February 14th, 2015

German gas attack. Aerial view. Photo: Imperial War Museums

According to rough estimates of historians, at least 1.3 million people suffered from chemical weapons during the First World War. All the main theaters of the Great War became, in fact, the largest proving ground in the history of mankind for testing weapons of mass destruction in real conditions. The international community began to think about the danger of such a development of events at the end of the 19th century, having tried to impose restrictions on the use of poisonous gases through the convention. But as soon as one of the countries, namely Germany, violated this taboo, all the others, including Russia, joined the chemical arms race with equal zeal.

In the material of "Russian Planet" I suggest you read about how it began and why the first gas attacks were never noticed by mankind.

The first gas is lumpy

On October 27, 1914, at the very beginning of the First World War, near the village of Neuve-Chapelle in the vicinity of Lille, the Germans fired at the French with improved shrapnel shells. In the glass of such a projectile, the space between the shrapnel bullets was filled with dianisidine sulfate, which irritates the mucous membranes of the eyes and nose. 3 thousand of these shells allowed the Germans to capture a small village on the northern border of France, but the striking effect of what would now be called "tear gas" was small. As a result, the disappointed German generals decided to abandon the production of "innovative" shells with insufficient lethality, since even developed industry in Germany did not have time to cope with the monstrous needs of the fronts for conventional ammunition.

In fact, mankind then did not notice this first fact of a new "chemical war". Against the background of unexpectedly high casualties from conventional weapons, the tears from the soldier's eyes did not seem dangerous.

German troops let gas from cylinders during gas attack... Photo: Imperial War Museums

However, the leaders of the Second Reich did not stop experimenting with combat chemistry. Just three months later, on January 31, 1915, already on the Eastern Front, German troops, trying to break through to Warsaw, near the village of Bolimov fired at Russian positions with improved gas ammunition. On that day, 18 thousand 150 mm shells containing 63 tons of xylyl bromide fell on the position of the 6th corps of the 2nd Russian army. But this substance was more "tear" than poisonous. Moreover, very coldy, which stood in those days, nullified its effectiveness - the liquid sprayed by exploded shells in the cold did not evaporate and did not turn into gas, its irritating effect was insufficient. The first chemical attack on the Russian troops was also unsuccessful.

The Russian command, however, paid attention to her. On March 4, 1915, from the Main Artillery Directorate of the General Staff, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, then the commander-in-chief of the Russian Imperial Army, received a proposal to start experiments with shells filled with toxic substances. A few days later the secretaries of the Grand Duke replied that "the supreme commander-in-chief has a negative attitude to the use of chemical projectiles."

Formally, the uncle of the last tsar was right in this case - the Russian army sorely lacked conventional shells to divert the already insufficient forces of industry to manufacture a new type of ammunition of dubious effectiveness. But military equipment during the Great it developed rapidly. And by the spring of 1915, the "gloomy Teutonic genius" revealed to the world a truly deadly chemistry that terrified everyone.

Nobel laureates kill at Ypres

The first effective gas attack was undertaken in April 1915 near the Belgian town of Ypres, where the Germans used chlorine released from cylinders against the British and French. On the 6-kilometer front of the attack, 6,000 gas cylinders filled with 180 tons of gas were installed. It is curious that half of these cylinders were civilian - the German army collected them throughout Germany and captured Belgium.

The cylinders were placed in specially equipped trenches, united in "gas cylinder batteries" of 20 pieces each. Burying them and equipping all positions for a gas attack was completed on April 11, but the Germans had to wait for a favorable wind for more than a week. It blew in the right direction only at 5 pm on April 22, 1915.

Within 5 minutes, the "gas-cylinder batteries" released 168 tons of chlorine. A yellow-green cloud covered the French trenches, and mainly the soldiers of the “color division” that had just arrived at the front from the French colonies in Africa were hit by the gas.

Chlorine caused laryngeal spasms and pulmonary edema. The troops did not yet have any means of protection against gas, no one even knew how to defend themselves and flee from such an attack. Therefore, the soldiers who remained in positions suffered less than those who fled, since each movement increased the effect of the gas. Since chlorine is heavier than air and accumulated near the ground, those soldiers who were under fire suffered less damage than those who were lying or sitting at the bottom of the trench. The most injured were the wounded, lying on the ground or on stretchers, and people moving to the rear with a cloud of gas. In total, almost 15 thousand soldiers were poisoned, of which about 5 thousand died.

It is significant that the German infantry following the chlorine cloud also suffered losses. And if the gas attack itself was successful, causing panic and even the flight of the French colonial units, then the German attack itself turned out to be almost a failure, and the progress was minimal. The breakthrough of the front, which the German generals had counted on, did not happen. The German infantrymen themselves were openly afraid to go forward through the contaminated area. Later, captured German soldiers in this area told the British that the gas hurt their eyes when they occupied the trenches left by the fleeing French.

The impression of the tragedy at Ypres was aggravated by the fact that the Allied command had been warned about the use of new weapons at the beginning of April 1915 - the defector said that the Germans were going to poison the enemy with a cloud of gas, and that “gas cylinders” had already been installed in the trenches. But then the French and British generals only brushed it off - the information got into the intelligence reports of the headquarters, but was ranked as "information that is not trustworthy."

The psychological impact of the first effective chemical attack was even greater. The troops, which then had no protection against a new type of weapon, were struck by a real "fear of gases", and the slightest rumor about the beginning of such an attack caused general panic.

Representatives of the Entente immediately accused the Germans of violating the Hague Convention, since Germany in 1899 in The Hague at the 1st Conference on Disarmament, among other countries, signed a declaration "On the non-use of shells that have the sole purpose of spreading asphyxiant or harmful gases." However, using the same wording, Berlin replied that the convention prohibits only projectiles with gas, and not any use of gases for military purposes. After that, in fact, no one remembered the convention anymore.

Otto Hahn (right) in the laboratory. 1913 year. Photo: Library of Congress

It is worth noting that it was chlorine that was chosen as the first chemical weapon for completely practical reasons. In peaceful life, it was then widely used to obtain bleach, hydrochloric acid, paints, medicines and a host of other products. The technology for its manufacture was well studied, so obtaining this gas in large quantities was not difficult.

The organization of the gas attack near Ypres was led by German chemists from the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin - Fritz Haber, James Frank, Gustav Hertz and Otto Hahn. The European civilization of the 20th century is best characterized by the fact that all of them subsequently received the Nobel Prizes for various scientific achievements of an exclusively peaceful nature. It is noteworthy that the creators of chemical weapons themselves did not believe that they were doing something terrible or even simply wrong. Fritz Haber, for example, claimed that he had always been an ideological opponent of war, but when it began, he was forced to work for the good of his homeland. Haber categorically denied accusations of creating inhuman weapons of mass destruction, considering such reasoning demagoguery - in response, he usually stated that death in any case is death, regardless of what exactly caused it.

"Showed more curiosity than anxiety."

Immediately after the "success" at Yprom, the Germans carried out several more gas attacks on the Western Front in April-May 1915. For the Eastern Front, the time for the first "gas attack" came at the end of May. The operation was again carried out near Warsaw near the village of Bolimov, where in January the first unsuccessful experiment with chemical shells took place on the Russian front. This time, 12 thousand chlorine cylinders were prepared on a 12-kilometer stretch.

On the night of May 31, 1915, at 3:20, the Germans released chlorine. Parts of two Russian divisions - the 55th and 14th Siberian divisions - fell under the gas attack. The reconnaissance in this sector of the front was then commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander De-Lazari, who later described that fateful morning: “Complete surprise and unpreparedness led to the fact that the soldiers showed more surprise and curiosity about the appearance of a gas cloud than anxiety. Mistaking a cloud of gas for disguising an attack, the Russian troops strengthened the forward trenches and pulled up reserves. Soon the trenches were filled with corpses and dying people. "

Almost 9038 people were poisoned in two Russian divisions, of which 1183 were killed. The concentration of the gas was such that, as an eyewitness wrote, chlorine “formed gas swamps in the lowlands, destroying the shoots of spring crops and clovers on the way” - the grass and leaves from the gas changed color, turned yellow and died after people.

As well as at Ypres, despite the tactical success of the attack, the Germans were unable to develop it into a breakthrough of the front. It is significant that the German soldiers at Bolimov were also very afraid of chlorine themselves and even tried to object to its use. But the high command from Berlin was relentless.

It is no less significant that, like the British and French at Ypres, the Russians were also aware of the impending gas attack. The Germans with the balloon batteries already placed in the forward trenches waited 10 days for a favorable wind, and during this time the Russians took several "tongues". Moreover, the command already knew the results of the use of chlorine at Iprom, but the soldiers and officers in the trenches did not warn about anything anyway. True, in connection with the threat of the use of chemistry, “gas masks” were discharged from Moscow itself - the first, not yet perfect gas masks. But, ironically, they were delivered to the divisions attacked by chlorine on May 31 in the evening, after the attack.

A month later, on the night of July 7, 1915, the Germans repeated the gas attack in the same area, not far from Bolimov, near the village of Volya Shidlovskaya. “This time the attack was no longer as unexpected as on May 31,” a participant in those battles wrote. "However, the chemical discipline of the Russians was still very low, and the passage of the gas wave caused the abandonment of the first line of defense and significant losses."

Despite the fact that the troops had already begun to supply primitive "gas masks", they still did not know how to properly respond to gas attacks. Instead of putting on masks and waiting for a cloud of chlorine to blow through the trenches, the soldiers fled in panic. It is impossible to overtake the wind by running, and they, in fact, ran in a gas cloud, which increased the time spent in chlorine vapor, and fast running only aggravated the damage to the respiratory system.

As a result, parts of the Russian army suffered heavy losses. The 218th Infantry Regiment lost 2,608 men. In the 21st Siberian regiment, after retreating in a cloud of chlorine, fewer companies remained combat-ready, 97% of soldiers and officers were poisoned. To conduct chemical reconnaissance, that is, to identify highly contaminated areas of the terrain, the troops also did not know how. Therefore, the Russian 220th Infantry Regiment launched a counterattack in the area contaminated with chlorine, and lost 6 officers and 1,346 privates from gas poisoning.

"In view of the enemy's complete promiscuity in the means of struggle"

Just two days after the first gas attack against the Russian troops, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich changed his mind about chemical weapons. On June 2, 1915, a telegram left him for Petrograd: “The Supreme Commander-in-Chief admits that in view of our enemy's complete illegibility in the means of struggle, the only measure of influence on him is the use of all the means used by the enemy on our part. The Commander-in-Chief asks for orders on the production of the necessary tests and the supply of the armies with the appropriate instruments with a supply of poisonous gases. "

But the formal decision on the creation of chemical weapons in Russia was made a little earlier - on May 30, 1915, an order of the Ministry of War No. 4053 appeared, which stated that “the organization of the procurement of gases and asphyxiant agents and the conduct of the case for the active use of gases is entrusted to the Commission for the Procurement of Explosives ". This commission was headed by two colonels of the guard, both Andrei Andreevich - specialists in artillery chemistry A.A. Solonin and A.A. Dzerzhkovich. The first was instructed to lead "on gases, their preparation and use", the second - "to manage the matter of equipping shells" with poisonous chemistry.

So, since the summer of 1915, the Russian Empire took care of the creation and production of its own chemical weapons. And in this question, the dependence of military affairs on the level of development of science and industry is especially clearly manifested.

On the one hand, by the end of the 19th century in Russia there was a powerful scientific school in the field of chemistry, it is enough to recall the epochal name of Dmitry Mendeleev. But, on the other hand, the Russian chemical industry in terms of the level and volume of production was seriously inferior to the leading powers of Western Europe, primarily Germany, which at that time was the leader in the world chemistry market. For example, in 1913, 75 thousand people worked at all chemical industries of the Russian Empire - from obtaining acids to producing matches, while in Germany over a quarter of a million workers were employed in this industry. In 1913, the value of the products of all chemical industries in Russia amounted to 375 million rubles, while Germany that year only sold chemical products abroad for 428 million rubles (924 million marks).

By 1914, there were less than 600 people with a higher education in chemistry in Russia. There was not a single specialized chemical-technological university in the country; only eight institutes and seven universities of the country trained a small number of chemists.

It should be noted here that the chemical industry in wartime is needed not only for the production of chemical weapons - first of all, its capacities are required for the production of gunpowder and other explosives required in gigantic quantities. Therefore, there were no longer any state "state-owned" factories in Russia that had free capacities for the production of chemical warfare.

Attack of the German infantry in gas masks in the clouds of poison gas. Photo: Deutsches Bundesarchiv

Under these conditions, the first manufacturer of "asphyxiant gases" was the private manufacturer Gondurin, who proposed to produce phosgene gas at his plant in Ivanovo-Voznesensk - an extremely poisonous volatile substance with a hay smell that damages the lungs. Since the 18th century, Hondurin merchants have been engaged in the production of calico, therefore, by the beginning of the 20th century, their factories, thanks to the work on dyeing fabrics, had some experience in chemical production. The Russian Empire signed a contract with the merchant Gondurin for the supply of phosgene in an amount of at least 10 poods (160 kg) per day.

Meanwhile, on August 6, 1915, the Germans tried to carry out a large gas attack against the garrison of the Russian fortress of Osovets, which had been successfully holding the defenses for several months. At 4 o'clock in the morning, they released a huge cloud of chlorine. The gas wave, released along a front 3 kilometers wide, penetrated to a depth of 12 kilometers and spread to the sides up to 8 kilometers. The height of the gas wave rose to 15 meters, the gas clouds this time had a green color - it was chlorine with an admixture of bromine.

In the epicenter of the attack, three Russian companies were completely killed. According to the surviving eyewitnesses, the consequences of that gas attack looked like this: “All the greenery in the fortress and in the nearest area along the path of the gases was destroyed, the leaves on the trees turned yellow, curled and fell off, the grass turned black and fell to the ground, the flower petals flew around. All copper objects in the fortress - parts of guns and shells, wash basins, tanks, etc. - were covered with a thick green layer of chlorine oxide. "

However, this time too, the Germans were unable to build on the success of the gas attack. Their infantry attacked too early and suffered gas losses themselves. Then two Russian companies counterattacked the enemy through a cloud of gases, losing up to half of the soldiers poisoned - the survivors, with swollen veins on the gas-stricken faces, launched a bayonet attack, which lively journalists in the world press would immediately call "an attack of the dead."

Therefore, the belligerent armies began to use gases in increasing quantities - if in April the Germans released almost 180 tons of chlorine near Iprom, then by autumn in one of the gas attacks in Champagne - already 500 tons. And in December 1915, a new, more toxic gas, phosgene, was used for the first time. Its "advantage" over chlorine was that the gas attack was difficult to determine - phosgene is transparent and invisible, has a faint smell of hay, and does not begin to act immediately after inhalation.

The widespread use of poison gases by Germany on the fronts of the Great War forced the Russian command to also enter the chemical arms race. At the same time, it was necessary to urgently solve two problems: firstly, to find a way to protect against new weapons, and secondly, “not to remain in debt to the Germans,” and to answer them in kind. The Russian army and industry coped with both of them more than successfully. Thanks to the outstanding Russian chemist Nikolai Zelinsky, the world's first universal effective gas mask was created in 1915. And in the spring of 1916, the Russian army carried out its first successful gas attack.
The empire needs poison

Before responding to the German gas attacks with the same weapon, the Russian army had to establish its production practically from scratch. Initially, the production of liquid chlorine was established, which before the war was completely imported from abroad.

This gas began to be supplied by the pre-war and converted production facilities - four plants in Samara, several enterprises in Saratov, one plant each - near Vyatka and in the Donbass in Slavyansk. In August 1915, the army received the first 2 tons of chlorine, a year later, by the fall of 1916, the release of this gas reached 9 tons per day.

An illustrative story happened with the plant in Slavyansk. It was created at the very beginning of the 20th century for the electrolytic production of bleach from rock salt mined in local salt mines. That is why the plant was called "Russian Electron", although 90% of its shares belonged to French citizens.

In 1915, it was the only facility located relatively close to the front and theoretically capable of rapidly producing chlorine on an industrial scale. Having received subsidies from the Russian government, the plant did not give the front a single ton of chlorine over the summer of 1915, and at the end of August the management of the plant was transferred to the hands of the military authorities.

Diplomats and newspapers of the seemingly allied France immediately raised a fuss about the violation of the interests of French property owners in Russia. The tsarist authorities were afraid of quarreling with the allies in the Entente, and in January 1916, the management of the plant was returned to the previous administration and even provided new loans. But until the end of the war, the plant in Slavyansk had not reached the production of chlorine in the quantities stipulated by military contracts.
An attempt to obtain phosgene in Russia from private industry also failed - Russian capitalists, despite all their patriotism, overstated prices and, due to the lack of sufficient industrial capacities, could not guarantee the timely execution of orders. For these needs, it was necessary to create new state-owned enterprises from scratch.

Already in July 1915, construction began on a "military chemical plant" in the village of Globino on the territory of what is now the Poltava region of Ukraine. Initially, it was planned to establish chlorine production there, but in the fall it was reoriented to new, more deadly gases - phosgene and chloropicrin. The ready-made infrastructure of the local sugar factory, one of the largest in the Russian Empire, was used for the chemical plant. Technical backwardness led to the fact that the enterprise was being built for more than a year, and the Globinsky Military Chemical Plant began producing phosgene and chloropicrin only on the eve of the February 1917 revolution.

The situation was similar with the construction of the second large state enterprise for the production of chemical weapons, which began to be built in March 1916 in Kazan. The first phosgene was produced by the Kazan Military Chemical Plant in 1917.

Initially, the War Ministry intended to organize large chemical plants in Finland, where there was an industrial base for such production. But the bureaucratic correspondence on this issue with the Finnish Senate dragged on for many months, and by 1917 the "military chemical plants" in Varkaus and Kajaan were still not ready.
While state-owned factories were just being built, the War Ministry had to buy gases wherever possible. For example, on November 21, 1915, 60 thousand poods of liquid chlorine were ordered from the Saratov City Council.

"Chemical Committee"

In October 1915, the first "special chemical teams" began to form in the Russian army to carry out gas attacks. But due to the initial weakness of Russian industry, it was not possible to attack the Germans with a new "poisonous" weapon in 1915.

In order to better coordinate all efforts to develop and produce war gases, in the spring of 1916, a Chemical Committee was created under the Main Artillery Directorate of the General Staff, often simply referred to as the “Chemical Committee”. All existing and created chemical weapons plants and all other works in this area were subordinated to him.

Major General Vladimir Nikolayevich Ipatiev, 48, became the Chairman of the Chemical Committee. A prominent scientist, he had not only a military, but also a professorial rank, before the war he taught a course in chemistry at St. Petersburg University.

Gas mask with ducal monograms

The first gas attacks immediately required not only the creation of chemical weapons, but also means of protection against them. In April 1915, in preparation for the first use of chlorine at Ypres, the German command supplied its soldiers with cotton pads soaked in sodium hyposulfite solution. They had to cover the nose and mouth during the launch of gases.

By the summer of that year, all the soldiers of the German, French and British armies were equipped with cotton-gauze bandages soaked in various chlorine neutralizers. However, such primitive "gas masks" proved to be uncomfortable and unreliable, besides mitigating the chlorine damage, they did not provide protection against the more toxic phosgene.

In Russia, in the summer of 1915, such bandages were called “stigma masks”. They were made for the front by various organizations and individuals. But as the German gas attacks showed, they almost did not save from the massive and prolonged use of toxic substances, and were extremely inconvenient in handling - they quickly dried out, finally losing their protective properties.

In August 1915, a professor at Moscow University Nikolai Dmitrievich Zelinsky suggested using activated charcoal as a means for absorbing poisonous gases. Already in November, Zelinsky's first coal gas mask was tested for the first time, complete with a rubber helmet with glass "eyes", which was made by an engineer from St. Petersburg, Mikhail Kummant.

Unlike previous designs, this one turned out to be reliable, easy to use and ready for immediate use for many months. The resulting protective device successfully passed all the tests and was named "Zelinsky-Kummant gas mask". However, here the obstacles to the successful arming of the Russian army with them were not even the shortcomings of Russian industry, but the departmental interests and ambitions of officials. At that time, all work on protection against chemical weapons was entrusted to the Russian general and the German prince Friedrich (Alexander Petrovich) of Oldenburg, a relative of the ruling Romanov dynasty, who served as the Supreme Chief of the medical and evacuation unit of the imperial army. By that time, the prince was almost 70 years old and Russian society remembered him as the founder of the resort in Gagra and a fighter against homosexuality in the guard. The prince actively lobbied for the adoption and production of a gas mask, which was designed by the teachers of the Petrograd Mining Institute using experience in mines. This gas mask, called the “gas mask of the Mining Institute,” as shown by the tests carried out, was less protective against asphyxiant gases and it was more difficult to breathe in it than in the gas mask of Zelinsky-Kummant.

Despite this, the Prince of Oldenburg ordered to begin production of 6 million "gas masks of the Mining Institute", decorated with his personal monogram. As a result, Russian industry spent several months producing a less perfect design. On March 19, 1916, at a meeting of the Special Conference on Defense - the main body of the Russian Empire for managing the military industry - an alarming report was made about the situation at the front with "masks" (as gas masks were then called): protect against other gases. The Mining Institute masks are unusable. The production of Zelinsky's masks, which have long been recognized as the best, has not been established, which should be considered criminal negligence. "

As a result, only the joint opinion of the military made it possible to start mass production of Zelinsky's gas masks. On March 25, the first state order for 3 million appeared and the next day for another 800 thousand gas masks of this type. By April 5, the first batch of 17 thousand had already been made. However, until the summer of 1916, the production of gas masks remained extremely inadequate - in June, no more than 10 thousand pieces a day arrived at the front, while for reliable protection their army needed millions. Only the efforts of the "Chemical Commission" of the General Staff made it possible to radically improve the situation by the fall - by the beginning of October 1916, over 4 million different gas masks were sent to the front, including 2.7 million "Zelinsky-Kummant gas masks." In addition to gas masks for people during the First World War, it was necessary to attend to special gas masks for horses, which then remained the main draft force of the army, not to mention the numerous cavalry. Until the end of 1916, 410 thousand horse gas masks of various designs were received at the front.

In total, during the First World War, the Russian army received over 28 million gas masks different types, of which over 11 million are the Zelinsky-Kummant system. Since the spring of 1917, only they were used in the combat units of the active army, thanks to which the Germans on the Russian front abandoned "gas" attacks with chlorine due to their complete ineffectiveness against troops in such gas masks.

"The war has crossed the last line»

According to historians, during the First World War, about 1.3 million people suffered from chemical weapons. The most famous of them, perhaps, was Adolf Hitler - on October 15, 1918, he was poisoned and temporarily lost his sight as a result of a close explosion of a chemical projectile. It is known that in 1918, from January to the end of the fighting in November, the British lost 115,764 soldiers from chemical weapons. Of these, less than one tenth of a percent died - 993. Such a small percentage of fatal losses from gases is associated with the full equipping of troops with advanced types of gas masks. but a large number of the wounded, more precisely poisoned and lost their combat effectiveness, left chemical weapons a formidable force on the fields of the First World War.

The US Army entered the war only in 1918, when the Germans brought the use of a variety of chemical weapons to maximum and perfection. Therefore, among all the losses of the American army, over a quarter were accounted for by chemical weapons. This weapon not only killed and wounded - with massive and prolonged use, it made entire divisions temporarily incapacitated. So, during the last offensive of the German army in March 1918, during an artillery preparation against the 3rd British army alone, 250 thousand mustard gas shells were fired. British soldiers on the frontline had to wear gas masks continuously for a week, making them almost incapacitated. The losses of the Russian army from chemical weapons in the First World War are estimated with a wide range. During the war, for obvious reasons, these figures were not announced, and two revolutions and the collapse of the front by the end of 1917 led to significant gaps in statistics.

The first official figures were published already in Soviet Russia in 1920 - 58 890 poisoned not fatally and 6268 died from gases. Hot on the heels in the 1920s and 1930s, studies in the West resulted in much larger numbers - over 56 thousand killed and about 420 thousand poisoned. Although the use of chemical weapons did not lead to strategic consequences, its impact on the psyche of soldiers was significant. Sociologist and philosopher Fyodor Stepun (by the way, he is of German origin, his real name is Friedrich Steppuhn) served as a junior officer in the Russian artillery. Even during the war, in 1917, his book "From the letters of an ensign artilleryman" was published, where he described the horror of people who survived the gas attack: "Night, darkness, howling overhead, the splash of shells and the whistle of heavy fragments. Breathing is so difficult that it seems that you are about to suffocate. The masked voice is almost inaudible, and in order for the battery to accept the command, the officer needs to shout it right into the ear of each gunner. At the same time, the terrible unrecognizability of the people around you, the loneliness of the damned tragic masquerade: white rubber skulls, square glass eyes, long green trunks. And all in a fantastic red sparkle of explosions and shots. And above everything there is an insane fear of a heavy, disgusting death: the Germans fired for five hours, and the masks were designed for six.

You can't hide, you have to work. With each step, it pricks the lungs, overturns, and the feeling of suffocation increases. And one must not only walk, one must run. Perhaps the horror of gases is not characterized by anything as vividly as the fact that in the gas cloud no one paid any attention to the shelling, but the shelling was terrible - more than a thousand shells fell on one of our batteries ...
In the morning, after the end of the shelling, the view of the battery was terrible. In the dawn fog, people are like shadows: pale, with bloodshot eyes, and with coal from gas masks that have settled on the eyelids and around the mouth; many are sick, many are fainting, the horses are all lying on a hitching post with dull eyes, with bloody foam at the mouth and nostrils, some are struggling in convulsions, some have already died. "
Fyodor Stepun summarized these experiences and impressions of chemical weapons: "After the gas attack in the battery, everyone felt that the war had crossed the last line, that from now on everything was allowed and nothing was sacred."
The total losses from chemical weapons in WWI are estimated at 1.3 million people, of which up to 100 thousand fatalities:

British Empire - 188 706 people were injured, 8109 of them died (according to other sources, on the Western Front - 5981 or 5899 out of 185 706 or 6062 out of 180 983 British soldiers);
France - 190,000, 9,000 died;
Russia - 475,340, 56,000 died (according to other sources, out of 65,000 victims, 6,340 died);
USA - 72 807, died 1462;
Italy - 60,000, died 4627;
Germany - 200,000, 9,000 died;
Austria-Hungary - 100,000, 3000 died.

The First World War was going on. On the evening of April 22, 1915, opposing German and French troops were under the Belgian city of Ypres. They fought for the city for a long time and to no avail. But this evening the Germans wanted to test a new weapon - poison gas. They brought with them thousands of cylinders, and when the wind blew towards the enemy, they opened the taps, releasing 180 tons of chlorine into the air. A yellowish gas cloud was blown towards the enemy line by the wind.

The panic began. The French soldiers immersed in the gas cloud were blind, coughing and suffocating. Three thousand of them died of suffocation, another seven thousand were burned.

"At that point, science lost its innocence," says science historian Ernst Peter Fischer. According to him, if before that the purpose of scientific research was to facilitate the living conditions of people, now science has created conditions that facilitate the murder of a person.

"In the war - for the fatherland"

The way to use chlorine for military purposes was developed by the German chemist Fritz Haber. He is considered the first scientist to subordinate scientific knowledge to military needs. Fritz Haber discovered that chlorine is an extremely poisonous gas that, due to its high density, concentrates low above the ground. He knew that this gas causes severe swelling of the mucous membranes, coughing, suffocation, and ultimately leads to death. In addition, the poison was cheap: chlorine is contained in the waste of the chemical industry.

"Haber's motto was" In the world - for humanity, in the war - for the fatherland, "Ernst Peter Fischer quotes the then head of the chemical department of the Prussian War Ministry. - Then there were other times. Everyone tried to find poison gas that they could use in the war . And only the Germans succeeded. "

The Ypres attack was a war crime as early as 1915. After all, the Hague Convention of 1907 prohibited the use of poison and poisoned weapons for military purposes.

Arms race

The "success" of Fritz Haber's military innovation became infectious, and not only for Germans. Simultaneously with the war of states, the "war of chemists" began. Scientists were tasked with creating chemical weapons ready for use as soon as possible. "Abroad looked at Haber with envy," says Ernst Peter Fischer. "Many wanted to have such a scientist in their country." In 1918, Fritz Haber received Nobel Prize in chemistry. True, not for the discovery of a poisonous gas, but for his contribution to the implementation of ammonia synthesis.

The French and British also experimented with poisonous gases. The use of phosgene and mustard gas became widespread in war, often in combination with each other. And yet, poisonous gases did not play a decisive role in the outcome of the war: these weapons could be used only in favorable weather.

Scary mechanism

Nevertheless, in the First World War, a terrible mechanism was launched, and Germany became its engine.

Chemist Fritz Haber not only laid the foundation for the military use of chlorine, but through his good industrial connections, helped to mass-produce these chemical weapons. Thus, the German chemical concern BASF produced large quantities of toxic substances during the First World War.

After the war with the creation of the IG Farben concern in 1925, Haber joined its supervisory board. Later, during National Socialism, a subsidiary of IG Farben was engaged in the production of "Cyclone B", which was used in the gas chambers of concentration camps.

Context

Fritz Haber himself could not have foreseen this. "He's a tragic figure," says Fischer. In 1933, Haber, a Jew by birth, emigrated to England, expelled from his country, in the service of which he placed his scientific knowledge.

Red line

In total, more than 90 thousand soldiers died on the fronts of the First World War from the use of poisonous gases. Many died of complications a few years after the end of the war. In 1905, the members of the League of Nations, which included Germany, under the Geneva Protocol pledged not to use chemical weapons. Meanwhile, scientific research on the use of poisonous gases was continued, mainly under the guise of developing means to combat harmful insects.

"Cyclone B" - hydrocyanic acid - insecticidal agent. "Agent orange" - a substance for de-leafing plants. The Americans used defoliant during the Vietnam War to thin out the local dense vegetation. As a consequence - poisoned soil, numerous diseases and genetic mutations in the population. The latest example of the use of chemical weapons is Syria.

"You can do whatever you want with poisonous gases, but they cannot be used as a target weapon," says science historian Fischer. “Everyone who is nearby becomes victims.” The fact that the use of poisonous gas is still “a red line that cannot be crossed”, he considers correct: “Otherwise, the war becomes even more inhuman than it already is.”

The use of poisonous gases in World War I was a major military innovation. The range of action of toxic substances went from simply harmful (such as tear gas) to deadly poisonous, such as chlorine and phosgene. Chemical weapon is one of the main ones in the First World War and, in total, throughout the XX century. The lethal potential of the gas was limited - only 4% of the deaths of the total number of those affected. Nevertheless, the proportion of non-fatalities was high, and gas remained one of the main hazards for soldiers. As it became possible to develop effective countermeasures against gas attacks, unlike most other weapons of this period, in the later stages of the war, its effectiveness began to decline, and it almost went out of circulation. But due to the fact that poisonous substances were first used in the First World War, it was also sometimes called the "war of chemists".

History of Poison Gases 1914

In the early days of the use of chemicals as weapons, there were tear irritants rather than fatal ones. During World War I, the French pioneered the use of gas using 26mm grenades filled with tear gas (ethyl bromoacetate) in August 1914. However, the Allied stockpiles of ethyl bromoacetate quickly came to an end, and the French administration replaced it with another agent, chloroacetone. In October 1914, German forces opened fire with shells partially filled with chemical irritants against British positions at Neuve Chapelle, despite the fact that the concentration achieved was so low that it was barely noticeable.

1915: widespread use of deadly gases

Germany was the first to use gas as a weapon of mass destruction on a large scale during World War I against Russia.

The first poison gas used by the German military was chlorine. The German chemical companies BASF, Hoechst, and Bayer (which formed the IG Farben conglomerate in 1925) produced chlorine as a by-product of dyes. In collaboration with Fritz Haber of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin, they began developing methods of using chlorine against enemy trenches.

By April 22, 1915, the German army had sprayed 168 tons of chlorine near the Ypres River. At 17:00 a weak east wind blew and the gas began to spray, it moved towards the French positions, forming yellowish-green clouds. It should be noted that the German infantry also suffered from gas and, not having sufficient reinforcements, could not use the advantage gained until the arrival of British-Canadian reinforcements. The Entente immediately announced that Germany violated the principles international law However, Berlin countered this claim by stating that the Hague Convention prohibits only the use of poisonous projectiles, but not gases.

After the Battle of Ypres, Germany used poison gases several more times: on April 24 against the 1st Canadian Division, on May 2 near the "Mousetrap Farm", on May 5 against the British and on August 6 against the defenders of the Russian fortress of Osovets. On May 5, 90 people died at once in the trenches; Of the 207 people who were admitted to field hospitals, 46 died on the same day, and 12 after prolonged torment. The effect of gases against the Russian army, however, was not effective enough: despite serious losses, the Russian army drove the Germans away from Osovets. The counterattack of Russian troops was called in European historiography as an "attack of the dead": according to many historians and witnesses of those battles, Russian soldiers by their appearance alone (many were disfigured after being fired with chemical shells) shocked and panicked German soldiers:

"All living things on outdoors on the bridgehead of the fortress was poisoned to death, - recalled the participant in the defense. - All the greenery in the fortress and in the immediate area along the path of the movement of gases was destroyed, the leaves on the trees turned yellow, curled up and fell off, the grass turned black and fell on the ground, the flower petals flew around. All copper objects on the bridgehead of the fortress - parts of guns and shells, washstands, tanks, etc. - were covered with a thick green layer of chlorine oxide; food items stored without hermetic sealing - meat, oil, lard, vegetables, turned out to be poisoned and unsuitable for consumption. "

"The half-poisoned ones wandered back, - this is another author," and, tormented by thirst, bent down to the water sources, but here, in low places, gases lingered, and secondary poisoning led to death. "

Chemical weapons are one of three types of weapons of mass destruction (the other 2 types are bacteriological and nuclear weapons). Kills people with toxins in gas cylinders.

History of chemical weapons

Chemical weapons began to be used by humans a very long time ago - long before the Copper Age. Then people used a bow with poisoned arrows. After all, it is much easier to apply poison, which will surely slowly kill the beast, than to run after it.

The first toxins were extracted from plants - man got it from the varieties of the acokantera plant. This poison causes cardiac arrest.

With the emergence of civilizations, bans on the use of the first chemical weapons began, but these bans were violated - Alexander the Great used all the chemicals known at that time in the war against India. His soldiers poisoned water wells and food stores. V ancient greece used the roots of the cultivar to poison the wells.

In the second half of the Middle Ages, alchemy, the forerunner of chemistry, began to develop rapidly. Acrid smoke began to appear, driving away the enemy.

First use of chemical weapons

The French were the first to use chemical weapons. It happened in the early days of the First World War. They say safety rules are written in blood. Safety rules for the use of chemical weapons are no exception. At first there were no rules, there was only one piece of advice - when throwing grenades stuffed with poisonous gases, you must take into account the direction of the wind. Also, there were no certain, tested substances that kill people 100%. There were gases that did not kill, but simply caused hallucinations or mild suffocation.

On April 22, 1915, the German armed forces used mustard gas. This substance is very toxic: it severely injures the mucous membrane of the eye and the respiratory system. After using mustard gas, the French and Germans lost about 100-120 thousand people. And for the entire First World War, 1.5 million people died from chemical weapons.

In the first 50 years of the 20th century, chemical weapons were used everywhere - against uprisings, riots and civilians.

The main toxic substances

Zarin... Sarin was opened in 1937. Sarin was discovered by accident - German chemist Gerhard Schrader was trying to create a stronger chemical against pests agriculture... Sarin is a liquid. Acts on the nervous system.

Soman... In 1944, Richard Kuhn discovered soman. Very similar to sarin, but more poisonous - two and a half times more than sarin.

After the Second World War, the research and production of chemical weapons by the Germans became known. All research classified as "secret" became known to the allies.

VX... In 1955, VX was opened in England. The most poisonous chemical weapon created artificially.

At the first signs of poisoning, you need to act quickly, otherwise death will occur in about a quarter of an hour. Protective equipment is a gas mask, OZK (combined arms protective kit).

VR... Developed in 1964 in the USSR, it is an analogue of the VX.

In addition to highly toxic gases, gases were also produced to disperse crowds of rioters. These are tear and pepper gases.

In the second half of the twentieth century, more precisely from the early 1960s to the late 1970s, there was a flourishing of discoveries and developments in chemical weapons. During this period, they began to invent gases that have a short-term effect on the human psyche.

Chemical weapons in our time

Currently, most of the chemical weapons are prohibited by the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

The classification of poisons depends on the hazard posed by the chemical:

• The first group includes all the poisons that have ever been in the arsenal of countries. Countries are prohibited from storing any chemicals in this group over 1 ton. If the weight is over 100g, the control committee must be notified.
• The second group consists of substances that can be used both for military purposes and in peaceful production.
• The third group includes substances that are used in large quantities in production. If the production produces more than thirty tons per year, it must be registered in the register for control.

First aid for poisoning with chemically hazardous substances

“As for me, if I were given the choice to die torn apart by fragments of an honest grenade, or agonizing in the prickly snares of a wire fence, or buried in a submarine, or suffocated with a poisonous substance, I would be in indecision, since there is no significant difference "

Giulio Douai, 1921

The use of toxic substances (OS) in the First World War became an event in the development of military art, no less important in its significance than the appearance of firearms in the Middle Ages. This high-tech weapon turned out to be a harbinger of the appearance in the twentieth century. means of warfare, known to us today as weapons of mass destruction. However, the "newborn" who was born on April 22, 1915 near the Belgian city of Ypres, was just learning to walk. The belligerent parties had to study the tactical and operational capabilities of the new weapon, and develop the basic techniques for its use.

The problems associated with the use of a new lethal agent began at the time of its "birth". Evaporation of liquid chlorine proceeds with a large absorption of heat, and the rate of its expiration from the cylinder decreases rapidly. Therefore, during the first gas launch, carried out by the Germans on April 22, 1915, near Ypres, the cylinders with liquid chlorine lined up in a line were lined with combustible materials, which were set on fire during the gas launch. Without heating the bottle with liquid chlorine, it was impossible to achieve the concentration of chlorine in the gaseous state necessary for the mass extermination of people. But a month later, when preparing a gas attack against units of the 2nd Russian army near Bolimov, the Germans combined 12 thousand gas cylinders into gas batteries (10 – 12 cylinders in each) and, as a compressor, we connected cylinders with compressed air up to 150 atmospheres to the manifold of each battery. Liquid chlorine was thrown out with compressed air from cylinders for 1.5 – 3 minutes. A dense gas cloud that covered the Russian positions on the 12 km front knocked out 9 thousand of our soldiers, and more than a thousand of them died.

The new weapon had to be learned to use at least for tactical purposes. The gas-cylinder attack, organized by the Russian troops near Smorgon on July 24, 1916, was unsuccessful due to an incorrectly chosen gas launch site (flank to the enemy) and was thwarted by German artillery. It is a well-known fact that chlorine released from cylinders usually accumulates in lowlands and funnels, forming "gas swamps". The wind can change the direction of its movement. However, not having reliable gas masks, the Germans and Russians, until the fall of 1916, went into bayonet attacks in close formation following the gas waves, sometimes losing thousands of soldiers poisoned by their own weapons. On the Sukha front sector – Volya Shydlovskaya 220th Infantry Regiment, repelling the German attack that followed the gas launch on July 7, 1915, made a desperate counterattack on the terrain filled with "gas swamps" and lost 6 commanders and 1346 riflemen poisoned with chlorine. On August 6, 1915, under the Russian fortress Osovets, the Germans lost up to a thousand soldiers, who poisoned themselves, advancing behind a wave of gas released by them.

The new OVs gave unexpected tactical results. Having applied phosgene for the first time on September 25, 1916 on the Russian front (the Ikskul area on the Western Dvina; the position was occupied by units of the 44th Infantry Division), the German command hoped that the wet gauze masks of the Russians, which retain chlorine well, would be easily "pierced" with phosgene. And so it happened. However, due to the slow action of phosgene, most Russian soldiers did not feel the signs of poisoning until a day later. With rifle, machine-gun and artillery fire, they destroyed up to two battalions of German infantry, which rose to attack after each gas wave. Having used mustard gas shells near Yprom in July 1917, the German command caught the British by surprise, but they could not use the success achieved by this OV due to the lack of appropriate protective clothing in the German troops.

The resilience of the soldiers, the operational art of command, and the chemical discipline of troops played an important role in chemical warfare. The first German gas-cylinder attack at Ypres in April 1915 fell on the French native units, consisting of Africans. They fled in panic, exposing the front for 8 km. The Germans drew the correct conclusion: the gas attack began to be viewed by them as a means of breaking through the front. But the carefully prepared German offensive near Bolimov, launched after a gas-cylinder attack against units of the 2nd Russian Army that did not have any means of anti-chemical protection, failed. And above all because of the resilience of the surviving Russian soldiers, who opened accurate rifle and machine-gun fire on the German attacking chains. The skillful actions of the Russian command, which organized the approach of reserves and effective artillery fire, also had an effect. By the summer of 1917, the contours of chemical warfare were gradually emerging - its basic principles and tactics.

The success of a chemical attack depended on how accurately the principles of chemical warfare were followed.

The principle of maximum concentration of OM... At the initial stage of chemical warfare, this principle did not matter much due to the fact that there were no effective gas masks. It was considered sufficient to create a lethal concentration of OM. The advent of activated carbon gas masks nearly made chemical warfare meaningless. However, the experience of hostilities has shown that even such gas masks are protected only for a limited period of time. Activated carbon and chemical absorbers of gas mask boxes are able to bind only a certain amount of OM. The higher the concentration of OM in the gas cloud, the faster it "breaks through" the gas masks. Achieving maximum concentrations of organic matter on the battlefield has become much easier after the appearance of gas cannons at the belligerent parties.

The principle of surprise... Its observance is necessary to overcome the protective effect of gas masks. The suddenness of a chemical attack was achieved by creating a gas cloud in such a short time that the enemy soldiers did not have time to put on gas masks (masking the preparation of gas attacks, gas launches at night or under the cover of a smoke screen, the use of gas cannons, etc.). For the same purpose, OM without color, odor and irritating effect (diphosgene, mustard gas in certain concentrations) were used. The shelling was carried out with chemical shells and mines with a large amount of explosive (fragmentation-chemical shells and mines), which made it impossible to distinguish the sounds of explosions of shells and mines with HE, from high-explosive. The hiss of gas coming out simultaneously from thousands of cylinders was drowned out by machine-gun and artillery fire.

The principle of mass exposure to organic matter... Small losses in combat among personnel are eliminated in a short time at the expense of reserves. It was empirically found that the damaging effect of a gas cloud is proportional to its size. The enemy's losses are the higher, the wider the gas cloud along the front (suppression of enemy flank fire in the breakthrough sector) and the deeper it penetrates into the enemy's defenses (shackling of reserves, defeat of artillery batteries and headquarters). In addition, the mere sight of a huge, dense gas cloud covering the horizon is extremely demoralizing even for experienced and staunch soldiers. The "flooding" of the terrain with an opaque gas makes troop control extremely difficult. Extensive contamination of the terrain with persistent agents (mustard gas, sometimes diphosgene) deprives the enemy of the opportunity to use the depth of his order.

The principle of overcoming enemy gas masks... The constant improvement of gas masks and the strengthening of the gas discipline of the troops significantly reduced the consequences of a sudden chemical attack. Achievement of the maximum concentrations of OM in the gas cloud was possible only near its source. Therefore, victory over a gas mask was easier to achieve by using an agent with the ability to penetrate a gas mask. To achieve this goal, since July 1917, two approaches have been used:

The use of arsine fumes, consisting of submicron particles. They passed through a gas mask charge without interacting with activated carbon (German “blue cross” chemical fragmentation shells) and forced the soldiers to throw off their gas masks;

The use of an agent capable of bypassing the gas mask. Such a remedy was mustard gas (German chemical and chemical fragmentation shells of the "yellow cross").

The principle of using new OM... By consistently using a number of new agents in chemical attacks, still unfamiliar to the enemy and taking into account the development of his defenses, it is possible not only to inflict tangible losses on him, but also to undermine his morale. The experience of the war has shown that re-emerging military agents on the front, possessing an unfamiliar smell and a special character of physiological action, cause the enemy to feel uncertainty about the reliability of their own gas masks, which leads to a weakening of the stamina and combat effectiveness of even battle-hardened units. In addition to the consistent use of new agents in the war (chlorine in 1915, diphosgene in 1916, arsines and mustard gas in 1917), the Germans fired shells with chlorinated chemical production waste at the enemy, posing the enemy with the problem of the correct answer to the question: “ What would that mean? "

The troops of the opposing sides used various tactics of using chemical weapons.

Gas balloon launch tactics... Gas-cylinder launches were carried out to break through the enemy's front and to inflict losses on him. Large (heavy, wave) launches could last up to 6 hours and include up to 9 gas waves. The front of the release of gases was either continuous or consisted of several sections with a total length of one to five, and sometimes more than kilometers. During the German gas attacks, which lasted from one to one and a half hours, the British and French, if they had good gas masks and shelters, suffered losses of up to 10 – 11% of the personnel of the units. The suppression of the enemy's morale was of colossal importance during prolonged gas-cylinder launches. The prolonged gas cylinder launch prevented the transfer of reserves to the area of ​​the gas attack, including the army. The transfer of large parts (for example, a regiment) in an area covered with an OM cloud was impossible, since for this the reserve had to be covered in gas masks from 5 to 8 km. The total area occupied by the poisoned air during large gas cylinder launches could reach several hundred square kilometers with a penetration depth of a gas wave of up to 30 km. During the First World War, it was impossible to cover such huge areas with any other methods of chemical attack (gas-cannon bombardment, chemical shelling).

The installation of cylinders for gas launching was carried out with batteries directly in the trenches, or in special shelters. The shelters were arranged according to the type " fox holes»To a depth of up to 5 m from the surface of the earth: thus, they protected from artillery and mortar fire both the material part installed in the shelters and the people carrying out the gas launch.

The amount of OM that had to be released in order to receive a gas wave with a concentration sufficient to incapacitate the enemy was established empirically based on the results of range launches. The consumption of OM was reduced to a conventional value, the so-called combat rate, showing the consumption of OM in kilograms per unit length of the release front per unit of time. One kilometer was taken as a unit of front length, and one minute for a unit of time for a gas cylinder release. For example, a combat rate of 1200 kg / km / min meant a gas consumption of 1200 kg at a release front of one kilometer for one minute. The combat norms used by various armies during the First World War were as follows: for chlorine (or its mixture with phosgene) - from 800 to 1200 kg / km / min with a wind of 2 to 5 meters per second; or from 720 to 400 kg / km / min with a wind of 0.5 to 2 meters per second. With a wind of about 4 m per second, a kilometer will be covered with a gas wave in 4 minutes, 2 km in 8 minutes and 3 km in 12 minutes.

The artillery was used to ensure the success of the release of the OM. This task was solved by shelling enemy batteries, especially those that can hit the front of the gas launch. Artillery fire was opened simultaneously with the start of the gas launch. The best projectile for such shooting was considered to be a chemical projectile with an unstable agent. He most economically solved the problem of neutralizing enemy batteries. The duration of the fire was usually 30–40 minutes. All targets for artillery were planned in advance. If the military commander had gas-throwing units at his disposal, then after the gas launch was completed, they could make passages in artificial obstacles erected by the enemy with high-explosive fragmentation mines, which took several minutes.

A. Photograph of the area after the British gas fired during the Battle of the Somme in 1916. Light stripes emanating from the British trenches correspond to discolored vegetation and mark the locations of chlorine outflows from gas cylinders. B. The same area, photographed from a higher altitude. The vegetation in front and behind the German trenches has faded, as if dried by fire and appears in the photographs as pale gray spots. The pictures were taken from a German airplane to identify the positions of British gas-cylinder batteries. Light spots in pictures sharply and accurately indicate where they are installed - important targets for German artillery. According to Yu Mayer (1928).

The infantry, intended for the attack, concentrated on the bridgehead some time after the start of the gas launch, when the enemy artillery fire subsided. The infantry attack began after 15 – 20 minutes after stopping gas firing. Sometimes it was carried out after an additionally installed smoke screen or in it itself. The smoke screen was intended to simulate the continuation of the gas attack and, accordingly, to constrain the enemy's actions. To ensure the protection of the attacking infantry from flank fire and flank attacks of enemy manpower, the front of the gas attack was made at least 2 km wider than the front of the breakthrough. For example, when a fortified strip was broken through at a front of 3 km, a gas-cylinder attack was organized at a front of 5 km. There are cases when gas launches were carried out in a defensive battle. For example, on July 7 and 8, 1915, on the Sukha front sector – Volya Shydlovskaya, the Germans carried out gas launches against the counterattacking Russian troops.

Mortar tactics... The following types of mortar and chemical fire were distinguished.

Small fire (mortar and gas attack)- sudden concentrated fire of one minute from as many mortars as possible on a specific target (mortar trenches, machine-gun nests, shelters, etc.). A longer attack was considered impractical due to the fact that the enemy had time to put on gas masks.

Average shooting- connection of several small fires over the smallest possible area. The area under fire was divided into sites of one hectare, and one or more chemical attacks were carried out for each hectare. The OM consumption did not exceed 1,000 kg.

Large shooting - any shooting with chemical mines, when the consumption of OM exceeded 1 thousand kg. Up to 150 kg of OM was produced per hectare during 1 – 2 hours. Areas without targets were not shelled, "gas swamps" were not created.

Concentration Shooting- with a significant accumulation of enemy troops and favorable weather conditions, the amount of OM per hectare was increased to 3 thousand kg. This technique was popular: a site was selected above the enemy's trenches, and medium chemical mines (a charge of about 10 kg of OM) were fired at it from a large number of mortars. A thick cloud of gas “flowed down” onto the enemy's positions along his own trenches and message trenches, as through channels.

Tactical techniques for using gas cannons. Any use of gas cannons presupposed “concentration shooting”. During the offensive, gas cannons were used to suppress enemy infantry. In the direction of the main attack, the enemy was bombarded with mines with unstable agents (phosgene, chlorine with phosgene, etc.) or high-explosive fragmentation mines or a combination of both. The volley was fired at the start of the attack. Suppression of infantry on the flanks of the attack was carried out either by mines with unstable weapons in combination with high-explosive fragmentation mines; or, with the wind to the outside of the front of the attack, mines with persistent OM (mustard gas) were used. Suppression of enemy reserves was carried out by shelling the areas of their concentration with mines with unstable weapons or high-explosive fragmentation mines. It was considered possible to limit ourselves to the simultaneous ejection of 100 – 200 chemical mines (each weighing 25 kg, of which 12 kg of OM) out of 100 – 200 gas cannons.

In a defensive battle, gas cannons were used to suppress the advancing infantry in directions dangerous for the defending directions (shelling with chemical or high-explosive mines). Usually, the target of gas-jet strikes was the concentration areas (hollows, ravines, forests) of the enemy's reserves, starting from the company level and higher. If the defenders themselves did not intend to go over to the offensive, and the areas where the enemy's reserves were concentrated were no closer than 1 – 1.5 km, then they were fired at with mines equipped with a persistent agent (mustard gas).

When leaving the battle, gas cannons were used to infect with persistent OM of road junctions, hollows, hollows, ravines convenient for movement and concentration of the enemy; and the heights where it was supposed to place his command and artillery observation posts. Volleys of gas were fired before the infantry began to withdraw, but not later than the withdrawal of the second echelons of battalions.

Artillery chemical firing tactics... German manuals on chemical firing of artillery assumed the following types, depending on the type of hostilities. Three types of chemical fire were used in the offensive: 1) gas attack or small chemical fire; 2) shooting to create a cloud; 3) chemical fragmentation shooting.

The essence gas attack consisted in the sudden simultaneous opening of fire with chemical projectiles and obtaining the greatest possible concentration of gas at a certain point with living targets. This was achieved by the fact that at least 100 field cannon shells, or 50 shells of a light field howitzer, or 25 shells of a heavy field cannon, were fired from the largest possible number of guns at the highest speed (in about one minute).

A. German chemical projectile "blue cross" (1917-1918): 1 - poisonous substance (arsines); 2 - a case for a poisonous substance; 3 - bursting charge; 4 - shell body.

B. Germanicheskikh chemical projectile "double yellow cross" (1918): 1 - poisonous substance (80% mustard gas, 20% dichloromethyl oxide); 2 - diaphragm; 3 - bursting charge; 4 - shell body.

B. French chemical projectile (1916-1918). The equipment of the projectile was changed several times during the war. The most effective were phosgene shells among the French: 1 - poisonous substance; 2 - bursting charge; 3 - shell body.

G. British chemical projectile (1916-1918). The equipment of the projectile was changed several times during the war. 1 - poisonous substance; 2 - a hole for pouring a poisonous substance, closed with a stopper; 3 - diaphragm; 4 - bursting charge and smoke generator; 5 - detonator; 6 - fuse.

Shooting to create gas cloud similar to a gas attack. The difference is that during a gas attack, the shooting was always carried out at the point, and when shooting at the creation of a cloud - at the area. Shooting to create a gas cloud was often carried out with a "multi-colored cross", that is, first, enemy positions were fired on with a "blue cross" (chemical fragmentation shells with arsines), forcing the soldiers to drop their gas masks, and then they were finished off with shells with a "green cross" (phosgene , diphosgene). In the plan of artillery fire, "sighting areas" were indicated, that is, areas on which the presence of living targets was assumed. They were fired at twice as intense as in other areas. The area exposed to more rare fire was called the "gas swamp". Skillful artillery commanders, thanks to "shooting to create a cloud," could solve extraordinary combat missions. For example, on the Fleury-Tiomont front sector (Verdun, east bank of the Meuse), French artillery was located in hollows and hollows, inaccessible even to the hanging fire of German artillery. On the night of June 22-23, 1916, German artillery used up thousands of "green cross" chemical shells of 77-mm and 105-mm caliber along the edges and slopes of the hollows and hollows that sheltered the French batteries. Thanks to a very weak wind, a continuous dense cloud of gas gradually filled all the lowlands and hollows, destroying the French troops entrenched in these places, including the crews of artillery guns. To carry out a counterattack, the French command advanced strong reserves from Verdun. However, the "green cross" destroyed the reserve units moving along the valleys and along the lowlands. The gas blanket remained in the fired area until 6 pm.

A drawing by a British artist shows the calculation of a 4.5 inch field howitzer - the main artillery system used by the British for firing chemical projectiles in 1916. The howitzer battery is fired by German chemical projectiles, their explosions are shown on the left side of the figure. With the exception of the sergeant (right), the gunners protect themselves from toxic substances with wet helmets. The sergeant has a large box gas mask with separate goggles. The projectile is marked "PS" - this means that it is loaded with chloropicrin. By J. Simon, R. Hook (2007)

Chemical fragmentation shooting was used only by the Germans: their opponents did not have chemical fragmentation shells. From the middle of 1917, the German artillerymen used “yellow”, “blue” and “green cross” fragmentation-chemical shells in any firing with high-explosive shells to increase the effectiveness of artillery fire. In some operations, they accounted for up to half of the artillery shells fired. Their use peaked in the spring of 1918, the time of major offensives. German troops... The Allies were well aware of the German "double barrage": one barrage of fragmentation shells advanced directly in front of the German infantry, and the second, of chemical fragmentation shells, went ahead of the first at such a distance that the action of OV could not delay the advance of its infantry. Chemical fragmentation projectiles proved to be very effective in the fight against artillery batteries and in suppressing machine gun nests. The greatest panic in the ranks of the Allies was caused by the German shelling of the "yellow cross" shells.

In defense, the so-called poisoning shooting... In contrast to the above, it represented a calm targeted firing of “yellow cross” chemical projectiles with a small explosive charge at areas of the terrain that they wanted to clear of the enemy or to which it was necessary to close access to him. If at the time of the shelling the area was already occupied by the enemy, then the action of the "yellow cross" was supplemented by shooting to create a gas cloud (shells of the "blue" and "green cross").

Bibliographic description:

Supotnitsky M.V. Forgotten chemical warfare. II. Tactical use of chemical weapons during the First World War // Officers. - 2010. - № 4 (48). - S. 52-57.

“… We saw the first line of trenches, smashed to smithereens by us. After 300-500 steps concrete casemates for machine guns. The concrete is intact, but the casemates are littered with earth and full of corpses. This is the effect of the last volleys of gas shells. "

From the memoirs of Captain of the Guard Sergei Nikolsky, Galicia, June 1916

The history of the chemical weapons of the Russian Empire has not yet been written. But even the information that can be gleaned from scattered sources shows the extraordinary talent of the Russian people of that time - scientists, engineers, military men, manifested during the First World War. Starting from scratch, without petrodollars and the "help from the West" so expected today, they managed to create a military-chemical industry in just a year, supplying the Russian army with several types of chemical warfare agents, chemical ammunition and personal protective equipment. The summer offensive of 1916, known as the Brusilov Breakthrough, already at the planning stage involved the use of chemical weapons to solve tactical problems.

For the first time, chemical weapons were used on the Russian front at the end of January 1915 on the territory of the left-bank Poland (Bolimovo). German artillery fired about 18 thousand 15-centimeter howitzer fragmentation-chemical shells of the "T" type at units of the 2nd Russian army, which blocked the way to Warsaw of the 9th army of General August Mackensen. The shells had a strong blasting effect and contained an irritant, xylyl bromide. Due to the low air temperature in the area of ​​shelling and insufficient massing of fire, the Russian troops did not suffer serious losses.

A large-scale chemical war on the Russian front began on May 31, 1915 in the same Bolimovsk sector with a grandiose gas cylinder release of chlorine at a 12 km front in the defense zone of the 14th Siberian and 55th rifle divisions. The almost complete absence of forests allowed the gas cloud to move deep into the defenses of the Russian troops, retaining the damaging effect for at least 10 km. The experience gained at Ypres gave the German command reason to consider the breakthrough of the Russian defense already a foregone conclusion. However, the resilience of the Russian soldier and the deeply echeloned defense structure in this sector of the front allowed the Russian command to repulse 11 German offensive attempts, made after the gas launch, with the introduction of reserves and the skillful use of artillery. The losses of the Russians by gas poisoning amounted to 9036 soldiers and officers, of which 1183 people died. On the same day, the losses from small arms and artillery fire of the Germans amounted to 116 fighters. This ratio of losses forced the tsarist government to take off the “rose-colored glasses” of the “laws and customs of land war” declared in The Hague and enter into a chemical war.

Already on June 2, 1915, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (nashtaverh) General of Infantry N.N. Yanushkevich telegraphed Minister of War V.A. Most of the Russian chemical industry was represented by German chemical plants. Chemical engineering, as a branch of the national economy, was generally absent in Russia. Long before the war, German industrialists were concerned that their enterprises could not be used by the Russians for military purposes. Their firms deliberately protected the interests of Germany, which monopolistically supplied benzene and toluene for the Russian industry, which are necessary for the manufacture of explosives and paints.

After the gas attack on May 31, the German chemical attacks on the Russian troops continued with increasing force and ingenuity. On the night of July 6-7, the Germans repeated the gas-cylinder attack in the Sukha-Volya Shidlovskaya sector against units of the 6th Siberian Infantry and 55th Infantry Divisions. The passage of the gas wave forced the Russian troops to abandon the first line of defense in two regimental sectors (the 21st Siberian Infantry Regiment and the 218th Infantry Regiment) at the junction of the divisions and entailed significant losses. It is known that the 218th Infantry Regiment during the retreat lost one commander and 2607 riflemen to the poisoned. In the 21st regiment, only half a company remained operational after the withdrawal, and 97% of the regiment's personnel were incapacitated. The 220th Infantry Regiment lost six commanders and 1,346 riflemen. A battalion of the 22nd Siberian Rifle Regiment crossed the gas wave during a counterattack, after which it turned into three companies, losing 25% of its personnel. On July 8, the Russians restored their lost position with counterattacks, but the struggle demanded from them more and more exertion of forces and colossal sacrifices.

On 4 August, the Germans launched a mortar attack on the Russian positions between Lomza and Ostrolenka. Used 25-centimeter heavy chemical mines, in addition to explosives equipped with 20 kg of bromoacetone. The Russians suffered heavy losses. On August 9, 1915, the Germans carried out a gas-cylinder attack that assisted in the assault on the Osovets fortress. The attack was unsuccessful, but more than 1600 people were poisoned and “strangled” out of the garrison of the fortress.

In the Russian rear, German agents carried out acts of sabotage, which increased the losses of Russian troops from military forces at the front. In early June 1915, wet masks designed to protect against chlorine began to arrive in the Russian army. But already at the front it became clear that chlorine passes through them freely. Russian counterintelligence detained a train with masks on its way to the front and investigated the composition of an anti-gas liquid intended for impregnating masks. It was found that this liquid is supplied to the troops diluted with water at least twice. The investigation brought counterintelligence officers to a chemical plant in Kharkov. Its director was a German. In his testimony, he wrote that he was an officer of the Landsturm, and that “Russian pigs should have reached complete idiocy, thinking that german officer could have acted differently. "

Apparently the allies adhered to the same point of view. The Russian Empire was the junior partner in their war. Unlike France and the United Kingdom, Russia did not have its own developments on chemical weapons, made before their use. Before the war, even liquid chlorine was brought to the Empire from abroad. The only plant that the Russian government could count on in the large-scale production of chlorine was the plant of the Southern Russian Society in Slavyansk, located near large salt beds (on an industrial scale, chlorine is obtained by electrolysis aqueous solutions sodium chloride). But 90% of its shares were owned by French citizens. Having received large subsidies from the Russian government, the plant did not give the front a single ton of chlorine during the summer of 1915. At the end of August, a sequestration was imposed on him, that is, the right to control from the side of society was limited. French diplomats and the French press raised a fuss about the violation of the interests of French capital in Russia. In January 1916, the sequestration was lifted, new loans were provided to the company, but until the end of the war chlorine in the quantities stipulated by contracts was not supplied by the Slavyansk plant.

Degassing of Russian trenches. In the foreground is an officer in a gas mask of the Mining Institute with a Kummant mask, two others - in Moscow-style Zelinsky-Kummant gas masks. Image taken from the site - www.himbat.ru

When, in the fall of 1915, the Russian government tried, through its representatives in France, to obtain technology from the French industrialists for the manufacture of military weapons, they were denied this. Preparing for the summer offensive of 1916, the Russian government ordered 2,500 tons of liquid chlorine, 1,666 tons of phosgene and 650,000 chemical shells in the United Kingdom with delivery no later than May 1, 1916.The timing of the offensive and the direction of the main attack of the Russian armies were adjusted by the Allies to the detriment of the Russians interests, but by the beginning of the offensive, only a small batch of chlorine was delivered to Russia from the ordered agents, and none of the chemical shells. By the beginning of the summer offensive, Russian industry was able to deliver only 150,000 chemical shells.

Russia had to increase the production of agents and chemical weapons independently. They wanted to produce liquid chlorine in Finland, but the Finnish Senate dragged out negotiations for a year, until August 1916. An attempt to obtain phosgene from private industry failed due to extremely high prices set by industrialists and a lack of guarantees in timely execution of orders. In August 1915 (that is, six months before the first use of phosgene shells by the French near Verdun), the Chemical Committee began the construction of state-owned phosgene plants in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Moscow, Kazan and at the Perezdnaya and Globino stations. Chlorine production was organized at factories in Samara, Rubizhne, Saratov, in the Vyatka province. In August 1915, the first 2 tons of liquid chlorine were obtained. Phosgene production began in October.

In 1916, Russian plants produced: chlorine - 2500 tons; phosgene - 117 tons; chloropicrin - 516 tons; cyanide compounds - 180 tons; sulfuryl chloride - 340 tons; chlorine tin - 135 t.

In October 1915, chemical teams began to be formed in Russia to carry out gas attacks. As they were formed, they were sent to the command of the front commanders.

In January 1916, the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) developed "Instructions for the use of 3-inch chemical projectiles in battle," and in March the General Staff drew up instructions for the use of OV in a wave release. In February, 15 thousand were sent to the Northern Front in the 5th and 12th armies, and to the Western Front in the group of General P. S. Baluev (2nd Army) - 30 thousand chemical shells for 3-inch guns ( 76 mm).

The first use of chemical weapons by the Russians occurred during the March offensive of the Northern and Western Fronts in the area of ​​Lake Naroch. The offensive was undertaken at the request of the Allies and was intended to weaken the German offensive against Verdun. It cost the Russian people 80 thousand killed, wounded and maimed. The Russian command considered chemical weapons in this operation as an auxiliary combat means, the action of which had yet to be studied in battle.

Preparation of the first Russian gas launch by sappers of the 1st chemical team in the defense sector of the 38th division in March 1916 near Ixskyl (photo from Thomas Wictor's book "Flamethrower Troops of World War I: The Central and Allied Powers", 2010)

General Baluev directed chemical shells into the artillery of the 25th Infantry Division, which was advancing in the main direction. During the artillery preparation on March 21, 1916, asphyxiating chemical shells were fired at the enemy's trenches, poisonous - at his rear. A total of 10 thousand chemical shells were fired at the German trenches. The effectiveness of the shooting was low due to the lack of mass in the use of chemical projectiles. However, when the Germans launched a counterattack, several bursts of chemical shells fired by two batteries drove them back into the trenches and they did not undertake more attacks in this sector of the front. In the 12th Army on March 21, in the Ikskul area, the batteries of the 3rd Siberian Artillery Brigade fired 576 chemical shells, but under the conditions of the battle, their action could not be observed. In the same battles, it was planned to carry out the first Russian gas-cylinder attack on the defense sector of the 38th division (it was part of the 23rd army corps of the Dvina group). The chemical attack was not carried out at the appointed time due to rain and fog. But the very fact of preparing a gas launch shows that in the battles of Ikskul, the capabilities of the Russian army in the use of chemical weapons began to catch up with the capabilities of the French, who carried out the first gas launch in February.

The experience of chemical warfare was generalized, and a large amount of special literature was sent to the front.

On the basis of the generalized experience of the use of chemical weapons in the Naroch operation, the General Staff prepared an "Instruction for the combat use of chemical weapons", approved by the Headquarters on April 15, 1916. The instructions provided for the use of chemicals from special cylinders, throwing chemical projectiles from artillery, bomb and mortar guns, from aeronautical vehicles or in the form of hand grenades.

The Russian army was armed with two types of special cylinders - large (E-70) and small (E-30). The name of the cylinder indicated its capacity: the large ones held 70 pounds (28 kg) of chlorine condensed into a liquid, the small ones held 30 pounds (11.5 kg). The initial "E" meant "capacity". Inside the cylinder there was a siphon iron tube through which the liquefied OM was released outside when the valve was open. The E-70 cylinder has been produced since the spring of 1916, at the same time it was decided to stop the production of the E-30 cylinder. In total, 65,806 E-30 cylinders and 93,646 E-70 cylinders were produced in 1916.

Everything needed to assemble a collector gas battery was packed into collector boxes. With E-70 cylinders, parts for assembling two collector batteries were placed in each such box. For the accelerated release of chlorine into the cylinders, air was additionally pumped up to a pressure of 25 atmospheres or the apparatus of Professor N. A. Shilov, made on the basis of German trophy samples, was used. It supplied air compressed to 125 atmospheres into chlorine cylinders. Under this pressure, the cylinders were freed from chlorine within 2-3 minutes. To make the chlorine cloud heavier, phosgene, tin chloride and titanium tetrachloride were added to it.

The first Russian gas launch took place during the summer offensive of 1916 in the direction of the main attack of the 10th Army northeast of Smorgon. The offensive was led by the 48th Infantry Division of the 24th Corps. The army headquarters gave the division the 5th chemical command, commanded by Colonel M. M. Kostevich (later a famous chemist and freemason). The initial gas launch was planned for July 3 to assist in the attack on 24th Corps. But it did not take place due to the fear of the corps commander that the gas could interfere with the attack of the 48th division. Gas launch was performed on July 19 from the same positions. But as the operational situation changed, the purpose of the gas launch was already different - to demonstrate the safety of new weapons for their troops and conduct a search. The choice of the gas launch time was determined by the meteorological conditions. The release of the OM began at 1 h 40 min with a wind of 2.8-3.0 m / s at a front of 1 km from the location of the 273rd regiment in the presence of the chief of staff of the 69th division. A total of 2 thousand chlorine cylinders were installed (10 cylinders made up a group, two groups - a battery). Gas launch was carried out within half an hour. At first, 400 balloons were opened, then every 2 minutes, 100 balloons were opened. A smoke screen was installed to the south of the gas launch site. After the gas launch, two companies were supposed to advance to conduct a search. Russian artillery opened fire with chemical shells at the ledge of the enemy's position, which was threatening with a flank attack. At this time, the scouts of the 273rd regiment reached the German barbed wire, but were met with rifle fire and were forced to return. At 2 hours 55 minutes, the artillery fire was transferred to the rear of the enemy. At 0320, the enemy opened heavy artillery fire on its barbed wire. Dawn began, and it became clear to the leaders of the search that the enemy did not suffer serious losses. The divisional commander found it impossible to continue the search.

In total, in 1916, Russian chemical teams carried out nine large gas starts, which used 202 tons of chlorine. The most successful gas-cylinder attack was carried out on the night of 5-6 September from the front of the 2nd Infantry Division in the Smorgon region. The Germans skillfully and with great ingenuity used gas launchers and chemical shells. Taking advantage of any oversight on the part of the Russians, the Germans inflicted heavy losses on them. So the gas-cylinder attack on the units of the 2nd Siberian Division on September 22 north of Lake Naroch led to the death of 867 soldiers and officers at the positions. The Germans waited for the arrival of untrained reinforcements to the front and made a gas launch. On the night of October 18, at the Vitonezh bridgehead, the Germans carried out a powerful gas-cylinder attack against parts of the 53rd division, accompanied by a massive shelling of chemical shells. Russian troops were tired of 16 days of work. It was not possible to wake up many of the fighters; the division lacked reliable gas masks. The result was about 600 dead, but the German attack was repulsed with heavy losses for the attackers.

By the end of 1916, thanks to an increase in the chemical discipline of the Russian troops and equipping them with Zelinsky-Kummant gas masks, the losses from the German gas attacks had significantly decreased. The wave launch, undertaken by the Germans on January 7, 1917 against units of the 12th Siberian Rifle Division (Northern Front), did not cause any losses at all thanks to timely dressed gas masks. The last Russian gas launch, performed near Riga on January 26, 1917, was completed with the same results.

By the beginning of 1917, gas launches had ceased to be an effective means of conducting chemical warfare, and chemical projectiles took their place. Since February 1916, two types of chemical shells have been supplied to the Russian front: a) suffocating (chloropicrin with sulfuryl chloride) - irritated the respiratory organs and eyes to such an extent that it was impossible for people to stay in this atmosphere; b) poisonous (phosgene with tin chloride; hydrocyanic acid in a mixture with compounds that increase its boiling point and prevent polymerization in shells). Their characteristics are shown in the table.

Russian chemical shells

(excluding shells for naval artillery) *

* Highly sensitive contact fuses were installed on chemical projectiles.

The gas cloud from the burst of a 76 mm chemical projectile covered an area of ​​about 5 m2. To calculate the number of chemical projectiles required for shelling areas, the norm was adopted - one 76-millimeter chemical grenade per 40 m? area and one 152-millimeter projectile for 80 m2. Projectiles fired continuously in such a quantity created a gas cloud of sufficient concentration. Subsequently, to maintain the concentration obtained, the number of projectiles fired was halved. In combat practice, poisonous shells showed the greatest efficiency. Therefore, in July 1916, the Headquarters ordered the production of projectiles of only poisonous action. In connection with the impending landing on the Bosphorus since 1916, large-caliber suffocating chemical shells (305-, 152-, 120- and 102-millimeters) were supplied to the combat ships of the Black Sea Fleet. In total, in 1916, Russian military-chemical enterprises produced 1.5 million chemical shells.

Russian chemical projectiles have shown high efficiency in counter-battery combat. So on September 6, 1916, during a gas launch conducted by the Russian army north of Smorgon, at 3:45 a.m. a German battery opened fire on the front lines of the Russian trenches. At 4 o'clock the German artillery was silenced by one of the Russian batteries, which fired six grenades and 68 chemical shells. At 3 hours 40 minutes, another German battery opened strong fire, but after 10 minutes and she fell silent, "having" from the Russian gunners 20 grenades and 95 chemical shells. Chemical shells played a large role in the "hacking" of the Austrian positions during the offensive of the Southwestern Front in May-June 1916.

Back in June 1915, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief N. N. Yanushkevich put forward an initiative to develop aerial chemical bombs. At the end of December 1915, 483 chemical single-pound aerial bombs designed by Colonel E.G. Gronov were sent to the active army. The 2nd and 4th aviation companies received 80 bombs each, the 8th aviation company received 72 bombs, the Ilya Muromets airship squadron received 100 bombs, and 50 bombs were sent to the Caucasian front. At that time, the production of chemical bombs in Russia ceased. The valves on the ammunition let in chlorine and poisoned the soldiers. The pilots did not take these bombs on planes for fear of poisoning. And the level of development of domestic aviation did not yet allow the massive use of such weapons.

***

Thanks to the impetus given by Russian scientists, engineers and the military during the First World War to the development of domestic chemical weapons, in Soviet times they turned into a serious deterrent for the aggressor. Nazi Germany did not dare to unleash a chemical war against the USSR, realizing that there would be no second Bolimov. Soviet chemical protection equipment was of such high quality that the Germans, when they fell into their hands as trophies, left them for the needs of their army. The remarkable traditions of Russian military chemistry were interrupted in the 1990s by a pile of papers signed by crafty politicians of timelessness.

“War is a phenomenon that should be observed with dry eyes and with a closed heart. Whether it is conducted with "honest" explosives or with "insidious" gases, the result is the same; it is death, destruction, devastation, pain, horror and everything that follows from this. Do we want to be truly civilized people? In that case, let's abolish the war. But if we do not succeed, then it is completely inappropriate to enclose humanity, civilization and so many other wonderful ideals in a limited circle of choice of more or less elegant ways to kill, devastate and destroy. "

Giulio Douai, 1921

Chemical weapons, first used by the Germans on April 22, 1915 to break through the defenses of the French army at Ypres, went through a period of "trial and error" in the next two years of the war. From a one-time means of tactical attack on the enemy , defended by a complex labyrinth of defensive structures, after the development of the basic techniques for its use and the appearance of mustard gas shells on the battlefield, it became an effective weapon of mass destruction capable of solving tasks of an operational scale.

In 1916, at the height of gas attacks, in the tactical use of chemical weapons, there was a tendency to shift the "center of gravity" to firing chemical projectiles. The growth of the chemical discipline of the troops, the constant improvement of gas masks, and the properties of the poisonous substances themselves did not allow chemical weapons to inflict damage on the enemy comparable to that inflicted by other types of weapons. The commanders of the belligerent armies began to view chemical attacks as a means of exhausting the enemy and carried out them not only without operational, but often without tactical expediency. This continued until the beginning of the battles, called by Western historians "the third Ypres".

For 1917, the Allies in the Entente planned to carry out joint large-scale joint Anglo-French offensives on the Western Front, while simultaneously carrying out Russian and Italian offensives. But by June on the Western Front for the Allies there was dangerous situation... After the breakdown of the offensive of the French army under the command of General Robert Nivelle (April 16-May 9), France was close to defeat. Riots broke out in 50 divisions, tens of thousands of soldiers deserted from the army. Under these conditions, the British launched the long-awaited German offensive to capture the Belgian coast. On the night of July 13, 1917, near Ypres, the German army for the first time used mustard shells ("yellow cross") to shell the British troops concentrated for the offensive. The mustard gas was intended to "bypass" gas masks, but the British did not have them at all that terrible night. The British deployed reserves in gas masks, but after a few hours they were also poisoned. Being very persistent on the ground, mustard gas poisoned the troops for several days, arriving to replace the units hit by mustard gas on the night of 13 July. The losses of the British were so great that they had to postpone the offensive for three weeks. According to the estimates of the German military, mustard shells turned out to be about 8 times more effective at destroying enemy personnel than their "green cross" shells.

Fortunately for the Allies, in July 1917, the German army did not yet have a large number of mustard shells or protective clothing that would allow an offensive in areas contaminated with mustard gas. However, as the German military industry increased the rate of production of mustard shells, the situation on the Western Front began to change for the worse for the Allies. Sudden night attacks on British and French positions with yellow cross shells began to be repeated more and more often. The number of mustard gas poisoned among the Allied troops grew. In just three weeks (from July 14 to August 4 inclusive), the British lost 14,726 people from mustard gas alone (500 of them died). The new poisonous substance seriously interfered with the work of the British artillery, the Germans easily took the "upper hand" in the counter-gun struggle. The areas designated for the concentration of troops were infected with mustard gas. The operational consequences of its use soon appeared.

The picture, judging by the soldiers' antipyretic clothing, dates back to the summer of 1918. There are no serious damage to houses, but there are many dead, and the effect of mustard gas continues.

In August-September 1917, mustard gas forced the offensive of the 2nd French army near Verdun to choke. French attacks on both banks of the Meuse were repelled by the Germans with yellow cross shells. Thanks to the creation of "yellow areas" (as the map designated areas contaminated with mustard gas), the decline in the Allied troops reached catastrophic proportions. Gas masks didn't help. The French lost 4430 people poisoned on August 20, 1350 on September 1 and 4134 on September 24, and during the entire operation - 13 158 poisoned with mustard gas, of which 143 were fatal. Most of the disabled soldiers were able to return to the front after 60 days. During this operation, in August alone, the Germans fired up to 100 thousand yellow cross shells. Forming vast "yellow areas" that hindered the actions of the Allied forces, the Germans retained the bulk of their troops deep in the rear, in positions for a counterstrike.

The French and British in these battles also skillfully used chemical weapons, but they did not have mustard gas, and therefore the results of their chemical attacks were more modest than those of the Germans. On October 22, in Flanders, the French units launched an offensive south-west of Laon after the strongest chemical shelling of the German division defending this sector of the front. Having suffered heavy losses, the Germans were forced to retreat. Building on their success, the French made a narrow and deep breach in the German front, destroying several more German divisions. After which the Germans had to withdraw their troops across the Ellet River.

In the Italian theater of operations in October 1917, gas cannons demonstrated their operational capabilities. The so-called 12th Battle of the Isonzo River(Caporetto area, 130 km northeast of Venice) began with the offensive of the Austro-German armies, in which the main blow was inflicted on units of the 2nd Italian army of General Luigi Capello. The main obstacle for the troops of the Central Bloc was the infantry battalion, which defended three rows of positions that crossed the river valley. For the purpose of defending and flanking the approaches, the battalion made extensive use of the so-called "cave" batteries and firing points located in caves formed in steep cliffs. The Italians' unit was out of reach for the artillery fire of the Austro-German troops and successfully delayed their advance. The Germans fired a volley of 894 chemical mines from gas cannons, followed by two more volleys of 269 blasting mines. When the cloud of phosgene enveloping the positions of the Italians dissipated, the German infantry went on the attack. Not a single shot was fired from the caves. The entire Italian battalion of 600 men with horses and dogs was dead. Moreover, some of the dead people were found wearing gas masks. . Further German-Austrian strikes copied the tactics of infiltration by small assault groups of General AA Brusilov. Panic ensued, and the Italian army demonstrated the highest rate of retreat among the armed forces involved in the First World War.

In the opinion of many German military authors of the 1920s, the Allies failed to carry out the planned breakthrough of the German front in the fall of 1917 due to the widespread use of the “yellow” and “blue” cross shells by the German army. In December, the German army received new instructions for the use of various types of chemical projectiles. With the pedantry characteristic of the Germans, each type of chemical projectile was given a strictly defined tactical purpose, and the methods of use were indicated. The instructions will still do a very disservice to the German command itself. But that will happen later. In the meantime, the Germans were full of hope! They did not allow their army to be “ground” in 1917, brought Russia out of the war and, for the first time, achieved a small numerical superiority on the Western Front. Now they had to achieve victory over the allies before the American army became a real participant in the war.

In preparing for a major offensive in March 1918, the German command viewed chemical weapons as the main weight on the scales of the war, which they were going to use to tip the cup of victory to their side. German chemical plants produced over a thousand tons of mustard gas every month. Especially for this offensive, the German industry has launched the production of a 150-mm chemical projectile, called a "blasting projectile with a yellow cross" (marking: one yellow 6-point cross), capable of effectively dispering mustard gas. It differed from the previous samples by a strong charge of TNT in the nose of the projectile, separated from the mustard gas by an intermediate bottom. To deeply defeat the positions of the allies, the Germans created a special long-range 150-mm projectile "yellow cross" with a ballistic tip, equipped with 72% mustard gas and 28% nitrobenzene. The latter is added to mustard gas to facilitate its explosive transformation into a "gas cloud" - a colorless and persistent fog that creeps along the ground.

The Germans planned to break through the positions of the 3rd and 5th British armies in the Arras-La Ferre sector of the front, striking the main blow against the Guzokur-Saint-Caten sector. To the north and south of the breakthrough site, a minor offensive was to be carried out (see diagram).

Some British historians argue that the initial success of the German March offensive was due to its strategic surprise. But speaking of "strategic surprise" they count the date of the offensive from March 21st. In fact, Operation Michael began on March 9th with a massive artillery bombardment, where the yellow cross shells accounted for 80% of the total ammunition used. In total, on the first day of artillery barrage, over 200,000 yellow cross shells were fired at targets of the secondary sectors of the British front for the German offensive, but from where flank attacks could be expected.

The choice of types of chemical projectiles was dictated by the characteristics of the front section where the offensive was supposed to be launched. The 5th Army's left-flank British corps occupied an area that was pushed forward and therefore flanked the approaches to the north and south of Guzokur. The Leuven - Guzokur section, which was the object of the auxiliary offensive, was exposed to mustard shells only on its flanks (the Leuven - Arras section) and the Inshi - Guzokur ledge, occupied by the 5th Army's left flank British corps. In order to prevent possible flank counterattacks and fire from the British troops occupying this ledge, their entire defensive zone was subjected to brutal shelling by yellow cross shells. The shelling ended only on March 19, two days before the start of the German offensive. The result exceeded all the expectations of the German command. The British corps, even without seeing the advancing German infantry, lost up to 5 thousand people and was completely demoralized. His defeat was the beginning of the defeat of the entire 5th British Army.

At about 4 o'clock in the morning on March 21, an artillery battle began with a powerful fire strike on a front of 70 km. The Guzokur-Saint-Quentin section, chosen by the Germans for a breakthrough, was subjected to a powerful action by the shells of the "green" and "blue cross" during the two days preceding the offensive. The chemical artillery preparation of the breakthrough area several hours before the attack was especially fierce. For every kilometer of the front, there were at least 20 – 30 batteries (about 100 guns). Shells of both types (“shooting with a multi-colored cross”) fired at all the defenses and buildings of the British for several kilometers into the depth of the first line. During the artillery preparation, more than a million (!) Of them were fired in this area. Shortly before the attack, the Germans, by firing chemical shells at the British third line of defense, placed chemical curtains between it and the first two lines, thereby excluding the possibility of transferring British reserves. The German infantry broke through the front without much difficulty. During the advance into the depths of the British defenses, the shells of the "yellow cross" suppressed strong points, the attack of which promised the Germans great losses.

The photograph shows British soldiers at a dressing station at Bethune on April 10, 1918, defeated by mustard gas on April 7-9 while on the flanks of a large German offensive on the Lys River.

The second great German offensive was carried out in Flanders (the offensive on the Lys river). Unlike the 21 March offensive, it took place on a narrow front. The Germans were able to concentrate a large number of chemical weapons, and 7 – On April 8, they made an artillery preparation (mainly with a "high-explosive shell with a yellow cross"), extremely strongly infecting the flanks of the offensive with mustard gas: Armantiere (right) and the area south of the La Basset canal (left). And on April 9th, the offensive zone underwent a hurricane of fire with a "multi-colored cross". The shelling of Armantier was so effective that mustard gas literally flowed through its streets. . The British left the poisoned city without a fight, but the Germans themselves were able to enter it only after two weeks. The losses of the British in this battle by the poisoned reached 7 thousand people.

The German offensive on the fortified front between Kemmel and Ypres, which began on 25 April, was preceded by a flank mustard barrage at Ypres, south of Meteren, on 20 April. In this way, the Germans cut off from the reserves the main object of the offensive - Mount Kemmel. In the offensive zone, German artillery fired a large number of "blue cross" shells and, to a lesser extent, "green cross" shells. Behind enemy lines, a “yellow cross” was set up from Sherenberg to Kruststraaetskhuk. After the British and French, hurrying to rescue the garrison of Mount Kemmel, stumbled upon mustard-infested areas of the terrain, they stopped all attempts to help out the garrison. After several hours of intense chemical fire on the defenders of Mount Kemmel, most of them were gassed and out of action. Following this, the German artillery gradually switched to firing high-explosive and fragmentation shells, and the infantry prepared for the assault, waiting for a convenient moment to move forward. As soon as the wind dispersed the gas cloud, the German assault units, accompanied by light mortars, flamethrowers and the fire of their artillery, moved to the attack. Mount Kemmel was taken on the morning of 25 April. The loss of the British from April 20 to April 27 was about 8,500 poisoned people (of whom 43 died). Several batteries and 6.5 thousand prisoners went to the winner. German losses were negligible.

On May 27, during a big battle on the En River, the Germans carried out an unprecedented massive shelling of chemical artillery shells of the first and second defensive zones, divisions and corps headquarters, railway stations up to 16 km deep in the location of the French troops. As a result, the attackers found "the defense almost entirely poisoned or destroyed" and during the first day of the attack broke through by 15 – 25 km in depth, inflicting losses on the defenders: 3495 poisoned people (of whom 48 died).

On June 9, during the offensive of the German 18th Army on Compiegne on the Mondidier-Noyon front, the chemical artillery preparation was already less intense. Apparently, this was due to the depletion of stocks of chemical projectiles. Accordingly, the results of the offensive turned out to be more modest.

But the time for victories was running out for the Germans. American reinforcements are all in more arrived at the front and entered the battle with enthusiasm. The Allies made extensive use of tanks and aircraft. And in the matter of chemical warfare itself, they took over a lot from the Germans. By 1918, the chemical discipline of their troops and the means of protection against toxic substances were already superior to those of Germany. The German monopoly on mustard gas was also undermined. The Germans received high-quality mustard gas according to the complex Mayer-Fischer method. The military-chemical industry of the Entente was unable to overcome the technical difficulties associated with its development. Therefore, the allies used simpler methods of obtaining mustard gas - Nieman or Pope - Green. Their mustard gas was of inferior quality than that supplied by the German industry. It was poorly stored and contained a large amount of sulfur. However, its production grew rapidly. If in July 1918 the production of mustard gas in France was 20 tons per day, then by December it increased to 200 tons. From April to November 1918 the French equipped with mustard gas 2.5 million shells, of which 2 million were spent.

The Germans feared mustard gas no less than their opponents. They first felt the effects of their mustard gas on "their own skin" during the famous Battle of Cambrai on November 20, 1917, when British tanks raided the Hindenburg Line. The British seized a warehouse of German "yellow cross" shells and immediately used them against the German troops. The panic and horror caused by the use of mustard shells against the 2nd Bavarian Division by the French on July 13, 1918, caused a hasty withdrawal of the entire corps. On September 3, the British began using their own mustard shells at the front, with the same devastating effect.

British newspaper guns in position.

The German troops were equally impressed by the massive chemical attacks of the British using Leavens gas jets. By the fall of 1918, the chemical industry in France and the United Kingdom began to produce toxic substances in such quantities that chemical projectiles could no longer be economized.

The pedantry of the German approach to chemical warfare was one of the reasons why it was not possible to win it. The categorical requirement of the German instructions to use only shells with unstable poisonous substances for shelling the point of attack, and shells of the "yellow cross" to cover the flanks, led to the fact that the Allies, during the period of German chemical training in the distribution along the front and in depth of shells with persistent and low-resistance with poisonous substances, they found out exactly which areas were intended by the enemy for a breakthrough, as well as the estimated depth of development of each of the breakthroughs. Long-term artillery preparation provided the allied command with a clear outline of the German plan and excluded one of the main conditions for success — surprise. Accordingly, the measures taken by the allies significantly reduced the subsequent successes of the grandiose chemical attacks of the Germans. Winning on an operational scale, the Germans did not achieve their strategic goals by any of their "big offensives" in 1918.

After the failure of the German offensive on the Marne, the Allies seized the initiative on the battlefield. They skillfully used artillery, tanks, chemical weapons, their aviation dominated the air. Their human and technical resources were now practically unlimited. On August 8, in the Amiens area, the Allies broke through the German defenses, losing significantly fewer people than the defenders. The prominent German military leader Erich Ludendorff called this day the "black day" of the German army. A period of war began, which Western historians call "100 days of victories." The German army was forced to retreat to the "Hindenburg Line" in the hope of gaining a foothold there. In September operations, the preponderance in the massing of chemical artillery fire passes to the Allies. The Germans felt an acute shortage of chemical shells, their industry was unable to meet the needs of the front. In September, in the battles of Saint-Miel and in the Battle of Argonne, the Germans lacked yellow cross shells. In the artillery depots left by the Germans, the Allies found only 1% of the chemical shells.

On October 4, British forces broke through the Hindenburg Line. At the end of October, riots were organized in Germany, which led to the collapse of the monarchy and the proclamation of a republic. On November 11, an agreement on the cessation of hostilities was signed in Compiegne. The First World War ended, and with it its chemical component, which in subsequent years was consigned to oblivion.

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II. Tactical use of chemical weapons during the First World War // Officers. - 2010. - No. 4 (48). - S. 52–57.