The war in Afghanistan is one of the main events of the Cold War, which provoked the crisis of the communist system, and after it the collapse of the USSR. The war led to the death of 15,000 Soviet servicemen, the emergence of several tens of thousands of young military invalids, exacerbated the already severe socio-economic crisis that the Soviet Union found itself in in the second half of the 1970s, made the burden of military spending unbearable for the country, led to further international isolation of the USSR.

The real causes of the war were the inability of the Soviet leadership to timely and correctly assess the major dynamic changes in the Greater Middle East, the main content of which was the emergence and growth of Islamic fundamentalism, the systematic use of terrorism as a tool to achieve political goals, the emergence of adventurous regimes that relied on armed conflicts ( Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya), economic polarization, population growth at the expense of the younger generation, dissatisfied with their financial situation.

Since the second half of the 1960s, new centers of influence, alliances and lines of tension began to form in the region, huge financial resources were accumulated from the sale of oil and the arms trade, which began to spread everywhere in abundance. The political rift in the region did not run along the “socialism-capitalism” axis, as Moscow erroneously imagined, but along religious lines.

The entry of troops and war could not be the answer to these changes and new problems. However, Moscow still viewed the Middle East region through the prism of its confrontation with the United States as the arena of some “big” zero-sum superpower game.

The Afghan crisis is an example of Moscow's misunderstanding of its national interests, incorrect assessment of the situation in the world, the region and in its own country, ideological narrow-mindedness, and political short-sightedness.

Afghanistan showed the inadequacy of the goals and methods of Soviet foreign policy to the real state of affairs in the world.

The middle and second half of the 1970s were marked by growing instability in the Middle East, which was the result of the anti-colonial revolutions of the 1950s and 60s, a series of Arab-Israeli conflicts, and the awakening of Islam. The year 1979 turned out to be especially turbulent: the leader of the Arab world, Egypt, concludes a separate peace treaty with Israel, which causes an uproar in the region; revolution in Iran brings ayatollahs to power; Saddam Hussein, who led Iraq, is looking for a pretext for an armed conflict and finds it in a war with Iran; Syria, led by Assad (senior), provokes a civil war in Lebanon, into which Iran is drawn; Libya under the leadership of Gaddafi sponsors various terrorist groups; Turkey's centre-left government resigns.

The situation is also radicalizing in peripheral Afghanistan. In April 1978, the "People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan" came to power here, declaring its desire to build socialism. In the political language of that time, this meant a statement of readiness to become a "client" of the USSR, counting on financial, economic and military assistance.

The Soviet Union has had good, even excellent, relations with Afghanistan since 1919, when Afghanistan gained independence from England and established friendly ties with Soviet Russia. In all the decades that have passed since then, there is no mention of Afghanistan in a negative context in Soviet history. There were mutually beneficial trade and economic ties. Afghanistan believed that it was in the informal sphere of influence of the USSR. The West has tacitly acknowledged this fact and has never been interested in Afghanistan. Even the change from a monarchy to a republic in 1973 as a result of a palace coup did not change the nature of bilateral relations.

The April "revolution" of 1978 was unexpected for Moscow, but not accidental. In Moscow, the leaders (Taraki, Amin, Karmal) and many participants in the coup were well known - they often visited the USSR, representatives of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee and the First Main Directorate of the KGB (now the Foreign Intelligence Service) worked closely with them.

It seemed that Moscow had nothing to lose from regime change. However, the "socialists" repeated the sad Soviet experience of the 1920s in Central Asia, when the nationalization and redistribution of land, property, and repressive measures provoked resistance from the population. Throughout 1978, the social base of the "socialists" was steadily shrinking. Neighboring Iran and Pakistan took advantage of the situation and began to send groups of their servicemen in civilian clothes to Afghanistan, as well as to support the opposition with weapons. China has been active. In parallel, historically existing and earlier contradictions between the leaders of the "socialists" intensified.

As a result, a year later, in the spring of 1979, the situation in Afghanistan became critical for the new government - it was on the verge of collapse. Only the capital and 2 more out of 34 provinces remained under its control.

On March 18, 1979, Taraki, in a lengthy telephone conversation with the head of the Soviet government, A. Kosygin, explains the current situation and insistently asks to send troops - now only this can save the situation, i.e. pro-Soviet government. Despair, the consciousness of hopelessness, comes through in every word of Taraki. He returns each question of the Soviet leader to the same urgent request - send troops.

For Kosygin, this conversation becomes a revelation. Despite the large number of advisers working in Afghanistan through various departments, incl. The KGB and the Ministry of Defense, the Soviet leadership are not aware of what is happening in this country. Kosygin wonders why, they say, you cannot defend yourself. Taraki admits that the regime has no support among the population. In response to Kosygin's naive, ideologically motivated proposals to rely on "workers", Taraki says that there are only 1-2 thousand of them. The Soviet premier proposes, as it seems to him, a reasonable solution: we will not give troops, but we will supply equipment and weapons in the required quantity. Taraki explains to him that there is no one to control the tanks and planes, there are no trained personnel. When Kosygin recalls several hundred Afghan officers who were trained in the USSR, Taraki reports that almost all of them went over to the side of the opposition, and mainly for religious reasons.

Shortly before Taraki, Amin called Moscow and told the Minister of Defense of the USSR D. Ustinov almost the same thing.

On the same day, Kosygin informs his colleagues in the Politburo about the conversation that took place at a meeting specially convened for this purpose. Members of the Politburo express seemingly sensible considerations: they underestimated the religious factor, the regime has a narrow social base, there is interference from Iran and Pakistan (and not the United States), the introduction of troops will mean war on the population. There seems to be a reason to revise or at least correct the policy in Afghanistan: start contacts with the opposition, with Iran and Pakistan, find a common basis for reconciliation, form a coalition government, and so on. Instead, the Politburo decides to follow the more than strange line that Kosygin suggested to Taraki - they are ready to supply weapons and equipment (which there is no one to control), but we will not send troops. Then it was necessary to answer the question: what to do in the event of an inevitable fall of the regime, about which the regime itself warns? But this question remains unanswered, and the entire line of Soviet actions is transferred to the plane of waiting and situational decisions. There is no strategy.

In the Politburo, 3 groups are gradually distinguished: 1) Andropov and Ustinov, who, in the end, insist on the entry of troops, 2) Kosygin, who opposes this decision to the end, 3) Gromyko, Suslov, Chernenko, Kirilenko, who silently or inactively support the entry troops. The ailing Leonid Brezhnev rarely participates in Politburo meetings and has difficulty focusing on problems that need to be addressed. These people are members of the Politburo commission on Afghanistan and actually act on behalf of the entire Politburo, making appropriate decisions.

During the spring-summer of 1979, Taraki and Amin increase pressure on the Soviet leadership with requests to help the troops. The situation is becoming so dramatic that their requests, despite the position of the Politburo, are already supported by all Soviet representatives in Afghanistan - the ambassador, representatives from the KGB and the Ministry of Defense.

By September, the conflict and struggle for power between the Afghan leaders themselves, Taraki and Amin, are heating up. On September 13-16, an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Amin takes place in Kabul, as a result of which he seizes power, removes Taraki, who is later killed. Apparently, this unsuccessful operation to eliminate Amin was carried out with the knowledge, if not without the participation of Moscow.

Since that time, Moscow has set itself the goal of achieving the removal of Amin, whom it does not trust, to bring to power "its" man - Karmal, and to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. Amin gives reasons: realizing that his survival now depends only on himself, he enters into a dialogue with some opposition forces, and also tries to establish contact with the Americans. In Moscow, these actions, in themselves reasonable, but committed without coordination and secretly from the Soviet side, are considered as a blow to Soviet interests, an attempt to withdraw Afghanistan from the Soviet sphere of influence.

Around October-November, the issues of a special operation by the Soviet forces against Amin are being worked out, which should be covered by the second, parallel and subordinate to the first operation of introducing a "limited" contingent of Soviet troops, the task of which should be to ensure order in case of another miscalculation with the support of Amin among the Afghan military. At the same time, in Kabul, all the main Soviet representatives were replaced with new ones, whose activities caused growing displeasure in the Kremlin.

By December 1, the study of issues is completed, and Andropov gives Brezhnev a note on this matter. On December 8, Brezhnev holds an interim meeting, and on December 12, the final decision of the Politburo on the special operation and the introduction of troops is made.

Before the final decision was made, he was actively resisted by the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal N. Ogarkov. It came to his open clashes and squabbles in raised tones with Ustinov and Andropov, but to no avail. Ogarkov pointed out that the army would have to go to war with the population without knowledge of traditions, without knowledge of the terrain, that all this would lead to guerrilla warfare and heavy losses, that these actions would weaken the position of the USSR in the world. Ogarkov warned about everything that eventually happened.

The operation began on December 25, 1979. On that day alone, 215 transport aircraft (An-12, An-22, Il-76) landed at Kabul airport, delivering the forces of about one division and a large amount of equipment, weapons and ammunition. There was no movement of ground troops concentrated on the Soviet-Afghan border, there was no border crossing either on December 25 or in the following days. On December 27, Amin was eliminated and Babrak Karmal was brought to power. The troops gradually began to enter - more and more.

We continue the series of publications about the war in Afghanistan.

Corporal of the Airborne Forces Sergey Boyarkinefreitor of the Airborne Forces Sergey Boyarkin
(317 RAP, Kabul, 1979-81)

For the entire time of service in Afghanistan (almost a year and a half) since December 1979. I have heard so many stories about how our paratroopers killed the civilian population just like that, that they simply cannot be counted, and I have never heard that our soldiers saved one of the Afghans - among the soldiers, such an act would be regarded as aiding the enemies.

Even during the December coup in Kabul, which lasted all night on December 27, 1979, some paratroopers shot at unarmed people who were seen on the streets - then, without a shadow of regret, they cheerfully recalled this as funny cases.

Two months after the introduction of troops - February 29, 1980. - The first military operation began in the province of Kunar. The main striking force was the paratroopers of our regiment - 300 soldiers who parachuted from helicopters on a high mountain plateau and went down to restore order. As I was told by the participants of that operation, order was put in the following way: food stocks were destroyed in the villages, all livestock was killed; usually, before entering the house, they threw a grenade there, then they shot with a fan in all directions - only after that they looked who was there; all men and even teenagers were immediately shot on the spot. The operation lasted almost two weeks, no one counted how many people were killed then.

What our paratroopers did for the first two years in remote areas of Afghanistan was complete arbitrariness. Since the summer of 1980 the 3rd battalion of our regiment was sent to the province of Kandahar to patrol the territory. Fearing no one, they calmly traveled along the roads and the desert of Kandahar and could, without any clarification, kill any person they met on their way.

He was killed just like that, with a machine gun burst, without leaving the BMDshek armor.
Kandahar, summer 1981

A photograph of the murdered Afghan, which was taken from his belongings.

Here is the most common story that an eyewitness told me. Summer 1981 province of Kandahar. Photo - a dead Afghan and his donkey lie on the ground. The Afghan went his own way and led the donkey. Of the weapons, the Afghan had only a stick, with which he drove the donkey. A column of our paratroopers was driving along this road. He was killed just like that, with a machine gun burst, without leaving the BMDshek armor.

The column stopped. One paratrooper came up and cut off the ears of the dead Afghan - in memory of his military exploits. Then a mine was planted under the Afghan's corpse to kill anyone else who found this body. Only this time the idea did not work - when the column started off, someone could not resist and finally fired a burst at the corpse from a machine gun - a mine exploded and tore the Afghan's body to pieces.

The caravans they met were searched, and if they found weapons (and the Afghans almost always had old rifles and guns), then they killed all the people who were in the caravan, and even animals. And when the travelers did not have any weapons, then, sometimes, they used the right practiced trick - during the search, they quietly pulled out a cartridge from their pocket, and, pretending that this cartridge was found in the pocket or in the things of an Afghan, they presented it to the Afghan as evidence his guilt.

These photos are taken from the dead Afghans. They were killed because their caravan met with a column of our paratroopers.
Kandahar summer 1981

Now it was possible to mock: after listening to a person warmly justifying himself, convincing that the cartridge was not his, they began to beat him, then watched him beg on his knees for mercy, but he was again beaten and then shot. Then they killed the rest of the people who were in the caravan.
In addition to patrolling the territory, the paratroopers often ambushed enemies on the roads and paths. These "caravan hunters" never found out anything - not even the presence of weapons among travelers - they simply suddenly fired from cover at everyone who passed in that place, sparing no one, even women and children.

I remember one paratrooper, a participant in hostilities, admired:

I would never have thought that this is possible! We kill everyone in a row - and for this they only praise us and hang awards!

Here is the documentary evidence. Wall newspaper with information about the military operations of the 3rd battalion, carried out in the summer of 1981. in Kandahar province.

It can be seen here that the number of recorded dead Afghans is three times the number of captured weapons: 2 machine guns, 2 grenade launchers and 43 rifles were seized, and 137 people were killed.

The mystery of the Kabul rebellion

Two months after the introduction of troops into Afghanistan, on February 22-23, 1980, Kabul was shaken by a major anti-government rebellion. Everyone who was then in Kabul remembered those days well: the streets were filled with crowds of protesters, they shouted, rioted, there was shooting all over the city. This rebellion was not prepared by any opposition forces or foreign intelligence services, it began completely unexpectedly for everyone: both for the Soviet military stationed in Kabul and for the Afghan leadership. Here is how Colonel General Viktor Merimsky recalls those events in his memoirs:

"... All the central streets of the city were filled with excited people. The number of demonstrators reached 400 thousand people ... There was confusion in the Afghan government. Marshal S. L. Sokolov, General of the Army S. F. Akhromeev and I left our residence for the Afghan Ministry of Defense, where we met with the Minister of Defense of Afghanistan M. Rafi. He could not answer our question about what is happening in the capital ... "

The reason that served as an impetus for such a stormy protest of the townspeople has not been clarified. Only after 28 years did I manage to find out the whole background of those events. As it turned out, the rebellion was provoked by the reckless trick of our paratrooper officers.

senior lieutenant Alexander Vovk
Alexander Vovk

The first commandant of Kabul, Major Yuri Nozdryakov (right).
Afghanistan, Kabul, 1980

It all started with the fact that on February 22, 1980, in Kabul, in broad daylight, Senior Lieutenant Alexander Vovk, a senior instructor in the Komsomol of the political department of the 103rd Airborne Division, was killed.

The story of Vovk's death was told to me by the first commandant of Kabul, Major Yuriy Nozdryakov. This happened near the "Green Market", where Vovk arrived in an UAZ vehicle together with the air defense chief of the 103rd Airborne Division, Colonel Yuri Dvugroshev. They did not fulfill any task, but, most likely, they simply wanted to buy something in the market. They were in the car when suddenly one shot was fired - the bullet hit Vovk. Dvugroshev and the soldier-driver did not even understand where they were shooting from, and quickly left this place. However, Vovk's wound turned out to be fatal, and he died almost immediately.

Deputy commander of the 357th regiment, Major Vitaly Zababurin (in the middle).
Afghanistan, Kabul, 1980

And then something happened that shook the whole city. Upon learning of the death of their comrade, a group of officers and ensigns of the 357th Airborne Regiment, led by the regiment's deputy commander, Major Vitaly Zababurin, got into armored personnel carriers and went to the scene to deal with local residents. But, having arrived at the scene, they did not bother to search for the culprit, but in a hot head decided to simply punish everyone who was there. Moving along the street, they began to smash and crush everything in their path: they threw grenades at houses, fired from machine guns and machine guns on armored personnel carriers. Dozens of innocent people fell under the hot hand of officers.
The massacre ended, but the news of the bloody pogrom quickly spread throughout the city. The streets of Kabul began to flood thousands of indignant citizens, riots began. At that time, I was on the territory of the government residence, behind the high stone wall of the Palace of the Peoples. I will never forget that wild howl of the crowd, inspiring fear, from which the blood ran cold. The feeling was the worst...

The rebellion was crushed within two days. Hundreds of Kabul residents were killed. However, the real instigators of those riots, who massacred innocent people, remained in the shadows.

Three thousand civilians in one punitive operation

At the end of December 1980 two sergeants from the 3rd battalion of our regiment came to our guardhouse (it was in the Palace of the Peoples, in Kabul). By that time, the 3rd battalion had been standing near Kandahar for half a year and was constantly participating in combat operations. Everyone who was then in the guardroom, including myself, listened attentively to their stories about how they fought. It was from them that I first learned about this major military operation, and heard this figure - about 3,000 Afghans killed in one day.

In addition, this information was confirmed by Viktor Marochkin, who served as a driver in the 70th brigade stationed near Kandahar (this is where the 3rd battalion of our 317th airborne regiment was included). He said that the entire 70th brigade took part in that combat operation in full force. The operation went as follows.

In the second half of December 1980, a large settlement (presumably Tarinkot) was surrounded by a semicircle. It stayed that way for about three days. By this time, artillery and Grad multiple rocket launchers had been brought up.
On December 20, the operation began: a blow from the "Grad" and artillery was struck at the settlement. After the first volleys, the kishlak plunged into a continuous cloud of dust. The shelling of the settlement continued almost continuously. Residents, in order to escape from the explosions of shells, ran from the village into the field. But there they began to shoot from machine guns, BMD guns, four "Shilka" (self-propelled units with four combined heavy machine guns) fired non-stop, almost all the soldiers fired from their machine guns, killing everyone: including women and children.

After shelling, the brigade entered the village and killed the rest of the inhabitants there. When the military operation ended, the whole earth around was strewn with the corpses of people. They counted about 3000 (three thousand) corpses.

Combat operation in the village, carried out with the participation of the 3rd battalion of our regiment.
Kandahar, summer 1981

The official start of the Afghan war can be considered adopted by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU December 12, 1979. in response to repeated requests from the government of Afghanistan, the decision to send a contingent of Soviet troops into the country. However, direct actions began on December 25 with the introduction of a contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan and on December 27, the capture of H. Amin's residence by the forces of the Guards Airborne Division and his replacement by the more accommodating B. Karmal.

There are 4 stages in the conduct of hostilities for 9 years and 49 days of warfare:

1. On the first, troops were brought in, positions were taken and strengthened on them (3 months)
2. The next stage was the conduct of active combat operations (5 years)
3. Subsequently, the Soviet units switched to supporting the actions of the allied Afghan groups (1.5g)
4. The last stage, consisting in the curtailment of activity and the withdrawal of the Soviet contingent from the territory of the country (2d)

The Soviet Union did not want to change the regime in Afghanistan, but intervened in the conflict to protect geopolitical interests.
The motives of the Soviet leadership in making the decision came largely from a mixture of ideological and political expediency of supporting a friendly regime and supporting its course towards reforms in the country. However, this was actively opposed by a Western-backed, US-led group of Islamic orthodox conservatives.
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A limited contingent of Soviet troops was present in Afghanistan. Both in the decision to send troops and in practice, the principle of "limited contingent of troops" was implemented. Moreover, contrary to the opinion about the fate of the predominant number of conscript soldiers, based on a lack of information, 60-70% of the contingent units consisted of 25-35 year old ensigns and reserve officers.

Soviet troops intervened in a year-long civil war. The aggravation of the situation in the country began after the proclamation in April 1978 of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) with a course towards socialist construction and radical groups of Islamists (dushmans, Mujahideen), supported by the poorest sections of the republic.


The losses of the Soviet Union in the Afghan war were much less than the losses of the United States during the Vietnam War. In terms of the ratio of losses killed during the same period of warfare on the part of the USSR and the USA, they differed in killed and wounded by 4 and 3 times in a larger direction, respectively.

The material costs of the USSR and the USA for the war differed significantly. In terms of US dollars for the USSR, the war in Afghanistan cost almost 3 billion / year and about a billion to support the Afghan regime. In rough terms, over 10 years, the costs are 40 billion, despite the fact that the United States spent on the Vietnam War for the same period $165 billion.

The Soviet contingent controlled a significant part of the country's territory. The Soviet contingent established control over most of the country's territory, spooks avoided direct clashes, limiting themselves to sorties of varying degrees of effectiveness. Unlike the later US-Afghan war, the Soviet period of the war saw no increase in opium poppy cultivation. Another difference is that the USSR built infrastructure for the population in Afghanistan, while the United States wiped out settlements with carpet bombing.


During the war in Afghanistan, oil prices dropped significantly. If the USSR started the war at the peak of oil prices at the end of the 70s, then during the first 6 years of the war, by agreement of the Gulf countries with the USA, the prices for "black gold" fell 6 times, which, of course, affected the military-economic capabilities of the Soviet Union.

In this war, poor personnel records were kept, signs of drunkenness, debauchery and drug addiction appeared. Control over the personnel of the contingent was unsystematic and fragmented, which allowed an employee on vacation, for example, to stay on the territory of the USSR not for 45 prescribed days, but for 90. In the initial period of the war, alcohol was abused by the entire officer corps, from which, according to some 70% were chronic alcoholics. The majority of the female members of the brigade agreed to cohabit with officers at a price of 50-100 Vneshtorg marks at a time.

Soldiers with access to medical painkillers used them intravenously to suppress feelings of fear, and some, having established contact with dushmans, used hashish and heroin.

After the end of the war, the United States redeemed the Stingers they presented to the Mujahideen at an inflated price. Contrary to popular belief about the significant influence of the Stingers on the course of the war, the Soviet command quickly found an antidote for them. It consisted in the fact that air cover operations were postponed to night time, given the lack of night vision devices in the spooks. It was recommended that air operations be carried out at altitudes exceeding the flight range of the Stingers. According to experts, the Mujahideen were donated from 500 to 2000 Stingers, which were redeemed from them after the war at a price of 183 thousand / piece, with a cost of MANPADS of 38 thousand.


The entry of a limited contingent of Soviet troops became the reason for the boycott of the 1980 Olympics. The result of the intervention of the USSR in the Afghan civil war was the boycott of the Moscow Olympics by the countries of the capitalist bloc. As a result, the socialist countries competed for the championship among themselves, according to its results, Soviet athletes received the largest number of medals in various sports.

Between 1948 and 1973 80% of high-quality No. 4 heroin was produced in Marseille from Turkish opium under the control of Corsican crime syndicates. That is why, and also because Turkey has been the main supplier of opiates to the US and Europe for more than a hundred years, Turkey has become so widely known as a producer of opium and heroin, although the gross production of opium in this country has never been significant. In 1949, after the Chinese communist revolution, poppy fields in China were destroyed, drug dealers were shot, and about 10 million drug addicts were subjected to compulsory treatment. The consequence of this was a sharp drop in the production of opium in the world: 1934 - 16.653 tons of opium, 1970 - 1094 tons. Turkey and Afghanistan produced opium for Iran, which had about a million opium smokers and became the world's largest opium consumer after the Chinese Revolution. The consequence of all these reasons was the transformation of the "Golden Triangle" into the world's largest producer of heroin. In 1970, the Golden Triangle accounted for 67% of the world's opium production (713 tons). Opium production in the world in 1970: Burma - 500 tons, Laos, Vietnam and Thailand together - 213 tons, Turkey - 76 tons, Iran, Afghanistan and India together - 305 tons, Mexico - 15 tons. US President Nixon in 1972 declared war on drugs and achieved the destruction of the existing chain Turkey (opium production) - Marseilles (heroin production) - USA (heroin sale). As a result, in the 1974-1975s. In Turkey, the cultivation of opium poppy has completely ceased. In 1978-1980s. there was a severe drought in the countries of the Golden Triangle, as a result, opium production in these countries fell from 700 tons in 1971 to 160 tons in 1979. As a result of the decline in the supply of opium to the world market from Turkey and the countries of the Golden Triangle, there was an increase in the cultivation of opium poppy in the countries of the Golden Crescent (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan). Opium production in the world in 1979: "Golden Triangle" - 160 tons "Golden Crescent" - 1400 tons Turkey - 0 tons Mexico - 16 tons. Period 1979-1989 characterized by a sharp rise in drug lords, such as the "opium king" Khun Sa in Burma and the leader of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in Afghanistan. A sharp increase in opium production began in the countries of the Golden Crescent and the Golden Triangle. In ten years, world opium production has tripled.

The annual turnover of the Afghan opiate market is about $65 billion. Approximately $55 billion is heroin. The turnover of the opium market reaches 7-10 billion dollars a year.
According to experts, in terms of money turnover, the global drug business is the third largest economy in the world; over the past 12 years, investments in this area have reached $3 trillion and are comparable to the impact on the global economy of the oil and gas market.
Up to $1.5 trillion from the drug trade is legalized every year, which corresponds to 5% of the value of world GDP.
As can be seen from the above data, the production (cultivation) of opium poppy since the mid-70s of the 20th century has been shifting to the countries of the "Golden Crescent" - Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
In Afghanistan, the cultivation of opium poppy was concentrated mainly in the southern provinces bordering Pakistan and Iran. The main flow of drug trafficking from Afghanistan went through the territory of Iran and through Pakistan to the Pakistani port of Karachi. And the main land transit from the Golden Triangle went through "East Pakistan" - Bangladesh.

Now you can look at the political processes taking place there at that time. They (processes), as in Latin America, are subject to the influence of the two main world Powers.
The cause of tense relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan in the 1970s was the long-standing dispute over the Durand Line, the Afghan-Pakistani border not recognized by Afghanistan, which appeared as a result of the British policy of "colorful carpet". Which assumed the maximum administrative fragmentation of the territory of British India. The "Durand Line" at one time was led by the British to the living and the Pashtuns became a large divided Asian people. Politics is known to Russians.

The actions of the leadership of Afghanistan were aimed at the reunification of the Pashtun tribes, with the formation of an autonomous Pashtunistan. The Pakistani government, on the contrary, took countermeasures, continually suppressing the uprisings of the Baloch and Pashtuns, while supporting the Islamists - opponents of the Afghan government.
From 1972 to 1977, Pakistan was ruled by the "Pakistani Allende" party - an adherent of "Islamic socialism" and an Oxford graduate - Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Like Allende, the Bhutto government nationalized all private banks, educational institutions, insurance companies and heavy industries. His party won the general election in March 1977.

Zulfikar Ali "Allende" Bhutto
Only every English Allende can find its own American Pinochet. He found. Pakistani Pinochet was a graduate of the US Senior Command College (Fort Leavenworth), General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq. At one time he regularly served the British and believed that "only the mind of a white man and Western technology are able to restore order in the East." And after studying in the States, the guidelines shifted slightly and the general's creed took the form: “England is losing its importance. We need to focus on America"

Muhammad "Pinochet" Zia-ul-Haq
By July 5, 1977, Zia-Ul-Haq planned and carried out a military coup in Pakistan. Bhutto was overthrown, placed under arrest, and executed in April 1979.
In Afghanistan in 1977, the Afghan government of Mohammed Daoud, who carried out a military coup in 1973 and ousted his cousin, King Zahir Shah, ruled. The Daoud government was already ready to settle all outstanding issues with the Bhutto government, but then a ziyaulhak happened in Pakistan.
The government of Zia-Ul-Haq begins to provide patronage and support to the Afghan separatists and the largest drug dealers Rabbani and Hekmatyar. And Zia-Ul-Haq, in turn, is patronized by the Americans.
Then Daud swung towards England - that is, the USSR. Then he recoiled again.
Finally, on April 27, 1978, Daoud was overthrown in a military coup by Nur Mohammad Taraki, a "Marxist" who came from the United States. Taraki himself also did not rule the ball for long, and on September 16, 1979, he was turned over by a graduate of Columbia University, Hafizullah Amin, who unleashed terror in the country against competitors and slowly began a policy of rapprochement with Pakistan.
The independent activity of the American "Marxists" came as a complete surprise to the British; things were going to lose control in a key region.
Therefore, on December 25-27, 1979, simultaneously with the first shots of special forces in the Taj Beck Palace, Soviet troops entered Afghanistan.

During the 10 years of Soviet rule, British breeders have made great strides in poppy and cannabis cultivation, bringing the yield from 180 tons per year in 1978 to 1400 tons per year in 1988. For ten years the English collective farmers were harmed in every possible way by American competitors.
In the end, the process of interaction between the parties in this direction has led to the fact that Afghanistan, under the joint Anglo-American tutelage, has now become the largest producer of opiates in the world.
All this is understandable, but we are talking about the Soviet "Afghan catastrophe".
This very "catastrophe" is not only a propaganda bogey, it is a key link in the chain of American clerical victories of the 20th century. The Cold War winners have come up with a wonderful story. Like, the Americans began to supply their Afghan drug dealers with Stingers, thanks to which the USSR began to suffer huge losses, lost the war in Afghanistan and collapsed. Fell apart. The folding fairy tale was immediately picked up by the media and the province went to write.
Only after the appearance of the first "Stingers" there, the Soviet command took prompt and effective countermeasures (changes in tactics, equipping aircraft and helicopters with interference stations and systems for dropping infrared traps) and rather quickly reduced the loss of flight materiel to the "dostinger" level.
During the 10 years of the war, Soviet aviation lost 446 vehicles - 113 aircraft and 333 helicopters. Aviation suffered most of these losses from anti-aircraft machine guns of various calibers. His contribution was made, for example, by the native Degtyarev-Shpagin, a large-caliber, model 1938. Overwhelmingly, the United States lost 5986 helicopters in Vietnam to the fire of similar weapons.
"Stingers" is not the reason. The reasons for the decision to withdraw must be sought in another catastrophe.
On August 17, 1988, Pinochet Zia-ul-Haq flew to the test site to watch demonstration tests of the American M-1 Abrams tank. After the performances, his C-130 Hercules aircraft headed back to Islamabad. But it didn't. Near Lahore "he fell".


None of the 37 people on board survived. According to one version, there was a container with poisonous gas on board. According to another, traces of explosives were found on the wreckage. But be that as it may, "Organizers and customers not found."
Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of Zulfiqar Ali, became the new Prime Minister of Pakistan.
By the way, about her "prototype" Christopher Andrew, who fell in love with me, writes like this:

The KGB residency in India in the 1970s and 1980s was the largest outside the USSR. In the 70s it was headed by Leonid Shebarshin, who later became the head of the First Main Directorate of the KGB. He spent over ten million dollars supporting Indira Gandhi's party and anti-American propaganda in India. The archive shows that this agency fabricated fakes under the guise of CIA documents in order to convince the Indian government of US intrigues. KGB agents planted fake documents labeled CIA, which spoke of US support for the Sikh separatists who sought to create the state of Khallistan. Indira Gandhi herself did not even suspect that the significant sums received by her party fund from sponsor Narayan Mishra actually came from Moscow. According to archive documents, the KGB fed ten newspapers and a news agency in India. From the reports of the residency it is clear that in 1972 she placed in the Indian press about four thousand articles she needed, in 1975 - already five thousand. It's hard to believe, but in the early 80s in India there were 1,500 Indian-Soviet friendship societies that were overseen by the KGB (and only two Indian-American friendship societies)

.
Wow it's like. The almighty KGB not only entwined the highest state positions in the pearl of the English crown with a net, but also crept up to arm's length to the Holy of Holies.


The naive English, who ruled India for three hundred years, only flapped their ears.
Benazir, like Gandhi, is the daughter of hereditary representatives of the Indian colonial administration.

Therefore, she graduated from Lady Margaret Hall College, Oxford University, where she was elected president of the Oxford Union debating society.

After the murder of her father, in 1984 she went "into exile" (of course, to Britain), from where she led her father's Pakistan People's Party. Yes, so cleverly that some of her competitors and even from among her relatives began to "die tragically." Some in France, some in Pakistan.
After the death of Zia-ul-Haq, Benazir returned to Pakistan, where she was met at the airport by a crowd of three million supporters.
But the most important meetings came later.

And a year later, in 1989, the Pure Country returned to the fraternal family of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

In parallel, from the middle of 1988, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began, which ended in February 1989. The British resolved the issues in the region. Agreed with the Americans. The troops were withdrawn.
So where is the "Afghan catastrophe"?
Maybe the Soviet army suffered huge losses? Well no. In total, 620,000 servicemen completed military service during the period in the troops stationed on the territory of Afghanistan. With a constant number of groups - about 150,000 people. The total number of deaths over 10 years is 15,051 people, of which 14,427 are servicemen of the Soviet army. Who died as a result of combat wounds, as well as from accidents and diseases. That is, 4-5% of the total contingent. Non-combat losses in the Soviet army, as a result of drunkenness, hazing, crossbows and idiocy, are almost comparable to the "Afghan" ones. I'm not talking about the death of "peaceful" in an accident.
The troops completed all assigned combat missions. Organized in, organized out.

Here are the "multinational forces" of Dobra, having a third smaller contingent than the Soviet one - about 40,000 - from 2001 to 2012 they lost about 4,000 people. Approximately 10%.
Aviation lost 141 vehicles - 39 aircraft and 102 helicopters.
And what, is this somewhere called a "catastrophe"? No, this is called the triumph of "Enduring Freedom".

Maybe the catastrophe is the "Afghan syndrome", with the light hand of the journalists of the Literaturnaya Gazeta in 1989, who put on the highly specialized term "post-traumatic stress disorder" on the entire "Soviet society"? Of course, some of the military personnel who went through the war had this syndrome, in the medical sense, of course. But what about "society"? After all, the USSR was not at all sawed up by "a society sick with the Afghan syndrome."
So, it turns out that there was no "Afghan catastrophe"?
Actually, there was.
Sergey Oboguev, for example, describes it like this:

During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the USSR physically destroyed a significant part of the irrigation network of Afghanistan, destroyed a significant part of the livestock, put 7 million Afghans to flight (half the country's population), killed a million Afghans (7% of the country's population; this is the minimum figure, more likely - 1.5 million, i.e. 10%), scattered along with the Afghan Marxist government 10-15 million mines in Afghanistan, subjected the city to many months (!) Carpet bombing of the city in 1987, reducing, for example. the population of Kandahar from pre-war 200 thousand to 25 thousand, etc. In 1985 alone, more than half of the farmers who remained in Afghanistan had their fields bombed. Afghanistan's irrigation system, vital to the Afghan people, was shattered by Soviet bombing and by bulldozing of canals as part of a program of targeted depopulation of areas that resisted communist control. More than a quarter of the peasants had their irrigation systems destroyed and their livestock shot by Soviet and Afghan communist troops. It was these Afghan-communist and Soviet destruction of Afghan agriculture and the destruction of the possibility of growing crops that caused the replacement of cereals with opium poppy. And it was during the Soviet-Afghan war that drug trafficking from Afghanistan to the USSR began

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I am making an amendment - drug trafficking did not go to, but THROUGH the USSR. In the 80s, drug addicts were quite rare in the USSR, the main part was registered, and there was no "market" as such. For currency transactions, you could get a tower. And the opium poppy in agricultural areas grew in almost every farmstead. So they did without imported heroin with domestic "hanka".
Traffic went in the 90s, through the independent Tochikiston.
Well, so, in general, everything is correct. Here is the disaster. But this is a disaster for Afghanistan, not for the Soviet Union and the Soviet army.

In December 1979, Soviet troops entered Afghanistan to support the friendly regime and intended to withdraw within a year at the most. But the good intentions of the Soviet Union turned into a long war. Today, some try to present this war as villainy or the result of a conspiracy. Let's look at those events as a tragedy, and try to dispel the myths that are emerging today.

Fact: the introduction of OKSAV is a forced measure to protect geopolitical interests

On December 12, 1979, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a decision was made and formalized in a secret resolution on the deployment of troops to Afghanistan. These measures were resorted to not at all in order to seize the territory of Afghanistan. The interest of the Soviet Union was primarily to protect its own borders, and secondly, to counteract US attempts to gain a foothold in the region. The formal basis for the introduction of troops was the repeated requests of the leadership of Afghanistan.

On the one hand, the participants in the conflict were the armed forces of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and on the other, the armed opposition (mujahideen, or dushmans). Dushmans received support from NATO members and Pakistani intelligence services. The struggle was for complete political control over Afghan territory.

According to statistics, Soviet troops were in Afghanistan for 9 years and 64 days. The maximum number of Soviet troops in 1985 reached 108.8 thousand, after which it steadily decreased. The withdrawal of troops began 8 years and 5 months after the start of the presence in the country, and by August 1988 the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was only 40 thousand. To date, the United States of America and its allies have been in this country for more than 11 years.

Myth: Western aid to the Mujahideen only began after the Soviet invasion

Western propaganda portrayed the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan as an aggression for the sake of seizing new territories. However, the West began to support the leaders of the Mujahideen even before 1979. Robert Gates, who at the time was a CIA officer and served as Secretary of Defense under President Obama, describes the events of March 1979 in his memoirs. Then, according to him, the CIA discussed the issue of whether it is worth supporting the Mujahideen further in order to "draw the USSR into the swamp," and it was decided to supply the Mujahideen with money and weapons.

In total, according to updated data, the losses of the Soviet Army in the Afghan war amounted to 14.427 thousand people dead and missing. More than 53 thousand people were shell-shocked, wounded or injured. For courage and heroism shown in Afghanistan, more than 200 thousand servicemen were awarded orders and medals (11 thousand were awarded posthumously), 86 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (28 posthumously).

In roughly the same amount of time, the US Army in Vietnam lost 47,378 combat casualties and 10,779 more dead. More than 152 thousand were wounded, 2.3 thousand were missing.

Myth: The USSR withdrew troops from Afghanistan because the CIA provided the Mujahideen with Stinger missiles

Pro-Western media claimed that it was Charlie Wilson who turned the tide of the war by convincing Ronald Reagan of the need to supply the Mujahideen with portable anti-aircraft missile systems designed to fight helicopters. This myth was voiced in the book "Charlie Wilson's War" by George Crile and in the film of the same name, where Tom Hanks played the role of a loud congressman.

In fact, the "Stringers" only forced the Soviet troops to change tactics. The Mujahideen did not have night vision devices, and helicopters operated at night. The pilots attacked from a higher altitude, which, of course, reduced their accuracy, but the level of losses of Afghan and Soviet aircraft, in comparison with the statistics of the first six years of the war, remained practically unchanged.

The decision to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan was made by the USSR government in October 1985 - even before the Mujahideen began to receive "Stringers" in significant quantities, which happened only in the fall of 1986. An analysis of the declassified protocols of the Politburo meetings shows that no innovations in the armament of the Afghan Mujahideen, including the Stringers as the reason for the withdrawal of troops, have ever been mentioned.

Fact: During the time of the American presence in Afghanistan, drug production has increased significantly.

Unlike the once introduced Soviet contingent, the US military does not control the entire territory of Afghanistan. It is also undeniable that after Afghanistan was occupied by NATO troops, drug production in this country increased significantly. There is an opinion that the Americans turn a blind eye to the rapid growth of heroin production quite consciously, realizing that an active fight against the drug business will sharply increase the losses of American troops.

If until 2001 drug trafficking in Afghanistan was repeatedly discussed in the UN Security Council, then later this issue was no longer brought up for discussion. It is also a fact that twice as many people die from heroin produced in Afghanistan in Russia and Ukraine than in 10 years of war in Afghanistan.

After the withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent from the territory of Afghanistan, the United States continued to maintain close ties with the Mujahideen. Washington blocked all proposals of President Mohammed Najibullah for negotiations and concessions. The Americans continued to arm the jihadists and guerrillas, hoping that they would overthrow the pro-Moscow regime of Najibullah.

This time was for Afghanistan the most destructive period in the recent history of the country: Pakistan and the West deprived the country of a unique opportunity to end the civil war. Charles Cogan, who served as the CIA's director of operations in South Asia and the Middle East from 1979-1984, later admitted: “I doubt whether it was worth our inertia to help the Mujahideen after the Soviets left. Looking back, I think it was a mistake."

Fact: the Americans were forced to buy weapons donated to them from the Afghans

When Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, the United States, according to various estimates, gave the Mujahideen from 500 to 2 thousand Stinger portable anti-aircraft missile systems. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country, the American government began to buy back donated missiles at $183,000 apiece, while the cost of the Stinger was $38,000.

Myth: The Mujahideen overthrew the Kabul regime and won a major victory over Moscow

The main factor that undermined Najibullah's position was Moscow's September 1991 announcement shortly after the collapse of the coup against Gorbachev. Yeltsin, who came to power, decided to reduce the country's international obligations. Russia has announced that it is halting the supply of arms to Kabul, as well as the supply of food and any other aid.

This decision was disastrous for the morale of Najibullah's supporters, whose regime lasted only 2 years after the Soviet troops left Afghanistan. Many military leaders and political allies of Najibullah went over to the side of the Mujahideen. As a result, Najibullah's army was not defeated. She just melted away. It turned out that Moscow overthrew the government, for which it was paid with the lives of Soviet people.

Fact: the USSR made a fatal mistake - it could not leave Afghanistan in time

The "Afghan unfinished construction" had a very negative impact on the USSR. There is an opinion that it was the unsuccessful Soviet military intervention that became one of the main reasons for the disappearance from the political map of the world. If the introduction of troops in 1979 strengthened “anti-Russian sentiments” both in the West, and in the countries of the socialist camp, and in the Islamic world, then the forced withdrawal of troops and the change of political allies and partners in Kabul became one of the most fatal mistakes, casting doubt on all that positive what the USSR did not only during the ten-year stay of OKSVA, but also for many years before that.

Myth: The US is rebuilding the Afghan economy today

According to statistics, over 12 years, the United States has invested $96.6 billion in the Afghan economy. True, no one dares to say how much went to the appointment. It is known that American businessmen who are engaged in the restoration of the Afghan economy, resolved by the war, have come up with a multi-stage corruption scheme for embezzling funds from the US budget through Afghanistan. According to the Stringer Bureau of International Investigation, multibillion-dollar sums are disappearing in an unknown direction.

During the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the USSR built two gas pipelines, several GSE and CHPPs, power lines, 2 airports, more than a dozen oil depots, industrial enterprises, bakeries, a Mother and Child Center, clinics, a Polytechnic Institute, vocational schools, schools - in total more than 200 different industrial facilities and social infrastructure.