In Mongolia on the Khalkhin-goal River, starting from spring, and ending in the fall of 1939, battles were fighting between and Japan. In the spring of 1939, the Japanese government sent numerous troops to the Mongolian territory in order to ensure the creation of a new border between Mongolia and Manzhou, in order for a new border strip on the Khalkhin Gol River. The Soviet troops were aimed at helping friendly Mongolia and, uniting with Mongolian military units, prepared to beat the aggressor. After the invasion of the Mongolian land, the Japanese immediately met a powerful rebuff of Soviet troops and by the end of May were forced to retreat to the territory of China.
The next blow of the Japanese troops was more prepared and massive. A heavy technique was sent to the border, tools and aircraft, and the number of soldiers had already had about 40 thousand people. The strategic task of the Japanese was to defeat Soviet troops on the Khalkhin-go-goer river, which commanded and occupy important heights and bridgeheads for future offensive. The Soviet-Mongol grouping was almost three times lost to Japanese troops, but bravely entered into battle with enemy forces. Having reached the strategic results first, and capturing Mount Bain-Tsagan on the eastern shore of Khalkhin-goal, the Japanese intended to surround and destroy the Soviet troops, but during the stubborn battles for three days, they were defeated and had to retreat again.
But on this, the Japanese army did not calm down and the August began to prepare a new even more powerful offensive, tightening additional reserves to the Khalkhin-goal. Soviet troops were also actively intensified, about 500 tanks, a fighter brigade, appeared, a large number of The guns and the number of personnel are almost 60 thousand soldiers. GK Zhukov was appointed commander of the corps and was preparing to apply Conrtudar in Japanese formations, carefully disguised and spreading false information that Soviet troops will be ready for the offensive only by winter. And the Japanese troops planned to take another attack at the end of August.
But Soviet troops unexpectedly hit all their power to the enemy on August 20 and, using the Japanese by 12 km, introduced tank troops, entrenched at important altitudes. The central, southern and northern group of Soviet-Mongolian troops, as planned, told the enemy with permanent attacks and by August 23, they took the main forces of the Japanese into a dense ring. And by the end of August, the Japanese were fragmented on small units and completely destroyed.
Half of September, the Japanese invaders tried to take revenge, they broke out several times through the Khalhin-goal and on the ground and by air, but the skillful actions of the Soviet troops constantly forced them to retreat, carrying big losses. In the end, the aggressive Japanese government was forced to conclude with Soviet Union Peace treaty, which was signed on September 15.
The victory in this conflict was very important for the USSR, there were guarantees of security in the east of the country and in the future, because of this battle, the Japanese did not risk helping the Germans against the Soviet Union.

"I look at my" I-16 "with love. Thank you, my dear "Ishacha"! You turned out to be much better than the Japanese fighter "I-97". And speed and fortress. You have repeatedly saved me, took over the enemy bullets. Thank you and your Creator Nikolai Nikolaevich Polikarpov! "

Vorozheikin A. V., pilot of the 22nd JEP

Brief history of events

On March 1, 1932, the "independent" state of Manzhou, created by the Japanese, as one of the bridgeheads for the future invasion of Soviet Primorye and Eastern Siberia appeared on the territory of Manchuria. After an unsuccessful conflict for the Kwantung army on Lake Hassan, it was from here that it was decided to put another blow.

The formal reason for the beginning of the conflict was the claims of Manzhou-go to the Mongolian People's Republic. The leaders of the first country (in fact, the Japanese standing behind them) in the spring of 1939 began to demand the revision of the state border between the states along the Khalhin Gol River. The Japanese military began laying the railway line to the border of the USSR. Due to the nature of the terrain, the road could pass only in the area close to the Mongolian border. Thus, in the event of war with the Soviet Union, it could be easily blocked by artillery fire from the Mongolian side, which, naturally, was unacceptable for the Kwantung army. The transfer of the border close to the Khalkhin-goal river, that is, several tens of kilometers deep into the Mongolian territory, would solve the problems of the Japanese. Mongolia refused to satisfy the requirements of the manzhou. The Soviet Union, another on March 12, 1936, who concluded a protocol on mutual assistance from the MTR, said that he would "protect the borders of Mongolia as his own." None of the parties was going to make compromises. The first shots sounded on May 11, 1939. By May 14, the Japanese-Manchurian troops occupied the entire "controversial" territory to Chalchin-goal, the Japanese government did not respond to the actions of the Kwantung Army and did not respond to the note sent by the Soviet Union. War began.

The composition of the forces

At the time of the beginning of the conflict in Mongolia, according to the protocol, the Soviet 57th special corps was stationed, consisting of 30 thousand servicemen, 265 tanks, 280 armored vehicles and 107 combat aircraft. The fighter forces were represented by the 70th IAP, which had 1939 and 15BIS and 24 I-16 for May 1939. All "Ishaki", far from the first freshness, belonged to the already obsolete type 5 and did not have armored. The degree of fighter combat readiness was low: by May 20, only 13 I-16 and 9 and 15BIS could rise into the air. The personnel of the regiment consisted of inexperienced pilots who owned mostly piloting techniques; Neither group battle, nor shooting they were trained. The discipline seriously chrome, due to bad living conditions, many fighter pilots wrote letters with a request to send them to the Union. Japanese fighter forces numbered 20 cars Nakajima Ki.27 (Two squadrons) were equipped with experienced pilots, many Japanese had the experience of fighting in China. This ratio of forces did not slow down to affect the results of the first fighting.

Air battles

The first loss of the RKKA Air Force was connected by the R-5Sh, shot down by Japanese fighters on May 21. And the next day there was the first air battle between the fighters: 3 I-16 and 2 I-15BIS met with the five KI-27. One "Ashak", who broke away from the group and rushed into an attack, was instantly shot down (the pilot I. T. Lysenko died), the rest did not enter the battle. In this time, the Soviet Union began to tighten the strength in the conflict area. On May 23, 1939, the 22nd JEAP arrived in Mongolia, in which, in addition to thirty-five and-15BIS (one of them was missing for a flight), 28 I-16 type 10 was listed, and the aircraft were in good technical condition. However, the level of preparation of pilots of this regiment also left much to be desired, which did not allow it to see later, reversal the situation in the air in their favor. In addition, the Japanese, in turn, were transferred to Manchuria another 20 ki-27 (two squadrons of the 11th Sentai). On May 17, a very unsuccessful "debut" of the I-16 of the 22nd JEAP took place. Lake Buin-Nur took place the battle of the Sisters "Ishakov" with nine ki.27. One Soviet pilot died, two were injured; Two and 16 are shot down, three are seriously damaged. The Japanese did not have losses.

If even I-16, close in their characteristics to the Japanese fighter, carried huge losses, then it can be reasonably assumed that the pilots on the and-15bis climb into the air at all no sense. Actually, so almost and it was. Our pilots who are accustomed to the exceptional maneuverability of their biplanes, during the battles with the Japanese, were surprised that they no longer have advantages and in this characteristic (Ki.27 maneuverance was no worse than). So, on May 28, it was entirely destroyed in the battle of the link and 15bis of the 70th IAP, all pilots died. On the same day, six of our aircraft were lost in the battle of nine biplanes from the 22nd IAP with the 18th Ki-27 in the air, another shot on the ground after a forced landing, five pilots died, one was injured. The Japanese once again went without losses. When the Soviet leadership became clear that the owed forces would not succeed in the air in the air, new aircraft and experienced pilots began to arrive at the battle area. On May 29, 1939, a group of forty-eight people arrived in Mongolia on three transport "Douglasha" - the most experienced pilots and techniques, many of whom managed to visit Spain and China. The Japanese also strengthened their grouping, but could not achieve a numerical advantage.

Over time, Soviet pilots began to fight more confidently, and the ratios of losses began to strain in our direction. "Transition Moment" can be considered June 22, 1939, when the largest air battle between the Japanese and Soviet fighters took place. 18 combat-ready ki-27 of the 24th Sentai took off to the interception of a group of Soviet fighters. 105 aircraft (56 and 16 and 49 and 15bis) rose from the RKKA Air Force to the air. However, they attacked by two waves, and part of the Soviet aircraft in the battle did not participate at all. The Japanese estimate its irrevocable losses to seven airplanes, the RKKK Air Force lost seventeen aircraft (14 and-15bis and 3 I-16), of which thirteen airplanes and eleven pilots were lost in the air. Four and-15bis were set on fire at the landing during the landing, their pilots were saved. Despite the fact that the Losses of the RKKA Air Force significantly exceeded the losses of the Japanese, the battlefield remains behind Soviet pilots: the Japanese were forced to retreat.

It is noticeable that the units who fought on the biplans of Polycarpov, suffered significantly more than those with in service and-16: the outdars and-15bis made itself felt. Already at the end of July, these aircraft were derived from the part of the first line (some of their number remained in air defense air defense), their place received new biplans I-153 with a retractable chassis and more powerful M-62 engine. From other new products of the Soviet aircraft enterprise, which "noted" on Halchin-goal should be mentioned by I-16P (I-16 type 17) - the cannonic variants of the widely saw and-16 type 10, as well as the "Asha" options with M-62 engines. The first such cars were obtained by upgrading and-16 Type 10 V field conditions (engines were taken from stocks for I-153); Subsequently, the factory options that are named I-16 type 18 began to be received. ... And in the meantime, the Japanese troops under the pressure of the Soviet-Mongol Forces began to retreat. On August 20, a decisive offensive surgery for the surroundings and the destruction of a grouping of the Kwanten Army east of the Khalkhin-goal river began. By this day, the number of Soviet aviation group reached a maximum. In the August battles, Japanese aviation tried in vain to intercept the initiative, but she failed. Boots at Soviet airfields also did not bring the desired results. The air parts of the imperial aviation lost the equipment and pilots.

In this complex situation Especially the impossibility of rapid restoration of the KI-27 fighters park: the plant "Nakajima" could produce only one car per day. As a result, the Japanese had to use the 9th Xentai battles armed with outdated biplanes Kawasaki ki.10.On September 2, 1939, these fighters first appeared in the sky of Chalchin-goal and immediately began to carry tangible losses. All the defeated Japanese requested a truce. On September 15 between the USSR, MNR and Japan, an agreement was signed on the termination of hostilities from 13.00 on September 16. Before this, the aviation of the Kwantung Army tried to strike a blow to the Soviet airfields. Their idea failed: as a result, attackers suffered large losses than attacked. The reflection of Japanese taxes on September 15, during which ten Japanese aircraft was shot down against six Soviet (one and-16 and five and-153), can be considered the last air berth in the sky over Chalchin Gol.

In brackets given the number of good fighters if it is known.

Losses of Soviet fighters during conflict

Period	And-15bis	And-153.	I-16	I-16P.
20.05-31.05	13 (1)	-	5 (1)	-
1.06-30.06	31 (2)	-	17 (2)	-
1.07-31.07	16 (1)	2 (1)	41 (2)	-
1.08-31.08	5 (1)	11 (4)	37 (16)	2 (0)
1.09-16.09	-	9 (1)	5 (1)	2 (0)
Total	65 (5)	22 (6)	105 (22)	4 (0)

In brackets are given unable losses.

Enemy fighters

As mentioned above, the main Japanese fighter in the conflict area was the Army KI-27 (he also "type 97", the Soviet name - I-97) of Nakajima. At first, the Soviet pilots took him for Mitsubishi A5M, who made his debut in China. The error was revealed with time: it happened after arriving at the War Veterans in China. As A. V. Voroshikin recalled, at the end of June, Comkor Smushkevich, Colonel Lakeev, Major Kravchenko and some other pilots studied the wreckage of the Japanese fighter and found the absence of a subsoil on the chassis characteristic of the product of Mitsubishi.

In terms of its structure, KI-27 very much resembles A5M, while the engine power is lower. However, due to better aerodynamics and less weight, he exceeds the main characteristics (except for the range) of its "fellow" from the Air Force of the Imperial Fleet. Armament remained the same: two machine guns of a rifle caliber. At Khalkhin-goal, both existing modifications "Type 97" were used: Ki-27-ko (Other names: KI-27A, KI-27-I) and Ki-27-o(KI-27B, KI-27-II). The latest version was different with a "lantern" with a circular overview, converted oil radiator, as well as the possibility of installing submerged fuel tanks and pendants of small-caliber bombs. "Type-97" exceeded its characteristics as I-15BIS and I-153. S I-16 The situation was somewhat more complicated. Horizontal

maneuverability KIU-27 was better than any version of "Ishak". In addition, the I-16 with M-25 engines were inferior to the Japanese fighter in the rate of sinking and highness, but possessed the best weapons and armor. "Ishaki" also possessed more sturdy construction And they could develop a greater dive speed. An important advantage of KI-27 was high stability, partly compensating for the shooting small second weight of the volley. Even after the arrival of fighters I-16 type 18, superior to KI-27 in speed and rawlifting, Japanese fighters remained dangerous opponents. The disadvantages of aircraft were compensated by the advantages of their pilots: according to the memoirs of Soviet veterans who have managed to play in Spain, the Japanese exceeded the Italians, and in aggressiveness - Germans. To interrogation of the prisoner Japanese pilot Midzimo:

"C I-15 is best to fight horizontal and vertical devices, with I-16 is the same. It believes that the fighter I-16 is more dangerous, explaining this speed and maneuverability I-16.

When attacking the I-16 in the forehead and 97 goes up with the subsequent ranversman. When attacking the I-16 on I-97 from above and-97 goes into a turn.

The pilot declares that the Japanese pilots of the front attacks do not like, they are afraid of damage to the motor, they consider the best attacks for themselves on the and 16 from above. As a rule, the exit from the battle is not applied. "

Another Japanese fighter who worked on Halhin-goal was Biplan Kawasaki Ki-10. In general terms, he was an analogue of Soviet I-15BIS and by 1939 irrevocably outdated. Here is a description of one of the first fights I-16 with KI-10:

Trophy Ki-10-II, passing tests in the NII Air Force

"In one of the first days of the autumn, Senior Lieutenant Fedor Cheremukhin, Zamomsky 22nd IAP, flew to combat patrol. Soon he noted that a group of Japanese aircraft seemed from behind the river. Cheremukhin, giving the sign by the slave, turned his I-16 towards the enemy. For him, it was not the first fight for him, and he studied the look of the main Japanese ki-27 fighter. But this time the Soviet pilots met completely different cars. Graceful stormy biplans were reminded Zamomskaya Old Polycarpovsky I-3, on which he once started his career of a combat pilot. The bundled "airborne carousel" immediately showed that Japanese fighters exceed the "Ashakov" on the bold, visibly inferior to them in speed and railing. Our pilots quickly figured out that biplans are better to start to beat from distant distances, and without interference in the near battle, to repetition an attack on a vertical. Soon the Cheremukhin managed to go to the tail in one of the Japanese and give a target queue. From the fuselage of the enemy aircraft, a jet of white couple escaped. "He breaks through the radiator," the senior lieutenant noted about himself and sharply dropped the gas, so as not to slip by the enemy. Japanese pilot either was either confused, or was injured, but he didn't even try to breathe in order to leave from under fire, but continued with a decrease in "pull" in a straight line, leaving behind a long steam train. Having thoroughly aiming, Cheremukhin released a long turn on the motor side of the car. Instead, a couple of "Japanese" poured a thick black smoke, and he, all increasing the corner of the dive, almost stuck into the ground. "

Interestingly, in Japanese data during the conflict, only one KI-10 was lost.

Camouflage schemes
	Nakajima Ki-27-Ko Art. Sergeant Casida, 2nd Chamber of the 59th Fighter Sentai
	Nakajima Ki-27-Otsu Commander of the 2nd Lightly 11th Fighter Sentai

Against bombarders

Japanese bombers, used in the conflict area, gave an extra reason to reflement to the Soviet Aviation Guide: the speed of any of them (not counting the light scout and bombarder KI-36) exceeded the same indicator of biplane fighters of the RKKA Air Force. Thus, the situation was repeated, characteristic of the war in Spain: the main means of interception of bombers became the I-16. The main average bombarder on TVD was a plane Mitsubishi Ki.21(On the Japanese classification, he was considered heavy). The product of Mitsubishi has a very good speed of 432 km / h, which, however, did not exceed the indicator I-16 type 10. Given the low level of security, characteristic of Japanese aircraft of that time, KI-21, in theory, should have become The light target for "Ishakov", but during the conflict, only six aircraft were lost. Another suspended Japanese shock aircraft on Halchin-goal was single-engine Mitsubishi ki.30 With a malicious chassis with a maximum speed of 430 km / h. It is he who has been incurred by the greatest losses among Japanese bombers during the conflict. Another Japanese aircraft, single-engine intelligence Mitsubishi Ki.15-Ko Karigane. Thanks to good aerodynamics (despite the dysfit chassis) and ease of construction, this aircraft could develop the maximum speed of 481 km / h, which made it difficult even for I-16 with M-62 engines. Nevertheless, seven aircraft of this type still were shot. The next modification of the scout, KI-15-OCU, reached 510 km / h, but she did not arrive at the chalchin goal.

The use of uncontrollable rockets

From August 20 to August 31, the fighter-fighter fighter fighters took part in the five I-16 (commander of the link Capant N. Zvonarev, the pilots I. Mikhailenko, S. Pimenov, V. Fedosov and T. Tkachenko) armed with installations RS-82. On August 20, 1939 at 16 o'clock, pilots over the front line met with Japanese fighters and launched RS from a distance near a kilometer. As a result, 2 enemy aircraft were shot down. Success is caused by the fact that the Japanese flew in a closer building and with constant speed. In addition, the suddenness factor worked. The Japanese did not understand who attacked them (they attributed their losses to the actions of the Soviet Zenitchikov). WHATE RAQUETONS RAKETONS participated in 14 battles, knocking down 13 Japanese aircraft without loss. Japanese military, having studied the wreckage of their technology, came to the opinion that large-caliber guns were installed on our fighters.

Camouflage schemes
	I-16 Type 5 Commander of the 2nd Squadron of the 70th JEAP Art. L-TA M. P. Noga, autumn 1938. The blue star instead of the number on the vertical plumage, obviously was the emblem of the commander machine. Artist - Sergey Vakhrushev.
	The author of the second drawing is Andrei Yurgenson.
	I-16 Type 10 of the 70th IAP. Green protective color is applied in the field over the factory silver gray color. Artist - Sergey Vakhrushev.
	I-16 Type 10 One of the Soviet Aviation Formations. The color of the coca of the screw and ending the steering wheel is indicated allegedly. Artist - Sergey Vakhrushev.
	I-16 Type 10 Witt Skobarichina. 22nd IAP, Tszemeag-Bulak airfield, summer of 1939.

Tactical and technical characteristics of the I-16 and its main opponents on Halchin-goal USSR of the USSR Year of the start of release 9.00 11.31 Length, M. 6.07 7.53 3.25 14.54 23.00 18.56 M-25V. M-62 Kawasaki HA-9-IIB 1426 1110 1716 1810 1830 413 N. d. - at an altitude of 448 461 470 882 920 10000 417 1100 627

	I-16 Type 10	I-16 Type 17	I-16 type 18	Kawasaki Ki.10-II	Nakajima Ki.27
Manufacturer country	the USSR	Japan	Japan
1938	1938	1939	1935 (1937**)	1937
Wingspan, m	9.00	9.00	10.02 / N. d. *
6.07	6.07	7.55
Height, M.	3.25	3.25	3.00	3.25
Square wings, m2	14.54	14.54
Engine	M-25V.	"Army type 97"
Power, hp	750	750	800	850	710
The weight of the aircraft, kg.
- empty	1327	1434	1360
- Bearing	1740	1790
Speed, km / h
- In the earth	398	385	n. d.
425	400
Speedness, m / min	688	1034	n. d.
Practical ceiling, m	8470	8240	9300	11150
Right, km	525	485
Virague time, with	16-18	17-18	17	n. d.	8
Armament	4 7.62 mm Machine gun cabcas	2 20 mm Guns Schwak, 2 7.62 mm Machine gun Case	4 7.62 mm Machine gun Case		2 7.7 mm synchronous machine gun "Type 89"

* Upper / Nizhny ** year of the start of release of this modification

List of winners who fought on I-16 during the conflict on Halchin-goal Notes

The name of the pilot	Subdivision	The number of victories on the I-16 (personal + group)
Rakhov V. G.	22th yap	8+6	-
VOROREYKIN A.V.	22th yap	6+13	Flew to I-16P
Kravchenko G. P.	22th yap	5	Commander of the 22nd JEP from July 1939
Trubachenko V.P.	22th yap	5	Commander Squadron I-16P
Krasnoyurchenko I. I.	n. d.	5	Flew to I-16P
Smirnov B. A.	n. d.	4	-
Skobarichin V. F.	22th yap	2+6	-
Zvonarev N. I.	22th yap	2+5	Flew to I-16 with RO-82
Antonenko A. K. *	n. d.	0+6	-
Glazikin N. G.	22th yap	1	Commander of the 22nd IAP, died 06/22/1939

* type of aircraft installed unreliable

Information sources Kondratyev V. Khalkhin-goal: War in the air. - M.: "Techniques - youth", 2002. Stepanov A. Air War on Chalchin-goal. // "Sky Corner" Astakhova E. Fighter "Kawasaki" KI-10. // "Airplanes of the World" №03 (23), 2000. Kondratyev V. Battle over the steppe. Aviation in the Soviet-Japanese armed conflict on the Khalkhin Gol River. - M., 2008. Mikhail Maslov. Polikarpov I-15, I-16 and I-153 ACES. Osprey Publishing, 2010.

Japan's military actions in the area of \u200b\u200bLake Xasan and the Khalhin Gol River in 1938-39.

In the summer of 1938, Japan invaded the Soviet territory in the area of \u200b\u200bLake Hasan at the junction of the borders of the USSR, China (Manchou-go) and Korea to capture a strategically important area (the ridge of the hills to the west of the lake, including Sopgians, Unnamed and Zazernaya) and creating a direct threat Vladivostoku and Primorye as a whole. It was preceded by Japan's propaganda campaign on the so-called "disputed territories" on the Soviet-Manchur border in Primorye (the passage of which was clearly defined in the Hunchunk Protocol of 1886 and was never questioned by the Chinese side - ed.), Which Completed with the presentation of the Soviet Union in July 1938, the categorical claim on the conclusion of the Soviet troops and the transfer of Japan of all territories to the west of Hassan under the pretext of the need to fulfill the "Japanese obligations" before the Manchou.

Fights in which the 19th and 20th divisions were involved from the Japanese side, the infantry brigade, three machine gun battalions, a cavalry brigade, separate tank parts and up to 70 aircraft, lasted from June 29 to August 11, 1938, and ended defeat Japanese grouping.

In May 1939, also under the pretext of the "unresolved territorial dispute" between Mongolia and Manchuria, the Japanese troops invaded the Mongolian territory in the Khalkhin Gol River (Nomongan) River. This time the purpose of the attack of Japan this time was an attempt to establish military control over the region bordering the Trans-Baikalia, which would imagine the immediate threat to the Trans-Siberian Railway Railway - the main transport artery connecting the European and Far Eastern part of the country, which in the area there is almost parallel to the Northern Border of Mongolia and in Immediately proximity to her. In accordance with Prisoner in 1936 between the USSR and the MTR Agreement on mutual assistance, the Soviet troops participated in the reflection of Japanese aggression together with Mongolian.

Military actions in the Khalkhin-goal area continued from May to September 1939 and on their scale significantly exceeded the events of Hassan. They also ended with the defeat of Japan, the losses of which were: about 61 thousand people killed, wounded and captured, 660 destroyed aircraft, 200 for the collapsed guns, about 400 machine guns and more than 100 cars (the loss of the Soviet-Mongolian side amounted to more than 9 thousand. human).

In the verdict of the Tokyo International Military Tribunal for the Far East of November 4-12, 1948, Japan's actions in 1938-39. Hasan and Khalkhin-goal were qualified as "the aggressive war" conducted by the Japanese ".

Marian Vasilyevich Novikov

Victory on Halchin-Goal

Novikov M.V., Politicization, 1971.

The M. Novikov Military Historian brochure introduces the reader with the combat actions of the Soviet-Mongolian troops on the Khalkhin-goal River against Japanese aggressors who violated the border of the Mongolian People's Republic in the spring of 1939.

The courage and combat skill of the soldiers of the Red Army and Mongolian curses, the superiority of Soviet military equipment led to victory. The battle of Halchin-goal will forever remain an example of the fraternal community of two socialist countries, harsh warning to aggressors.

Fights on the Mongolian-Manchur border between Soviet-Mongolian and Japanese troops, during which Soviet troops under the command carried out a classical deep offensive operation with the surroundings and complete defeat of the enemy. In battle, tanks, aviation, artillery were actively involved.

The end of the 30s. The XX century was characterized by a large growth of international tension. At the same time, militarized Germany and Japan conducted an active policy to expand their territories at the expense of nearby states. It is quite active in this regard was the Soviet Union. His interests in the Far East faced the interests of Japan.

The name of a large battle, waking up in Mongolia between two powers, "Halhin-goal" many Western historians replace the term "incident from Nomon-Khan" (by the name of the border mountain), allegedly provoked by the Soviet side to show its military power.

It is probably not quite so. Undoubtedly, the USSR during the fighting in the Far East has been practiced the schemes of conducting deep offensive operations that were going to use in the coming big war in Europe. Do not feed the illusions and about the sincerity of the friendship of the Soviet government with oppressed and captured by all sorts of aggressors. Indeed, among the new "friends" of the Stalinist regime, in addition to the future "16 Soviet Republic", Mongolia (by the way, recognized by the moment only by the Soviet Union), Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova, Western Ukraine were soon found. He experienced the strength of friendly Soviet location and Finland. However, Japan's goals were no more noble. The militarized and aggressive power sought to secure their military bridgeheads, invaded other people's territories, created a fortified military area here. The actions of the Japanese in relation to external Mongolia can be assessed as aggressive.

* * *

In the 30s. The Japanese army invaded China, occupied the whole territory of Manzhuria, creating the Manyzhou puppet state here, headed by the emperor Pu I. Manchuria was turned into a bridgehead of aggression against the USSR, Mongolia and China. The first step of aggression was the invasion of the Japanese in July 1938 to Soviet territory at Oz. Hasan. This is nothing special not a remarkable border strip of the Earth, cut off by hills, river valleys, has become a place of hot contractions. Soviet troops in stubborn battles won here an important victory.

The Japanese believed that mastering the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic gives them major strategic benefits. The chief of headquarters of the Kwantung Army General Ithagaki said that Mongolia "is very important from the point of view of the Japanese-Manchurian influence of today, for it is a flank of the defense of the Trans-Siberian Railway connecting Soviet territories in the Far East and in Europe. If the external Mongolia is combined with Japan and Manzhou, then Soviet territories in the Far East will be in a very difficult situation and it will be possible to destroy the influence of the Soviet Union in the Far East without special military efforts. Therefore, the purpose of the army should be the spread of the Japaway Manchurian domination on the external Mongolia by any means. "

In Manchuria, the Japanese created 11 fortified areas at the borders with the Soviet Union and Mongolian People's Republic, in settlements along state borders there were strong military garrisons; They built and improved highways. In North and Northeast Manchuria, the main grouping of the Kwantung Army was concentrated. By the summer of 1939, her numbers were adjusted to 350 thousand people; There were more than a thousand artillery guns, 385 tanks and 355 aircraft.

Japanese command In addition to the Harbin Railway - Cizzicar - Highlard (formerly FC) began to build a new strategic railway from Soluni to Halun - Arshan and further on Ganzhur. She was walking around the revolt of the Grand Hinggang Range and had to go almost in parallel to the Mongol-Manchu border, on the distance from it in places just two or three kilometers.

The Japanese feared that the Railway Halun - Arshan - Ganzhzhur may be subjected to a sighting fire with dominant sandy heights on the eastern shore of Halhin-goal. In this regard, it was decided to seize part of the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic to the east of the river. Owning this territory, it was possible to eliminate the threat of a strategic railway, as well as reduce the possibility of hitting the rear of the Japanese troops focused in the Highlard fortified area. She could be a good bridgehead for hostilities against the MTR and the Soviet Union.

Given the tension of the situation and the threat of a military attack, the USSR accepted the measures of a diplomatic and military nature. Only on March 12, 1936, the Soviet-Mongolian protocol on mutual assistance was signed. In accordance with this agreement in Mongolia, parts of the Red Army were sent, from which the 57th special case was formed. The Soviet government officially announced that "the border of the Mongolian People's Republic, by virtue of the agreement between us on mutual assistance, we will protect the same strongly as our own."

By the summer of 1939, the 1st separate red-known army was part of the Soviet troops in the Far East under the command of the commander of the 2nd rank of M. Stern, the 2nd separate red-known army of Komkory I. S. Koneva, Transbaikal Military District (commander Commk Φ. η. Remizov). In operational submission of the 1st separate red-known army, the Pacific fleet was located, the 2nd separate red-known army - the Red-known Amur flotilla, and the Trans-Baikal Military District - the 57th special building stationed on the territory of the MPR.

The construction of many defensive areas in the most threatened directions was completed. From aviation union and compounds created a new operational association - 2nd Air Army. Tank battalions and mechanized shelves were included in the rifle and cavalry connections.

The Japanese command elected the object of the attack of the Eastern Property of the Republic in the area r. Chalchin-goal. Mastering this area would give Japanese a number of advantages. The Khalkhin-goal river is 100-130 m wide and a depth of 2-3 m has cool descents, in many places are swallowing, and in some places it was difficult to access for military equipment. A few kilometers east of it stretches the ridge heights. Along with this, in the valley of the river a lot of sandy boilers. In the chalchin-goal here falls. Highlast-goal, cutting into two parts area of \u200b\u200bupcoming fighting.

From the Manchurian side, two railways approached this area close to this area, the nearest railway station of the Soviet and Mongolian troops of Borzya was at a distance of 750 km. Steppe and deserted area east r. Chalchin-goal was guarded only by individual border guides, the obstacles were at a distance of 20-30 km from the state border.

In May 1939, the Japanese military command pulsed about 38 thousand soldiers, 135 tanks and 225 aircraft into the planned area of \u200b\u200bhostilities. Soviet-Mongolian troops, defeated east of r. Halhin-goal at the front of 75 km, had 12.5 thousand fighters in its composition, 186 tanks, 266 armored vehicles and 82 aircraft. According to the number of personnel and aviation, the opponent three times exceeded the forces of Soviet-Mongolian troops.

To substantiate their claims to the territory located on the right bank of the Khalkhin-goal, Japanese cartographers fabricated downlines, on which the state border was held on the river - more than 20 kilometers of the west of its true location.

On May 11, 1939, Japanese parts attacked the head of the Mongolian People's Army east of the river. Chalchin-goal in the area of \u200b\u200bOz. Buir-Nur. Mongolian warriors were forced to move to the river. Fights went here ten days, but they did not bring any success to the Japanese.

The Soviet command took urgent measures to strengthen the leadership of the troops in the area of \u200b\u200bthe combat operations. In the first days of June, Deputy Commander of the Belarusian Military District in Cavalry, K. Zhukov, was sent there. He came to the conclusion that "those forces that have had the 57th special corps in the MNR, prevent the Japanese military adventure will not be possible ..." The Soviet General Command immediately decided to enhance the corps. His commander was appointed G. K. Zhukov. Soon to help the Soviet-Mongolian troops in the Khalkhin-goal area, fresh parts and units began to arrive. The strengthening of the aviation group received new fighters ("Seagull" and I-16).

On June 20, the commander of the Kwantung Army gave an order on the occurrence of the Japanese-Manchurian troops in the Khalkhin Gola area. On June 30, the commander of the 23rd Japanese division, Lieutenant-General Kamatsubar, in turn, ordered the troops to go to the offensive. The plan of the Japanese command was coming down to the following: Going to the offensive throughout the site, to sow Soviet parts from the front, and then by the impact group bypassing the left flank defense, cross it through the r. Chalchin-goal, to take the height of the Bain-Tsagan dominating in the area and hit the Soviet-Mongolian parts into the rear.

On the night of July 3, Japanese troops switched to the offensive. Forking Halhin-goal, they developed a blow to the direction of Mount Bainzagan. The battle continued for three days, about 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 300 guns and several hundred aircraft participated on both sides. Part of the Japanese group moved to the left bank. Chalchin-goal. Mountain Bainzagan was busy.

Soviet command threw motoromechanized parts into this area: 11th tank brigade of Combridge M. P. Yakovlev, 24th motorized rifle regiment Colonel I. I. Fedyuninsky. By 19 o'clock on July 3, the enemy was attacked from three sides. The fight lasted at night and all day July 4th. All attempts by the Japanese to move into a counterattack and transfer the new parts across the river were repulsed. By morning, July 5, the Japanese retreated (or rather to say - fled) to the crossing. Their shock group, pressed against the river, was the head alone. The enemy lost almost all tanks, a significant part of artillery, 45 aircraft and about 10 thousand soldiers and. On July 8, the Japanese tried to take revenge for this defeat by going to the attack. After the bloody four-day fight, Japanese troops, lost another 5.5 thousand people killed and wounded, were forced to move away.

Despite the Bain-Tsaganskaya catastrophe, the Japanese still hoped to change the course of events in their favor. In August 1939, the "general offensive" was planned. During the month, the Japanese command moved new parts and connections to the Boot area. On August 10, the 6th Army was formed led by the General Rippo General. This army, located on the territory of 70 km on the front and 20 km in depth, had 75 thousand people, 500 guns, 182 tanks, more than 300 aircraft.

In turn, the USSR decided on MPR military assistance in large sizes. By mid-August, the Soviet-Mongolian troops had about 57 thousand people, they were in service with 500 tanks, 385 armored vehicles, 542 guns and mortars, 2255 machine guns and 515 combat aircraft.

On July 15, 1939, the 1st Army Group was formed (commander of the group - K. Zhukov already commerized). The Mongolian troops operating in the fighting area, led Marshal X. Choibalsan.

Much work was carried out on the organization of the rear. Thousands of cars from the supply station, which was already mentioned, at a high distance, delivered 18 thousand tons of artillery ammunition, 6,500 tons of ammunition for aviation, 15 thousand tons of fuel and lubricants, 7 thousand tons of fuel, 4 thousand tons of food.

The design of the Soviet-Mongolian command was based on the following idea: having worked out the strength of the Japanese troops from the front, to apply a preemptive bilateral blow to the flanks in the general direction to Nomon-Khan - Bourge-Oh, and then surround and destroy the enemy between p. Chalchin-goal and the state border. Three groups of troops were created for the implementation of this idea. The main strike was applied by the South Group of Colonel M. I. Potapova, consisting of two divisions, tank, motorlike brigades and several tank battalions, and auxiliary - the Northern Group led by Colonel I. V. Shevnikov. The central group under the command of Combridge D. E. Petrova was the challenge to sow an opponent from the front.

Preparation of the operation was carried out in the strictest mystery with wide applications Operational disguise and disinformation. Commanders of the divisions were put into the course of the case only 3-4 days before the operation, and the Red Army team - on the night of August 20, on the eve of the offensive. During the preparation, events were held to create an impression from the opponent's impression of the intended wintering of our parts: stakes were driven, a wire barrier was built, false demands on the sending of stakes and wire, winter uniforms were passed onto the radio. And the orders were transmitted in the code known to the Japanese.

The Japanese command was calculated to begin the "general offensive" on August 24, 1939. Establishing an opponent for four days, the Soviet-Mongolian troops on the morning of August 20 were switched to a decisive offensive. More than 150 bombers and powerful artillery fell on the combat order of the enemy, his artillery positions. About 100 Soviet fighters covered enemy aircraft focused on the initial areas for the onset of part of the shock groups of Soviet-Mongolian troops.

After a powerful aviation and artillery preparation, which lasted 2 hours for 45 minutes, Soviet tanks moved to the attack. Following them all over the front, Soviet-Mongolian infantry and cavalry parts rushed over the opponent.

The strike of aviation and artillery of the Soviet-Mongolian troops turned out to be so powerful and sudden that the enemy did not produce a single artillery shot for one and a half hours, aviation did not make a single departure.

While the troops of the central part of the frontal attacks were shot down by the main Japanese forces, South and Northern shock groups of Soviet-Mongolian troops broke through the enemy defense on the flanks and the rapid deep coverage began to surround the enemy. The Japanese command threw a large number of tanks, artillery and aviation against Soviet-Mongolian troops. Under their cover in the counterattack, the infantry and cavalry became increasingly. The fierce battle flared on the entire front.

Despite the desperate resistance of the enemy, to the outcome of the first day, serious success was achieved at the external flanks of the South and Northern Group, where the cavalry joints of the Soviet-Mongolian troops defeated parts of the Japanese-Manchurian cavalry and mastered the marked turns along the state border.

Evaluating the situation that created the situation, the commander of the 1st Army Group G. K. Zhukov decided to introduce all the forces of the reserve in the northern direction. The mobile group under the command of Colonel I. P. Alekseenko, going to the offensive, to the end of August 23 reached Nomon-Khan - Bourge-Oh and the next day entered the firing connection with parts of the southern group. Japanese troops were completely surrounded. Attempts by the Japanese command break through the ring of surroundings from outside the blows of tightened fresh reserves were not crowned with success.

The Soviet-Mongolian command has begun to the systematic destruction of surrounded by Japanese troops. Simultaneously with the external front of the environment, which consisted mainly of motorcycle, cavalry, aviation and partially rifle troops, which switched to defense along the border, the inner front was formed from rifle parts that caused converging strikes on the enemy.

Once in the boiler, the Japanese troops were desperately resisted, but on August 31, the last foci of their defense were eliminated. After the complete defeat of its ground grouping, the Japanese command attempted to impose a defeat of Soviet aviation. However, this idea failed. During the first half of September 1939, the Soviet pilots conducted a number of air battles in which 71 Japanese plane were destroyed. A large grouping of the Kwantung army ceased to exist. On September 16, the Japanese government was forced to recognize the defeat of his troops and asked about the cessation of hostilities. In the battles on Chalchin-goal, the Japanese lost about 61 thousand killed, wounded and prisoners, 660 aircraft, a significant amount of military property. The trophies of the Soviet-Mongolian troops were 12 thousand rifles, 200 guns, about 400 machine guns, more than 100 cars. The Japanese command in full force was forced to resign. The commander of the Kwantung Army, General West, and the head of the army headquarters, General Mosigan, were shifted.

On scale and character, the surgery on the Halchin-goal was the largest operation for the time of modern armies equipped with the newest military equipment. For the first time, modern tanks and aviation were applied on Halchin-goal. In some battles, the number of machines were calculated by hundreds, and in the decisive moments of the battle in the air rose to 300 aircraft. Creating an external and inner front to eliminate the surrounded enemy was a new contribution to the further development of martial arts.

The defeat of the Japanese troops on Chalchin-goal was mainly the correctness of the views of offensive operations that existed in the Soviet military military theory for the conduct of offensive operations, and in particular a deep operation. The August operation showed that its successful holding is inextricably linked with the skillful maneuvering of troops, the use of counterdovern, with the conquest of domination in the air, isolation of the fighting area from suitable enemy reserves and violations of its communications. At the same time, the experience of Halhin-goal allowed to draw conclusions about the need to increase artillery density.

Fights on Chalchin-goal once again confirmed the increasing role of reserves in the war and their timely and skillful use in the decisive moments of hostilities. Entering mobile reserves carried out by the commander of the Army Group G. K. Zhukov, allowed to significantly speed up the complete environment of the enemy.

More than 17,000 fighters, commanders and political workers were awarded by government awards, 70 of them received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, among them and the commander of the Army Group K. K. Zhukov; Pilots Ya. V. Smeushevich, G. P. Kravchenko and S. I. Groveniec became twice the heroes of the Soviet Union.

1939)
G. K. Zhukov (after June 6, 1939)
Khorlogyin Choibalsan

The beginning of the conflict was put on the requirements of the Japanese side on the recognition of the Khalkhin-goal river the border between Manzhou and Mongolia (the old border took place by 20-25 km east). One of the reasons for such a requirement was the desire to ensure the safety of the Khalun-Arshan - Ganzhur under construction in this area of \u200b\u200bthe Railway.

May 1939 first battles

On May 11, 1939, a Mongolian border appendix at the altitude of Nomon-Khan-Bourge-Bourgain was attacked by a detachment of Japanese cavalry of up to 300 people. On May 14, as a result of a similar attack with the support of aviation, the height of Dangur-OBS was occupied.

On May 17, the commander of the 57th Special Rifle Corps Comdaiv N. V. Feklenko sent a group of Soviet troops as part of three motorized rifle mouth, rods of armored vehicles, a sapper company and an artillery battery. On May 22, the Soviet troops switched to Chalchin-goal and discarded the Japanese to the border.

In the period from May 22 to 28, significant forces are focused in the conflict area. The composition of the Soviet-Mongolian troops was 668 bayonets, 260 sabers, 58 machine guns, 20 guns and 39 armored vehicles. The Japanese forces accounted for 1680 bayonets, 900 sabers, 75 machine guns, 18 guns, 6 armored vehicles and 1 tank.

On May 28, the Japanese troops, possessing a numerical superiority, transferred to the offensive, having the goal to surround the enemy and cut it off from crossing the West Coast of Khalhin-goal. Soviet-Mongolian troops retreated, but the plan of the environment fell apart, largely due to the action of the battery under the command of Senior Lieutenant Bakhtin.

The next day, the Soviet-Mongolian troops conducted a counteroffensive, pushing the Japanese to the initial positions.

June. Fight for domination in the air

Although no collision has happened on Earth in June, an air war unfolded in the sky. Already the first clashes at the end of May showed the advantage of Japanese aviators. So, in two days of fighting, the Soviet fighter regiment lost 15 fighters, while the Japanese side lost only one car.

The Soviet command had to go to radical measures: on May 29 from Moscow to the fighting area flew by a group of pilot-Asov, headed by the Deputy Head of the RKKA Air Force Yakov Smeshekvich. Many of them were the heroes of the Soviet Union, as well as having a combat experience in the sky of Spain and China. After that, the power of the parties in the air became approximately equal.

In early June, N. V. Feklenko was withdrawn to Moscow, and in his place at the proposal of the head of the Operational Department of the General Staff M. V. Zakharov, K. Zhukov was appointed. Soon after arriving in June 1939 to the Military Conflict District of K. Zhukov, he proposed his own plan of combat operations: conducting active defense at a bridgehead for Halchin-Golov and the preparation of strong counterdard at the opposing grouping of the Japanese Quantong Army. The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Headquarters of the Red Army agreed with the proposals put forward by G. K. Zhukov. The necessary forces began to be tightened to the conflict area. The headquarters of the corps became arriving together with Zhukov Combrig M. A. Bogdanov. Assistant Zhukova on the command of Mongolian cavalry was the Corps Commissioner J. Lhagwasuren.

To coordinate the actions of the Soviet troops in the Far East and parts of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, from Chita to the Khalkhin-goal River area arrived Commander M. Stern.

Air battles resumed with a new force in the twenties of June. As a result of battles 22, 24 and 26 June, the Japanese lost more than 50 aircraft.

Early in the morning of June 27, Japanese aviation managed to apply a sudden blow to Soviet airfields, which led to the destruction of 19 cars.

All June, the Soviet side was engaged in arrangement of defense on the eastern shore of Halhin-goal and planning a decisive counteroffensive. To ensure domination in the air, new Soviet modernized fighters and 16 and "seagull" were transferred here. So as a result of the battle on June 22, which was widely fame in Japan, the superiority of Soviet aviation over Japanese was provided and managed to seize the domination in the air.

At the same time - on June 26, 1939, the first official statement of the Soviet government was made about the events on Chalchin-goal.

July. Offensive of the Japanese grouping

Around the Bayan-Tsagan mountain launched fierce battles. Up to 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 800 artillery guns and hundreds of aircraft participated on both sides. Soviet artillerymen led fire on the enemy by direct vendor, and in the sky over the mountain in some points there were up to 300 aircraft on both sides. The 149th rifle regiment of Major I. M. Remizova and the 24th motorized rifle regiment I. I. Fedyuninsky were especially distinguished in these battles.

On the eastern shore of Halhin-goal by night on July 3, the Soviet troops due to the numerical superiority of the enemy moved to the river, reducing the size of their eastern bridgehead on her shore, however, the impact group of the Japanese under the command of Lieutenant-General Yasuoka did not fulfill the task set before it.

The grouping of the Japanese troops on Mount Bayan-Tsagan was in a semicircle. By evening, July 4, the Japanese troops held only the top of the Bayan Cagan - a narrow strip of terrain of five kilometers long and two kilometers wide. On July 5, the Japanese troops began retreat towards the river. In order to force his soldiers to fight until the last, the only pontoon bridge across the Khalkhin-goal, which is available at their disposal was blown up by order of the Japanese command. In the end, the Japanese troops near the Mount of Bayan-Tsagan began the painful retreat from the occupied positions by the morning of July 5. On the slopes of the Bayan-Tsagan mountain, more than 10 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers died. Almost all tanks and most of the artillery were lost.

The result of these fighting was that in the future, as later G. K. Zhukov noted in his memoirs, the Japanese troops "no longer risked to transfer to the West Bank of the Khalkhin-goal river." All further events took place on the eastern bank of the river.

However, the Japanese troops continued to remain on the territory of Mongolia and the military leadership of Japan planned new offensive operations. Thus, the focus of the conflict in the Khalkhin-goal area remained. The situation was dictated to the need to restore the state border of Mongolia and radically solve this border conflict. Therefore, G. K. Zhukov began planning an offensive operation with the aim of fully defeated the entire Japanese group, which was located in Mongolia.

The 57th special case was deployed to the 1st Army (front) group under the command of G. K. Zhukov. In accordance with the Decree of the Chief Military Council of the Red Army, the military council of the Army Group as part of the commander of the Commander of the Commander, M. S. Nikishev and the headquarters of the Combridge, M. A. Bogdanova, was established.

To the place of conflict urgently began to throw new troops, including the 82nd Infantry Division ,. From the Moscow Military District, the 37th Tank Brigade was transferred, which had the BT-7 and BT-5 tanks on the territory of the Trans-Baikal Military District, partial mobilization was carried out and formed the 114th and 93rd rifle divisions.

July 8, the Japanese side again began active martialctions. At night, they told the onset of large forces on the eastern shore of Halhin-goal against the position of the 149th Rifle Regiment and the battalion of the shooting-machine-gun brigade, which were absolutely not ready for this attack of the Japanese. As a result of this attack of the Japanese, the 149th shelf had to move back to the river, while maintaining a springboard just 3-4 kilometers. At the same time, one artillery battery was thrown, the platoon of anti-tank guns and several machine guns.

Despite the fact that this kind of sudden night attacks, the Japanese conducted a few more times, and on July 11, they managed to seize the height, they were as a result of the counterattack of Soviet tanks and infantry, which was headed by the commander of the 11th tank brigade Combrig M. P. Yakovlev, They were knocked out from height and discarded at the starting position. The line of defense on the eastern shore of Halhin-goal was completely restored.

From July 13 to July 22, a lull came in hostilities, which both parties were used to increase their strength. The Soviet side took energetic measures to strengthen the bridgehead on the eastern bank of the river, which was required to conduct the planned G. K. Zhukov offensive operation against the Japanese group. The 24th motorized rifle regiment I. I. Fedyuninsky and the 5th shooting gallery brigade were transferred to this bridgehead.

On July 23, the Japanese, after artillery training, began an offensive on the right-banking bridgehead of the Soviet-Mongolian troops. However, after two-day fights, there are significant losses, the Japanese had to move back to its original positions. At the same time, intensive air battles took place, so from July 21 to July 26, the Japanese side lost 67 aircraft, the Soviet only 20.

Significant efforts lay on the shoulders of border guards. To cover the border of Mongolia and the protection of the crossing through the Chalchin-goal from the Trans-Baikal Military District, a consolidated battalion of Soviet border guards was transformed under the command of Major A. Bulygi. Only for the second half of July, the border guards detained 160 suspicious persons, among which dozens of Japanese intelligence officers were revealed.

During the development of an offensive operation against the Japanese troops, proposals were made to both the headquarters of the Army Group, and in the General Staff of the Red Army on the transfer of hostilities from the territory of Mongolia to the Manchu territory, but these proposals were categorically rejected by the country's political leadership.

As a result of the construction conflict conducted by both parties to the beginning of the Soviet countertime, the 1st Army group of Zhukov had about 57 thousand people, 542 guns and mortars, 498 tanks, 385 armored vehicles and 515 combat aircraft, opposing her Japanese group - specially formed by the imperial decree The Japanese 6th Separate Army under the command of General Fiess Rippo, had an in its composition 7 and 23rd infantry divisions, a separate infantry brigade, seven artillery regiments, two tank regiments, a manchurian brigade, three shelf of Birth Cavalry, two engineering regiments and Other parts that a total of 75 thousand people, 500 artillery guns, 182 tanks, 700 aircraft were accounted for. It should also be noted that the Japanese group had a lot of soldiers who received military experience during the war in China.

General Rippo and his headquarters also planned the offensive, which was scheduled for August 24. At the same time, taking into account the sad for the Japanese experience of fighting on Mount Bayan Cagan this time the hit was planned on the right flank of the Soviet group. Forcing the river was not planned.

During the preparation of the city of K. Zhukov offensive operation of the Soviet and Mongolian troops, a plan for the operational-tactical deception of the enemy was carefully developed and strictly developed. For the introduction of an enemy in confusion in the early period of preparation for the occurrence of the Soviet side at night with the help of sound installations imitated the noise of the movement of tanks and armored vehicles, aircraft and engineering work. Soon the Japanese was tired of responding to sources of noise, so during the real regrouping of Soviet troops, their opposition was minimal. Also, all the time of preparation for the offensive of the Soviet side was carried out an active radio electronic combating opponent. Despite the general superiority in the forces of the Japanese side, by the beginning of the onset of Zhukov managed to reach almost three-time superiority in tanks and 1.7 times in airplanes. For the offensive operation, two-week ammunition reserves, food and fuel and lubricants were created.

During the offensive operation, K. Zhukov planned, using maneuverable mechanized and tank parts, unexpectedly strong flank strikes to surround and destroy the enemy in the area between the state border of the MPR and the Khalkhin Gol River.

The upcoming troops were divided into three groups - southern, north and central. The main blow was applied by the Southern Group under the command of Colonel M. I. Potapova, auxiliary blow - the Northern Group, which was commanded by Colonel I. P. Alekseenko. The central group under the command of Combridge D. E. Petrova was supposed to be for the power of the enemy in the center, on the front line, thereby deprive them of maneuver. In the reserve focused in the center, there were 212th air brigades and 9th engine brigades and a tank battalion. Mongolian troops also participated in the operation - the 6th and 8th cavalry divisions under the general command of Marshal X. Choibalsan.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops began on August 20, thereby proactive the offensive of the Japanese troops appointed on August 24.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, which began on August 20, turned out to be a complete surprise for the Japanese command. At 6 o'clock 15 minutes, a powerful artillery preparation and aviation raid started at the opponent's position. At 9 o'clock began the offensive of the ground forces. On the first day of the offensive, the attacking troops operated in full compliance with the plans, with the exception of the hitch, which happened when crossing the tanks of the 6th tank brigade, because when crossing the tanks, the pontoon bridge induced the pontoon bridge did not stand the gravity of tanks across the Chalchin-goal.

The opponent's most resistance was rendered on the central section of the front, where the Japanese had well-equipped engineering fortifications - here the coming people managed to advance only 500-1000 meters per day. Already on the 21st and August 22, Japanese troops, having come to themselves, led persistent defensive fights, so G. K. Zhukov had to introduce a backup 9-engine brigade in the battle.

Soviet aviation acted well at this time. Only for the 24th and 25th of August, the Sat bombers made 218 combat group departures and dropped about 96 tons of bombs on the enemy. Fighters for these two days in air battles were shot down about 70 Japanese aircraft.

In general, it should be noted that the command of the 6th Japanese army on the first day of the offensive could not determine the direction of the main strike of the upcoming troops and did not attempt to support their troops defending on the flanks. The armored and mechanized troops of the South and Northern groups of Soviet-Mongolian troops to the end of August 26 were connected and completed the complete environment of the 6th Army Japanese. After that, it began its crushing with cutting blows and destruction in parts.

In general, Japanese soldiers, mostly infantrymen, as noted later by G. K. Zhukov in their memoirs, fought extremely harder and extremely stubbornly, to the last person. Often, Japanese bludges and dumplings were captured only when there was no living Japanese soldier there. As a result of the resistance of the Japanese on August 23 at the central section of the front of the front of the city of K. Zhukov, it was even necessary to introduce his last reserve into battle: the 212th airborne brigade and two companies of the border guards, although he went for a considerable risk.

Repeated attempts by the Japanese command to draw counterattacks and discard surrounded in the Khalkhin-goal area, the grouping ended in failure. After the battles on August 24-26, the command of the Kwanant Army until the very end of the operation on Halhin-goal did not try to release his surrounded troops more, having resigned to the inevitability of their death.

The last battles continued on August 29 and 30 at the site of the north of the Highlast Gol River. By the morning of August 31, the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic was completely purified from the Japanese troops. However, this was not yet a complete end of the border conflict (the actual undeclared War of Japan against the USSR and the Allied Mongolia). Since on September 4 and 8, Japanese troops have taken new attempts to penetrate the territory of Mongolia, but they are strongly removed by the state border. Air battles continued, which ceased only with the conclusion of the official truce.

On September 15, 1939, an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union, MNR and Japan on the cessation of hostilities in the Khalkhin Gol River area, which came into force the next day.

RESULTS

The victory of the USSR on Chalchin-goal played a decisive role in the nonsense of Japan in the USSR. A notable fact is that when in December 1941, German troops stood near Moscow, Hitler violently demanded from Japan to attack the USSR in the Far East. It is the defeat on Halchin-goal, according to many historians, played a major role in refusing plans to attack the USSR in favor of the US attack.

In the autumn of 1941, the USSR leadership received a reconnaissance message to Zorga that Japan was not going to attack the USSR. This information allowed the most critical days of the defense of Moscow at the end of October - early November 1941 to transfer with far East up to twenty fresh, fully equipped and well-equipped rifle divisions and several tank joints that played one of the key roles in Moscow defense, and also allowed soviet troops Go to counteroffensive near Moscow in December 1941.

Literature

• Zhukov G. K. Memories and reflections. Head seventh. An undeclared war on Halhin-goal. - M.: Olma-Press, 2002.

• Shishov A. V. Russia and Japan. The history of military conflicts. - M.: Veva, 2001.
• Fedyuninsky I.I. In the east. - M.: Milivdat, 1985.
• Novikov M.V. Victory to Halchin-goal. - M.: Politicize, 1971.
• Kondratyev V. Halchin-goal: War in the air. - M.: Equipment - Youth, 2002.
• Kondratyev V. Battle over the steppe. Aviation in the Soviet-Japanese armed conflict on the Khalkhin Gol River. - M.: Foundation for Aviation Aviation "Russian Vityazi", 2008. - 144 p. - (Series: Air Wars of the XX Century). - 2000 copies. - ISBN 978-5-903389-11-7

Cinema

The Soviet-Mongolian feature film "Listen to the side of the director of Boris Yermolaeva and Badhyna Sumakh (1971) is devoted to the Khalkhin-Goal River.

The 65th anniversary of the end of the battle on the Khalkhin-Gol and Soviet-Mongolian expedition on the places of combat fame is devoted to the television film "The Roads of Fathers" of the Irkutsk TV journalist Natalia Volina (2004).

Notes

Footnotes

1. including 6 472 killed and died at the stages of sanitary evacuation, 1 152 died from wounds in hospitals, 8 died of disease, 43 died in disasters and as a result of incidents
2. Data incomplete
3. In the "Western" historiography, in particular in American and Japanese, the term "Chalchin-goal" is used only for the name of the river, and the military conflict itself is called the local "Nomon-Khan" incident. Nomon-Khan is the name of one of the mountains in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Manzhuro-Mongol border.
4. Translated into Russian "Halchin-goal" - Khalha River
5. The troops were driven over the Trans-Siberian railway line to Ulan-Ude, and then they followed the territory of Mongolia
6. During this battle, a famous Japanese pilot-ac Tayo Fuuda, famous during the war in China, was captured and captured.
7. In total in air battles from 22 to 28 June, Japanese aviation forces lost 90 aircraft. The losses of Soviet aviation turned out to be much smaller - 38 cars.
8. : June 26, 1939 on the Soviet radio sounded the words "TASS is authorized to declare ..." News from the shores of Khalkhin-goal appeared on the pages of Soviet newspapers.
9. : Zhukov, without waiting for the approach of the rifle shelf of escort, threw on the battlefield right from the march in reserve the 11th tank brigade of Combridge M. P. Yakovlev, who supported the Mongolian armored branch, armed with 45-mm cannons. It should be noted that the beetles in this situation, violating the requirements of the combat charter of the Red Army, acted at their own risk and risk, and contrary to the opinion of Comandarm G. M. Stern. In fairness, it costs to note that later Stern acknowledged that in that situation the decision was the only possible. However, this act Zhukov had other consequences. According to the special department of the building to Moscow, the report was transferred, which fell on the table I. V. Stalin, that the comda buffa "deliberately" threw a tank brigade without intelligence and infantry accompaniment. The investigative commission was sent from Moscow, headed by the Deputy Commissar of Defense, Comandarm of the 1st Rank I. Kulik. However, after conflicts of the commander of the 1st Army Group K. Zhukov with a Kulik, who began to intervene in the operational management of the troops, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR in the telegram of July 15 declared him a reprimand and withdrew him to Moscow. After that, the head of the Main Political Office of the Red Army Commissioner of the 1st Rank Mehlis was sent to Chalchin-goal from Moscow, with the instructions from L. P. Beria "Check" Zhukov.
10. : The division was formed in the Urals Nastech, many soldiers of this division never kept weapons in the hands, therefore, it was urgent to organize the training of her personnel on the spot.