Thousands of books have been written about this battle, but many of the facts are still little known to a wide audience. Russian historian and a writer, author of more than 40 publications on the history of the Battle of Kursk and the Prokhorov battle, Valery Zamulin recalls the heroic and victorious battle in the Black Earth Region.

The article is based on the material of the program "The Price of Victory" by the radio station "Echo of Moscow". The broadcast was hosted by Vitaly Dymarsky and Dmitry Zakharov. You can read and listen to the full original interview here.

After the encirclement of Paulus's group and its dismemberment, the success at Stalingrad was deafening. After February 2, a number of offensive operations were carried out. In particular, the Kharkov offensive operation, as a result of which Soviet troops captured a significant territory. But then the situation changed dramatically. In the Kramatorsk region, a group of tank divisions, some of which were transferred from France, including two SS divisions - "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" and "Das Reich" - the Germans dealt a crushing counterattack. That is, the Kharkov offensive operation turned into a defensive one. I must say that we got this battle dearly.

After the German troops occupied Kharkov, Belgorod and adjacent territories, the well-known Kursk ledge was formed in the south. Around March 25, 1943, the front line finally stabilized in this sector. Stabilization took place due to the introduction of two tank corps: the 2nd Guards and 3rd "Stalingrad" corps, as well as the operational transfer at the request of Zhukov from Stalingrad of the 21st Army of General Chistyakov and 64th Army of General Shumilov (hereinafter it is 6 1st and 7th Guards armies). In addition, by the end of March there was a thaw, which, of course, helped our troops to hold the line at that moment, because the equipment was very stuck and it was simply impossible to continue the offensive.

Thus, given that Operation Citadel began on July 5, from March 25 to July 5, that is, for three and a half months, preparations were underway for summer operations. The front stabilized, and in fact, a certain balance, equilibrium was maintained, without abrupt, as they say, movements on both sides.

The Stalingrad operation cost the Germans the 6th Army of Paulus and himself

Germany suffered a colossal defeat at Stalingrad, and most importantly, the first such deafening defeat, so the political leadership had an important task - to consolidate its bloc, because Germany's allies began to think that Germany was not so invincible; and what will happen if suddenly another Stalingrad? Therefore, Hitler needed after a fairly victorious offensive in Ukraine in March 1943, when Kharkov was recaptured, Belgorod was taken, the territory was captured, another, perhaps small, but impressive victory.

Although no, not small. If Operation Citadel were crowned with success, which, of course, the German command hoped for, then two fronts would be in the ring - Central and Voronezh.

Many German military leaders took part in the development and implementation of Operation Citadel. In particular, General Manstein, who initially proposed a completely different plan: to cede the Donbass to the advancing Soviet troops so that they could pass there, and then, with a blow from above, from the north, press them down, throw them into the sea (in the lower part there were the Azov and Black Seas).

But Hitler did not accept this plan for two reasons. First, he said that Germany cannot make territorial concessions now, after Stalingrad. And, secondly, the Donetsk basin, which the Germans needed not so much from the psychological point of view, but from the point of view of raw materials, as an energy base. Manstein's plan was rejected, and the forces of the German General Staff concentrated on developing Operation Citadel to eliminate the Kursk salient.

The fact is that it was convenient for our troops to carry out flank attacks from the Kursk salient, so the area of ​​the beginning of the main summer offensive was precisely determined. However, the process of formulating the tasks and the preparation process took a long time because there were controversies. For example, Model spoke and persuaded Hitler not to start this operation due to the understaffing, both in manpower and technical. And, by the way, the second date of the "Citadel" was set for June 10 (the first - for May 3-5). And already from June 10, it was moved even further - to July 5.

Here, again, we must return to the myth that only "Tigers" and "Panthers" were involved in the Kursk Bulge. In fact, this was not the case, because these machines began to be produced in a relatively large series precisely in 1943, and Hitler insisted that about 200 "Tigers" and 200 "Panthers" be sent to the Kursk direction. However, this entire 400-machine group was not involved, because, like any new technology, both tanks suffered from "childhood diseases". As Manstein and Guderian noted, the Tigers' carburetors quite often caught fire, the Panthers had transmission problems, and therefore no more than 50 vehicles of both types were actually used in combat during the Kursk operation. God forbid, the remaining 150 of each species would have been brought into battle - the consequences could have been much more dire.

It is important to understand here that the German command originally planned the Belgorod grouping, that is, the Army Group South, led by Manstein, as the main one - it had to solve the main task. The strike of Model's 9th Army was, as it were, auxiliary. Manstein had to cover 147 kilometers before joining Model's troops, so the main forces, including tank and motorized divisions, were concentrated near Belgorod.

The first offensive in May - Manstein saw (there were intelligence reports, photographs) how quickly the Red Army, the Voronezh Front, in particular, was strengthening the positions, and he realized that his troops would not be able to reach Kursk. With these thoughts, he arrived at the beginning in Bohodukhiv, in the command post of the 4th Panzer Army to Gotha. What for? The fact is that Goth wrote a letter - there was also an attempt to develop Operation Panther (as a continuation in the case of the success of Citadel). So, in particular, Goth opposed this operation. He believed that the main thing was not to rush to Kursk, but to destroy, as he assumed, about 10 mechanized tank corps, which the Russians had already prepared. That is, to destroy mobile reserves.

If this whole colossus moves on Army Group South, then, as they say, it will not seem a little. That's why it was necessary to plan at least the first stage of the "Citadel". On May 9-11, Goth and Manstein discussed the plan. And it was at this meeting that the tasks of the 4th Panzer Army and Kempf's operational group were clearly defined, and the plan for the Prokhorov battle was also developed here.

It was at Prokhorovka that Manstein planned a tank battle, that is, the destruction of these mobile reserves. And after they are broken when the condition is assessed German troops, it will be possible to talk about the offensive.

In the region of the Kursk salient, both in the north and in the south, the Germans concentrated up to 70% of the armored vehicles at their disposal on the Eastern Front for Operation Citadel. It was assumed that it was these forces that would be able to ram the three most fortified lines of the Soviet defense and destroy, given the qualitative superiority of German armored vehicles at that time over our tanks, mobile reserves. After that, under favorable circumstances, they will also be able to advance in the direction of Kursk.

For the battles at Prokhorovka, an SS corps was planned, partly the 48th corps and part of the forces of the 3rd Panzer Corps. These three corps were supposed to grind mobile reserves, which were supposed to approach the Prokhorovka area. Why to the Prokhorovka area? Because the area was favorable there. In other places, it was simply impossible to deploy a significant number of tanks. This plan was largely implemented by the enemy. The only thing is that they did not calculate the forces of our defense.

A few more words about the Germans. The fact is that the situation in Africa they already had a seam. After the loss of Africa, it automatically followed that the British would establish complete control over the Mediterranean. Malta is an unsinkable aircraft carrier from which they hammer Sardinia first, Sicily, and thus prepare the possibility of landing in Italy, which was eventually carried out. That is, the Germans in other areas, too, were not doing it, thank God. Plus the vacillation of Hungary, Romania and other allies ...

The planning of the summer hostilities of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht began at about the same time: for the Germans - in February, for us - at the end of March, after the stabilization of the front line. The fact is that the retention of the enemy, which was advancing from Kharkov in the Belgorod region, and the organization of the defense was controlled by the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal Zhukov. And after the stabilization of the front line, he was here, in the area of ​​Belgorod; together with Vasilevsky they discussed further plans. After that, he prepared a note in which he outlined the point of view, which was developed jointly with the command of the Voronezh Front. (By the way, Vatutin became the commander of the Voronezh Front on March 27, before that he commanded the South-Western Front. He replaced Golikov, who was removed from this position by the decision of the Headquarters).

So, in early April, a note was laid on Stalin's desk, which outlined the basic principles of conducting hostilities in the south in the summer of 1943. On April 12, a meeting was held with Stalin's participation, in which the proposal was approved to switch to deliberate defense, to prepare troops and defense in depth in case the enemy goes on the offensive. And the configuration of the front line in the region of the Kursk salient suggested a high probability of such a transition.

Despite local successes, the Nazi operation "Citadel" failed

Here we should return to the system of engineering structures, because until 1943, before the Battle of Kursk, the creation of such powerful defensive lines was not carried out by the Red Army. After all, the depth of these three lines of defense was about 300 kilometers. That is, the Germans had to plow, ram, drill 300 kilometers of fortified areas. And these are not just trenches dug up to their full height and reinforced with boards, these are anti-tank ditches, holes, this is the most powerful system of minefields made for the first time during the war; and each, in fact, settlement on this territory also turned into a mini-fortress.

Neither the German nor our side has ever erected such a strong and full of engineering barriers and fortifications on the Eastern Front. The most fortified were the first three strips: the main army strip, the second army strip and the third rear army strip - approximately to a depth of 50 kilometers. The fortifications were so powerful that two large, strong enemy groups for two weeks were unable to break through them, despite the fact that, in general, the Soviet command did not guess the main direction of the German strike.

The fact is that in May, fairly accurate data were received about the enemy's plans for the summer: from time to time they came from illegal agents from England and Germany. The headquarters of the supreme command knew about the plans of the German command, but for some reason it was determined that the Germans would deliver the main blow on the Central Front, on Rokossovsky. Therefore, Rokossovsky was additionally transferred to significant artillery forces, a whole artillery corps, which Vatutin did not have. And this miscalculation, of course, influenced how the fighting in the south developed. Vatutin was forced to repel the attacks of the enemy's main tank grouping with tanks, not having sufficient artillery means to fight; in the north, there were also tank divisions, which took part directly in the offensive against the Central Front, but they dealt with Soviet artillery, and numerous at that.

But let's smoothly move to July 5, when, in fact, the event began. The canonical version is Ozerov's film "Liberation": the defector says that the Germans are concentrated here and there, a colossal artillery attack is being carried out, almost all Germans are killed, it is not clear who else is fighting there for a whole month. What was the case in reality?

There really was a defector, and not one - there were several of them both in the north and in the south. In the south, in particular, on 4 July, a reconnaissance soldier from the 168th Infantry Division came over to our side. According to the plan of the command of the Voronezh and Central Fronts, in order to inflict maximum losses on the enemy preparing for the offensive, it was supposed to carry out two measures: firstly, to conduct a powerful artillery attack, and, secondly, to strike the aviation of the 2nd, 16th and 17th air armies on the airfield. Let's say about the air raid - it failed. Moreover, it had unfortunate consequences, since the time was not calculated.

As for the artillery attack, it had partial success in the zone of the 6th Guards Army: mainly telephone communication lines were disrupted. There were losses in both manpower and equipment, but insignificant.

Another thing is the 7th Guards Army, which took up defenses along the eastern bank of the Donets. The Germans, respectively, are on the right. Therefore, in order to launch an offensive, they had to cross the river. They pulled up significant forces, watercraft to certain settlements and sectors of the front, and preliminarily set up several crossings, hiding them under water. Soviet intelligence recorded this (engineering reconnaissance, by the way, worked very well), and the artillery strike was carried out precisely in these areas: along the crossings and in settlements where these assault groups of the 3rd Panzer Corps of Routh were concentrated. Therefore, the effectiveness of artillery preparation in the zone of the 7th Guards Army was much higher. Losses from it both in manpower and in technology, not to mention management and so on, were high. Several bridges were destroyed, which slowed down the pace of the offensive, and in some places paralyzed.

Already on July 5, Soviet troops began to split the enemy's strike grouping, that is, they did not allow the 6th Panzer Division, Kempf's army group, to cover the right flank of the 2nd Hausser Panzer Corps. That is, the offensive of the main strike group and the auxiliary one along diverging lines began. This forced the enemy to attract additional forces to cover their flanks from the edge of the blow. This tactic was conceived by the command of the Voronezh Front and was perfectly implemented.

Since we are talking about the Soviet command, many will agree that both Vatutin and Rokossovsky - famous people, but the latter had a reputation, perhaps, of a greater commander. Why? Some say that he fought better in the Battle of Kursk. But Vatutin, in general, did a lot, since he still fought with fewer forces, fewer numbers. Judging by the documents that are now open, it is safe to say that Nikolai Fedorovich very competently, very sensibly and skillfully planned his defensive operation, given that the main group, the most numerous, was advancing against his front (although it was expected from the north). And until the 9th, inclusively, when the situation practically changed, when the Germans had already sent shock groups to the flanks to solve tactical problems, the troops of the Voronezh Front fought excellently, and, of course, control went very well. As for the next steps, the decisions of the front commander Vatutin were influenced by a number of subjective factors, including the role of the supreme commander in chief.

Everyone remembers that Rotmistrov's tankers won a great victory on the tank field. However, before that, at the turn of the German attack, at the forefront, there was the notorious Katukov, who, in general, took all the bitterness of the first blows upon himself. How did this happen? The fact is that the defense was structured as follows: in front, at the main line, were the troops of the 6th Guards Army, and it was assumed that the Germans would most likely strike along the Oboyanskoye highway. And then they had to be stopped by the tankers of the 1st Tank Army of Lieutenant General Mikhail Efimovich Katukov.

On the night of the 6th, they advanced to the second army line and almost in the morning took the brunt of the attack. By the middle of the day, Chistyakov's 6th Guards Army was split into several parts, three divisions were scattered, and we suffered significant losses. And only thanks to the skill, skill and resilience of Mikhail Efimovich Katukov, the defense was held until the 9th inclusive.

The commander of the Voronezh Front, General of the Army N.F. Vatutin, accepts the report of one of the commanders of the formations, 1943

It is known that after Stalingrad our army suffered huge losses, including among the officers. I wonder how these losses were replenished in a fairly short period by the summer of 1943? Vatutin received the Voronezh front in a very deplorable state. A number of divisions numbered two, three, four thousand. The replenishment came at the expense of the call of the local population, which left the occupied territory, marching companies, as well as at the expense of the replenishment arrived from the Central Asian republics.

As for the command staff, its shortage in 1942 in the spring was made up for by officers from academies, from rear units, and so on. And after the battles at Stalingrad, the situation with the command staff of the tactical echelon, especially the commanders of battalions and regiments, was disastrous. As a result, on October 9, the well-known order to abolish the commissars, and a significant part of the political staff was sent to the troops. That is, everything that was possible was done.

The Battle of Kursk is regarded by many as the largest defensive operation of the Great Patriotic War. Is it so? At the first stage - undoubtedly. No matter how we now assess the battle on the Black Earth Region, it was precisely after August 23, 1943, when it ended, that our enemy, the German army, was no longer able to conduct any major strategic offensive operation within the army group. He just had nothing to do it with. In the south, the situation was as follows: the Voronezh Front was tasked with exhausting the enemy's forces and knocking out his tanks. During the defensive period, until July 23, they could not completely do this. The Germans sent a significant part of the repair fund to the repair bases, which were located not far from the front line. And after the troops of the Voronezh Front went on the offensive on August 3, all these bases were captured. In particular, in Borisovka there was a re-base of the 10th tank brigade. There the Germans blew up a part of the "Panthers", up to forty units, we captured a part. And at the end of August Germany was no longer able to replenish all the panzer divisions on the Eastern Front. And this task of the second stage of the Battle of Kursk during the counteroffensive - to knock out the tanks - was solved.

The Great Battle of Kursk is one of the largest battles of the Second World War in terms of its scale, forces and means involved, tension, results and military-political consequences. It lasted 50 incredibly difficult days and nights and was a combination of strategic defensive (July 5-23) and offensive (July 12 - August 23) operations in the Great Patriotic War, conducted by the Red Army in the Kursk salient in order to disrupt a major German offensive and defeat the enemy's strategic grouping.

As a result of the winter 1942-1943. the offensive of Soviet troops and the forced withdrawal during the Kharkov defensive operation in 1943, the so-called Kursk ledge was formed. The troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts located on it threatened the flanks and rear of the German army groups "Center" and "South". In turn, these enemy groups, occupying the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov bridgeheads, had favorable conditions to deliver powerful flank attacks against Soviet troops defending in the Kursk region. At any moment, the enemy could surround and defeat the forces of the Red Army stationed there with powerful counter blows. This fear was confirmed by intelligence information about the intentions of the German command to undertake a decisive offensive near Kursk.

In order to realize this opportunity, the German military leadership launched preparations for a major summer offensive in this direction. It counted on delivering a series of powerful counter-strikes to crush the main forces of the Red Army in the central sector of the Soviet-German front, regain the strategic initiative and change the course of the war in its favor. The concept of the operation (code name "Citadel") provided for strikes in converging directions from the north and south at the base of the Kursk salient on the 4th day of the operation to encircle and then destroy the Soviet troops. Subsequently, it was planned to strike at the rear of the Southwestern Front (Operation Panther) and launch an offensive in the northeastern direction in order to reach the deep rear of the central group of Soviet troops and create a threat to Moscow. To carry out Operation Citadel, the best generals of the Wehrmacht and the most combat-ready troops were involved, a total of 50 divisions (including 16 tank and motorized) and a large number of separate units that were part of the 9th and 2nd armies of the army group " Center "(Field Marshal G. Kluge), in the 4th Tank Army and Operational Group" Kempf "of Army Group" South "(Field Marshal E. Manstein). They were supported by the aviation of the 4th and 6th air fleets. In total, this group consisted of over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, about 2,050 aircraft. This amounted to about 70% of tank, up to 30% of motorized and more than 20% of infantry divisions, as well as over 65% of all combat aircraft operating on the Soviet-German front, which were concentrated in a sector that was only about 14% of its length.

In order to achieve a quick success in its offensive, the German command relied on the massive use of armored vehicles (tanks, assault guns, armored personnel carriers) in the first operational echelon. The medium and heavy tanks T-IV, T-V ("panther"), T-VI ("tiger"), which entered service with the German army, and the assault guns "Ferdinand" had good armor protection and strong artillery weapons. Their 75-mm and 88-mm cannons with a direct firing range of 1.5-2.5 km were 2.5 times higher than the 76.2-mm cannon of the main Soviet T-34 tank. Due to the high initial velocity of the shells, increased armor penetration was achieved. The armored self-propelled howitzers Hummel and Vespe, which were part of the artillery regiments of tank divisions, could also be successfully used for direct fire at tanks. In addition, excellent Zeiss optics were installed on them. This allowed the enemy to achieve a certain superiority in tank equipment. In addition, new aircraft entered service with the German aviation: the Focke-Wulf-190A fighter, the Henkel-190A and Henkel-129 attack aircraft, which were supposed to ensure the retention of air supremacy and reliable support of tank divisions.

The German command attached particular importance to the surprise of Operation Citadel. To this end, it was envisaged to carry out disinformation of the Soviet troops on a large scale. For this, intensive preparations for Operation Panther continued in the South Army zone. Demonstrative reconnaissance was carried out, tanks were advanced, ferry means were concentrated, radio communications were carried out, agent actions were activated, rumors spread, etc. On the contrary, in the zone of Army Group Center, everything was carefully camouflaged. But although all the activities were carried out with great care and methodicality, they did not give effective results.

To secure the rear areas of their strike groups, the German command in May-June 1943 undertook large punitive expeditions against the Bryansk and Ukrainian partisans. So, more than 10 divisions operated against 20 thousand Bryansk partisans, and in the Zhytomyr region the Germans attracted 40 thousand soldiers and officers. But the enemy failed to defeat the partisans.

When planning the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command (VGK) intended to conduct a broad offensive, striking the main blow in the southwestern direction in order to defeat Army Group South, liberate the Left-Bank Ukraine, Donbass and overcome the river. Dnieper.

The Soviet command began to develop a plan for the upcoming actions for the summer of 1943 immediately after the end of the winter campaign at the end of March 1943. The Supreme Command Headquarters, the General Staff, all front commanders defending the Kursk ledge took part in the development of the operation. The plan provided for the main attack in the southwest direction. Soviet military intelligence was able to timely reveal the preparation of the German army for a major offensive on the Kursk Bulge and even set the date for the start of the operation.

The Soviet command was faced with a difficult task - to choose a method of action: to attack or defend. In his report on April 8, 1943 to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with an assessment of the general situation and on his views on the actions of the Red Army for the summer of 1943 in the Kursk Bulge area, Marshal G.K. Zhukov reported: “I consider it inexpedient for our troops to go on the offensive in the coming days with the aim of preempting the enemy. It will be better if we exhaust the enemy on our defenses, knock out his tanks, and then, by introducing fresh reserves, by going over to the general offensive, we will finally finish off the main grouping of the enemy. " The chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky: "A thorough analysis of the situation and foreseeing the development of events allowed us to draw the correct conclusion: the main efforts should be concentrated to the north and south of Kursk, to bleed the enemy here in a defensive battle, and then go over to the counteroffensive and carry out his defeat."

As a result, an unprecedented decision was made to go over to the defensive in the region of the Kursk salient. The main efforts were concentrated in the regions north and south of Kursk. There was a case in the history of the war when the strongest side, which had everything necessary for an offensive, chose from several possible the most optimal course of action - defense. Not everyone agreed with this decision. The commanders of the Voronezh and Southern fronts, Generals N.F. Vatutin and R. Ya. Malinovsky continued to insist on a preemptive strike in the Donbass. They were supported by S.K. Timoshenko, K.E. Voroshilov and some others. The final decision was made in late May - early June, when it became known for sure about the Citadel plan. Subsequent analysis and the actual course of events showed that the decision on deliberate defense in conditions of significant superiority in forces in this case was the most rational type of strategic action.

The final decision for the summer and autumn of 1943 was drawn up by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in mid-April: it was necessary to expel the German invaders behind the Smolensk - r. Sozh - the middle and lower reaches of the Dnieper, crush the so-called defensive "eastern rampart" of the enemy, as well as eliminate the enemy bridgehead in the Kuban. The main blow in the summer of 1943 was supposed to be delivered in the south-west, and the second in the west. On the Kursk salient, it was decided to deplete and bleed the shock groupings of German troops by deliberate defense, and then complete their defeat by going over to the counteroffensive. The main efforts were concentrated in the regions north and south of Kursk. The events of the first two years of the war showed that the defense of Soviet troops did not always withstand massive enemy attacks, which led to tragic consequences.

To this end, it was supposed to make the most of the advantages of the previously created multi-lane defense, to bleed the main tank groupings of the enemy, wear out his most combat-ready troops, and gain strategic air supremacy. Then, going over to a decisive counteroffensive, complete the rout of the enemy groupings in the region of the Kursk salient.

The troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts were mainly involved in the defensive operation near Kursk. The headquarters of the Supreme Command understood that the transition to deliberate defense is associated with a certain risk. Therefore, by April 30, the Reserve Front was formed (later renamed the Steppe Military District, and from July 9 - the Steppe Front). It included the 2nd reserve, 24, 53, 66, 47, 46, 5th Guards Tank Army, 1st, 3rd and 4th Guards, 3rd, 10th and 18th Tank, 1st and 5th th mechanized corps. All of them were stationed in the districts of Kastorny, Voronezh, Bobrovo, Millerovo, Rossosh and Ostrogozhsk. The front's field control was located not far from Voronezh. In the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters (RVGK), as well as in the second echelons of the fronts, at the direction of the Supreme High Command, five tank armies, a number of separate tank and mechanized corps, and a large number of rifle corps and divisions were concentrated. From April 10 to July, 10 rifle divisions, 10 anti-tank artillery brigades, 13 separate anti-tank artillery regiments, 14 artillery regiments, eight guards mortar regiments, seven separate tank and self-propelled artillery regiments entered the Central and Voronezh fronts. A total of 5635 guns, 3522 mortars, and 1284 aircraft were transferred to two fronts.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Central and Voronezh fronts and the Steppe Military District numbered 1,909 thousand people, more than 26.5 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units (ACS), about 2.9 thousand . aircraft.

After achieving the goals of the strategic defensive operation, it was planned to transfer the Soviet troops to a counteroffensive. At the same time, the defeat of the Oryol grouping of the enemy (plan "Kutuzov") was assigned to the troops of the left wing of the Western (Colonel General VD Sokolovsky), Bryansk (Colonel General MM Popov) and the right wing of the Central Fronts. The offensive operation in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction (plan "Commander Rumyantsev") was planned to be carried out by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts in cooperation with the troops of the Southwestern Front (General of the Army R. Ya. Malinovsky). The coordination of the actions of the troops of the fronts was entrusted to the representatives of the Supreme Command Headquarters of the Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukova and A.M. Vasilevsky, Colonel-General of Artillery N.N. Voronov, and aviation - to Air Marshal A.A. Novikov.

The troops of the Central, Voronezh fronts and the Steppe Military District created a powerful defense, including 8 defensive zones and lines with a total depth of 250-300 km. The defense was built as anti-tank, anti-artillery and anti-aircraft defense with deep echeloning of battle formations and fortifications, with a well-developed system of strong points, trenches, communication routes and obstacles.

A state defense line was set up on the left bank of the Don. The depth of the defense lines was 190 km on the Central Front, and 130 km on the Voronezh Front. Each front had three army and three front-line defensive lines, equipped in engineering terms.

Both fronts had six armies each: the Central Front - 48th, 13th, 70th, 65th, 60th combined arms and 2nd tank; Voronezh - 6, 7th guards, 38, 40, 69th combined arms and 1st tank. The width of the defense lines of the Central Front was 306 km, and of the Voronezh Front - 244 km. All combined-arms armies were located in the first echelon on the Central Front, and four combined-arms armies on the Voronezh front.

The commander of the Central Front, General of the Army K.K. Rokossovsky, assessing the situation, came to the conclusion that the enemy would deliver the main blow in the direction of Olkhovatka in the defense zone of the 13th combined arms army. Therefore, it was decided to reduce the width of the 13th Army's defensive zone from 56 to 32 km and bring its composition to four rifle corps. Thus, the composition of the armies increased to 12 rifle divisions, and its operational formation became two-echelon.

The commander of the Voronezh Front, General N.F. It was more difficult for Vatutin to determine the direction of the enemy's main attack. Therefore, the defense zone of the 6th Guards Combined Arms Army (it was she who defended in the direction of the main attack of the enemy's 4th Panzer Army) was 64 km. In the presence of two rifle corps and one rifle division in its composition, the army commander was forced to form the army's troops in one echelon, allocating only one rifle division to the reserve.

Thus, the depth of defense of the 6th Guards Army was initially less than the depth of the 13th Army's zone. Such an operational formation led to the fact that the commanders of the rifle corps, in an effort to create a defense as deep as possible, built a battle formation in two echelons.

Great importance was attached to the creation of artillery groups. Particular attention was paid to the massing of artillery in the likely directions of enemy strikes. On April 10, 1943, the People's Commissar of Defense issued a special order on the use of artillery of the High Command's reserve in battle, the assignment of artillery reinforcement regiments to the armies and the formation of anti-tank and mortar brigades for the fronts.

In the defense zones of the 48th, 13th and 70th armies of the Central Front, on the intended direction of the main attack of Army Group Center, 70% of all guns and mortars of the front and 85% of all artillery of the RVGK were concentrated (taking into account the second echelon and front reserves). Moreover, in the zone of the 13th Army, where the tip of the attack of the main enemy forces was aimed, 44% of the artillery regiments of the RVGK were concentrated. This army, which had 752 guns and mortars with a caliber of 76 mm and above, was reinforced with the 4th breakthrough artillery corps, which had 700 guns and mortars and 432 rocket artillery mounts. This saturation of the army with artillery made it possible to create a density of up to 91.6 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front (including 23.7 anti-tank guns). Such a density of artillery was not found in any of the previous defensive operations.

Thus, the desire of the command of the Central Front to solve the problems of the insurmountability of the defense being created already in the tactical zone, did not give the enemy the opportunity to break out of it, was clearly outlined, which significantly complicated the further struggle.

The problem of using artillery in the defense zone of the Voronezh Front was solved in a slightly different way. Since the troops of the front were built in two echelons, the artillery was also distributed between the echelons. But even on this front, on the main axis, which constituted 47% of the entire front line of defense, where the 6th and 7th Guards armies were stationed, it was possible to create a sufficiently high density - 50.7 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front. 67% of the front's guns and mortars and up to 66% of the RVGK artillery (87 out of 130 artillery regiments) were concentrated in this direction.

The command of the Central and Voronezh fronts paid great attention to the use of anti-tank artillery. They included 10 anti-tank brigades and 40 separate regiments, of which seven brigades and 30 regiments, that is, the overwhelming majority of anti-tank weapons, were on the Voronezh front. On the Central Front, more than one third of all artillery anti-tank weapons became part of the front's artillery anti-tank reserve, as a result, the commander of the Central Front K.K. Rokossovsky was able to quickly use his reserves to combat enemy tank groupings in the most threatened areas. On the Voronezh Front, the bulk of the anti-tank artillery was transferred to the armies of the first echelon.

Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy grouping at Kursk in personnel by 2.1, artillery by 2.5, tanks and self-propelled guns - by 1.8, aircraft - by 1.4 times.

On the morning of July 5, the main forces of the enemy strike groupings, weakened by the preemptive artillery counter-training of the Soviet troops, went on the offensive, throwing up to 500 against the defenders in the Oryol-Kursk direction, and about 700 tanks and assault guns in the Belgorod-Kursk direction. German troops attacked the entire defensive zone of the 13th Army and the flanks of the 48th and 70th armies adjacent to it in a 45 km wide strip. The main blow was delivered by the enemy's northern grouping with the forces of three infantry and four tank divisions on Olkhovatka against the troops of the left flank of the 13th army of General N.P. Pukhova. Four infantry divisions advanced against the right flank of the 13th and left flanks of the 48th Army (commanded by General P.L. Romanenko) at Maloarkhangelsk. Three infantry divisions struck on the right flank of the 70th army of General I.V. Galanin in the direction of Gnilets. The offensive of the ground forces was supported by air strikes. Heavy and stubborn battles ensued. The command of the 9th German Army, which did not expect to meet such a powerful rebuff, was forced to re-conduct an hour-long artillery training. In increasingly fierce battles, soldiers of all types of troops fought heroically.

But the enemy tanks, despite the losses, continued to stubbornly push forward. The front command promptly reinforced the troops defending in the Olkhovat direction with tanks, self-propelled artillery mounts, rifle formations, and field and anti-tank artillery. The enemy, stepping up the actions of his aviation, also brought heavy tanks into battle. On the first day of the offensive, he managed to break through the first line of defense of the Soviet troops, advance 6-8 km and reach the second line of defense in the area north of Olkhovatka. In the direction of Gnilets and Maloarkhangelsk, the enemy was able to advance only 5 km.

Having met the stubborn resistance of the defending Soviet troops, the German command brought into battle almost all the formations of the shock group of Army Group Center, but they could not break through the defenses. In seven days, they managed to advance only 10-12 km without breaking through the tactical defense zone. By July 12, the enemy's offensive capabilities on the northern face of the Kursk Bulge had dried up, he stopped attacks and went on the defensive. It should be noted that the enemy did not conduct active offensive operations in other sectors of the defense zone of the Central Front troops.

After repelling enemy attacks, the troops of the Central Front began to prepare for offensive operations.

On the southern face of the Kursk salient, in the zone of the Voronezh front, the struggle was also extremely intense. As early as July 4, the forward detachments of the 4th German Tank Army tried to shoot down the outposts of the 6th Guards Army of General I.M. Chistyakov. By the end of the day, they managed to reach the front line of the army's defense at several points. On July 5, the main forces began to operate in two directions - on Oboyan and Korocha. The main blow fell on the 6th Guards Army, and the auxiliary - on the 7th Guards Army from the Belgorod region to Korocha.

The German command sought to build on the success achieved by continuing to build up its efforts along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. By the end of July 9, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps not only broke through to the army (third) defense zone of the 6th Guards Army, but also managed to drive a wedge into it about 9 km south-west of Prokhorovka. However, he failed to break out into the operational space.

On July 10, Hitler ordered the commander of Army Group South to bring about a decisive turning point in the battle. Convinced of the complete impossibility of breaking the resistance of the troops of the Voronezh Front in the Oboyan direction, Field Marshal E. Manstein decided to change the direction of the main attack and now attack Kursk in a roundabout way - through Prokhorovka. At the same time, the auxiliary strike group struck at Prokhorovka from the south. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was brought up to the Prokhorovka direction, which included the elite divisions "Reich", "Dead Head", "Adolf Hitler", as well as parts of the 3rd Panzer Corps.

Having discovered the enemy's maneuver, the front commander, General N.F. Vatutin moved the 69th Army to this direction, and then the 35th Guards Rifle Corps. In addition, the Supreme Command Headquarters decided to strengthen the Voronezh Front at the expense of strategic reserves. Back on July 9, she ordered the commander of the Steppe Front, General I.S. Konev to move the 4th Guards, 27th and 53rd armies to the Kursk-Belgorod direction and transfer to the subordination of General N.F. Vatutin 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Army. The troops of the Voronezh Front were to disrupt the enemy's offensive, inflicting a powerful counterattack (five armies) on his grouping, which had wedged in on the Oboyan direction. However, on July 11, they failed to deliver a counterstrike. On this day, the enemy captured the line designated for the deployment of tank formations. Only by the introduction into battle of four rifle divisions and two tank brigades of the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P.A. Rotmistrov managed to stop the enemy two kilometers from Prokhorovka. Thus, the oncoming battles of the vanguard detachments and units in the Prokhorovka area began already on July 11.

On July 12, both opposing groupings went on the offensive, striking in the Prokhorovka direction on both sides of the Belgorod-Kursk railway. A fierce battle unfolded. The main events took place southwest of Prokhorovka. From the north-west, formations of the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies were attacking Yakovlevo. And from the northeast, from the Prokhorovka area, the 5th Guards Tank Army with attached two tank corps and the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Combined Arms Army attacked in the same direction. East of Belgorod, the attack was undertaken by rifle formations of the 7th Guards Army. After a 15-minute artillery raid, the 18th and 29th tank corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 2nd and 2nd Guards Tank Corps attached to it on the morning of July 12 launched an offensive in the general direction of Yakovlevo.

Even earlier, at dawn, on the river. Psel in the zone of defense of the 5th Guards Army launched an offensive tank division "Death's Head". However, the divisions of the SS Panzer Corps "Adolf Hitler" and "Reich", which directly opposed the 5th Guards Tank Army, remained on the occupied lines, preparing them overnight for defense. In a rather narrow section from Berezovka (30 km north-west of Belgorod) to Olkhovatka, a battle between two tank strike groups took place. The battle lasted all day. Both sides suffered heavy losses. The struggle was extremely fierce. The losses of the Soviet tank corps were 73% and 46%, respectively.

As a result of a fierce battle in the Prokhorovka area, neither side was able to solve the tasks assigned to it: the Germans - to break through to the Kursk area, and the 5th Guards Tank Army - to enter the Yakovlevo area, defeating the opposing enemy. But the enemy's path to Kursk was closed. The motorized SS divisions "Adolf Hitler", "Reich" and "Death's Head" stopped their attacks and consolidated their positions. The 3rd German Panzer Corps, advancing on Prokhorovka from the south, was able to press the 69th Army's formations by 10-15 km that day. Both sides suffered heavy losses.

Despite the fact that the counterstrike of the Voronezh Front slowed down the enemy's advance, it did not achieve the goals set by the Supreme Command Headquarters.

In fierce battles on July 12 and 13, the enemy's strike group was stopped. However, the German command did not abandon its intention to break through to Kursk, bypassing Oboyan from the east. In turn, the troops participating in the counterstrike of the Voronezh Front did everything to fulfill the tasks assigned to them. The confrontation between the two groups - the advancing German and the Soviet counterstrike - continued until July 16, mainly on the lines that they occupied. During these 5-6 days (after July 12) there were continuous battles with enemy tanks and infantry. Attacks and counterattacks followed each other day and night.

On July 16, the 5th Guards Army and its neighbors received an order from the commander of the Voronezh Front to go over to a tough defense. The next day, the German command began to withdraw its troops to their original positions.

One of the reasons for the failure was that the most powerful grouping of Soviet troops struck at the most powerful grouping of the enemy, but not on the flank, but on the forehead. The Soviet command did not use the advantageous configuration of the front, which made it possible to strike under the base of the enemy penetration in order to encircle and subsequently destroy the entire group of German forces operating north of Yakovlevo. In addition, the Soviet commanders and staffs, the troops as a whole did not yet have proper combat skills, and the military leaders did not yet possess the art of the offensive. The omissions in the interaction of infantry with tanks, ground troops with aviation, between formations and units also had an effect.

On the Prokhorovka field, the number of tanks fought against their quality. The 5th Guards Tank Army included 501 T-34 tanks with a 76-mm cannon, 264 T-70 light tanks with a 45-mm cannon, and 35 Churchill III heavy tanks with a 57-mm cannon, received by the USSR from England. This tank had very low speed and poor maneuverability. Each corps had a regiment of SU-76 self-propelled artillery mounts, but not a single SU-152. The Soviet medium tank had the ability with an armor-piercing projectile to penetrate 61 mm armor at a distance of 1000 m and 69 mm - at 500 m. Tank armor: frontal - 45 mm, side - 45 mm, tower - 52 mm. The German medium tank T-IVH had armor thickness: frontal - 80 mm, side - 30 mm, turret - 50 mm. An armor-piercing projectile of his 75-mm cannon at a distance of up to 1500 m pierced armor of more than 63 mm. German heavy tank The T-VIH "tiger" with an 88 mm cannon had armor: frontal - 100 mm, side - 80 mm, turrets - 100 mm. Its armor-piercing round penetrated 115 mm of armor. He pierced the armor of the thirty-four at a distance of up to 2000 m.

Opposing the army, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps had 400 modern tanks: about 50 heavy tanks "tiger" (88-mm cannon), dozens of high-speed (34 km / h) medium tanks "panther", modernized T-III and T-IV ( 75-mm cannon) and heavy assault guns "Ferdinand" (88-mm cannon). To hit a heavy tank, the T-34 had to approach it by 500 m, which was not always possible; the rest of the Soviet tanks had to get even closer. In addition, the Germans placed some of their tanks in caponiers, which ensured their invulnerability from the side. Fighting with the hope of success in such conditions could only be done in close combat. As a result, losses grew. At Prokhorovka, Soviet troops lost 60% of the tanks (500 out of 800), and the German troops lost 75% (300 out of 400; according to German data, 80-100). It was a disaster for them. For the Wehrmacht, such losses were difficult to replace.

The repulse of the most powerful strike by the troops of Army Group South was achieved as a result of the joint efforts of the formations and troops of the Voronezh Front with the participation of strategic reserves. Thanks to the courage, perseverance and heroism of soldiers and officers of all branches of the military.

The Soviet counteroffensive began on July 12 with strikes from the northeast and east of the left wing of the Western and Bryansk fronts against the German 2nd Tank Army and the 9th Army of Army Group Center, which were defending in the Oryol sector. On July 15, the troops of the Central Front attacked Kromy from the south and southeast.

Concentric strikes by the front forces broke through the enemy's deeply echeloned defense. Coming in converging directions to Oryol, Soviet troops liberated the city on August 5. Pursuing the retreating enemy, by August 17-18 they reached the Hagen defensive line, prepared in advance by the enemy on the approaches to Bryansk.

As a result of the Oryol operation, Soviet troops defeated the enemy's Oryol grouping (defeated 15 divisions) and advanced to the west up to 150 km.

The troops of the Voronezh (from July 16) and Steppe (from July 19) fronts, pursuing retreating enemy troops, reached the lines occupied before the start of the defensive operation by July 23, and on August 3 launched a counteroffensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction.

With a swift blow, their armies defeated the troops of the German 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf operational group, and on August 5 they liberated Belgorod.

On the evening of August 5, an artillery salute was fired for the first time in Moscow in honor of the troops that liberated Oryol and Belgorod. Developing the offensive and repelling strong enemy counterattacks in the areas of Bogodukhov and Akhtyrka, the troops of the Steppe Front, with the assistance of the Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts, liberated Kharkov on August 23. In three weeks, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts defeated 15 enemy divisions, advanced 140 km in the southern and southwestern directions and expanded the offensive front, which amounted to 300-400 km.

The Battle of Kursk was one of the largest battles of the Second World War. On both sides, more than 4 million people were involved in it, over 69 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, up to 12 thousand aircraft. Soviet troops defeated 30 divisions (including 7 tank) of the enemy, whose losses amounted to over 500 thousand people, 3 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, over 3.7 thousand aircraft ... The failure of Operation Citadel forever buried the myth created by Nazi propaganda about the “seasonality” of the Soviet strategy, that the Red Army could only attack in winter. The collapse of the offensive strategy of the Wehrmacht once again showed the adventurism of the German leadership, which overestimated the capabilities of its troops and underestimated the strength of the Red Army. The Battle of Kursk led to a further change in the balance of forces at the front in favor of the Soviet Armed Forces, finally consolidated their strategic initiative and created favorable conditions for the deployment of a general offensive on a broad front. The defeat of the enemy on the "Arc of Fire" became an important milestone in achieving a radical turning point in the course of the war, the overall victory of the Soviet Union. Germany and its allies were forced to go on the defensive in all theaters of World War II.

As a result of the defeat of significant Wehrmacht forces on the Soviet-German front, more profitable terms For the deployment of the actions of the American-British troops in Italy, the beginning of the collapse of the fascist bloc was laid - the Mussolini regime collapsed, and Italy withdrew from the war on the side of Germany. Influenced by the victories of the Red Army, the scale of the resistance movement in the countries occupied by German troops increased, the authority of the USSR as the leading force of the anti-Hitler coalition strengthened.

In the Battle of Kursk, the level of military art of the Soviet troops increased. In the field of strategy, the Soviet Supreme High Command creatively approached the planning of the summer-autumn campaign of 1943. The peculiarity of the decision was that the side with strategic initiative and general superiority in forces went on the defensive, deliberately giving an active role to the enemy in the initial phase of the campaign. Subsequently, within the framework of a single campaign process, following the defense, it was planned to launch a decisive counteroffensive and launch a general offensive in order to liberate the Left-Bank Ukraine, Donbass and overcome the Dnieper. The problem of creating an insurmountable defense on an operational-strategic scale was successfully resolved. Its activity was ensured by the saturation of the fronts with a large number of mobile troops (3 tank armies, 7 separate tank and 3 separate mechanized corps), artillery corps and artillery divisions of the RVGK, formations and units of anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery. It was achieved by conducting artillery counterpreparations on the scale of two fronts, by extensive maneuvering of strategic reserves to reinforce them, and by delivering massive air strikes against enemy groupings and reserves. The headquarters of the Supreme Command skillfully determined the concept of conducting a counteroffensive in each direction, creatively approaching the choice of directions for the main attacks and methods of defeating the enemy. So, in the Oryol operation, Soviet troops used concentric strikes in converging directions, followed by crushing and destruction of the enemy grouping in parts. In the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, the main blow was delivered by the adjacent flanks of the fronts, which ensured a quick break in of the strong and deep defense of the enemy, the dissection of his group into two parts and the exit of Soviet troops to the rear of the Kharkov defensive area of ​​the enemy.

In the Battle of Kursk, the problem of creating large strategic reserves and their effective use was successfully solved, and strategic air supremacy was finally won, which was held by Soviet aviation until the end of the Great Patriotic War. The headquarters of the Supreme Command skillfully carried out strategic interaction not only between the fronts that participated in the battle, but also with those operating in other directions (the troops of the South-Western and Southern fronts on the Seversky Donets and Mius rivers constrained the actions of German troops on a wide front, which made it difficult for the Wehrmacht command to transfer from here their troops near Kursk).

The operational art of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk for the first time solved the problem of creating a deliberate positional, insuperable and active operational defense up to 70 km deep. The deep operational formation of the front forces made it possible during a defensive battle to firmly hold the second and army lines of defense and front lines, preventing the enemy from breaking through to the operational depth. The broad maneuver of the second echelons and reserves, the conduct of artillery counterpreparations and the delivery of counterattacks gave high activity and great stability to the defense. During the counteroffensive, the problem of breaking through the enemy's deeply echeloned defense was successfully resolved by decisively massing forces and assets in the areas of the breakthrough (from 50 to 90% of their total number), skilful use of tank armies and corps as mobile groups of fronts and armies, and close cooperation with aviation. , which carried out an air offensive in full on the scale of the fronts, which to a large extent ensured the high rates of offensive of the ground forces. Valuable experience was gained in waging tank battles both in a defensive operation (near Prokhorovka) and during an offensive when repelling counterattacks by large enemy armored groups (in the areas of Bogodukhov and Akhtyrka). The problem of ensuring stable command and control of troops in operations was solved by bringing command posts closer to the combat formations of troops and by widely introducing radio equipment into all bodies and command posts.

At the same time, during the Battle of Kursk, there were significant shortcomings that adversely affected the course of hostilities and increased the losses of Soviet troops, which amounted to: irrecoverable - 254 470 people, ambulances - 608 833 people. They were due in part to the fact that by the beginning of the enemy offensive, the development of the plan for artillery counterpreparations in the fronts had not been completed, tk. reconnaissance was unable to accurately identify the places of concentration of troops and the placement of targets on the night of 5 July. Counterpreparations began prematurely, when the enemy forces had not yet fully occupied the starting position for the offensive. In a number of cases, the fire was carried out across areas, which allowed the enemy to avoid large losses, to bring the troops in order in 2.5-3 hours, go on the offensive and on the first day to wedge into the defenses of the Soviet troops by 3-6 km. Counterstrikes of the fronts were hastily prepared and were often launched against the enemy who had not exhausted their offensive potential, so they did not reach the final goal and ended with the transition of the counterattacking troops to the defensive. During the Oryol operation, excessive haste was allowed in the transition to the offensive, not due to the situation.

In the Battle of Kursk, Soviet soldiers showed courage, resilience and mass heroism. Over 100 thousand people were awarded orders and medals, 231 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 132 formations and units received the rank of guards, 26 were awarded the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov and Karachevsky.

Material prepared by the Research Institute (Military History) of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

Losses Defensive phase:

Participants: Central Front, Voronezh Front, Steppe Front (not all)
Irrevocable - 70 330
Sanitary - 107 517
Operation Kutuzov: Participants: Western Front (left wing), Bryansk Front, Central Front
Irrevocable - 112 529
Sanitary - 317 361
Operation Rumyantsev: Participants: Voronezh Front, Steppe Front
Irrevocable - 71 611
Sanitary - 183 955
Common in the Battle of the Kursk Bulge:
Irrevocable - 189 652
Sanitary - 406 743
In the Battle of Kursk in general
~ 254 470 killed, captured, missing
608 833 wounded, sick
153 thous. small arms
6064 tanks and self-propelled guns
5245 guns and mortars
1626 combat aircraft

According to German sources 103 600 killed and missing on the entire Eastern Front. 433 933 wounded. According to Soviet sources 500 thousand total losses on the Kursk ledge.

1000 tanks according to German data, 1500 - according to Soviet
less 1696 aircraft

The Great Patriotic War

Invasion of the USSR Karelia Arctic Leningrad Rostov Moscow Sevastopol Barvenkovo-Lozovaya Kharkov Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad Rzhev Stalingrad Caucasus Velikie Luki Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh Voronezh-Kastornoye Kursk Smolensk Donbass Dnieper Right-bank Ukraine Leningrad-Novgorod Crimea (1944) Belarus Lviv-Sandomierz Iasi-Chisinau Eastern Carpathians Baltics Courland Romania Bulgaria Debrecen Belgrade Budapest Poland (1944) Western Carpathians East Prussia Lower Silesia Eastern Pomerania Upper Silesia Vein Berlin Prague

The Soviet command decided to conduct a defensive battle, wear down the enemy troops and inflict defeat on them, inflicting counterattacks on the attackers at a critical moment. For this purpose, an in-depth defense was created on both faces of the Kursk salient. In total, 8 defensive lines were created. The average density of mining in the direction of expected enemy strikes was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines per kilometer of the front.

In the assessment of the forces of the parties in the sources, there are strong discrepancies associated with different definitions of the scale of the battle by different historians, as well as the difference in the methods of accounting and classification of military equipment. In assessing the forces of the Red Army, the main discrepancy is associated with the inclusion or exclusion from the calculations of the reserve - the Steppe Front (about 500 thousand personnel and 1,500 tanks). The following table contains some estimates:

Estimates of the forces of the parties before the Battle of Kursk according to various sources

A source	Personnel (thousand)		Tanks and (sometimes) self-propelled guns		Guns and (sometimes) mortars		Aircraft
	the USSR	Germany	the USSR	Germany	the USSR	Germany	the USSR	Germany
RF Ministry of Defense	1336	over 900	3444	2733	19100	about 10,000	2172 2900 (including By-2 and far)	2050
Krivosheev 2001	1272
Glanz, House	1910	780	5040	2696 or 2928
Mueller-Gill.				2540 or 2758
Zett., Frankson	1910	777	5128 +2688 "Rate reserve" more than 8000 in total	2451	31415	7417	3549	1830
KOSAVE	1337	900	3306	2700	20220	10000	2650	2500

The role of intelligence

However, it should be noted that as early as April 8, 1943, G.K. Zhukov, relying on data from the intelligence agencies of the fronts of the Kursk direction, very accurately predicted the strength and direction of German strikes on the Kursk Bulge:

... I believe that the enemy will deploy the main offensive operations against these three fronts in order to defeat our troops in this direction and gain freedom of maneuver to bypass Moscow in the shortest direction.
2. Apparently, at the first stage, the enemy, having collected the maximum of his forces, including up to 13-15 tank divisions, with the support of a large number of aviation, will strike with his Oryol-Krom grouping bypassing Kursk from the northeast and the Belgorod-Kharkov grouping bypassing Kursk from the southeast.

Thus, although the exact text of the Citadel was put on Stalin's desk three days before Hitler signed it, four days before that, the German plan became obvious to the Soviet military command.

Kursk defensive operation

The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the time of the start of the operation, at 3 a.m. (the German army fought in Berlin time - translated into Moscow time as 5 a.m.), artillery and aviation counterpreparations were carried out 30-40 minutes before the start of the operation.

Before the start of the ground operation, at 6 a.m. our time, the Germans also launched a bomb and artillery strike against the Soviet defensive lines. The tanks that went over to the offensive immediately encountered serious resistance. The main blow on the northern face was delivered in the direction of Olkhovatka. Unable to achieve success, the Germans suffered a blow in the direction of Ponyri, but even here they could not break through the Soviet defenses. The Wehrmacht was able to advance only 10-12 km, after which, from July 10, having lost up to two-thirds of the tanks, the 9th German army went on the defensive. On the southern face, the main attacks of the Germans were directed to the areas of Korochi and Oboyan.

July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkassky.

To accomplish the assigned task, units of the 48th military corps on the first day of the offensive (day "X") needed to break into the defense of the 6th Guards. A (Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov) at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I.P. Sivakov) and 67th Guards Rifle Division (Colonel A.I. direction of the village Yakovlevo. The offensive plan of 48 mk determined that the village of Cherkasskoye was to be captured by 10:00 on July 5. And already on July 6, parts of the 48th shopping mall. had to reach the city of Oboyan.

However, as a result of the actions of the Soviet units and formations, their courage and resilience shown by them, as well as the preparation of defensive lines that they carried out in advance, the plans of the Wehrmacht in this direction were "significantly adjusted" - 48 mk did not reach Oboyan at all.

The factors that determined the unacceptably slow pace of advancement of 48 mk on the first day of the offensive were the good engineering preparation of the terrain by Soviet units (from anti-tank ditches along almost the entire length of the defense and ending with radio-controlled minefields), divisional artillery fire, guards mortars and the actions of assault aviation on the accumulated in front of engineering barriers to enemy tanks, a competent location of anti-tank strongholds (No. 6 south of Korovin in the zone of the 71st Guards Division, No. 7 south-west of Cherkassk and No. 8 southeast of Cherkassk in the zone of the 67th Guards Rifle Division), rapid rebuilding of the battle formations of battalions of 196 Guards .sp (Colonel V.I.Bazhanov) in the direction of the main attack of the enemy south of Cherkassk, a timely maneuver of divisional (245 ot, 1440 sap) and army (493 iptap, as well as 27 of colonel N.D. counterattacks into the flank of the wedged-in units of 3 TD and 11 TD with the involvement of forces 245 ot ( Lieutenant Colonel M.K. Akopov, 39 tanks) and 1440 glanders (Lieutenant Colonel Shapshinsky, 8 SU-76 and 12 SU-122), as well as the not completely suppressed resistance of the remnants of the outpost in the southern part of the village of Butovo (3 baht. 199 Guards rifle regiment, captain V.L. Vakhidov) and in the area of ​​workers' barracks south-west of the village. Korovino, which were the starting positions for the offensive of the 48th battalion (the capture of these initial positions was planned to be carried out by specially allocated forces of 11th TD and 332nd Infantry Divisions by the end of the day on July 4, that is, on the day of "X-1", but the resistance of the outpost was never completely suppressed by dawn on July 5). All of the above factors influenced both the speed of concentration of units in their initial positions before the main attack, and their advance during the offensive itself.

Machine gun crew firing at the advancing German units

Also, the speed of the corps offensive was affected by the shortcomings of the German command in planning the operation and the poorly worked out interaction of tank and infantry units. In particular, the division "Great Germany" (W. Heyerlein, 129 tanks (of which 15 Pz.VI tanks), 73 self-propelled guns) and attached to it 10 tbr (K. Decker, 192 combat and 8 command tanks Pz.V) in the prevailing conditions combat proved to be clumsy and unbalanced connections. As a result, for the entire first half of the day, the bulk of the tanks was crowded in narrow "corridors" in front of engineering barriers (especially great difficulties were caused by overcoming a swampy anti-tank ditch south of Cherkassky), came under a combined attack by Soviet aviation (2nd VA) and artillery - from PTOP No. 6 and No. 7, 138 Guards Aps (Lieutenant Colonel M.I.Kirdyanov) and two regiments of the 33rd brigade (Colonel Stein), suffered losses (especially in the officer corps), and could not turn around in accordance with the offensive schedule on tank-accessible terrain at the turn Korovino - Cherkasskoye for a further strike in the direction of the northern outskirts of Cherkasskoye. At the same time, the infantry units that had overcome the anti-tank obstacles in the first half of the day had to rely mainly on their own firepower. So, for example, the combat group of the 3rd battalion of the Fusilier regiment, which was at the forefront of the attack of the "VG" division, at the time of the first attack found itself without tank support at all and suffered significant losses. Possessing huge armored forces, the "VG" division for a long time actually could not bring them into battle.

The result of the resulting congestion on the advance routes was also the untimely concentration of artillery units of the 48th Panzer Corps in firing positions, which affected the results of artillery preparation before the start of the attack.

It should be noted that the commander of the 48th military commander became hostage to a number of erroneous decisions of the higher authorities. The absence of an operational reserve at Knobelsdorf had a particularly negative effect - all divisions of the corps were brought into battle almost simultaneously on the morning of July 5, after which they were drawn into active hostilities for a long time.

The development of the 48th mk offensive in the afternoon of July 5 was most facilitated by: active operations of engineer-assault units, aviation support (more than 830 aircraft sorties) and an overwhelming quantitative superiority in armored vehicles. It is also necessary to note the proactive actions of parts of the 11th TD (I. Mikl) and 911 dep. a division of assault guns (overcoming the strip of engineering obstacles and reaching the eastern outskirts of Cherkassy by a mechanized group of infantry and sappers with the support of assault guns).

An important factor in the success of German tank units was the qualitative leap in the combat characteristics of German armored vehicles that had taken place by the summer of the year. Already during the first day of the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, the insufficient power of the anti-tank weapons in service with the Soviet units manifested itself in the fight against both the new German Pz.V and Pz.VI tanks, and with modernized tanks of older brands (about half of the Soviet Iptap were armed with 45-mm guns, the power of 76-mm Soviet field and American tank guns made it possible to effectively destroy modern or modernized enemy tanks at distances half to three times less than the effective range of fire of the latter, heavy tank and self-propelled units at that time were practically absent, not only in the combined arms 6 Guards A, but also in the second line of defense of the 1st tank army of M.E. Katukov, which occupied the second line of defense behind it).

Only after the bulk of the tanks overcame the anti-tank obstacles south of Cherkassy in the afternoon, repelling a number of counterattacks by Soviet units, divisions of the VG and 11th division were able to catch on to the southeastern and southwestern outskirts of the village, after which the fighting turned into a street phase. At about 21:00, Divisional Commander A.I. Baksov ordered the withdrawal of units of the 196th Guards Rifle Regiment to new positions to the north and northeast of Cherkassk, as well as to the center of the village. When units of the 196th Guards rifle regiment departed, minefields were installed. At about 21:20 a combat group of grenadiers of the "VG" division, with the support of "Panthers" 10th brigade, broke into the Yarki farm (north of Cherkassy). A little later, 3 TD of the Wehrmacht managed to capture the Krasny Pochinok farm (north of Korovino). Thus, the result of the day for the 48th Army Corps of the Wehrmacht was the penetration of the 6th Guards into the first line of defense. And at 6 km, which in fact can be considered a failure, especially against the background of the results achieved by the evening of July 5 by the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (operating eastward in parallel with 48 mk), less saturated with armored vehicles, which managed to break through the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. A.

Organized resistance in the village of Cherkasskoye was suppressed around midnight on 5 July. However, the German units were able to establish full control over the village only by the morning of July 6, that is, when, according to the offensive plan, the corps was already supposed to approach Oboyan.

Thus, the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division, not possessing large tank formations (they had only 39 American tanks of various modifications and 20 self-propelled guns from the 245 infantry division and 1440 sap), were held for about a day in the area of ​​the villages of Korovino and Cherkasskoye five enemy divisions (of which three are tank divisions). In the battle on July 5, in the Cherkassky area, the fighters and commanders of the 196 and 199 Guards especially distinguished themselves. rifle regiments of 67 guards. divisions. Competent and truly heroic actions of the soldiers and commanders of the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division, allowed the command of the 6th Guards Rifle Division. And in a timely manner to pull up army reserves to the place of wedging in of units of the 48th military corps at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division and to prevent a general collapse of the defense of the Soviet troops in this sector in the following days of the defensive operation.

As a result of the above-described hostilities, the village of Cherkasskoye actually ceased to exist (according to post-war eyewitness accounts: "it was a lunar landscape").

The heroic defense of the village of Cherkasskoye on July 5 - one of the most successful moments of the Battle of Kursk for the Soviet troops - unfortunately, is one of the undeservedly forgotten episodes of the Great Patriotic War.

July 6, 1943 Day two. The first counterattacks.

By the end of the first day of the offensive, the 4th TA wedged into the defense of the 6th Guards. And to a depth of 5-6 km in the offensive section of 48 mk (in the area of ​​the village of Cherkasskoye) and at 12-13 km in the section 2 mk SS (in the area of ​​Bykovka - Kozmo-Demyanovka). At the same time, the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (Obergruppenfuehrer P. Hausser) managed to break through the first line of defense of the Soviet troops to the full depth, pushing back units of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I. M. Nekrasov), and approached the front 5-6 km directly to the second the defensive line occupied by the 51st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N. T. Tavartkeladze), engaging in battle with its forward units.

However, the right neighbor of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps - AG "Kempf" (V. Kempf) - on July 5 did not fulfill the task of the day, faced with stubborn resistance from units of the 7th Guards. And, thereby exposing the right flank of the 4th Panzer Army that had advanced forward. As a result, Hausser was forced from 6 to 8 July to use a third of the forces of his corps, namely MD "Dead Head", to cover his right flank against the 375 RD (Colonel P. D. Govorunenko), whose units brilliantly showed themselves in battles on July 5 ...

Nevertheless, the success achieved by the Leibstandarte divisions, and in particular the Das Reich, forced the command of the Voronezh Front, in conditions of incomplete clarity of the situation, to take hasty retaliatory measures to plug the breakthrough that had formed in the second line of the front’s defense. After the report of the commander of the 6th Guards. And Chistyakov about the state of affairs on the left flank of the army, Vatutin by his order gives the 5th Guards. Stalingrad military complex (Major General A. G. Kravchenko, 213 tanks, of which 106 are T-34 and 21 - Mk.IV "Churchill") and 2 Guards. Tatsinsky Tank Corps (Colonel AS Burdeyny, 166 combat-ready tanks, of which 90 - T-34 and 17 - Mk.IV "Churchill") under the command of the commander of the 6th Guards. And he approves of his proposal to launch counterattacks against the German tanks of the 5th Guards who broke through the positions of the 51st Guards Rifle Division. Stk and under the base of the entire advancing wedge 2 tk SS forces 2 Guards. Ttk (right through the combat formations of the 375th rifle division). In particular, in the afternoon of July 6, I.M. Chistyakov puts the commander of the 5th Guards. Stk to Major General A.G. Kravchenko the task of withdrawing the main body of the corps (two of three brigades and a heavy tank breakthrough regiment) from the defensive area occupied by him (in which the corps was already ready to meet the enemy, using the tactics of ambushes and anti-tank strongholds), and the application by these forces of a counterattack to the flank of MD "Leibstandart". Having received the order, the commander and headquarters of the 5th Guards. Stk, already knowing about the capture of s. Bows by tanks of the "Das Reich" division, and assessing the situation more correctly, tried to challenge the execution of this order. However, under the threat of arrest and execution, they were forced to proceed with its implementation. The attack by the corps brigades was launched at 15:10.

Sufficient own artillery means of the 5th Guards. The Stk did not have, and the order did not leave the order to link the actions of the corps with neighbors or aviation. Therefore, the attack of tank brigades was carried out without artillery preparation, without aviation support, on level ground and with practically open flanks. The blow fell directly on the forehead of MD Das Reich, which regrouped, deploying tanks as an anti-tank barrier and, calling in aviation, inflicted significant fire damage on the brigades of the Stalingrad corps, forcing them to stop the attack and go on the defensive. After that, pulling up anti-tank gunnery artillery and organizing flanking maneuvers, units of the MD "Das Reich" between 17 and 19 o'clock managed to reach the communications of the defending tank brigades in the area of ​​the Kalinin farm, which was defended by 1696 Zenap (Major Savchenko) and the 464 Guards Art that had retreated from the village of Luchki. . division and 460 guards. mortar battalion of the 6th Guards Rifle Brigade. By 19:00, units of the MD "Das Reich" actually managed to encircle most of the 5th Guards. Stk between s. Luchki and the Kalinin farm, after which, building on the success, the command of the German division with part of the forces, acting in the direction of Art. Prokhorovka, tried to capture the Belenikhino crossing. However, thanks to the initiative actions of the commander and the battalion commander, the 5th Guards Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel P.F. The Stk, who were able to quickly create a rigid defense around Belenikhino from the various corps units that were at hand, managed to stop the Das Reich offensive and even force the German units to return to Kh. Kalinin. Being without communication with the headquarters of the corps, on the night of July 7, the surrounded units of the 5th Guards. The Stk organized a breakthrough, as a result of which part of the forces managed to break out of the encirclement and merged with units of 20 tbr. During July 6, parts of 5 Guards. Stk for military reasons, 119 tanks were irretrievably lost, 9 more tanks were lost for technical or unexplained reasons, and 19 were sent for repair. Not a single tank corps had such significant losses in one day during the entire defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge (the losses of the 5th Guards Stk on 6 July even exceeded the losses of 29 battalions during the attack on 12 July at the Oktyabrsky farm).

After the encirclement of the 5th Guards. Stk, continuing the development of success in the northern direction, another detachment of the tank regiment MD "Das Reich", using the confusion during the withdrawal of Soviet units, managed to reach the third (rear) line of the army defense, occupied by units of 69A (Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchenkin) , near the Teterevino farm, and for a short time wedged into the defense of the 285th Rifle Division of the 183rd Rifle Division, however, due to the apparent lack of forces, having lost several tanks, he was forced to retreat. The exit of German tanks to the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front on the second day of the offensive was regarded by the Soviet command as an emergency.

Battle of Prokhorovka

Belfry in memory of those killed in the Prokhorovskoye field

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The central front, involved in the battle in the north of the arc, suffered losses of 33,897 people on July 5-11, 1943, of which 15,336 were irrecoverable, its enemy, Model's 9th Army, lost 20,720 people over the same period. which gives a loss ratio of 1.64: 1. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which took part in the battle on the southern face of the arc, lost 143,950 people on July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), of which 54,996 were irretrievable. Including only the Voronezh Front - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov and the chief of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they believed the losses of their front were 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irrecoverable. If, contrary to the Soviet documents of the war period, the official numbers are considered correct, then taking into account the German losses on the southern face of 29,102 people, the ratio of losses of the Soviet and German sides here is 4.95: 1.

During the period from 5 to 12 July 1943, the Central Front used 1,079 wagons of ammunition, and the Voronezh Front - 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.

The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply surpassed the losses of the Central is in the lesser massing of forces and equipment in the direction of the German strike, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate their armored forces on the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.

On the southern face, the counter-offensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5 at about 18-00 Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, on August 11, Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway, and on August 23 captured Kharkov. The German counterstrikes were unsuccessful.

After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the ability to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as "Watch on the Rhine" () or the operation on Balaton (), were also unsuccessful.

On August 23, the Day of Military Glory of Russia is celebrated - the Day of the defeat of the Wehrmacht forces by Soviet troops at the Kursk Bulge. Almost two months of intense and bloody battles led to this important victory for the Red Army, the outcome of which was not at all a foregone conclusion. The Battle of Kursk is one of the largest battles in world history. Let's remember it in more detail.

Fact 1

The protrusion in the center of the Soviet-German front to the west of Kursk was formed during the stubborn battles of February – March 1943 for Kharkov. Kursk Bulge was up to 150 km deep and 200 km wide. This ledge is called the Kursk Bulge.

Battle of the Kursk Bulge

Fact 2

The Battle of the Kursk Bulge is one of the key battles of World War II, not only because of the scale of the battles that took place on the fields between Orel and Belgorod in the summer of 1943. The victory in this battle marked the final turning point in the war in favor of the Soviet troops, which began after the Battle of Stalingrad. With this victory, the Red Army, having exhausted the enemy, finally seized the strategic initiative. And this means that we were advancing from now on. The defense was over.

Another consequence - political - was the final confidence of the Allies in victory over Germany. At a conference held in November-December 1943 in Tehran on the initiative of F. Roosevelt, the post-war plan for the dismemberment of Germany was already discussed.

Scheme of the Battle of Kursk

Fact 3

1943 was a difficult choice for the command of both sides. Defend or attack? And if you attack, how large-scale tasks should you set yourself? One way or another, both the Germans and the Russians had to answer these questions.

Back in April, G.K. Zhukov sent to Headquarters his report on possible military operations for the coming months. According to Zhukov, the best solution for the Soviet troops in the current situation would be to wear down the enemy on their defenses, destroying as many tanks as possible, and then introduce reserves and go on a general offensive. Zhukov's considerations formed the basis of the campaign plan for the summer of 1943, after the preparation of the Nazi army for a major offensive on the Kursk Bulge was discovered.

As a result, the decision of the Soviet command was the creation of a deeply echeloned (8 lines) defense in the most likely sectors of the German offensive - on the northern and southern faces of the Kursk salient.

In a situation of a similar choice, the German command decided to attack in order to keep the initiative in their hands. Nevertheless, even then Hitler designated the tasks of the offensive on the Kursk Bulge not to seize territory, but to exhaust the Soviet troops and improve the balance of forces. So, the advancing German army was preparing for a strategic defense, while the defending Soviet troops were intent on advancing decisively.

Building defensive lines

Fact 4

Although the Soviet command correctly identified the main directions of the attacks of the Germans, mistakes were inevitable given such a scale of planning.

So, the Stavka believed that a stronger grouping would attack in the Orel region against the Central Front. In reality, however, the southern grouping, which operated against the Voronezh front, turned out to be stronger.

In addition, the direction of the main attack of the Germans on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge was inaccurately determined.

Fact 5

Operation Citadel was the name of the plan of the German command to encircle and destroy the Soviet armies on the Kursk salient. It was planned to deliver converging strikes from the north from the Orel region and from the south from the Belgorod region. Impact wedges were to connect near Kursk. The maneuver with the turn of Gotha's tank corps in the direction of Prokhorovka, where the steppe terrain favors the action of large tank formations, was planned in advance by the German command. It was here that the Germans, reinforced with new tanks, hoped to crush the Soviet tank forces.

Soviet tank crews inspecting the padded "Tiger"

Fact 6

The battle of Prokhorovka is often called the largest tank battle in history, but this is not so. It is believed that the largest in terms of the number of tanks involved was the multi-day battle that took place in the first week of the war (June 23-30), 1941. It happened in Western Ukraine between the cities of Brody, Lutsk and Dubno. While about 1,500 tanks from both sides converged at Prokhorovka, more than 3,200 tanks took part in the battle of 1941.

Fact 7

In the Battle of Kursk, and in particular in the battle of Prokhorovka, the Germans especially relied on the strength of their new armored vehicles - the Tiger and Panther tanks, the Ferdinand self-propelled guns. But perhaps the most unusual novelty is the Goliath tankette. This unmanned tracked self-propelled mine was remotely controlled by wire. It was intended to destroy tanks, infantry and buildings. However, these tankettes were expensive, slow-moving and vulnerable, and therefore did not provide much help to the Germans.

Memorial in honor of the heroes of the Battle of Kursk

July forty-third ... These hot days and nights of war are an integral part of history Soviet army with the German fascist invaders. The front in its configuration in the area near Kursk, the front resembled a giant arc. This segment attracted the attention of the fascist command. The German command was preparing an offensive operation as a revenge. The Nazis spent a lot of time and effort on developing the plan.

Hitler's operational order began with the words: "I decided, as soon as the weather conditions permit, to launch the Citadel offensive - the first offensive this year ... It must end with a quick and decisive success." The swift tanks "tigers" and "panthers", super-heavy self-propelled guns "Ferdinands", according to the plan of the Nazis, were to crush, disperse the Soviet troops, and turn the tide of events.

Operation Citadel

The Battle of Kursk began on the night of July 5, when a captured German sapper said during interrogation that the German operation "Citadel" would begin at three in the morning. There were only a few minutes left before the decisive battle ... The Military Council of the Front had to make a very important decision, and it was made. On July 5, 1943, at two twenty minutes, silence exploded with the thunder of our guns ... The battle that began lasted until 23 August.

As a result, the events on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War turned into a defeat for the Hitlerite groups. The strategy of the operation "Citadel" of the Wehrmacht on the Kursk bridgehead - crushing blows using surprise at the forces of the Soviet Army, their encirclement and destruction. The triumph of the Citadel plan was to ensure the implementation of further plans of the Wehrmacht. To disrupt the plans of the Nazis, the General Staff developed a strategy aimed at defending the battle and creating conditions for the liberation actions of the Soviet troops.

The course of the Kursk battle

The actions of the Army Group Center and the Operational Group Kempf of the Army South, which came out from Orel and Belgorod in the battle on the Central Russian Upland, were supposed to decide not only the fate of these cities, but also change the entire subsequent course of the war. The repulsion of the blow from the direction of Orel was assigned to the formations of the Central Front. The formations of the Voronezh Front were supposed to meet the advancing detachments from the side of Belgorod.

The steppe front, as part of the rifle, tank, mechanized and cavalry corps, was entrusted with a bridgehead in the rear of the Kursk bend. On July 12, 1943, the Russian field under the Prokhorovka railway station took place the greatest through tank battle, noted by historians unprecedented in the world, the largest through tank battle in scale. Russian power on its own land withstood another test, turned the course of history to victory.

One day of the battle cost the Wehrmacht 400 tanks and almost 10 thousand casualties. Hitler's groups were forced to go on the defensive. The battle on the Prokhorovskoye field was continued by units of the Bryansk, Central and Western fronts, launching Operation Kutuzov, the task of which was to defeat the enemy groupings in the Orel region. From 16 to 18 July, the corps of the Central and Steppe Fronts liquidated the Nazi groupings in the Kursk triangle and began pursuing it with the support of the air forces. The combined forces of the Hitlerite units were thrown back 150 km to the west. The cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov were liberated.

The significance of the Battle of Kursk

• An unprecedented force, the most powerful tank battle in history, was the key in the development of further offensive operations in the Great Patriotic War;
• The Battle of Kursk is the main part of the strategic tasks of the General Staff of the Red Army in the 1943 campaign plans;
• As a result of the implementation of the "Kutuzov" plan and the "Commander Rumyantsev" operation, units of the Nazi troops were defeated in the area of ​​the cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov. The strategic Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkiv bridgeheads were liquidated;
• The end of the battle meant the complete transfer of strategic initiatives into the hands of the Soviet Army, which continued to advance westward, liberating cities and towns.

Results of the Kursk battle

• The failure of the Wehrmacht operation "Citadel" presented to the world community the impotence and complete defeat of the Hitlerite company against the Soviet Union;
• A radical change in the situation on the Soviet-German front and the whole as a result of the "fiery" Battle of Kursk;
• The psychological breakdown of the German army was obvious, there was no longer any confidence in the superiority of the Aryan race.