed settlements and caused a tank blow from the southeast and the West. Despite the good provision of settlements, the enemy garrison was completely destroyed. In this battle, the units of engineering-ass searching were best of all, which skillfully "smoked" the German firepoints in the houses. At this time in p. Ulyanovo the coming troops with false attacks were pulled onto the western outskirts of the entire German garrison, which allowed to take place almost freely into the village on the tanks from. Staritsa. When this important reference point, the loss on the part of the coming were small (only ten people killed).

With the elimination of these resistance nodes, our troops opened the way to the south and southeast. The troops advancing in these directions created a threat to the communications of the Germans between Eagle and Bryansky. In two days of fighting, but the testimony of prisoners, the German 211st and 293rd infantry divisions were practically destroyed, and the 5th tank division, which suffered great losses, was bred in the rear. The defense of German troops was broken at the front 23 km and to a depth of 25 km. However, the German command competently operated on the available reserves, and by July 14, the attack on this site was suspended. The battles took a position.

The troops of the 3rd Army and the 3rd Guards Tank Army, who arrived at the eagle from the East, successfully forced several water obstacles and, by the foci of resistance, tried to break through to the eagle. By the time of commissioning on July 18. 3 gv. The tank army had T-34 - 475 tanks, T-70 - 224 tanks, guns and mortars - 492. They created a serious danger of dissection for the German troops in half, and therefore anti-tank reserves were introduced against them in the evening of July 19.

Fighters and commanders of the engineering-sapper assault brigade, distinguished in the battles for the eagle.

Pontoon Park H-2-P moves to the front. Orlovsk eg.

"Forward, on the eagle!" Heavy 203-mm Gaubes B-4 on the march.

However, since the front was broken on a wide plot, the actions of the German command resembled Latinas of Rube in Tricken Kaftan, and were ineffective.

On July 22, the advanced parts of the 61st and the army broke into wolf, improving the position of the troops of the Bryansky front. At the same time, the troops 11th GW. The army cut the Highway Bolkhov - Eagle, creating a jewelry threat to the German Bolkhov group.

At this time, the 63rd army and part of the 3rd GW. The tank army was heavy battles with the 3rd tank division of the Germans, transferred from Novo-Sokolnikov, and the divisions of the 2nd tank and 36th mechanized divisions, transmitted from under the reindium. Especially heavy battles unfolded in Miscean to Ukraine, Olesnya, where the Germans had a well-prepared defensive line, which they tried to take suitable forces. The troops of the 3rd army with the move captured the bridgehead on the bank of the river. Olesnya in the Alexandrov district, where the 3rd GW of Tanks began. Tank army. But the onset of South Alexandrovka was small. It was especially difficult to deal with German tanks and assault guns into the ground. Nevertheless, by July 19, our troops came to R. Oleshen at all its length. On the night of July 19, in German, defense on the river. Olesuna was caused by a mosary aviation flare, and in the morning art preparation began. In noon, Olesnya was forced in several places, which created a threat to the surroundings of the entire Netsev grouping, and on July 20, they left the city almost without a fight.

On July 15, the central front divisions were transferred to offensive actions, which took advantage of the part of the German forces from under the reindeer. But until July 18, the successes of the central front were rather modest. Only in the morning on July 19, the central front broke through the German defense strip on 3 ... 4 km away in the direction northwest, bypassing the eagle. At 11 o'clock in the breakthrough, tanks of the 2nd Tank Army were introduced.

SU-122 crew receives a combat task. North Eagle, August 1943

Su-152 Major Sankovsky, destroyed in the first battle 10 German tanks. 13th Army, August 1943

It is interesting to note that artillery guns transferred to the tank troops for amplification, towed by some advancing tanks of the 16th TC. (For which the tanks were re-equipped with towing hooks), and their calculations were tank landings. The unity of the ammunition of tank and anti-tank guns helped to cope with the problem of the guns of the guns, and most of the ammunition was brought by regular tractors (cars "Studeckker," Ji-Em-Si ", ZIS-5 and Tractor" Stz-Nati ") and used as artilleryrs, so and tankers. Such organizations helped to use artillery and tanks while overcoming the fortified enemy points. But on the tanks they had to shoot a little. The main goals of Soviet tanks and anti-tank artillery were machine-gun bronorchelpaks, anti-tank guns and German sau. However, the 3rd TC. The same 2nd tank army used the attached anti-tank and light artillery illiterately. The shelves of the TsRDBRICADA were dodged with tank brigades that crushed them on Baga-Rei by passing tank battalions. It destroyed the leadership of the brigade, bringing it that the batteries were provided to themselves. Commanders of tank battalions demanded that the batteries accompany the tanks with their move in their combat order, which led to the unjustifiably large loss of matchmakers and personnel of the 2nd Iapt (trucks in combat orders of tanks were easy prey for all types of weapons). Yes, and the 3rd TC himself. It suffered heavy losses in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Cane, trying without intelligence and artillery support to attack the fortified positions of German grenadiers, reinforced by fighten-anti-tank SAU and assault tools. The onset of the central front developed slowly. To speed up the promotion of the front parts and due to large losses in the tanks, the rate of 3rd GW passed on July 24-26. Tank army from the Bryansky front to the central. However, by this time the 3rd guv. The tank army also suffered large losses and therefore could not seriously affect the speed of advancement of the front. July 22-24, the most difficult situation was created for the German troops defended under the eagle. To the west of Volkhov, Soviet troops created the greatest threat to the main communications of the German troops. July 26 and Hitler's bet was held a special meeting dedicated to the position of German troops in the Orlovskoye Bridgehead. As a result of the meeting, it was decided to discharge all German troops from the Orlovsk bridgehead for the Hagen line. However, the retreat was necessary as possible to delay due to the unpretentiousness of the defense line in engineering. Nevertheless, from July 31, the Germans began a planned discharge of their troops from the Orlovsky Bridgehead.

To enlarge - click on the image

In the first day of August, battles began for the outskirts of the city of Eagle. On August 4, in the eastern essentials of the city of battles led the 3rd and 63rd army. From the south, the eagle covered the movable joints of the central front, which put the defendant German troops in a difficult position and forced to urgent departure. By August 5, battles in the city moved to Western outskirts, and on August 6, the city was completely released.

At the final stage of the struggle for the Orlovsky bridgehead, the battles turned over the city of Karachev, covering the approaches to Bryansk. Fights for Karachev began on August 12th. Important role During the offensive, engineering parts were played here, restored and demining roads destroyed by German troops during retreat. To the end of August 14, our troops broke through German defense east and northeastern Karachev and the next day mastered the city. With the liberation of Karachev, the elimination of the Oryol group was practically completed. By August 17-18, the advancing Soviet troops came to the Hagen line.

FROM It is believed that the offensive on the southern Face Kursk Arc began on August 3, but this is not quite so. On July 16, the German troops, which were in the area of \u200b\u200bProkhorovsky Bridgehead, fearing the flank strikes of Soviet troops, began to waste on the initial position under the cover of powerful arrigars. But Soviet troops could not immediately begin the persecution of the enemy. Only on July 17, part 5th GW. Army and 5th GW. Tank armies were able to knock down the arrigars and move 5-6 km. On July 18-19, 6 GW joined them. Army and 1st tank army. Tank parts have advanced by 2-3 km., But the infantry for tanks did not go. In general, the promotion of our troops these days were insignificant. On July 18, all available Steppe Front forces under the command of General Konev had to be introduced into battle. However, before Exodus on July 19, the front was engaged in regrouping forces. Only on July 20, the troops of the front as part of the five general-official armies managed to advance by 5-7 km.

On July 22, the troops of Voronezh and the Steppe Fronts moved to the universal offensive and to the outcome of the next day, breaking through German barriers, mainly came to the positions that our troops occupied before the start of the German offensive on July 5. However, the further promotion of troops was stopped by German reserves.

The rate required to immediately continue the offensive, but for its success it was necessary to regroup the strength and replenishment of the personnel and material part. After listening to the arguments of the fronts of the fronts, the rate postponed the term of further offensive for 8 days. In total, the beginning of the second phase of the Belgorod-Kharkiv offensive operation in the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts there were 50 rifle divisions. 8 tank buildings, 3 pieces and, moreover, 33 tank brigades, several separate tank regiments and self-propelled-artillery regiments. Despite the regrouping and replenishment, tank and artillery units were not fully equipped. A somewhat better position was near the Voronezh Front, in the strip of which more powerful counterdasters of German troops were expected. Thus, the 1st tank army to the beginning of the counteroffensive had T-34 - 412 tanks, T-70 - 108, T-60 - 29 (total - 549). 5th guv. The tank army at the same time numbered 445 tanks of all types and 64 armored car.

Artilleryrs of a fighter brigade (general-official type) pursue a retreating enemy.

The offensive began at dawn on August 3 with powerful art preparation. At 8 am, infantry and breakthrough tanks went on the offensive. The fire of German artillery was messy. In the air, our aviation previsilate it. By 10 o'clock, the advanced parts of the 1st Tank Army crossed over the Warken River. In the first half of the day, the infantry parts advanced to 5 ... 6 km, and the front commander General Vatutin introduced the main forces of the 1st and 5th GW into battle. Tank armies. To the outcome of the day, part of the 1st tank army was advanced in the depths of the German defense by 12 km and approached Tomarovka. Here they met a powerful anti-tank defense and were temporarily stopped. Connections 5th GW. The Tank Army has advanced much further - up to 26 km and reached the District Will area.

In a more complex setting, the north of Belgorod part of the steppe front occurred. Without having such strengthening means like Voronezh, his offensive developed more slowly, and by the end of the day, even after entering the tanks of the 1st Mechkorpus, part of the steppe front advanced only 7 ... 8 km.

On August 4 and 5, the main efforts of Voronezh and Steppe fronts were aimed at the elimination of Tomarovsky and Belgorod resistance angles. On the morning of August 5, part 6th GW. The army tied the battles to Tomarovka and in the evening they cleared it from the German troops. The enemy actively counteranated groups of 20-40 tanks with the support of assault guns and motorcycles, but unsuccessfully. By morning, on August 6, the Tomarovsky resistance assembly was cleared of German troops. The mobile group of the Voronezh Front at that time was incurred by increasing the defense of the enemy by 30-50 km, creating a ridiculous troops of the environment.

On August 5, the troops of the Voronezh Front tied the battles for Belgorod. The troops of the 69th Army entered the city from the north. Forcing the Northern Donets, the 7th GW troops came out to the eastern outskirts. The army, and from the west Belgorod, the movable connections of the 1st mehroscope were accounted for. By 18 o'clock, the city was completely purified from the German troops, a large number of abandoned German equipment and ammunition were captured.

Belgorod's liberation and the destruction of the Tomarovsky resistance assembly allowed the advancing moving groups of the Voronezh front as part of the 1st and 5th GW. Poyty tank armies on operational space. To the outcome of the third day of the offensive, it became clear that the pace of the offensive of the Soviet troops in the South Face is significantly higher than the eagle floor. But for the successful occurrence of the steppe front, he lacked tanks. By the end of the day, at the request of the command of the steppe front and the representative of the front rate, the front was allocated to replenish 35 thousand people, 200 T-34 tanks, 100 T-70 and 35 tanks. In addition, the front was reinforced by two engineering brigades and four shelves of self-propelled artillery.

Grenader after the fight. August 1943

On the night of August 7, the Soviet troops attacked the Node of the Cooperation of the Germans in Borisska and the next day they took it. In the evening, our troops took Grevonvon. Here reconnaissance reported that a large column of German troops is moving to the city. The commander of the artillery of the 27th Army ordered to nominate all the existing artillery funds to destroy the column. More than 30 large-caliber guns and the division of jet mortars unexpectedly opened fire on the column, while new tools were hastily installed on positions and were included in the shooting. The blow was so unexpected that many German cars were thrown completely good. In total, more than 60 caliber guns from 76 to 152 mm and about 20 reactive mortars took part in the shelling. More than five hundred corpses, as well as up to 50 tanks and assault implements, left German troops. According to the prisoners, these were remnants of 255, 332, the 57th infantry and parts of the 19th Tank Division. During the fighting on August 7, the Borisov group of German troops ceased to exist.

On August 8, the Power Front of the South-Western Front Army was transferred to the steppe front, and on August 9, the 5th GW. Tank Army. The main direction of the steppe front is now on the bypass of the Kharkiv grouping of German troops. At the same time, the 1st tank army received an order to cut the main railway and highways leading from Kharkov to Poltava, Krasnograd and Lozova.

To the end of August 10, the 1st Tank Army was able to capture Kharkov-Poltava railway, but it was stopped on its approach to the south. Nevertheless, Soviet troops approached Kharkov at a distance of 8-11 km, threatening communications of the Kharkiv defensive grouping of German troops.

Stug 40 assault gun, povered with a gunshev. Akhtyrky district.

Soviet self-propelled tools SU-122 in the offensive to Kharkov. August 1943.

Anti-tank gun cancer 40 on the trailer at the RSO tractor left after the art freshet under Bogodhov.

Tanks T-34 with infantry target in the offensive in Kharkov.

In order to somehow correct the situation, the German troops on August 11 were inflicted at the Bogodukhovsky direction Kontruddar in parts of the 1st tank army hastily assembled by the group, which included the 3rd tank division and a part of the SS tank divisions "Totenkopf", "Das Reich "And" Viking ". This blow has significantly slowed down the pace of the offensive not only of the Voronezh, but also the steppe front, since the latter had to take part of the units to form an operational reserve. By August 12, the Germans were constantly attacked by tank and motor vehicles at the Varkovsky direction, the Germans were constantly attacked, but they could not achieve decisive success. How could not once again discard Kharkov-Poltava railway. To strengthen the 1st Tank Army, which by August 12 he had only 134 tanks (instead of 600), the 5th GW was also swamped at the Bogodukhovsky direction. The tank army, which consisted of 115 serviceable tanks. On August 13, German disguise during the fighting was somewhat divided into the joint between the 1st Tank Army and the 5th GW. Tank Army. The anti-tank artillery of both armies has ceased to exist, and the commander of the Voronezh Front. Vatutin decided to introduce the reserves of the 6th GW into battle. The army and all the effusion artillery, which unfolded South Bogodukhov.

On August 14, the intensity of German tank attacks slept, while parts of the 6th GW. The army achieved significant success, advanced by 4-7 km. But the next day, the German troops, rearming the strength, broke through the defense strip of the 6th Tank Corps and went to the rear of the 6th GW. The army, which was forced to move back to the north and go to the defense. The next day, the Germans tried to develop their success in the 6th GW band. Army, but all their efforts ended in anything. In the course of Bogodukhovskoy operations against enemy tanks, the piquetted bombers "Petwek" were especially well shown, and at the same time noted the insufficient effectiveness of Ilyushin attack aircraft (by the way, the same results were noted during defensive battles in the Northern FaAs).

The crew is trying to level the overturned Tank PZKPFW III AUSF M. Pan Division SS "Das Reich".

German troops are receded by the Donets River. August 1943

Tanks T-34, shot around Akhtyrki.

Soviet troops move to Kharkov.

The steppe front had a task to destroy the Kharkov defensive knot and release Kharkov. The commander of the front I. Konev, having received defensible about the defensive structures of the German troops in the Kharkov region, decided to destroy the German group at the approaches to the city and prevent the disappearance of German tank troops to the city trait. On August 11, the advanced parts of the Steppe Front approached the external defensive ownership of the city and began his assault. But only the next day, after entering all artillery reserves, we managed to split into it somewhat. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the 5th GW. The tank army was involved in the reflection of German Ular in the area of \u200b\u200bBogodukhov. Tanks lacked, but thanks to the actions of artillery, August 13, the 53rd, 57th, 69th and 7th GW. The army broke through the external defensive distribution and came to the suburbs.

In the period on August 13-17, the Soviet troops tied the battles on the outskirts of Kharkov. Fights did not stop at night. Soviet troops carried big losses. So, in some shelves of the 7th GW. The army on August 17 has no more than 600 people. The 1st Mehkorpus had only 44 tanks (less than the number of tank brigade), more than half are lungs. But the defendant side also carried great losses. According to the prisoners, in some rotations defending in Kharkov, the Kerpf group remained 30 ... 40 people.

German artilleryrs lead fire from IEFH 18 in the upcoming Soviet troops. Kharkov direction, August 1943

"Studeskeckers" with anti-tank guns ZIS-3 on the trailer follow the upcoming troops. Kharkov direction.

The heavy tank "Churchill" of the 49th Guards Heavy-Tank Regiment of the 5th Tank Army follows by the broken eight-wheeled armored car SDKFZ 232. On board the tank tank inscription "For Radyansk Ukraine." Kharkiv district, July-August 1943.

Scheme of Belgorod-Kharkiv offensive operation.

To enlarge - click on the image

On August 18, the German troops have undertaken one attempt to stop the troops of the Voronezh Front, strikes the north of Akhtyrki in the flank of the 27th Army. In the impact grouping, a motorized division "Grossdoychland" was involved, transferred from under Bryansk. 10th Motorized division, parts of the 11th and 19th tank divisions and two separate battalions of heavy tanks. Grouping numbered about 16 thousand soldiers, 400 tanks, about 260 guns. The group was opposed by part of the 27th army in approx. 15 thousand soldiers, 30 tanks and up to 180 guns. To reflect the counterdard, it could be attracted from neighboring plots up to 100 tanks and 700 guns. However, the command of the 27th Army was late with the assessment of the deadlines for the offensive of the Akhtyra group of German troops, and therefore the reinforcement transformation began already during the German counteroffensive.

On the morning of August 18, the Germans conducted strong art preparation and began an offensive in the position of the 166th division. Up to 10 hours of artillery of the Division successfully reflected the attacks of German tanks, but after 11 hours, when the Germans were introduced into battle up to 200 tanks, the division artillery was disabled, and the front was broken. By 13 o'clock, the Germans broke through to the location of the division headquarters, and by the end of the day they had moved to a narrow wedge to a depth of 24 km in the south-east direction. For the location of the strike, the 4th GW was introduced. Tank corps and divisions of the 5th GW. The tank corps that attacked the broken grouping to the flank and in the rear.

The long-range 152-mm armor of BR-2 is preparing to open fire on retreating German troops.

German artilleryrs reflect the attack of Soviet troops.
Despite the fact that the strike of the Akhtyra group was stopped, he slowed down the promotion of the Troops of the Voronezh Front and complicated the operation on the surroundings of the Kharkiv grouping of German troops. Only on August 21-25, Akhtyra's fupping of Bila destroyed and the city was released.

Soviet artillery enters Kharkov.

Tank T-34 on the outskirts of Kharkov.

"Panther", beaten by the calculation of the GW. Senior Sergeant Parfenova on the outskirts of Kharkov.

At the time when the troops of the Voronezh front were fighting in the area of \u200b\u200bBogodukhov, the advanced parts of the steppe front approached Kharkov. On August 18, the troops of the 53rd army began fighting for a strongly fortified forest massif on the northwestern outskirts of the city. The Germans turned it into a fortified area, rugged machine-gun points and anti-tank guns. All the attempts of the army break through the array to the city were repulsed. Only with the onset of darkness, having put forward all artillery to open positions, the Soviet troops managed to knock the defenders from their positions, and by the morning of August 19 they went to the River Uda and in some places they began forcing.

Due to the fact that most of the ways to retreat the German grouping from Kharkov was cut off, and the threat of a complete environment, in the afternoon, on August 22, the Germans began to withdraw their units from the urban trail. However, all attempts by the Soviet troops to break into the city were encountered on a dense artillery-machine-gun fire of parts left in the angroup. In order not to allow the German troops to lead combally parts and a serviceable technique, the commander of the steppe front gave an order for the nightstorm. The huge masses of the troops were focused on a small territory adjacent to the city, and at 2 o'clock at night, on August 23, the assault began.

"Taught" "Panther" on the street of the liberated Kharkov. August-September 1943

Common loss of tank armies during the offensive operations

Note: The first digit - tanks and SAU of all brands, in brackets - T-34

Irrevocable losses were at T-34 tanks - up to 31%, according to T-70 tanks - up to 43% of the total losses are familiar with "~", very contradictory data obtained by indirect method are marked.

The first army divisions broke into the city, the parts of the 7th Guards Army moved to them with battles. The Germans moved away, hiding behind strong arielices, reinforced tanks and assault tools. At 4:30 minutes, the 183th division went to the Dzerzhinsky Square, and the city was mainly released to the dawn. But only after noon ended the battles on his outskirts, where the streets were scored abandoned with the retreat with appliances and weapons. On the evening of the same day, Moscow Saluteoval Liberators of Kharkov, but a week lasted battles to destroy the remains of the Kharkiv defensive group. On August 30, residents of Kharkov celebrated the full liberation of the city. Kursk battle ended.

Conclusion

TO The urvian battle became the first alignment of the Second World War, in which mass of tanks took part on both sides. The advancing tried to use them according to the traditional scheme - for the prolaiming of defensive frontiers on narrow sites and the further development of the offensive. Defenseized also relied on experience 1941-42. And originally used their tanks for confrudars, designed to restore the complex position in the individual sections of the front.

However, such an use of tank parts was not justified, since both sides underestimated the increased murge on the anti-tank defense of their opponents. For the German troops, there was an unexpected high density of Soviet artillery and good engineering preparation of the defense band. The Soviet command did not expect a high maneuverability of German anti-tank units who quickly regrouping and met the counterattacking Soviet tanks with a failing fire from ambushes even in conditions of the onset. As practice has shown during the Kursk battle, the Germans sought the best resultsUsing tanks on the manner of Sau, leading fire at the positions of Soviet troops from a long distance, while infantry units stormed them. The defenders were achieving the best results, also using the tanks "self-propelled", leading fires from the tanks buried to the ground.

Despite the high concentration of tanks in the armies of both parties, the main opponent of armored combat vehicles remained anti-tank and self-propelled artillery. The total role of aviation, infantry and tanks in the fight against them was small - less than 25% of the total number of banging and destroyed.

Nevertheless, it was the Kursk battle that became an event that prompted the development of new tactics to the application of tanks and SAU in the offensive and defense.

People who forgets their past, there is no future. So once said the ancient Greek philosopher Plato. In the middle of the last century, the "fifteen sisters", united "Great Rusy", caused a crushing defeat by the plag of mankind - fascism. The brutal fight was marked by a number of victories of the Red Army, which can be called key. The topic of this article is one of the decisive battles of the Second World War - Kursk arc, one of the fateful battles, which marked the final mastering of our grandfathers and great-grandios of the strategic initiative. From this time, the German invaders began to loud at all turns. The targeted movement of the fronts to the West began. Since that time, the fascists have forgotten what "forward to the East" means.

Historical parallels

Kursk confrontation occurred 05.07.1943 - 08.23.1943 at the original Russian land, over which the Great Prince Alexander Nevsky once held his shield. His thing is a warning of Western conquerors (who came to us with a sword) about the emergence of the Russian sword who met their onslaught. It is characteristic that the Kursk arc was something like a battle given by Prince Alexander Teutonic knights at 05.04.1242. Of course, the armies and the time of these two battles are incommensurable. But the scenario of both battles in something similar: the Germans were trying to break the battle order of the Russians in the center of the center, but were crushed by the offensive actions of flanks.

If pragmatically try to say that the Kursk arc is unique, a summary will be as follows: an unprecedented in history (before and after) operational and tactical density per 1 km of front.

Disposition of battle

The onset of the Red Army after the Stalingrad battle from November 1942 to March 1943 was marked by defeating about 100 divisions of the enemy, discarded from the North Caucasus, Don, Volga. But due to the losses of our party, by the beginning of the spring of 1943, the front stabilized. On the map of hostilities in the center of the front line with the Germans, in the direction of the Hitler's army, the protrusion was distinguished, to whom the military gave the name Kursk arc. 1943 Spring brought to the front of the calm: no one occurred, both sides were forced by piggybacks to again master the strategic initiative.

Preparation of fascist Germany

After the Stalingrad defeat, Hitler declared mobilization, as a result of which the Wehrmacht grew up, with more than bother losses incurred. "Under guns" was 9.5 million people (including 2.3 million reservists). 75% of the most combat-ready forces (5.3 million people) were located on the Soviet-German front.

Fuhrer eager to intercept the strategic initiative in the war. A fracture, in his opinion, was supposed to happen precisely on the front of the front, where the Kursk arc was located. To implement the idea, the headquarters of the Wehrmacht developed a strategic operation "Citadel". The plan assumed the application converging to the kursco strikes (from the north - from the Orel; from the south - from the district of Belgorod). In the "boiler" thus hit the troops of the Voronezh and Central Fronts.

Under this operation in this section of the front, 50 divisions were concentrated incl. 16 tank and motorized, a total of 0.9 million selected, fully equipped troops; 2.7 thousand tanks; 2.5 thousand aircraft; 10 thousand mortars and guns.

In this grouping, a transition to new weapons was mainly carried out: the tanks "Panther" and "Tiger", assault guns "Ferdinand".

When preparing the Soviet troops to the battle, we should pay tribute to the local talent of the Deputy Supreme Commander of the city of K. Zhukov. He, together with the head of the General Staff, reported by the Supreme Commander I. V. Stalin, the assumption that the Kursk arc will become the main coming place of the battle, and also predicted the approximate forces of the coming group of the enemy.

On the front line, the Fascists opposed Voronezh (Commander - General Vatutin N. F.) and the Central Fronts (Commander - General Rokossovsky K. K.) with a total number of 1.34 million people. 19 thousand mortars and guns consisted in their armament; 3.4 thousand tanks; 2.5 thousand aircraft. (As we see, the advantage was on their side). Secret from the enemy behind the listed fronts is located a backup steppe front (commander I. S. Konev). It consisted of tank, aviation and five combined army, supplemented by individual buildings.

The control and coordination of the actions of this grouping was carried out personally G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevsky.

Tactical Battle Plan

The intention of Marshal Zhukova assumed that the battle on the Kursk arc would have two phases. The first is defensive, the second is offensive.

It was equipped with a deeply echelonized bridgehead (300 km depth). The total length of his trenches was approximately equal to the distance "Moscow - Vladivostok". It provided 8 powerful defense lines. The purpose of such a defense was to weaken the enemy as much as possible, to deprive him of initiatives, facilitating the task of the coming as possible. In the second, offensive phase of the battle, the implementation of two offensive operations was planned. First: Operation "Kutuzov" in order to eliminate the fascist grouping and liberation of the city "Eagle". The second: "Rumyantsev's" commander "to destroy the Belgorod-Kharkiv group of invaders.

Thus, with the actual advantage of the Red Army, the battle on the Kursk arc occurred from the Soviet side "from defense." For offensive actions, as tactic teaches, it was required two or three times the superior number of troops.

Shelling

It turned out that the time of the onset of the fascist troops became known in advance. On the eve, German sappers began to do passes in mineral fields. Soviet front intelligence tied a fight with them and took prisoners. From the "Languages" it became known time: 3-00 05/05/1943

The reaction was operational and adequate: in 2-20 05.07.1943 Marshal Rokossovsky K.K. (commander of the central front) in the approval of the Deputy Supreme Commander of G. K. Zhukov forces of the front artillery, a preventive powerful actuator was held. It was an innovation in the tactics of fighting. In the occupiers, the fire was hosted by a hundred "Katyusha", 600 guns, 460 mortars. For fascists, it was a complete surprise, they suffered losses.

Only in 4-30, regrouping, they were able to conduct their art preparation, and in 5-30 go to the offensive. The battle on the Kursk arc began.

Start of battle

Of course, not everyone could predict our commander. In particular, and the General Staff, and the rate was waiting for the main blow from the Nazis in the southern direction, to the city of Orlo (who defended the Central Front, Commander - General Vatutin N. F.). In reality, the battle on the Kursk arc from the German troops was focused on the Voronezh front, from the north. Two battalions of heavy tanks moved to the troops of Nikolai Fedorovich, eight tank divisions, a division of assault guns, one motorized division. In the first phase of the battle of the first hot spot, Cherkasy village became (actually erased from the face of the Earth), where two Soviet rifle divisions were held back for the occurrence of five enemy divisions during the day.

German offensive tactics

Military art of Slavna, this great war. Kursk arc fully demonstrated the confrontation of two strategies. What did a German offensive looked like? Ahead of the attack front, heavy technique was moving: 15-20 tiger tanks and instruments of self-propelled "Ferdinand". Following them, they followed from the fifth to hundreds of middle tanks "Panther", accompanied by infantry. Ducklied back, they were rearranged and repeated the attack. Attacks resembled sea tides and flows, following each other.

We follow the advice of the famous military historian, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Professor Zakharov Matvey Vasilyevich, will not idealize our defense of the 1943 sample, we will express objectively.

We have to talk about the German tactics of tank combat. Kursk arc (this should be recognized) demonstrated the art of Colonel-General Herman Gota, he "jewelry", if it can be said about the tanks, introduced his 4th army into battle. At the same time, our 40th Army with 237 tanks, most equipped with artillery (35.4 units per 1 km), under the command of General Kirill Semenovich Moskalenko turned out to be much left, i.e. Not at work. The opposing 6th Guards Army (Commander I. M. Chistyakov) had a density of guns per 1 km - 24.4 with 135 tanks. Mainly on the 6th Army, far from the most powerful, the group of the "South" armies, the commanding of which was the most gifted strategist of Wehrmacht Erich von Manstein. (By the way, this man was of a few who constantly argued on the issues of strategy and tactics with Adolf Hitler, for which in 1944, in fact, he was resigning).

Tank battle under Prokhorovka

In the current heavy setting to eliminate the breakthrough, the Red Army was put into battle strategic reserves: the 5th Guards Tank Army (Commander Rothmistrov P. A.) and the 5th Guards Army (Commander Zheadov A. S.)

The possibility of the flank strike of the Soviet tank army in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village Prokhorovka was previously considered by the German General. Therefore, the divisions of the "dead head" and "leibstandart" direction of the strike was changed by 90 0 - for a frontal collision with the army of General Rothmistrova Pavel Alekseevich.

Tanks on the Kursk Arc: with the German side, 700 combat cars went into battle, with our - 850. Impressive and terrible picture. As eyewitnesses remember, the roar stood such that the blood flowed from the ears. Shoot accounted for emphasis, from which the towers folded. By entering the enemy from the rear, they tried to fire on the tanks, from which the tanks flashed with torches. Tankers were as it were in Prostration - still alive, it was necessary to fight. To retreat, it was impossible to hide.

Of course, to attack the enemy on the first phase of the operation was unreasonable (if during defense we suffered losses one to five, whatever they were at the occurrence?!). At the same time, the Soviet soldiers on this field of Brahi showed real heroism. 100,000 people were awarded orders and medals, and 180 of them were awarded high rank Hero of the Soviet Union.

Nowadays, her end day - August 23 - annually meets inhabitants of the country as Russia.

Kursk battle on its scale, military, as well as a political meaning, is considered to be one of the key battles not only the Great Patriotic, but also the Second World War. The battle on the Kursk arc finally established the power of the Red Army and is entirely broken by the morale of the forces of the Wehrmacht. After her, the German army fully lost the offensive potential.

Kursk battle or as it is also called in domestic historiography - the battle for the Kursk arc is one of the decisive battles during the Great Patriotic War, which took place in the summer of 1943 (July 5, August 23).

Historians call Stalingrad and Kursk battles by two most significant victories of the Red Army against the Wehrmacht Forces, which completely turned the course of hostilities.

In this article we will learn the date of the Kursk battle and its role, and significance during the war, as well as its causes, the move and the results.

The historical meaning of the Kursk battle is difficult to overestimate. If there were no feats of Soviet soldiers during the battle, the Germans were able to intercept the initiative on the Eastern Front and resume the offensive, again move to Moscow and Leningrad. During the battle, the Red Army broke most of the combat-ready parts of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, and he lost the opportunity to use fresh reserves, as they were already exhausted.

In honor of the victory on August 23, it was forever in the afternoon of military glory of Russia. In addition, during the battles, the largest and bloody tank battle occurred in history, as well as a huge number of aviation and other types of equipment.

Kursk battle is also called the battle on a fiery arc - all because of the most important meaning of this operation and bloody battles that took hundreds of thousands of lives.

The Stalingrad battle, which occurred earlier battles on the Kursk arc, completely destroyed the plans of the Germans about the rapid seizure of the USSR. According to the plan "Barbarossa" and the Blitzkrieg tactics, the Germans tried to take the USSR in one fell into the winter. Now Soviet Union Gathered forces and was able to quit a serious challenge of the Wehrmacht.

During the Kursk battle, on July 5, 1943, at least 200 thousand soldiers were killed, more than half a million were injured on historically estimates. It is important to note that many historians consider these figures lowered and loss of parties in a Kursk battle, perhaps, more significant. Basically, foreign historians speak the bodies of these data.

Intelligence service

A huge role in the victory over Germany played Soviet intelligence, which was able to find out about the so-called "Citadel" operation. Messages about this operation, Soviet intelligence officers began to receive in early 1943. On April 12, 1943, a document was laid on the table of the Soviet leader, which contained complete information about the operation - the date of its holding, tactics and strategy of the German army. It was difficult to assume that there was no intelligence with their work. Probably, the Germans would still manage to break through Russian defense, as the preparation for the "Citadel" operation was serious - it was preparing no worse than to the Barbarossa operation.

At the moment, historians are unsure exactly who exactly delivered to Stalin these essential knowledge. It is believed that this information was produced by one of the British intelligence officers John Kankrost, as well as a member of the so-called "Cambridge Five" (a group of British intelligence officers, which was recruited by the USSR back in the early 1930s and worked at once to two governments).

There is also an opinion that information on the plans of the German command transferred scouts of the Draz Group, namely the Hungarian scout Shanndor Rado.

Some historians believe that all the information about the "Citadel" operation was transferred to Moscow, one of the most famous intelligence officers of the Second World War - Rudolf Ressler, who was at that time in Switzerland.

Substantial support for the USSR was provided by British agents who were not recruited by the Union. During the Ultra program, British intelligence managed to crack the German encryption machine "Lorenz", according to which reports were transferred between members of the top leadership of the Third Reich. First of all, it was possible to intercept the plans for a summer offensive in the area of \u200b\u200bKursk and Belgorod, after which this information was immediately sent to Moscow.

Before the start of the Kursk battle, Zhukov claimed that as soon as he saw the future of the battlefield, he already knew how the strategic offensive of the German army would be held. However, there is no confirmation of his evidence - it is believed that in his memoirs he simply exaggerates his strategic talent.

Thus, the Soviet Union knew about all the details of the offensive operation "Citadel" and was able to prepare adequately to her so as not to leave the Germans to the victory.

Preparation for battle

In early 1943, the German and Soviet armies held offensive actions, which led to the formation of a protrusion in the center of the Soviet-German front, which reached in a depth of 150 kilometers. This protrusion and called the Kursk Arc. In April, both sides became clear that soon one of the key battles would begin for this protrusion, able to solve the outcome of war on the Eastern Front.

In the German headquarters there was no one opinion. Hitler could not work out an accurate action strategy for the summer of 1943. Many generals, including Manstein, were against the offensive at the moment. He believed that the offensive would make sense if it began right now, and not in the summer, when the Red Army can prepare to him. The rest either believed that it was time to move into defense, or to start an offensive in the summer.

Despite the fact that the most experienced leader Reich (Mannecin) was against, Hitler still agreed to begin the offensive in early July 1943.

The battle near Kursk is 1943 is the chance of the Union to consolidate the initiative after the victory under Stalingrad, and therefore the preparation of the operation reacted with previously unprecedented seriousness.

The state of affairs at the headquarters of the USSR was much better. Stalin was known about the plans of the Germans, he had a numerical advantage in infantry, tanks, guns and aviation. Knowing how and when the Germans will come, the Soviet soldiers prepared defensive fortifications to meet them and equipped the mine fields to repel the attack, and then move to counteroffensive. The experience of Soviet military leaders played a huge role in successful defense, who in two years of hostilities were still able to develop tactics and a war register strategy of the Best Warlords of Reich. The fate of the "Citadel" operation was predetermined before it began.

Face Plans and Force

German command planned to hold a large offensive operation on the Kursk arc (code name) "Citadel". To destroy the Soviet defense, the Germans decided to apply outcomed strikes from the north (district of the city of Orel) and from the south (district of Belgorod). Losing enemy defense, the Germans were to unite in the city of Kursk, thus taking into the full environment of the troops of the Voronezh and Central Fronts. In addition, German tank parts were to turn around in the eastern direction - to the village of Prokhorovka, and destroy the armored reserves of the Red Army so that they could not come to the aid of the main forces and did not help get out of the environment. Such tactic was completely not new for German generals. Their tank flank attacks worked for four. Using such tactics, they were able to conquer almost all of Europe and put a lot of crushing defeats of the Red Army in 1941-1942.

For the operation "Citadel", the Germans focused in Eastern Ukraine, in Belarus and Russia 50 divisions with a total number of 900 thousand people. Of these, 18 divisions were tank and motorized. Such a large number of tank divisions was the usual thing for the Germans. Wehrmacht's forces always used the lightning attacks of tank parts, so as not to give the enemy even a chance to group and repulse. In 1939, it was the tank divisions that played a key role in seizing France, which surrendered, did not have time to give a fight.

The commander-in-chief troops of the Wehrmacht were the Feldmarshal Blohem General (Army Group Center) and Field Marshal General Manstein (Army Group South). The shock forces commanded General-Field Marshal model, the 4th tank army and the operative group "Kemple" commanded General Herman Goth.

The German army has received long-awaited tank reserves before the start of the battle. Hitler sent more than 100 heavy tiger tanks to the Eastern Front, almost 200 Panther tanks (for the first time they were involved in the Kursk battle) and less than a hundred PT-SAU Ferdinand or Elephant (Elephant).

"Tigers", "Panthers" and "Ferdinanda" were one of the most powerful tanks for the period of World War II. Neither allies nor the USSR at that time did not have tanks that could boast such fireproof and booking. If the "Tigers" Soviet soldiers have already seen and learned to fight against them, the Panthers and Ferdinanda delivered many problems on the battlefield.

Panthers are medium-sized tanks that are a bit inferior to booking "Tigram" and had 7.5 cm kwk 42 guns in service. These tools had excellent rapidity and fired at a large distance with great accuracy.

Ferdinand is a severe self-propelled anti-tank installation (PT-SAU), which was one of the most famous in the period of the Second World War. Despite the fact that her number was small, she had a serious resistance to the Tanks of the USSR, since he possessed at that time almost better armor and firing power. During the Kursk battle of Ferdinanda, they showed their power, perfectly withstanding hitting from anti-tank guns, and even coped with artillery getting. However, his main problem was in a small number of anti-personnel machine guns, and therefore PT-SAU was very vulnerable to the infantry, which could come to him closely and exploding them. Destroy these tanks shots in the forehead was simply impossible. Weaknesses were on the sides, where after learned to shoot with podkaliberny shells. The most vulnerable place in the protection of the tank is a weak chassis, which was outlined, and after the fixed tank was captured.

Total Manstein and the Beelis received at their disposal less than 350 new tanks, which was catastrophically not enough, given the number of Soviet armored troops. It is also worth allocating that approximately 500 tanks used during the Kursk battle were outdated models. These are pz.ii and pz.III tanks, which have already been irrelevant at that time.

The 2nd tank army during the Kursk battle includes elite tank parts of the Panzerwaff, including the 1st Tank Division of the SS Adolf Hitler, the 2nd Tan Division of the SS "DASRYX" and the famous 3rd tank division "Totenkopf" (she same "dead head").

The number of aircraft to support infantry and tanks in the Germans was modest - about 2500 thousand units. Among the guns and mortars, the German army was inferior to Soviet more than twice, and some sources indicate the three-time advantage of the USSR in implements and mortars.

Soviet command realized their mistakes in conducting defensive operations in 1941-1942. This time, a powerful defensive line was built, capable of keeping the massive offensive of German armored troops. According to the plans of the command, the Red Army had to urge the enemy by defensive battles, after which they start counteroffensive in the most disadvantageous momentum.

During the Kursk battle, the commander of the central front was one of the most talented and efficient army generals - Konstantin Rokossovsky. His troops assumed the task of defending the Northern Fast Kursk. The commander of the Voronezh Front on the Kursk Dug was a native of the Voronezh region, the Army General Nikolai Vatutin, on whose shoulders lay down the task of defending the southern faces of the protrusion. The coordination of the Action of the Red Army was engaged in the Marshals of the USSR Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.

The ratio of the number of troops was far from the side of Germany. It is estimated that the Central and Voronezh fronts had 1.9 million soldiers, including part of the troops of the steppe front (steppe military district). The number of Wightle Fighters did not exceed 900 thousand people. By the number of tanks, Germany was inferior less than two times 2.5 thousand against less than 5 thousand. As a result, the ratio of forces to the Kursk battle looked like this: 2: 1 in favor of the USSR. The historian of the Great Patriotic Aleksey Isaev says that the number of the Red Army during the battle is overestimated. His point of view is exposed to great criticism, as it does not take into account the troops of the steppe front (the number of fighters of the steppe front, which participated in operations numbered more than 500 thousand people).

Kursk defensive operation

Before you give a full description of the events on a Kursk arc, it is important to show the action map to easier to navigate in the information. Kursk battle on the map:

In this picture, a scheme of a Kursk battle is visible. The Kursk Battle map can clearly show how combat connections acted during the battle. On the Kursk battle map, you will also see the conditional notation that will help you learn information.

Soviet generals received all the necessary orders - the defense was durable and the Germans soon waited for resistance, which did not receive the Wehrmacht in the entire history of its existence. On the day, when the Kursk battle began, the Soviet army pulled a huge amount of artillery to the front to give a response art preparation, which the Germans would not expect.

The beginning of the Kursk battle (the defensive stage) was scheduled for morning on July 5 - the offensive was to pass at once from the North and South Faca. Before Tank Attack, the Germans conducted large-scale bombing, to which the Soviet army answered the same. At that moment, the German command (namely, Field Marshal Manstein began to understand that the Russians learned about the operations "Citadel" and were able to prepare defense. Manstein has repeatedly spoke Hitler that this offensive at the moment no longer makes sense. He believed that it was necessary to thoroughly prepare defense and try to prevent the red army first and only then think about counterattacks.

Start - Fire Arc

In the Northern Face, the offensive began at six o'clock in the morning. The Germans attacked a little west of the Cherkasy direction. The first tank attacks ended for the Germans to fail. Sturdy defense led to great losses in German armored parts. And yet the enemy managed to get into the way of 10 kilometers. In the South Face, the offensive began at three in the morning. The main blows fell on the Obovoi and Korochi settlements.

The Germans could not break through the defense of the Soviet troops, as those were carefully prepared for battle. Even the elite vermochet tank divisions hardly advanced. As soon as it became clear that in the north and southern faces of Germany, it was not forces to break through, the command decided that it was necessary to hit in Prokhorov.

On July 11, tough battles began not far from the village of Prokhorovka, which turned into the largest tank battle in history. Soviet tanks in the Kursk battle exceeded German in numbers, but despite this, the enemy resisted to the end. On July 13-23, the Germans are still trying to carry out offensive attacks that end in failure. On July 23, the opponent completely exhausted his offensive potential and decided to move to defense.

Tank Battle

It is difficult to answer how many tanks participated on both sides, as the data from various sources differ. If you take the average data, the number of Tanks of the USSR reached about 1 thousand cars. Whereas the Germans had about 700 tanks.

A tank battle (fight) during a defensive operation in the Kursk Dug occurred on July 12, 1943. Attacks of the enemy on Prokhorovka began immediately from the Western and southern directions. Four tank divisions fell in the West and about 300 tanks were sent from the south.

The battle began early in the morning and the Soviet troops received an advantage, since the ascending sun shone the Germans directly into the observation instruments of tanks. The combat orders of the parties were mixed pretty quickly and after a few hours after the start of the battle it was difficult to disassemble where whose tanks.

The Germans were in a very difficult position, since the main power of their tanks was in long-range weapons, which were useless in the conditions of melee, and the tanks themselves are very slow, whereas in this situation a lot of maneuverability solved a lot. The 2nd and 3rd tank (anti-tank) German army suffered defeat under Kursk. Russian tanks opposite got an advantage, since they had a chance to push vulnerable places hard armored German tanks, and they themselves were very maneuverable (especially these are famous T-34).

However, the Germans still gave a serious rebuff from their anti-tank guns, which undermined the fighting spirit of Russian tanks - the fire was so dense that the soldiers and tanks did not have time and could not form orders.

While the main part of the tank troops was connected by the fight, the Germans decided to use the Cempf tank group, which fell on the left flank of the Soviet troops. To reflect this attack had to use the tank reserves of the Red Army. In the southern direction, by 14.00, the Soviet troops began to be crowned with German tank parts, which did not have fresh reserves. In the evening, the battlefield was already far behind the Soviet tank parts and the battle was won.

Losses of tanks on both sides during the battle near Prokhorovka during the Kursk defensive operation looked as follows:

• about 250 Soviet tanks;
• 70 German tanks.

The above figures are irretrievable losses. The number of damaged tanks was significantly large. For example, the Germans after the battle under Prokhorovka had only 1 \\ 10 fully combat-ready cars.

The battle under Prokhorovka is called the largest tank battle in history, but this is not entirely true. In fact, this is the largest tank battle, which was only one day. But the largest battle occurred two years earlier between the forces of the Germans and the USSR on the Eastern Front under Dubno. During this battle, which began on June 23, 1941, 4500 tanks collided. The Soviet Union has 3,700 units of technology, while the Germans had only 800 units.

Despite such a numerical advantage of the Tank Union, there was not a single chance to win. There are several reasons for this. First, the quality of tanks in the Germans was significantly higher - they were in service with new samples with good anti-tank bookings and weapons. Secondly, in the Soviet military thought, at that time, the principle was that "tanks with tanks are not fighting." Most tanks in the USSR had only opposite armor and could not break through thick German armor. That is why the first largest tank battle has become a catastrophic failure for the USSR.

Resort of defensive battle phase

The defensive stage of the Kursk battle ended on July 23, 1943 by the complete victory of the Soviet troops and the crushing defeat of the forces of the Wehrmacht. As a result of bloody fighting, the German army was exhausted and bleeded, a significant number of tanks was either destroyed or partially lost combat capability. The German tanks participating in the battle under Prokhorovka were practically completely disabled, destroyed or hit the enemy's hands.

The ratio of losses during the defensive phase of the Kursk battle looked as follows: 4.95: 1. The Soviet army lost five times more soldiers, while the German losses were much smaller. However, a huge number of German soldiers were injured, as the tank troops destroyed, which significantly undermined the mood power of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front.

As a result of a defensive operation, the Soviet troops came to the line, which was held before the German offensive, which began on July 5. The Germans switched to deep defense.

During the Kursk battle occurred a radical fracture. After the Germans have exhausted their offensive capabilities, the Red Army counteroffensions began on the Kursk arc. From July 17 to July 23, the Soviet troops carried out a raisins-Barvenkovskaya offensive operation.

The operation was performed by the southwestern front of the Red Army. Its key target was to shoot the Donbas grouping of the enemy, so that the enemy could not transfer fresh reserves to the Kursk arc. Despite the fact that the enemy threw his hardly the best tank divisions into battle, the forces of the South-Western Front still managed to seize the bridgeheads and powerful blows and surround the Donbas grouping of the Germans. Thus, the South-West Front has greatly helped in the defense of the Kursk Arc.

Mius offensive operation

From July 17 to August 2, 1943, a Mius offensive operation was also held. The main task of the Soviet troops during the operation was to delay the fresh reserves of Germans from Kursk Arc to the Donbass and the defeat of the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht. To reflect the attack in the Donbas, the Germans had to transfer significant forces of aviation to protect the city and tank parts. Despite the fact that the Soviet troops failed to break through German defense near Donbass, they still managed to significantly weaken the offensive on the Kursk arc.

The offensive stage of the Kursk battle continued successfully for the Red Army. The following important battles in the Kursk arc occurred under the eagle and Kharkov - offensive operations were called "Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev".

The offensive operation of Kutuzov began on July 12, 1943 in the area of \u200b\u200bthe city of Eagle, where the Soviet troops opposed two German armies. As a result of bloody battles, the Germans could not hold the bridgehead on July 26 they retreated. Already on August 5, the city of Eagle was liberated by the Red Army. It was on August 5, 1943 for the first time in the whole time of hostilities with Germany in the capital of the USSR there was a small parade with salute. Thus, it can be judged that the liberation of the Eagle was an extremely important task for the Red Army, with which she successfully coped.

Offensive operation "Rumyantsev"

The next basic event of the Kursk battle during its offensive stage began on August 3, 1943 on the southern Face Arc. As already mentioned, this strategic offensive was called "Rumyantsev". The operation was carried out by the forces of the Voronezh and the Steppe Front.

Already two days after the start of the operation - August 5, the city of Belgorod was liberated from the Nazis. And after another two days of the Red Army, the city of Bogodukhov was liberated. During the occurrence of August 11, Soviet soldiers managed to cut the railway line of the Germans of Kharkov-Poltava. Despite all the counterattacks of the German army, the strength of the Red Army continued to adopt. As a result of fierce fights on August 23, the city of Kharkov was repulsed.

The battle for the Kursk arc was already won by Soviet troops at this moment. It understood the German command, but Hitler gave a clear order to "stand up to the last".

The MGIN offensive operation began on July 22 and lasted until August 22, 1943. The main goals of the USSR looked as follows: Finally disrupt the plan of the offensive of the Germans to Leningrad, do not give the enemy to throw strength to the West and completely destroy the 18th Army of the Wehrmacht.

The operation began from a powerful artillery strike in an enemy direction. The forces of the parties at the time of the start of the operation on the Kursk arc looked like this: 260 thousand soldiers and about 600 tanks on the side of the USSR, and 100 thousand people and 150 tanks - on the side of the Wehrmacht.

Despite the strong art preparation, the German army had ill resistance. Although the forces of the Red Army and managed to seize the first echelon of the defense of the enemy, the fond of them did not advance.

In early August 1943, having received the Fresh reserves of the Red Army again began to attack the German positions. Thanks to the numerical advantage and powerful mortar fire, the USSR soldiers managed to capture defensive strengthening of the enemy in the village of Porechye. However, the ka will advance again, could not - the German defense was too dense.

The cruel battle between the opposing parties during the operation was launched for Sinyaevo and Siniyevsky heights, which seized Soviet troops several times, and then they moved back to the Germans. Fights had a fierce character and both sides carried big losses. The German defense was so strong that the KA command decided to stop the offensive operation on August 22, 1943 and move to a deaf defense. Thus, the MGIN offensive operation did not bring final success, although he played an important strategic role. To repel this attack by the Germans had to use reserves that were to go under Kursk.

Smolensk offensive operation

While the Soviet counteroffensive in the Kursk battle of 1943 was not beginning, the rate was extremely important to defeat as much enemy parts as possible, which Wehrmacht could send under the course to contain the Soviet troops. To weaken the defense of the enemy and deprive his assistance of reserves was carried out by the Smolensk offensive operation. Smolensk direction adjacent to the western district of Kursk. The operation received the code name "Suvorov" and began on August 7, 1943. The offensive began the strength of the left wing of the Kalininsky front, as well as the whole Western Front.

The operation ended with success, since in its course the beginning of the liberation of Belarus was found. However, the most important, commanders of the Kursk battle have made a screaming of as many as 55 enemy divisions, without giving them the opportunity to go to the Kursk - it has significantly increased the chances of the forces of the Red Army during a counterattack under Kursk.

For the weakening of the position of the enemy near Kursk, another operation was carried out by the Red Army - the Donbass offensive. The plans of the parties about the Donbass basin were very serious, because this place was important economic Center - Donetsk mines were extremely important for the USSR and Germany. In the Donbass stood a huge German group, which had more than 500 thousand people.

Operation began on August 13, 1943 and was carried out by the forces of the South-Western Front. On August 16, the forces of the Red Army met a serious resistance on the Mius River, where he stood a strong fortified defensive line. On August 16, the forces of the Southern Front entered the battle, which managed to break through enemy defense. Especially in the battles manifested itself from all regiments of the 67th. The successful offensive continued and already on August 30, the city of Taganrog released.

On August 23, 1943, the offensive phase of the Kursk battle was completed and the Kursk battle itself, however, the Donbass offensive operation continued - the forces of KA should have pushed the enemy for the Dnieper River.

Now, important strategic positions have been lost for the Germans and over the South Army Group hung a threat to dismemberment and death. To prevent the leader of the Third Reich, still allowed her to move away for the Dnieper.

On September 1, all German units in the area began to retreat from Donbass. On September 5, Gorlovka was liberated, and after three days during the fighting was taken Stalino or as the city is now called - Donetsk.

The retreat for the German army was very difficult. Wehrmacht's forces ended ammunition for artillery guns. When retreat german soldiers Actively used the tactics of the "scorched land". The Germans killed civilians and burned the village, as well as small towns on their way. During the Kursk battle of 1943, retreating cities, the Germans robbed everything that came under his arms.

On September 22, the Germans managed to learn over the Dnieper River in the city of Zaporizhia and Dnepropetrovsk. After that, the Donbass offensive operation approached its end, ending with the complete success of the Red Army.

All the above operations have led to the fact that the Wehrmacht's forces as a result of hostilities in the Kursk battle were forced to move out for the Dnieper to build new defensive binding. The victory in the Kursk battle was the result of the increased courage and combat spirit of Soviet soldiers, the mastery of commanders and the competent use of military equipment.

The Kursk battle of 1943, and then the battle for the Dnieper finally secured the initiative on the eastern front for the USSR. No one else doubted that the victory in the Great Patriotic War would be for the USSR. It was understood by the allies of Germany, who began to gradually throw the Germans, leaving Rihu even less chance.

Many historians also believe that an important importance in the victory over the Germans played the offensive of the Allies on the island of Sicily, which at that time was occupied mainly by Italian troops.

On July 10, the Allies began an offensive in Sicily and Italian troops almost without resistance surrendered to British and American troops. It strongly spoiled Hitler's plans, since for the holding of Western Europe, he had to translate part of the troops from the Eastern Front, which again weakened the position of the Germans under Kurk. Already on July 10, Manstein spoke Hitler that the offensive under Kursk must stop and move into deep defense behind the Dnieper River, but Hitler still hoped that the enemy would not be able to put a defeat.

Everyone knows that the Kursk battle in the course of the Great Patriotic War was bloody and the date of its start is associated by the death of our grandfathers and great-grandfathers. However, there were funny (interesting) facts during the Kursk battle. One of such cases is associated with the Tank KV-1.

During the tank battle, one of the Soviet tanks of the KV-1 rank and the crew ended the ammunition. He was opposed by two German pz.iv tank, which could not break through the KV-1 armor. German tank workers tried to get to the Soviet crew, sawing armor, but nothing came out. Then two pz.IV decided to drag the KV-1 to their base to deal with tankers there. They closed the KV-1 and began towing it. Somewhere halfway the engine KV-1 suddenly began and the Soviet tank dragged two pz.ivna from his base. German tank workers were shocked and simply disastened their tanks.

The results of the Kursk battle

If the victory in the Stalingrad battle completed the red army defense period during the Great Patriotic War, the end of the Kursk battle marked the root fracture during the fighting.

After the report (message) came to Stalin's table, the Secretary General said that this is only the beginning and very soon the troops of the Red Army will push the Germans from the occupied territories of the USSR.

Events after a Kursk battle, of course, did not unfold simply for the Red Army. Victory was accompanied by huge losses, because the enemy stubbornly held the defense.

The liberation of cities after the Kursk battle continued, so, for example, in November 1943 the capital of the Ukrainian SSR was liberated - the city of Kiev.

Very important outcome of the Kursk battle - changing the relationship of allies to the USSR. The report to the US President, written in August, it was said that the USSR now occupies a dominant position in World War II. This is proof. If Germany allocated only two divisions on the defense of Sicily from the United Kingdom and the United States, then on the Eastern Front of the USSR, the attention of two hundred German divisions was challenged.

The United States was very worried about the success of the Russians on the Eastern Front. Roosevelt said that if the USSR continues to pursue such success, the opening of the "second front" will be unnecessary and the United States will not be able to influence the fate of Europe without the benefit for itself. Consequently, the opening of the "second front" should follow as soon as possible until the US assistance was required.

The failure of the operation "Citadel" entailed the disruption and further strategic offensive operations of the Wehrmacht, which were already prepared for execution. The victory under Kurk would allow the offensive to Leningrad, and after the Germans went to occupy Sweden.

The result of the Kursk battle was the undermining of the authority of Germany among its allies. The successes of the USSR on the Eastern Front gave the opportunity to turn away to the Americans and British in Western Europe. After such a crushing defeat of Germany, the leader of the fascist Italy Benito Mussolini broke the agreement with Germany and came out of the war. Thus, Hitler lost his faithful ally.

For success, of course, I had to pay expensive. The losses of the USSR in the Kursk battle were huge, as well as German. The ratio of forces has already been rendered above - now it is worth looking at losses in a Kursk battle.

In fact, to establish the exact number of dead is quite difficult, since the data from different sources is very different. Many historians take medium numbers - these are 200 thousand dead and three times wounded. The least optimistic data is talking about more than 800 thousand killed on both sides and about the same number of wounded. The parties also lost a huge number of tanks and technology. Aviation in the Kursk battle played almost a key role and loss of aircraft amounted to about 4.2 thousand units on both sides. At the same time, the loss of aviation is the only, where the Red Army lost no more German - everyone lost about 2 thousand aircraft. For example, the ratio of human losses looks like 5: 1 or 4: 1 in different sources. Based on the characteristics of the Kursk battle, it is possible to conclude that the effectiveness of Soviet aircraft at this stage of the war did not infergenate German at all, while at the beginning of the hostilities the situation was radically different.

Soviet soldiers under Kursk showed extraordinary heroism. Their exploits were noted even abroad, especially American and British publications. The heroism of the Red Army also noted the German generals, including mansyna, which was considered the best warlord of Reich. Several hundred thousand soldiers received awards "For participation in the Kursk battle".

Another interesting fact - Children also participated in Kursk battle. Of course, they did not fight on the front line, but provided serious support in the rear. They helped deliver supplies and shells. And before the start of the battle with the help of children, hundreds of kilometers of railways were built, which were necessary for rapid transportation of military and supplies.

Finally, it is important to consolidate all the data. The end of the end and the beginning of the Kursk battle: July 5 and August 23, 1943.

Key dates of the Kursk battle:

• July 5 - 23, 1943 -cura strategic defensive operation;
• July 23 - August 23, 1943 -cura strategic offensive operation;
• July 12, 1943 - bloody tank battle under Prokhorovka;
• July 17 - 27, 1943 - Ishim-Barvenkovskaya offensive operation;
• July 17 - August 2, 1943 - Mius offensive operation;
• July 12 - August 18, 1943 - Orlovskaya Strategic Offensive Operation "Kutuzov";
• August 3 - 23, 1943 - Belgorod-Kharkiv Strategic Offensive Operation "Rumyantsev";
• July 22 - August 23, 1943 - Mginsk offensive operation;
• August 7 - October 2, 1943 - Smolensk offensive operation;
• August 13 - September 22, 1943 - Donbass offensive operation.

The results of the battle on the fiery arc:

• a radical turn of events during the Great Patriotic and World War II;
• full fiasco German campaign for the seizure of the USSR;
• the Nazis lost confidence in the invincible of the German army, which reduced the combat spirit of the soldiers and led to conflicts in the ranks of the command.

Kursk battle was planned by German-fascist invaders under the leadership of Hitler in response to the battle near Stalingradwhere they suffered a crushing defeat. The Germans, as usual, wanted to attack suddenly, but accidentally captured by the Saper-Fascist, passed his own. He reported that at night of the fifth of July 1943, the Nazis would begin to surpass the "Citadel" operation. The Soviet army is decided to start the battle first.

The main idea of \u200b\u200bthe "Citadel" was to apply a sudden strike in Russia with the involvement of powerful equipment and self-propelled installations. Hitler did not doubt his success. But the General Staff of the Soviet Army was developed a plan aimed at the liberation of Russian troops and the defense of the battle.

The battle received its interesting name in the form of a battle on the Kursk arc, due to the external similarity line of the front with a huge arc.

Change the course of the Great Patriotic War and to solve the fate of Russian cities, such as Eagle and Belgorod, was assigned to the "Center" army, "South" and the "Cempf" operational group. On the defense of the eagle, the troops of the central front were delivered, and on the defense of Belgorod - the Voronezh Front.

Date of the Kursk Battle: July 1943.

July 12, 1943 marked the greatest tank battle on the field under the station Prokhorovka. After the battle, the Nazis had to change the attack on defense. This day cost them huge human losses (about 10 thousand) and defeat 400 tanks. Further, in the Eagle area, the Bryansky, Central and West Front continued, by going to the Kutuzov operation. For three days, from July 16 to July 18, the Central Front was eliminated by the Hitler group. In the future, they betrayed aviation persecution and thus were discarded 150 km. west. Russian cities Belgorod, Eagle and Kharkov sighed freely.

The results of the Kursk battle (briefly).

• sharp turn of the course of the events of the Great Patriotic War;
• after the fascists failed to turn their "Citadel" operation, at the global level it looked like a full defeat of the German campaign before the Soviet Army;
• the fascists turned out to be morally suppressed, disappeared all confidence in their superiority.

The meaning of the Kursk battle.

After the most powerful tank battle, the Soviet army turned the events of the war to reverse, took the initiative to their hands and continued to promote to the West, exempting Russian cities.